The ideal of value free science states that the justification of scientific findings should not be based on non-epistemic (e.g. moral or political) values. It has been criticized on the grounds that scientists have to employ moral judgements in managing inductive risks. The paper seeks to defuse this methodological critique. Allegedly value-laden decisions can be systematically avoided, it argues, by making uncertainties explicit and articulating findings carefully. Such careful uncertainty articulation, understood as a methodological strategy, is exemplified by the current (...) practice of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). (shrink)

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

When does a human being begin to exist? Barry Smith and Berit Brogaard have argued that it is possible, through a combination of biological fact and philosophical analysis, to provide a definitive answer to this question. In their view, a human individual begins to exist at gastrulation, i. e. at about sixteen days after fertilization. In this paper we argue that even granting Smith and Brogaard's ontological commitments and biological assumptions, the existence of a human being can be shown to (...) begin much earlier, viz., with fertilization. Their interpretative claim that a zygote divides immediately into two substances and therefore ceases to exist is highly implausible by their own standards, and their factual claim that there is no communication between the blastomeres has to be abandoned in light of recent embryological research. (shrink)

In the debate about the moral status of human embryos, it is not always clear which arguments are actually disputed. This book offers students and researchers, but also laypersons interested in the current debate, the opportunity to inform themselves about the current state of discussion and to learn about the most important arguments in a clear and concise form. These arguments are as follows: Since embryos as members of the species homo sapiens sapiens are human beings, they possess dignity (species (...) argument); embryos develop continuously, i.e. without morally relevant incisions, into adult human beings possessing dignity (continuum argument); embryos are identical with adult human beings possessing dignity (identity argument); embryos have the potential to become human beings, and this potential is without restriction worth protecting (potentiality argument). These arguments are each represented by a pro position and a contra position and defended or criticized. In an accompanying contribution by the editors, the four arguments in context are reconstructed, evaluated, and supported by new arguments. (shrink)

By means of multi-agent simulations, it investigates the truth and consensus-conduciveness of controversial debates. The book brings together research in formal epistemology and argumentation theory.

As climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty, being based on a range of future climate change scenarios, it becomes a crucial question how to set up this scenario range. Failing to comply with the precautionary principle, the scenario methodology widely used in the Third Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seems to violate international environmental law, in particular a provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To place climate policy advice on a (...) sound methodological basis would imply that climate simulations which are based on complex climate models had, in stark contrast to their current hegemony, hardly an epistemic role to play in climate scenario analysis at all. Their main function might actually consist in ‘foreseeing future ozone-holes’. In order to argue for these theses, I explain first of all the plurality of climate models used in climate science by the failure to avoid the problem of underdetermination. As a consequence, climate simulation results have to be interpreted as modal sentences, stating what is possibly true of our climate system. This indicates that climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty. Two general methodological principles which may guide the construction of the scenario range are formulated and contrasted with each other: modal inductivism and modal falsificationism. I argue that modal inductivism, being the methodology implicitly underlying the third IPCC report, is severely flawed. Modal falsificationism, representing the sound alternative, would in turn require an overhaul of the IPCC practice. (shrink)

This article discusses how inference to the best explanation can be justified as a practical meta - argument. It is, firstly, justified as a practical argument insofar as accepting the best explanation as true can be shown to further a specific aim. And because this aim is a discursive one which proponents can rationally pursue in — and relative to — a complex controversy, namely maximising the robustness of one’s position, IBE can be conceived, secondly, as a meta - argument. (...) My analysis thus bears a certain analogy to Sellars ’ well - known justification of inductive reasoning ; it is based on recently developed theories of complex argumentation. (shrink)

The paper deals with the question of the structure of knowledge and the precise relationship between propositional "knowledge that" and dispositional "knowledge how." In the first part of my essay, I provide an analysis of the term 'knowing how' and argue that the usual alternatives in the recent epistemological debate – knowing how is either a form of propositional or dispositional knowledge – are misleading. In fact it depends on the semantic and pragmatic context of the usage of this term (...) whether 'knowing how' refers to a type of dispositional knowledge, to propositional knowledge, or to a hybrid form of both. Only in the first case, can one say that dispositional know how cannot be reduced to any form of propositional knowledge. Yet, this case is the most interesting one to consider in the investigation of the nature of knowledge, if one assumes that knowing that p presupposes "having found out that p." Having found something out, however, presupposes certain acts of epistemic inquiry and corresponding epistemic abilities. Examined more carefully, it is shown that the dispositional knowledge-how is a necessary condition for propositional knowledge-that, hence propositional knowledge-that is a species of the dispositional knowledge-how. Accordingly, dispositional knowledge has to be understood as being at the very core of our notion of knowledge, including propositional knowledge. (shrink)

