The relationship between music and language is one of the main axes of Western philosophy of music. In particular, the link between music and literature has fostered an intense debate that resulted in a plurality of different solutions. The present issue of "Itinera” aims at analyzing some of the fundamental questions that emerge from Azio Corghi's use of literary sources in composition. The complexity of the themes that characterize Corghi's work, across musicology, aesthetics and literature, leads the reader to deal (...) with fundamental categories such as postmodernity and avant-garde, in music and beyond. (shrink)

The term ‘gesture’ is often used for an action capable of conveying a meaning and, in this sense, it is related to the question of the origin of language. In this paper I rather focus on a concept of ‘gesture’ intended as the «supplement of an act», produced by an historical and cultural process and representative of a «pure mediality». Such a different notion of gesture should not to be confused with a form of expression considered as an end in (...) itself. In this perspective, I will try to think the artistic gesture not as bearer of meaning but as what is ‘beared’, i.e., as the non-communicative rest of previous acts of communication. (shrink)

A long tradition, whose echo is still perceptible in some contemporary reflections, combines philosophy and melancholy, often indentifying melancholy as the beginning of philosophy. But rereading the Freud’s _Mourning and Melancholia_, the «circular insanity» shows two sides, depressive and maniac. Once the double nature of the «circular insanity» has been taken into consideration, it can be reiterated that melancholy is connected to philosophy not only with regard of its beginning but also to its (temporary) end, approached through Wittgenstein's reflection on (...) the miracle and the mystical as the extinction of the philosophical question. In this perspective, the whole cycle of philosophy, from its depressive beginning to its maniacal outcome, undergoes an aesthetic consideration, in which what is more important is the _how_ of experience rather than its _what_. Finally, the aesthetic point of view on the connection between melancholy and philosophy makes it possible to reconsider the very status of that research that presents itself as 'love of knowledge'. (shrink)

L’obiettivo di questo articolo è quello di esaminare le riflessioni dedicate da Wittgenstein al tema del giudizio di valore, al fine di rintracciare una linea di continuità tra le ricerche riguardanti i criteri per determinare la sensatezza degli enunciati – principale impegno del “primo” Wittgenstein – e la successiva filosofia dei giochi linguistici, presentata nelle Ricerche filosofiche. Secondo la teoria raffigurativa del linguaggio, così come viene formulata nel Tractatus logico-philosophicus, i giudizi di valore non rappresentano fatti del mondo e pertanto (...) sono senza senso. In questa prospettiva, il tentativo di esprimere esperienze di “valore assoluto”, come dice Wittgenstein nella Conferenza sull’etica (1929), è condannato al nonsenso, sebbene esso dia testimonianza di una tendenza tipicamente umana ad avventarsi contro i limiti del linguaggio. Circa dieci anni dopo, nelle Lezioni di estetica (1938) Wittgenstein analizza l’uso degli aggettivi estetici nei giudizi di valore e sottolinea la prossimità di queste espressioni al gesto, inteso come un modo di trasmettere il sentimento del parlante in reazione a una specifica esperienza. Nell’espressività del nonsenso è possibile intravedere in anticipo l’importanza della nozione di uso, centrale nella “seconda” filosofia di Wittgenstein; nell’analisi degli aggettivi estetici, usati in maniera simile a gesti, rimane un collegamento con le precedenti ricerche intorno ai limiti del linguaggio. Attraverso la riflessione su nonsenso e gesto Wittgenstein sviluppa un’idea non-comunicativa ed espressiva del linguaggio che possiamo rintracciare lungo l’intero sviluppo del suo lavoro. (shrink)

L’obiettivo di questo articolo è di proporre una considerazione del fenomeno musicale non come oggetto ma come evento. La musica si allontana dall’ambito degli oggetti a partire dall’immissione del suono nel contesto musicale, in cui l’origine fisica delle vibrazioni perde rilevanza (Roger Scruton). La musica si presenta infatti come una concatenazione di eventi sonori retti da una logica autonoma; i nessi causali in base a cui i suoni trovano il proprio ordine costituiscono un mondo ideale, distinto dal mondo fisico, in (...) cui trovano spazio processi dinamici privi di qualunque polo oggettuale (Francis Wolff). A partire da un’idea di suono autonomo rispetto all’oggetto d’origine e dalla concezione dell’ambito musicale come un mondo di puri eventi sonori, si prende in esame la concezione del processo musicale come insieme di qualità sonore prive di sostrato, vale a dire di qualia senza sostanza (Antonia Soulez). In questa prospettiva è possibile proporre una desostanzializzazione dell’oggetto musicale che non implichi una posizione di scetticismo nei confronti della realtà del processo sonoro. L’evento musicale nasce piuttosto dalla complessa interazione tra materiale sonoro e forze provenienti dal mondo esterno (Pascale Criton). Considerato come evento e non come oggetto, il fenomeno musicale si sottrae all’indagine intorno al suo significato, pur mantenendo un profilo enigmatico dovuto alla duplice provenienza, umana e “mondana”, del suono. (shrink)

