This book attempts to synthesize two apparently contradictory views of psychology: as the science of internal mental mechanisms and as the science of complex external behavior. Most books in the psychology and philosophy of mind reject one approach while championing the other, but Rachlin argues that the two approaches are complementary rather than contradictory. Rejection of either involves disregarding vast sources of information vital to solving pressing human problems--in the areas of addiction, mental illness, education, crime, and decision-making, to name (...) but a few. Where previous books have focused either on psychology as an abstract science of the mind or as a strictly empirical approach to behavioral problems, this is the only book that attempts to show how the best modern theoretical work on mental mechanisms relates to the best modern empirical work on complex behavioral problems. It will be of considerable interest to psychologists and philosophers across many disciplines and perspectives. (shrink)

Oxford Scholarly Classics is a new series that makes available again great academic works from the archives of Oxford University Press. Reissued in uniform series design, the reissues will enable libraries, scholars, and students to gain fresh access to some of the finest scholarship of the last century.

In Paradigms and Barriers Howard Margolis offers an innovative interpretation of Thomas S. Kuhn's landmark idea of "paradigm shifts," applying insights from cognitive psychology to the history and philosophy of science. Building upon the arguments in his acclaimed Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, Margolis suggests that the breaking down of particular habits of mind—of critical "barriers"—is key to understanding the processes through which one model or concept is supplanted by another. Margolis focuses on those revolutionary paradigm shifts— such as the (...) switch from a Ptolemaic to a Copernican worldview—where challenges to entrenched habits of mind are marked by incomprehension or indifference to a new paradigm. Margolis argues that the critical problem for a revolutionary shift in thinking lies in the robustness of the habits of mind that reject the new ideas, relative to the habits of mind that accept the new ideas. Margolis applies his theory to famous cases in the history of science, offering detailed explanations for the transition from Ptolemaic to cosmological astronomy, the emergence of probability, the overthrow of phlogiston, and the emergence of the central role of experiment in the seventeenth century. He in turn uses these historical examples to address larger issues, especially the nature of belief formation and contemporary debates about the nature of science and the evolution of scientific ideas. Howard Margolis is a professor in the Harris Graduate School of Public Policy Studies and in the College at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Selfishness, Altruism, and Rationality and Patterns, Thinking, and Cognition, both published by the University of Chicago Press. (shrink)

James I. The Political Works of James I. Reprinted from the Edition of 1616. With an Introduction by Charles Howard McIlwain. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918. cxi, 354 pp. Reprinted 2002 by The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd.

While the traditional interpretation takes Mengzi 孟子 to be trying to persuade King Xuan 宣 of Qi 齊, I take him to be manipulating King Xuan with insincere flattery. My interpretation has several advantages. On the traditional interpretation, Mengzi is naïve about King Xuan’s motives, and confused about basic aspects of his own views, but my interpretation makes Mengzi into a canny sage with a clear, comprehensive grasp of his doctrines. My interpretation also brings the dialog into harmony with the (...) rest of the book, and with common sense on several points. It thus makes the dialog a more nuanced, coherent, and plausible work. Next, my interpretation shows Mengzi to possess a more complete list of virtues, and a longer list of character improvement strategies than is usually thought. Finally, by attributing to Mengzi a promising strategy for curing rulers prone to rages, lust, and greed, I show that Mengzi’s work fills a pressing contemporary need. (shrink)

The problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ is the problem of explaining the difference between a content-expressing declarative sentence and a ‘mere list’ of referents. The prevailing view is that such a problem is to be solved metaphysically, either by reducing our ontology to exclude propositions or universals, or by explaining how it is possible for a certain kind of complex entity – the ‘proposition’– to ‘unify’ its constituents. I argue that these metaphysical approaches cannot succeed; instead the only (...) viable approach is linguistic, identifying features of the (type–) sentence itself that enable it to express a content. Thus the problem of the ‘Unity of the Proposition’ (distinguishing sentences from lists) is distinct from the problem of ‘propositional unity’ (explaining how the constituents of propositions form a unified content). I suggest that, while the latter problem is not pressing, the former does not permit of an answer which applies in generality in all languages; we can only fully explain the Unity of the Proposition for single languages or groups of similar languages. (shrink)