This chapter goes into crucial questions related to the impact of technology on our privacy, our personal identity and our social relationships. While technology often seems extremely convenient in helping us remember things and share our experiences with others, this episode shows that it can have highly undesirable side‐effects as well. Technologies like the grain put inevitable pressures not only on privacy and trust but also on our ability to create and tell our life stories. In this chapter, we show (...) how getting to know each other's entire history and achieving full transparency about ourselves and others will likely destroy crucial and valuable aspects of our social lives. (shrink)

Suppose a fire broke out in a fertility clinic. One had time to save either a young girl, or a tray of ten human embryos. Would it be wrong to save the girl? According to Michael Sandel, the moral intuition is to save the girl; what is more, one ought to do so, and this demonstrates that human embryos do not possess full personhood, and hence deserve only limited respect and may be killed for medical research. We will argue, however, (...) that no relevant ethical implications can be drawn from the thought experiment. It demonstrates neither that one always ought to let the embryos die, nor does it allow for any general conclusion concerning the moral status of human embryos. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung Fußballfans bilden eine eigene Subkultur, die sich selbst noch einmal im Fußballstadion von den anderen Zuschauern als soziale Gruppierung unterscheidet. Ausgehend von Schütz’s Lebensweltbegriff wird die Fankultur als ein geschlossenes Sinngebiet mit einem eigenen Realitätsakzent sowie einem besonderen Erkenntnis- und Erlebnisstil aufgefasst. Der vorliegende Beitrag analysiert die konstitutiven Elemente dieser fanspezifischen Lebenswelt am Beispiel der Fangemeinschaft des FC Energie Cottbus. Die dort beobachteten Rituale, symbolischen Darstellungsmittel, Selbstinszenierungen und Kollektivausdrücke stellen die Konstitutionsbedingungen für einen gemeinsamen Wirklichkeitsentwurf dar. Es wird gezeigt, (...) dass es der Fankultur, trotz der ständigen Spielerwechsel und fortschreitenden Ökonomisierung im Fußball, keineswegs an Vielfalt und identitätsstiftenden Orientierungen fehlt. (shrink)

In der Reihe werden herausragende monographische Untersuchungen und Sammelbände zu allen Aspekten der Philosophie Kants veröffentlicht, ebenso zum systematischen Verhältnis seiner Philosophie zu anderen philosophischen Ansätzen in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Veröffentlicht werden Studien, die einen innovativen Charakter haben und ausdrückliche Desiderate der Forschung erfüllen. Die Publikationen repräsentieren den aktuellsten Stand der Forschung.

Die dritte, vollständig überarbeitete Auflage des bewährten Studienbuches wurde um elf Einträge erweitert: Abduktion (Schluss auf die beste Erklärung), Clusterdefinition, Experimentelle Philosophie, Explikation, Kontextdefinition, Kriterien, Methode, Naturalistischer Fehlschluss, Neologismus, notwendig und hinreichend – mengentheoretisch und Stipulative Definition. Zudem enthält der Band einen wertvollen Anhang mit einem philosophischen Kanon, den wichtigsten logischen Regeln und einem umfangreichen Register, das neben den deutschen auch alle wichtigen englischen Fachbegriffe umfasst. Wer philosophieren will, muss, methodisch betrachtet, vor allem drei Dinge tun: analysieren, argumentieren und interpretieren. (...) Jede Person – ob Anfänger/in, Schüler/in, Student/in oder fortgeschrittene/r Wissenschaftler/in – kann mit diesem Buch lernen, Begriffe zu analysieren, Argumente zu verstehen, zu bewerten und zu entwickeln. Im Unterschied zu anderen Einführungsbüchern kommt auch die Interpretation zu ihrem vollen Recht. Mit diesem Buch können die Methoden der Philosophie praxisnah gelernt und geübt werden. Es präsentiert deshalb so etwas wie einen methodischen Werkzeugkasten, der sich ausgezeichnet für die Schule, die Universität und auch das Selbststudium eignet. (shrink)

