The Society for Gestalt Theory and its Applications (GTA) is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year. The task of this article was to give a selection of gestalt theoretical research, which was created within the framework of the GTA. After a brief introduction to the theory, recent developments that have emerged since the founding of the Society and have found expression in the journal Gestalt Theory, as well as in many other publications, have been discussed. A number of contributions to (...) the fundamental area could be cited: consciousness research, multifield approach, synergetics, language, development, and so on. The transfer of basic knowledge to a number of application-oriented disciplines, namely, psychotherapy, education, arts, culture, nation and society, organizations, and so on, has been presented. The article has shown that Gestalt theory has great relevance in both basic and application-related areas and can cover a wide range of issues. (shrink)

An emotional episode consists of psychological, physiological, motor and expressive components that are tied together. Present theories and previous contributions by gestalt theorists to emotions are discussed. It is shown that the synergetic system theory represents a fruitful model for emotional processes, in which self-organisation plays a central role. Also, a selection of neuropsychological findings in this context is taken into account.

The Society for Gestalt Theory and its Applications (GTA) is celebrating its 40th anniversary this year. The task of this article was to give a selection of gestalt theoretical research, which was created within the framework of the GTA. After a brief introduction to the theory, recent developments that have emerged since the founding of the Society and have found expression in the journal Gestalt Theory, as well as in many other publications, have been discussed. A number of contributions to (...) the fundamental area could be cited: consciousness research, multifield approach, synergetics, language, development, and so on. The transfer of basic knowledge to a number of application-oriented disciplines, namely, psychotherapy, education, arts, culture, nation and society, organizations, and so on, has been presented. The article has shown that Gestalt theory has great relevance in both basic and application-related areas and can cover a wide range of issues. (shrink)

Definitions of terms that are central to a theoretical understanding of the Royal Government of Bhutan's policy of Gross National Happiness.

Frankfurt‐style action cases have been immensely influential in the free will and moral responsibility literatures because they arguably show that an agent can be morally responsible for a behavior despite lacking the ability to do otherwise. However, even among the philosophers who accept Frankfurt‐style action cases, there remains significant disagreement about whether also to accept Frankfurt‐style omission cases – cases in which an agent omits to do something, is unable to do otherwise, and is allegedly morally responsible for that omission. (...) Settling this debate about Frankfurt‐style omission cases is significant because the resolution entails an important fact about moral responsibility: whether there is there a moral asymmetry between actions and omissions with respect to the ability to do otherwise. My proposal is that both Frankfurt‐style action cases and omission cases involve the same type of causal structure: causal preemption. However, the preemptor and the preemptee differ. In action cases, the Frankfurted agent preempts the neuroscientist and is causally and morally responsibility for the effect. In omission cases, Frankfurted agent is neither causally nor morally responsible for the effect. Instead, the neuroscientist preempts the Frankfurted agent. Thus, there are no Frankfurt‐style omission cases. (shrink)

A three chapter part of a textbook for undergraduate philosophy majors.

This article introduces a special issue of Philosophical Papers devoted to the topic of meaning in life. In the paper, I engage with articles by Robert Audi, David Velleman, John Martin Fischer, Laurence Thomas, Berit Brogaard, Barry Smith and Larry James, laying out their central views, criticizing them, and suggesting ways they could be developed.

I seek to advance enquiry into the point of a public higher education institution by drawing on ideals salient in the sub-Saharan African philosophical tradition. There are relational, and specifically communal, values prominently held by African thinkers that I use to ground a promising rival to the dominant contemporary Western, and especially Anglo-American, accounts of what a university ultimately ought to strive to achieve, which focus mainly on autonomy, truth, and citizenship. My aims are not merely comparative, contrasting an Afro-communal (...) approach with other ones that have been more globally influential, but also substantive. Although the theory of a university’s point that I articulate and defend has an African pedigree, I work to show that it should be taken seriously by a global audience, for plausibly capturing a variety of intuitions and claims that are widely shared. (shrink)

Philosophers have already recognized the importance of causal preemption involving “positive” events. First, preemption with positive events raises problems for counterfactual theories of causation. Second, theories of moral and legal responsibility rely heavily on the concept of causation, so accurately assessing responsibility in preemption cases requires correctly assessing their causal structure. However, philosophers have not discussed preemption involving “negative” events or omissions. This paper argues that cases of preemptive omissions exist and have important implications for theories of causation and for (...) moral and legal responsibility. Of theoretical importance, the alterations made to counterfactual theories of causation to address preemption with positive events do not seem to work for accommodating preemptive omissions. Of practical importance, there have been actual legal cases involving preemptive omissions, and at least one such case was, this paper contends, decided incorrectly on erroneous causal grounds. This paper identifies what must happen for preemptive omissions to obtain. It then argues for the existence of preemptive omissions by constructing a series of cases and drawing structural parallels between preemption cases with positive events and cases with omissions. It ultimately presents a formula for generating preemptive omissions and examines both why “traditional” methods of generating preemption fail for omissions and why the proposed method avoids such concerns. (shrink)