The physics and metaphysics of identity and individuality Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9463-7 Authors Don Howard, Department of Philosophy and Graduate Program in History and Philosophy of Science, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556, USA Bas C. van Fraassen, Philosophy Department, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, San Francisco, CA 94132, USA Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL 33124, USA Elena Castellani, Department of Philosophy, University of Florence, Via Bolognese 52, (...) 50139 Florence, Italy Laura Crosilla, Department of Pure Mathematics, School of Mathematics, University of Leeds, Leeds, LS2 9JT UK Steven French, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Décio Krause, Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Santa Catarina, 88040-900 Campus Trindade, Florianópolis, SC Brazil Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796. (shrink)

This is the original English version of the introduction to Ciencia, Realidad y Racionalidad (University of Cauca Press, 2015), which is a collection of my essays translated into Spanish by Juan Carlos Aguirre Garcia.

Book Information Humans and Other Animals. Humans and Other Animals John Dupré , Oxford: Oxford University Press , 2002 , 272 , £17.99 ( cloth ) By John Dupré. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 272. £17.99 (cloth:).

Review: David Jeneman, Adorno in America, ; Alex Thomson, Adorno: A Guide for the Perplexed.

The questions considered in this book are common to philosophers, psychologists and anthropologists alike: What is man, and how does he differ from the animals? Is it true that man is less ruled by instinct than animals? How is man affected by heredity and environment? In particular, how are masculine and feminine "traits" affected by heredity and/or environment? Are there any relatively clear-cut stages in the evolution of the individual and of the human race? Does man have a mind or (...) soul distinct from the body, and does it entail the possibility of survival after physical death? Questions such as these posed throughout civilized time are examined anew in this book. Originally published by the University of Alabama Press in 1981. (shrink)

Whether we are morally obligated to obey the law is the central question addressed by Joseph Raz in his most recent work entitled, The Authority of Law. It is a question which divides positivists from natural law adherents. Professor Raz, a self-proclaimed positivist, concludes that “there is no general moral obligation to obey [the law], not even in a good society.” Rather, for Raz he individual must obey the law only if he respects it. “His respect,” says Raz, “is the (...) source of obligation,” leading one to conclude that for Raz the authority of law is the individual. The question of whether we are morally bound to obey the law is not a novel one; foremost among those who have addressed it are Plato, Aristotle and Aquinas. Each does so, it is important to note, in terms of the distinction between legitimate and illegitimate forms of government, which, in turn, is based upon a correct understanding of the nature of man and human happiness. The law of an illegitimate government, argues St. Thomas, “since it is not in accordance with reason, is not a law absolutely speaking, but rather a perversion of law.”. (shrink)

This title is part of UC Press's Voices Revived program, which commemorates University of California Press’s mission to seek out and cultivate the brightest minds and give them voice, reach, and impact. Drawing on a backlist dating to 1893, Voices Revived makes high-quality, peer-reviewed scholarship accessible once again using print-on-demand technology. This title was originally published in 1982.