Wo Meinungen aufeinanderprallen, um Verständnis geworben und Überzeugungsarbeit geleistet wird, sind Begründungen nicht weit. Für jede Überzeugung gibt es immer ein, zwei Gründe, die mit Gegengründen konfrontiert und, im Gegenzug, mit weiteren Überlegungen verteidigt werden usw. usf. Schnell sind wir verwirrt und drohen, ohne uns der "Grammatikregeln" vernünftigen Argumentierens zu besinnen, nicht mehr durchzublicken. Die Theorie dialektischer Strukturen leistet einen Beitrag zur Grammatik vernünftigen Argumentierens. Sie stellt Begriffe und Verfahren bereit, um Fragen, die sich angesichts einer komplexen Argumentation stellen können, (...) zu beantworten: Wie beziehen sich die einzelnen Argumente der Debatte aufeinander? Welche Positionen vertreten die verschiedenen Proponenten, und wie lassen sich diese bewerten? Wie gut ist die zentrale These der Kontroverse alles in allem begründet? Ist die und die Argumentationshandlung angesichts des Debattenstandes tatsächlich zweckmäßig und rational? Liegt hier eine zirkuläre - und damit fehlerhafte - Argumentation vor? Die klassische Logik, die sogenannte informal logic und argumentationstheoretische Ansätze der Künstlichen Intelligenz bilden Anknüpfungspunkte der Theorie dialektischer Strukturen. Exemplarisch werden die entwickelten argumentationstheoretischen Methoden zur Analyse umfangreicher philosophischer Kontroversen eingesetzt. (shrink)

We give a construction of the square principle by means of forcing with finite conditions.

Based on a unique data set on US direct microloans, we study the funding determinants of interest-free peer-to-peer crowdlending aimed at borrowers in the US. By performing logistic regressions on funding success and Tobit regressions on the reversed funding time, the existence of a social underwriting by a third-party trustee and information in the description texts fostering the investors’ trust are shown to be the main predictors of successful funding. Regarding social impact, the possibility to empower women and groups of (...) borrowers appeals to the investors, whereas empowerment of the family or community beyond the borrowers themselves appears to remain unappreciated. When examining the vulnerability of the borrowers as a predictor, the results manifest differences amongst the attitudes of the investors towards social impact. In the subsample of non-endorsed loans, the investors appear to prefer to support borrowers with an immigration background. In contrast, this is not the case with endorsed loans. (shrink)

Cellular processes are highly dependent on a dynamic proteome that undergoes structural and functional rearrangements to allow swift conversion between different cellular states. By inducing proteasomal degradation of inhibitory or stimulating factors, ubiquitylation is particularly well suited to trigger such transitions. One prominent example is the remodelling of the centrosome upon cell cycle exit, which is required for the formation of primary cilia – antenna‐like structures on the surface of most cells that act as integrative hubs for various extracellular signals. (...) Over the last decade, many reports on ubiquitin‐related events involved in the regulation of ciliogenesis have emerged. Very often, these processes are considered to be initiated ad hoc, that is, directly before its effect on cilia biogenesis becomes evident. While such a temporal restriction may hold true for the majority of events, there is evidence that some of them are initiated earlier during the cell cycle. Here, we provide an overview of ubiquitin‐dependent processes in ciliogenesis and discuss available data that indicate such an early onset of proteolytic regulation within preceding cell cycle stages. (shrink)

The Contingency Postulate of Truth. - Is there a statement that cannot be false under any contingent conditions? Two well-known philosophical schools have given contradictory answers to this question about the existence of a necessarily true statement: Fallibilists (Albert, Keuth) have denied its existence, transcendental pragmatists (Apel, Kuhlmann) and objective idealists (Wandschneider, Hösle) have affirmed it. Dieter Wandschneider has (following Vittorio Hösle) translated the principle of fallibilism, according to which every statement is fallible, into a thesis which he calls the (...) contingency postulate of truth (CPT). It says: <For every true statement there are contingent conditions.> If this postulate were true, it would mark an insurmountable boundary of knowledge: a final epistemic justification would then not be possible. Wandschneider has therefore developed a counterargument to show that the contingency postulate of truth cannot be formulated without contradiction and implies the thesis that there is at least one necessarily true statement. This essay deals with the systematic question whether the contingency postulate of truth really cannot be presented without contradiction. To this end I will first present the contingency postulate and the associated problems (I.). Then I will analyze Wandschneider's argument against the consistency of the contingency postulate (II.) and finally reject it with the help of some considerations from the field of epistemic logic (III.). (shrink)

