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  1. What’s the worst case? The Methodology of Possibilistic Prediction.Gregor Betz - 2010 - Analyse & Kritik 32 (1):87-106.
    Frank Knight (1921) famously distinguished the epistemic modes of certainty, risk, and uncertainty in order to characterize situations where deterministic, probabilistic or possibilistic foreknowledge is available. Because our probabilistic knowledge is limited, i.e. because many systems, e.g. the global climate, cannot be described and predicted probabilistically in a reliable way, Knight's third category, possibilistic foreknowledge, is not simply swept by the probabilistic mode. This raises the question how to justify possibilistic predictionsincluding the identication of the worst case. The development of (...)
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  • Wie frei sind wir eigentlich empirisch?Sven Walter - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (1):8-35.
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  • Climate Change and Second-Order Uncertainty: Defending a Generalized, Normative, and Structural Argument from Inductive Risk.Daniel Steel - 2016 - Perspectives on Science 24 (6):696-721.
    This article critically examines a recent philosophical debate on the role of values in climate change forecasts, such as those found in assessment reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. On one side, several philosophers insist that the argument from inductive risk, as developed by Rudner and Douglas among others, applies to this case. AIR aims to show that ethical value judgments should influence decisions about what is sufficient evidence for accepting scientific hypotheses that have implications for policy issues. (...)
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  • Distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate values in climate modeling.Kristen Intemann - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):217-232.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
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  • The role of climate models in adaptation decision-making: the case of the UK climate projections 2009.Liam James Heaphy - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):233-257.
    When attendant to the agency of models and the general context in which they perform, climate models can be seen as instrumental policy tools that may be evaluated in terms of their adequacy for purpose. In contrast, when analysed independently of their real-world usage for informing decision-making, the tendency can be to prioritise their representative role rather than their instrumental role. This paper takes as a case study the development of the UK Climate Projections 2009 in relation to its probabilistic (...)
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  • Underdetermination, Model-ensembles and Surprises: On the Epistemology of Scenario-analysis in Climatology.Gregor Betz - 2009 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 40 (1):3-21.
    As climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty, being based on a range of future climate change scenarios, it becomes a crucial question how to set up this scenario range. Failing to comply with the precautionary principle, the scenario methodology widely used in the Third Assessment Report of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) seems to violate international environmental law, in particular a provision of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. To place climate policy advice on a (...)
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  • What range of future scenarios should climate policy be based on? Modal falsificationism and its limitations.Gregor Betz - 2009 - Philosophia Naturalis 46 (1):133-158.
    Climate policy decisions are decisions under uncertainty and are, therefore, based on a range of future climate scenarios, describing possible consequences of alternative policies. Accordingly, the methodology for setting up such a scenario range becomes pivotal in climate policy advice. The preferred methodology of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change will be characterised as ,,modal verificationism"; it suffers from severe shortcomings which disqualify it for scientific policy advice. Modal falsificationism, as a more sound alternative, would radically alter the way the (...)
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  • Are climate models credible worlds? Prospects and limitations of possibilistic climate prediction.Gregor Betz - 2015 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 5 (2):191-215.
    Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to (...)
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