Karl Marx's normative views have routinely been contrasted with moral-political theories such as utilitarianism and Rawlsian justice. They have not been systematically contrasted with characteristically African, and specifically communal, values, with post-independence African leaders such as Nyerere and Nkrumah instead having emphasized the similarities. In this article, a work of analytic philosophy, I sketch the essentials of Marx’s approach to the human good, especially his early writings on alienation from 1843-1845, and weigh them up against a theoretical interpretation of the (...) under-explored African moral-political tradition. According to the latter perspective, a person displays human excellence insofar as she prizes communal relationships, ones of sharing a way of life and caring for others’ quality of life. My aims are to identify key differences between this Afro-communalism and the young Marx’s views, and, where they diverge, to provide some reasons for favouring one approach over the other. I conclude that insofar as the two ethics differ, the African ideal is the better candidate for capturing a moral point view, one that includes human rights, whereas Marx’s is preferable, and even compelling to a wide contemporary audience, as a broader account of how to live well. (shrink)

An idea salient in the African and East Asian philosophical traditions is that the right sort of socio-political interaction would be similar to the intuitive ways that family members ought to relate to each other. Applying this perspective to economic and ecological inequalities, I articulate some principles implicit in healthy familial relationships, show what they entail for certain aspects of distributive justice at the national level, and contend that the implications are plausible relative to competing theories such as utilitarianism, Rawlsianism, (...) and the Capabilities Approach. Specifically, I maintain that reflection on familial norms suggests that an array of objective goods, particularly ones pertaining to relationality, the development of talents, and life, should be central to what the state distributes, an account that rivals subjective well-being, primary goods, or democratically chosen capabilities. When it comes to how much the state should ideally ensure each citizen has, reflection on familial norms supports a new, balancing approach, according to which all have a comparable share of resources needed for objective goodness, but more go to those with great ability or great disability, an approach that differs, and plausibly so, from maximizing, prioritizing the worst off, equalizing, or providing a sufficient minimum. (shrink)

Online reprint of part of an encyclopedia entry (from the Encyclopaedia of Quality of Life and Well-being Research 2014).

Um eine globale Dimension zu gewinnen, muss moderne Geschichtswissenschaft theoriefähig sein. Das hier vorgeschlagene Konzept einer Historie, die sich zur Theorie hin weitet, entspricht einem neuen Paradigma des forschenden Umgangs mit Vergangenheit, also einer Fortbildung des Wissens zum Denken.

Das Wirken Gabriel Biels, eines der bedeutendsten Theologen des Spatmittelalters, ist nicht nur durch scharfsinniges, vor allem an Ockham, aber auch an Scotus orientiertes theologisches Nachdenken gekennzeichnet. Es ist ebenso gepragt durch die Devotio moderna. Aus dieser Quelle speist sich sein unermuedlicher Einsatz fuer eine Kirchenreform wie auch seine tiefe Frommigkeit. Trotz Kenntnis der Bedeutung dieser Linie fuer Biels Frommigkeitspraxis blieb sein Verhaltnis zur Mystik bisher unerforscht. Das vorliegende Buch fuellt diese Luecke. Es sammelt aus Biels Hauptwerken, dem Collectorium und (...) der Auslegung des Meakanons, die mystischen Elemente (wie z.B. raptus, Einwohnung, unio, transformatio) und analysiert deren Rezeption. Dabei beruecksichtigt es auch das Vorfeld von Mystik in Gebet und Meditation. Einen anderen Schwerpunkt bildet Biels Stellung zum Phanomen religioser und mystischer Erfahrung. Einen qualifizierten Begriff religioser Erfahrung entwickelt Biel nicht. Er wertet sie durchaus positiv, doch gilt ihm als das Hochste im Christenleben die Liebe. Betrachtet man aber die Funktion der Mystik in Biels Werken, so ist seine Theologie im weiteren Sinne mystagogisch. In devoter Tradition stehend, will er zur Frommigkeit hinfuehren. Nicht zu hoch veranschlagt werden darf die Relevanz des Nominalismus fuer Biels Mystik-Rezeption. Mit Register. "Es ist M. gelungen, in seiner grundgelehrten Untersuchung einmal die Forschung der Theologie Biels erheblich weiter voranzutreiben, und er hat zugleich zu uebergeordneten Fragen substantielle Beitrage geleistet." Theologische Rundschau "a ein solider und fuer die Erforschung der spatmittelalterlichen Theologie und Frommigkeit unentbehrlicher Beitraga" Rottenburger Jahrbuch fuer Kirchengeschichte "Durch sorgfaltige Analysen diesen verkannten theologischen Denker in die Gegenwart geholt zu haben - dies ist ein Verdienst dieser Arbeit." Hulda "Die beeindruckenden Starken der Arbeit liegen in der behutsamen, differenzierten Einzelanalyse" Theologische Literaturzeitung. (shrink)