Although Eco was deeply interested in music, his bibliography does not include a work entirely and exclusively dedicated to this theme. However, references to the problems of musical production, listening, interpretation and transmission are scattered in numerous essays, and are often implicitly or explicitly linked to the theoretical and compositional work of his friend and composer Luciano Berio, who in turn dialogued with the developments of Eco’s thought. This article reconstructs the intellectual relationship and friendship between Eco and Berio, originated (...) in the fifties at the Rai studios in Milan; then it examines the passages in Eco’s work dedicated to music, from The Open Work (1962) to Kant and the Platypus (1997). Finally, the article focuses on the controversies raised by the concept of open work, conceived by Eco starting from some musical works including Berio’s Sequenza I for solo flute (1958). With respect to the freedom left to the performer in the 1958 score, Berio’s rewriting in traditional notation in the Nineties seems to undermine at its roots the idea of openness which, according to Eco, distinguishes contemporary poetics. This circumstance provoked some musicological, philological and philosophical controversies, which allowed Eco (2012) to return to reflect on the concept of open work, specifying and clarifying the aesthetic conception underlying it. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to propose a comparison between the mystical feeling, as it is defined by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, and the psycho-pathological state of melancholy, posed in relation with mourning by Sigmund Freud. The comparison will depart from the radical dissatisfaction that seems to be a distinctive characteristic of both phenomena. According to Wittgenstein in fact the drive to mystical feeling rises from the deep dissatisfaction regarding the explanations given by science, which is incapable (...) of producing any answer to the «problem of life». In a similar way, Slavoj Žižek underlines that melancholy is a form of «disappointment at all positive, observable objects, none of which can satisfy our desire». In this perspective, I will check the similarities and differences between mystical feeling and melancholy and I will put in relation the double profile of this latter with the Wittgensteinian theme of aspect seeing. (shrink)

Background: Undergraduate nursing students have been documented to experience ethical distress during their clinical training and felt poorly supported in discussing the ethical issues they encountered. Research aims: This study was aimed at exploring nursing students’ perceived opportunity to discuss ethical issues that emerged during their clinical learning experience and associated factors. Research design: An Italian national cross-sectional study design was performed in 2015–2016. Participants were invited to answer a questionnaire composed of four sections regarding: socio-demographic data, previous clinical learning (...) experiences, current clinical learning experience quality and outcomes, and the opportunity to discuss ethical issues with nurses in the last clinical learning experience. Participants and research context: Participants were 9607 undergraduate nursing students who were attending 95 different three-year Italian baccalaureate nursing programmes, located at 27 universities in 15 Italian regions. Ethical considerations: This study was conducted in accordance with the Human Subject Research Ethics Committee guidelines after the research protocol was approved by an ethics committee. Findings: Overall, 4707 perceived to have discussed ethical issues ‘much’ or ‘very much’; among the remaining, 3683 and 1217 students reported the perception of having discussed, respectively, ‘enough’ or ‘never’ ethical issues emerged in the clinical practice. At the multivariate logistic regression analysis explaining 38.1% of the overall variance, the factors promoting ethical discussion were mainly set at the clinical learning environment levels. In contrast, being male was associated with a perception of less opportunity to discuss ethical issues. Conclusion: Nursing faculties should assess the clinical environment prerequisites of the settings as a context of student experience before deciding on their accreditation. Moreover, the nursing faculty and nurse managers should also enhance competence with regard to discussing ethical issues with students among clinical nurses by identifying factors that hinder this learning opportunity in daily practice. (shrink)

La observación del cinismo antiguo como precursor filosófico del anarquismo ha sido abordada por un gran número de estudiosos y especialistas de ambos campos. El siguiente trabajo se propone aportar nuevos puntos de vista a la relación cinismo-anarquismo. Nuestro punto de partida es la figura del protocínico Diógenes de Sinope [412-402 /325-321], cuya heterodoxa filosofía, de la que no conservamos escritos, ha sido objeto de ambivalentes recepciones a lo largo de la historia. Veremos por qué ha sido reivindicado como un (...) miembro ilustre de la prehistoria del anarquismo y qué nuevas perspectivas podemos añadir a esos estudios. (shrink)