In his "Ontological proof", Kurt Gödel introduces the notion of a second-order value property, the positive property P. The second axiom of the proof states that for any property φ: If φ is positive, its negation is not positive, and vice versa. I put forward that this concept of positiveness leads into a paradox when we apply it to the following self-reflexive sentences: (A) The truth value of A is not positive; (B) The truth value of B is positive. Given (...) axiom 2, sentences A and B paradoxically cannot be both true or both false, and it is also impossible that one of the sentences is true whereas the other is false. (shrink)

Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to (...) use models for possibilistic prediction and salvage widespread scientific practice. (shrink)

‘Dancing mania’ has often been understood as an expression of purportedly ‘typical medieval’ mass hysteria. Yet evidence suggests that a better interpretation would be to see it as a disease, the idea of which was shaped by patterns tracing back to antique cosmology. During the later Middle Ages, this concept became reality as a form of suffering primarily determined by spiritual forces which typically struck only individuals or small groups in narrowly defined regions. This article closely examines a key shift (...) in the semiotic setting of how this disease was interpreted: During the 15th and early 16th centuries, it became medicalised and desacralized. Evidence of this development can be found in isolated instances of ‘dancing mania’ in towns of the Rhine and Moselle area which at first glance would appear to be of little significance. As a medical concept, ‘dancing mania’ would survive the Reformation, and as a concept of primarily medical understanding it would later be re-integrated into the renewed Catholic culture of the late 16th and 17th centuries. (shrink)

Gregor Betz explores the following questions: Where are the limits of economics, in particular the limits of economic foreknowledge? Are macroeconomic forecasts credible predictions or mere prophecies and what would this imply for the way economic policy decisions are taken? Is rational economic decision making possible without forecasting at all?

Doing Philosophy Yourself. A Book of Methods. Whoever wants to philosophize must do three things: analyze for himself, argue for himself, and interpret for himself. This book enables one to learn the methods of philosophy through exercises and solutions close to philosophical practice; particular emphasis is put on close textual interpretation. This book is excellent both for the university and for self-study.

Enlightenment and Science. - Short conference report about a meeting organised by Rainer Enskat and Andreas Kleinert, which took place on 25 and 26 January 2007 in the rooms of the IZEA and the Leopoldina, the German National Academy of Sciences, in Halle (Saale), Germany. The topic of the conference was the question, which had become urgent since the 18th century, whether enlightenment through science is possible or necessary despite science.

Wer philosophieren will, muss, methodisch betrachtet, vor allem drei Dinge tun: analysieren, argumentieren und interpretieren. Jeder - ob Erstsemester oder fortgeschrittener Student - kann mit diesem Buch lernen, selbst Begriffe zu analysieren, selbst Argumente zu verstehen, zu bewerten und zu entwickeln; im Unterschied zu anderen Einführungsbüchern kommt aber auch die Interpretation zu ihrem vollen Recht. Analysieren, Argumentieren und Interpretieren sind die Methoden der Philosophie, die hier mit Hilfe umfangreicher Übungsaufgaben und Lösungen ausführlich vorgestellt werden. In gewissem Sinne präsentiert dieses Studienbuch (...) daher so etwas wie einen methodischen Werkzeugkasten, der sich ausgezeichnet für die Universität, aber gerade auch für das Selbststudium eignet. Wer mit diesen Methoden umzugehen weiß, wird nicht notwendigerweise gut philosophieren; aber ohne diese Methoden wird man schlechter philosophieren, als man es könnte. Das Buch enthält einen nützlichen Anhang mit einem philosophischen Kanon, den wichtigsten logischen Regeln und einem praxisnahen Register, das neben den deutschen auch alle wichtigen englischen Fachbegriffe umfasst. (shrink)