In this article I aim to make progress towards the philosophical goal of ascertaining what, if anything, all mental illnesses have in common, attempting to unify a large sub-set of them that have a relational or interpersonal dimension. One major claim is that, if we want a promising theory of mental illness, we must go beyond the dominant western accounts of mental illness/health, which focus on traits intrinsic to a person such as pain/pleasure, lethargy/liveliness, fragmentation/integration, and falsehood/authenticity. A second major (...) claim is that the relational facets of mental illness are plausibly understood theoretically in terms of a person’s inability to identify with others or to exhibit solidarity with them, relational values that are salient in the African philosophical tradition. I show that these two extrinsic properties well explain several intuitive instances of mental illness, including, amongst several others, being abusive, psychopathic, narcissistic, histrionic, paranoid, and phobic. (shrink)

In this article we focus on three key precepts shared by Confucianism and the African ethic of Ubuntu: the central value of community, the desirability of ethical partiality, and the idea that we tend to become morally better as we grow older. For each of these broad similarities, there are key differences underlying them, and we discuss those as well as speculate about the reasons for them. Our aim is not to take sides, but we do suggest ways that Ubuntu (...) and Confucianism might have something to learn from each other and perhaps come closer. We hope that our preliminary reflections can inspire further debate and thinking on a theme – dialogues between long-standing and large-scale non-Western traditions – that is bound to increase in importance as non-Western societies play a greater role in the global system and as the search continues for a 'global ethic'. (shrink)

Omissions are puzzling, and theyraise myriad questions for many areas of philosophy. In contrast, omissions ofomissions are not usually taken to be very puzzling since they are oftenthought to just be a fancy way of describing ordinary “positive” events, statesof affairs, or actions. This paper contends that – as far as agency isconcerned – at least some omissions of omissions are omissions, not actions. First,this paper highlights how our actions are accompanied by many first-orderomissions - i.e., omissions to act – (...) and that there already are many strongreasons to think that at least some of these first-order omissions are agentiallydistinct from simultaneous actions and from other first-order omissions. Itthen argues that our actions and first-order omissions are also accompanied byhigher-order omissions – i.e., omissions to omit to act – and that higher-orderomissions are distinct from actions and first-order omissions for similarreasons. Higher-order omissions also illuminate a more holistic picture of agency,which involves recognizing that our exercises of agency at a moment in timeinclude all of our overlapping behaviors – our actions, first-order omissions,and higher-order omissions. This paper concludes by exploring the impacts ofhigher-order omissions. (shrink)

Karl Popper is famous for favoring an open society, one in which the individual is treated as an end in himself and social arrangements are subjected to critical evaluation, which he defends largely by appeal to a Kantian ethic of respecting the dignity of rational beings. In this essay, I consider for the first time what the implications of a characteristically African ethic, instead prescribing respect for our capacity to relate communally, are for how the state should operate in an (...) open society. I argue that, while an Afro-communal moral foundation does not prescribe a closed society, it supports an open society politics of a sort different from the one that Popper specifies. For Popper, the state in an open society should improve social arrangements albeit without seeking to promote objective goods, should protect rights that merely serve the function of facilitating individual choice, and should employ majoritarian democracy to be able to avoid unwelcome rulers and policies. On all three counts, I show that a relational ethic typical of the African philosophical tradition entails different, intuitively attractive approaches to politics. This chapter is reprinted from an article that initially appeared in Jus Cogens (2020). (shrink)

I begin by constructing a religio-philosophical argument informed by ideas salient in the African tradition for thinking that we should express gratitude to God for having been giving a dignity-conferring life-force, after which I defend the argument from value-theoretic criticisms (I set aside metaphysical issues altogether). For example, I respond to the objections that having an inherent dignity is not a benefit of a sort warranting gratitude and that those with bad lives have no reason to be grateful. I conclude (...) roughly that, while those with unavoidably bad lives indeed have some reason to be disappointed about the quality of their life, that is compatible with there also being some reason for them to express gratitude for their dignified life-force. I conclude the chapter by considering the prospects for secularizing the African rationale. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