In this paper I argue for worker self-management of the media, particularly the press. I begin with a general argument for self-management of enterprises. Then I consider and respond to objections to my proposal arising from the distinctive character of media, their social and political functions, and their legal status. I argue that not only would self-management not conflict with the function of enabling citizens to be informed and participate equally in social and political life, but it would enable (...) media to better perform their function than when controlled by either government or concentrated commercial corporations. But self-managed media would require some rethinking of the meaning of press freedom. And self-management would itself need to be supplemented with other measures such as rights of access to ensure equality of freedom of expression. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic by Ian ProopsStephen HowardIan Proops. The Fiery Test of Critique: A Reading of Kant's Dialectic. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Pp. 512. Hardback, $105.00.Ian Proops's book is a substantial contribution to the thriving field of Anglophone scholarship on the Transcendental Dialectic of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Across five hundred pages, Proops examines the whole of the (...) Dialectic. The book is divided into three parts, following the disciplines of previous special metaphysics with which Kant critically engages in the Dialectic: rational psychology, cosmology, and theology. Discussions of transcendental illusion and the regulative use of ideas of reason are slotted into the rational psychology and theology parts, respectively.Methodologically, Proops aims to take a middle course between historical and reconstructive approaches (31–32). In historical and reconstructive modes alike, though, Proops is primarily concerned with accurately presenting and rigorously evaluating Kant's arguments in the Dialectic. These arguments come in two forms: either those of the imagined rational psychologist, cosmologist, or theologian, whom Kant ventriloquizes in order to reveal their errors; or those arguments that Kant makes in his own voice. The Fiery Test of Critique distinguishes itself from existing studies through the detail and care with which these arguments are scrutinized. Specialists will find numerous illuminating exegeses and links to a wide range of Kant's published and unpublished writings. Proops does not hesitate to identify where, in his view, Kant's arguments fail (or where those of Kant's ventriloquized metaphysicians fail in a way Kant does not intend), but he endeavors to interpret charitably and to make his own evaluative criteria explicit.The wide-ranging introduction to the book offers intriguing reflections on a metaphor Kant uses for his critique of pure reason: a "fiery test" (8; A 406/B 433). This test, Proops suggests, is best understood not as a religious ordeal by fire but as a "metallurgical assay": the testing of a coin or an ore to determine its precious metal content (9–10). This means that the test of critique "is not pass-fail" (12). Kantian critique identifies some precious metal to be retained alongside the dross (the base-metal bearer) to be discarded. The "gold" [End Page 525] and "silver" found by Kant's fiery test are, Proops contends, respectively the indirect proof of transcendental idealism that emerges from the Antinomy chapter, and the doctrinal beliefs in God and an afterlife that remain after the Paralogism and Ideal (13, 453–54).This application of Kant's metaphor indicates how far Proops diverges from the dismissive views of older Anglo-American studies of the Dialectic (the paradigm being Bennett's Kant's Dialectic [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974]). Proops's opening questions and goals show that he aims to clarify the precise character of the dogmatic metaphysical claims criticized by Kant, and to identify what of this previous tradition Kant considers worth saving and why (2–7). This focus on the positive contribution of the Dialectic to Kant's philosophy—an approach Proops shares with other recent commentators—is very welcome.For all his illuminating discussion of Kant's Feuerprobe imagery, Proops neglects to note that Kant does not simply identify worthwhile aspects of previous special metaphysics. Rather, the philosophical findings that Proops takes to be the precious results of the critical test are significantly developed in Kant's hands. That is, no pre-Kantian rational cosmologist claims that their debates provide an indirect proof of transcendental idealism (of course). Neither do pre-Kantian rational psychologists or theologians make Kant's move of conceiving of God and the immortal soul as matters of doctrinal belief, where the latter is an epistemic attitude distinct from knowledge and cognition. In the cases that Proops highlights, then, the relevant image seems to be not only a metallurgical test but also an alchemical transformation of previous metaphysical doctrines into positive "critical" results.The parts of the book on the Paralogisms and the Ideal, on which Proops has previously published, will no doubt stimulate further detailed debate among specialists. I leave these debates aside to consider the part of the... (shrink)

Book Reviews Howard Williams, Kantian Review, FirstView Article.

Traditional epistemology is haunted by the spectre of scepticism. Yet the more pressing concern in the contemporary intellectual scene must surely be relativism rather than scepticism. This has been the case in the history and philosophy of science since the work of Thomas Kuhn and Paul Feyerabend, to say nothing of the emergence of the sociology of scientific knowledge. In Epistemic Relativism: A Constructive Critique, Markus Seidel comes firmly to grips with this modern spectre. Though Seidel devotes attention to other (...) forms of relativism, the primary focus of the book is epistemic relativism, which he understands to be relativism about epistemic justification. Relativist or relativist-tending authors such as Kuhn, Nelson Goodman, Martin Kusch, Richard Rorty and Peter Winch receive some discussion . But Seidel takes as his main relativist target the work of the founding figures of the Edinburgh “strong programme”, Barry Barnes and David Bloor. While .. (shrink)

Hodgens, Howard Review of: Betting on famine: Why the world still goes hungry, by Jean Ziegler, The New Press $34.99.