Aim of the paper is contributing to a context-informed understanding of Fichte’s theory of conscience. This crucial element in his moral philosophy (and, in fact, in his whole philosophy) represents the last of the many significant accounts of conscience in the 18th century, before in the following century the role of conscience in moral life was repeatedly put into question. Accordingly, in my paper I argue that: (1) Fichte puts forward an un-Kantian account of conscience, following, instead, a quite different (...) model; (2) Fichte’s views on conscience grew out of a complex conceptual milieu, from which Fichte borrows important (quasi-)sentimentalist elements; (3) Fichte’s idea of the infallibility of conscience must be distinguished from other similar views put forward in the same years. (shrink)

Moral subjectivism is commonly associated with out-of-favour theories like, e.g., Alfred Ayer’s emotivism or John Mackie’s error theory. This paper approaches the field against the background of the attitudinal character of morality and religion. The possibility of a brand of moral subjectivism is established which is common to Ayer’s and Mackie’s theories in name only yet still has significant merits. The perspective from action theory and the philosophy of mind suggests that the problem of moral obligation, central to moral philosophy, (...) is more convincingly dealt with by subjectivism than by its rivals: In contrast to realism or even relativism (with which subjectivism is often confused), subjectivism can help to explain the peculiarities of obligation without forcing us to disregard the parallel problem in the field of religion. This finding calls into question the rationale for, as well as the success of, central assumptions in ontology and semantics which the realist so freely hands out in order to make his point: If religious facts and the truth-aptness of religious judgements will not explain religious obligation, moral facts and the truth-aptness of moral judgements will not help the moral realist either. So unless we do not wish to simply cast the problem of moral obligation aside, in future, moral subjectivism must be seriously considered as a worthwhile position in its own right. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ********** Moralischer Subjektivismus ist ein Oberbegriff für Theorien wie Alfred Ayers „Emotivismus“ und John Mackies „Irrtumstheorie“, die heute kaum noch Vertreter finden. In diesem Aufsatz beleuchte ich das Feld vom Einstellungscharakter von Moral und Religion her. Ich lege so die Möglichkeit eines anderen moralischen Subjektivismus dar, der mit Ayers oder Mackies Theorie nur das Rubrum gemein hätte und doch gewichtige Vorzüge aufweist. Die handlungstheoretische Betrachtung von Moral und Religion mit Hilfe der Philosophie des Geistes legt nahe, dass dieser moralische Subjektivismus mit dem für die Moralphilosophie zentralen Problem des moralischen Sollens besser umgehen kann als seine Rivalen: Anders als der Realismus oder gar der Relativismus (mit dem der Subjektivismus oft verwechselt wird), kann der hier ausgeleuchtete Subjektivismus mit der besonderen Verbindlichkeit moralischer Forderungen umgehen, ohne die Parallele zur besonderen Verbindlichkeit religiöser Forderungen in Abrede stellen zu müssen. Die Rolle und Durchschlagkraft der vom Realisten so freigiebig gespendeten ontologischen oder semantischen Zusatzannahmen er- scheint vor diesem Hintergrund fragwürdig. Dem religiösen Realisten wird man vergleichbare Annahmen nicht zugeben wollen und muss es auch nicht. Dann aber können wir die Erklärung besonderer Verbindlichkeit generell nicht auf Ontologie oder Semantik gründen. Der verbreitete Appell an sogenannte moralische Tatsachen oder die behauptete Wahrheitsfähigkeit moralischer Sätze erweist sich so als wirkungslos. Sofern wir das Problem des moralischen Sollens überhaupt weiter ernst nehmen wollen, muss der moralische Subjektivismus als Position künftig ernsthaft erwogen werden. (shrink)

After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue combines elements of realism with (...) elements of voluntarist ascent, Kant’s position can be characterized as an idealist version of moral realism or, more specifically, as the combination of a strong realism about the moral law with an idealist account of moral obligation. (shrink)

Transhumanism and Gnosis: A Parallelism The aim of this paper is to draw a parallel between the phenomenon of gnosis and transhumanism together with its ultimate version, posthumanism. After some methodological clarifications, the paper focuses on four confrontational axes: self-recognition, cosmic and anthropological dualism, the meaning of morality, death and suffering, and finally the promise of salvation. Finally, the two doctrines are framed within the context of the Gnostic revolution, emphasizing the sense of uprootedness and post-modernity to explain the resurgence (...) of these phenomena. (shrink)