Dem anthropofugalen Denken wird die dionysische Bejahung des Lebens entgegengestellt. Nietzsches Ja zum Leben steht somit solchen Denkern entgegen, die das Heil der Welt in der Verweigerung des Erdendaseins erblicken. Das Buch stellt im ersten Teil die negativen Passagen Schopenhauers zum Thema Leben vor, die Nietzsches Widerspruch herausgefordert haben. Der zweite Teil ist dialektisch als Nietzsches Antwort mit dem Konstrukt Übermensch zu verstehen, welcher die allgemeine Problematik der Höherentwicklung aufzeigt. Dabei ist Nietzsches generelle Skeptik gegenüber Moral als Antwort auf die (...) Schopenhauersche »Quelle der Moral« zu verstehen. (shrink)

Die vorauseilende Frage des Buchs wird sein, wie sind Kriterien, Maßstäbe selbstverantwortli-chen und vernünftigen Handelns möglich – wenn überhaupt? Was ist der Grund legitimer mora-lischer Urteile? Läßt ein radikales Denken der Zeitlichkeit noch etwas, woran wir uns „halten“ können? Gibt es eine „Ethik ohne Geländer“? Auch wenn ein Hegelsches Denken der Ge-schichte des Geistes oder ein Kantisches Denken des intelligiblen Charakters nicht mehr möglich sind, so scheint die Frage nach der Nicht-Notwendigkeit eines metaphysischen Denkens nicht eindeutig bejaht zu sein. Wenn (...) in dieser „Kehre“ zur Grundlosigkeit, zur Endlichkeit selbst, das Denken nicht nur zum grundnegativ-kritischen, sondern auch zum positiv-ethischen Denkens wird – wäre dies nicht eine Dialektik der Endlichkeit, Hegels letzter Streich? Diese Untersuchung hat zum Ziel, generell Wege sichtbar zu machen, die zu moralischen Urteilen führen wollen. Dabei konnte von der Sache her nicht ausbleiben, eine Gegenüberstellung zu vollziehen, welche die unterschiedlichen Ausgangspunkte aufzeigt. Der Methodische Schritt geht aus von der Alternative der Grundsätzlichkeit: Gefühl - Vernunft und deren Verquickung unter dem Begriff "emotionale Vernunft". Es kann hier selbstverständlich nicht darum gehen, die ganze Methodenlehre der Ethik auszubreiten. Die Ausführungen wollen vorrangig das Problem der Findung aufzeigen, welches sich schließlich bei allen ethischen Systemen ergibt. (shrink)

Scholars have compared the transitional justice processes of Colombia and South Africa in some respects, but there has yet to be a systematic moral-philosophical evaluation of them regarding how they have sought to allocate economic goods. Here I appraise the ways that South Africa and Colombia have responded to their respective historical conflicts in respect of the distribution of property and opportunities. I do so in the light of a conception of reconciliation informed by a relational ethic of harmony, a (...) value salient in the worldviews of many indigenous peoples in both Africa and South America. I argue that, given such an account of reconciliation, one of Colombia’s major proposed ways of allocating property and opportunities, whereby offenders would labour for the sake of improving victims’ socio-economic conditions, would be much better than what South Africa has done, even if Colombia has yet to put such a policy systematically into practice. (shrink)

For the more than a decade, I have advanced an account of what makes persons, animals, and other beings entitled to moral treatment for their own sake that is informed by characteristically African ideas about dignity, a great chain of being, and community. Roughly according to this account, a being has a greater moral status, the more it is capable of communing (as a subject) or of us communing with it (as an object). I have mainly argued that this characteristically (...) African and relational approach to moral status is a better account than salient Western approaches, especially individualist views associated with utilitarianism and Kantianism. Over the years, several commentators have raised criticisms of my approach, including that it objectionably: entails that we may rightly dominate mentally incapacitated human beings; prioritizes mentally incapacitated human beings over animals with similar cognitive abilities without sufficient justification; entails that intelligent aliens lack moral status; cannot make sense of our duties towards the dead; and is unable to account for the standing of species as distinct from their members. In this chapter I provide a comprehensive response to these and related objections, defending the initial account as an attractive way to understand what makes a being matter morally for non-instrumental reasons. (shrink)

Three chapters on the meaning of life composed for undergraduate philosophy majors, now revised and updated for a second edition.