Die dritte, vollständig überarbeitete Auflage des bewährten Studienbuches wurde um elf Einträge erweitert: Abduktion (Schluss auf die beste Erklärung), Clusterdefinition, Experimentelle Philosophie, Explikation, Kontextdefinition, Kriterien, Methode, Naturalistischer Fehlschluss, Neologismus, notwendig und hinreichend – mengentheoretisch und Stipulative Definition. Zudem enthält der Band einen wertvollen Anhang mit einem philosophischen Kanon, den wichtigsten logischen Regeln und einem umfangreichen Register, das neben den deutschen auch alle wichtigen englischen Fachbegriffe umfasst. Wer philosophieren will, muss, methodisch betrachtet, vor allem drei Dinge tun: analysieren, argumentieren und interpretieren. (...) Jede Person – ob Anfänger/in, Schüler/in, Student/in oder fortgeschrittene/r Wissenschaftler/in – kann mit diesem Buch lernen, Begriffe zu analysieren, Argumente zu verstehen, zu bewerten und zu entwickeln. Im Unterschied zu anderen Einführungsbüchern kommt auch die Interpretation zu ihrem vollen Recht. Mit diesem Buch können die Methoden der Philosophie praxisnah gelernt und geübt werden. Es präsentiert deshalb so etwas wie einen methodischen Werkzeugkasten, der sich ausgezeichnet für die Schule, die Universität und auch das Selbststudium eignet. (shrink)

Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictionsincluding the identication of the worst case. The development of (...) such a modal methodology is particularly vital with respect to predictions of climate change. I show that a methodological dilemma emerges when possibilistic predictions are framed in traditional terms and argue that a more nuanced conceptual framework, distinguishing dierent types of possibility, should be used in order to convey our uncertain knowledge about the future. The new conceptual scheme, however, questions the applicability of standard rules of rational decision-making, thus generating new challenges. (shrink)

This paper gives an explication of our intuitive notion of strength of justification in a controversial debate. It defines a thesis' degree of justification within the bipolar argumentation framework of the theory of dialectical structures as the ratio of coherently adoptable positions according to which that thesis is true over all coherently adoptable positions. Broadening this definition, the notion of conditional degree of justification, i.e.\ degree of partial entailment, is introduced. Thus defined degrees of justification correspond to our pre-theoretic intuitions (...) in the sense that supporting and defending a thesis t increases, whereas attacking it decreases, t's degree of justification. Moreover, it is shown that (conditional) degrees of justification are (conditional) probabilities. Eventually, the paper explains that it is rational to believe theses with a high degree of justification insofar as this strengthens the robustness of one's position. (shrink)

Climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty and are, therefore, based on a range of future climate scenarios, describing possible consequences of alternative policies. Accordingly, the methodology for setting up such a scenario range becomes pivotal in climate policy advice. The preferred methodology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will be characterised as ,,modal verificationism"; it suffers from severe shortcomings which disqualify it for scientific policy advice. Modal falsificationism, as a more sound alternative, would radically alter the way the (...) climate scenario range is set up. Climate science's inability to find robust upper bounds for future temperature rise in line with modal falsificationism does not disprove that methodology, rather, this very fact prescribes even more drastic efforts to curb CO2 emissions than currently proposed. (shrink)

Its author was a Carthusian monk. Offered here is a translation, with annotation and an important introduction, of the four books on natural philosophy, the predecessor of modern science.

This study investigates the ethical aspects of deploying and researching into so-called climate engineering methods, i.e. large-scale technical interventions in the climate system with the objective of offsetting anthropogenic climate change. The moral reasons in favour of and against R&D into and deployment of CE methods are analysed by means of argument maps. These argument maps provide an overview of the CE controversy and help to structure the complex debate.

Menschliches Bewusstein findet sich immer schon als verkörpertes vor. Diese Einsicht steht im Zentrum des kognitionswissenschaftlichen Paradigmas der embodied cognition: Der Geist ist „innig an einen Körper gebunden und innig in seine Welt eingebettet“. Der Geist ist kein in einem vermeintlichen Innenraum verborgenes und von der Welt weitgehend gelöstes neuronales Netzwerk, sondern als eine dynamische Weise des leiblichen In-der-Welt-Seins zu verstehen. Mit der Philosophie der Verkörperung gewinnt die Theologie einen Gesprächspartner, der ihr hilft, ihre eigene Körpervergessenheit zu überwinden und Anschluss (...) an die biblischen Anthropologien zu gewinnen. Denn diese verstehen die menschliche Existenz grundsätzlich als leiblich verfasst. Aktuelle Forschungen an der Schnittstelle von Neurobiologie und Philosophie einerseits und Exegese und Systematik andererseits lassen sich so in einen spannenden Diskurs bringen, an dessen Ende eine neue interdisziplinäre Anthropologie stehen könnte. Der vorliegende Band eröffnet diesen Diskurs mit Beiträgen aus Philosophie, Exegese und Systematischer Theologie. (shrink)