O problema da corporalidade em Leibniz se vincula necessariamente à discussão sobre o estatuto da matéria em uma Metafísica cuja base são as mônadas imateriais. Veremos que, neste contexto, o material deverá ser fenomênico, mas nem por isso ilusório. O objetivo deste trabalho é mostrar como o campo fenomênico, cujo caso exemplar é o corpo, pode ganhar um suporte metafísico e racionalmente justificado, constituindo o que Leibniz chama de fenômenos bem fundados. Para tal, deverá ser feito um exame cuidadoso da (...) natureza das Forças no pensamento leibniziano e de como elas apresentam o vínculo procurado entre Física e Metafísica. Leibniz on Phenomenon and CorporalityThe problem of corporality in Leibniz is necessarily attached to the discussion on the nature of matter in a Metaphysics whose basis are the immaterial monads. We will see that, in this context, although the material must be phenomenic, it is not necessarily ilusory. The aim of this paper is to show how the phenomenic domain, whose exemplar case is the body, may be metaphysically founded and rationally justifyed, constituting what Leibniz calls well founded phenomena. In order to do it, it is necessary to examine Leibniz's conception of the nature of the Forces and how they could present the link between Physics and Metaphysics. (shrink)

What is discrimination and what makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Even after an ever-rising tide of research over the course of the past twenty-five or so years these questions still remain hard to answer. Exercising candid and self-critical hindsight, Larry Alexander, who contributed his fair share to this tide, thus remarked: “All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.” If this is true it (...) raises serious doubts as to how wrongful discrimination can be a moral wrong in itself. Also, the question comes up as to who it is who breaches a promise or a fiduciary duty. This paper defends the view that the substance of these remarks is better understood by couching them in a political approach towards discrimination. Against this background, they give rise to real and pressing concerns. Once we conceptualise the realm political along Hobbesian lines as the battleground comprising both the private sphere of the individual and the public sphere of the commonwealth it emerges that discrimination has different significance with regard to these respective spheres. In order to illustrate this, I adopt Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen’s descriptive account of discrimination as „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ and the common view that wrongful discrimination is wrong because it is harmful, disrespectful, or both. In the private sphere the case can be made for morally permissible cases of discrimination. Sexual discrimination due to sexual self-determination with consequently freely choosing your sexual or romantic partner is the central case in point. Where somebody feels unfairly rejected and consequently hurt neither the charge of harm inflicted nor that of disrespect endured need be justified. No “breach of promises or fiduciary duties” is involved. The case is different, however, when it comes to the fiduciary of power. In discriminating, he who exercises the power of the commonwealth necessarily breaches a promise and a fiduciary duty. Discrimination thus appears to be more of a problem of political philosophy than one of applied ethics. [in German] **************************************************************************************************** ******************** Was ist Diskriminierung und warum ist Diskriminierung verwerflich, wenn sie es denn ist? Dies bleibt ungeachtet der seit fünfundzwanzig Jahren anschwellenden Forschungsliteratur unverändert eine harte Nuss. Larry Alexander, der selbst maßgeblich zu dieser Forschungsliteratur beigetragen hat, merkt daher selbstkritisch an: „All cases of discrimination, if wrongful, are wrongful either because of their quite contingent consequences or perhaps because they are breaches of promises or fiduciary duties.“ Wenn dies der Fall ist, stellt sich die Frage, wie moralisch verwerfliche Diskriminierung dann noch an sich verwerflich sein kann. Es stellt sich dann auch die Frage, wer hier ein Versprechen bricht und seine Treuepflichten verletzt. Die leitende Annahme dieses Aufsatzes ist es, dass man dem sachlichen Kern dieser Bedenken Rechnung tragen kann, indem man eine politische Perspektive auf das Phänomen der Diskriminierung einnimmt. Die Bedenken erweisen sich dann als substanziell und zutreffend. Konzeptualisieren wir den Bereich des Politischen mit Thomas Hobbes als das Spannungsfeld, das die private Sphäre des Individuums und die öffentliche Sphäre des Gemeinwesens gegeneinander abgrenzt, wird sichtbar, dass Diskriminierung in diesen Sphären jeweils unterschiedlich zu bewerten ist. Um dies zu verdeutlichen, lege ich Kasper Lippert-Rasmussens deskriptives Verständnis von Diskriminierung als „differential treatment on the basis of membership of a socially salient group“ zugrunde und mache von der in der Diskussion verbreiteten Ansicht Gebrauch, dass das Zufügen von Schaden oder die Verweigerung von Respekt Diskriminierung verwerflich macht. In der privaten Sphäre kann es nun Fälle moralisch zulässiger Diskriminierung geben. Zentral ist die sexuelle Diskriminierung aufgrund der Ausübung einer freien Wahl des eigenen Sexual- oder Liebespartners. Auch wenn sich der Abgewiesene womöglich geschädigt sieht, wird unbilliger Schaden nicht zugefügt und geschul- deter Respekt nicht verweigert. Den Grund finden wir in Alexanders Formel: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt nicht vor. Anders im Fall staatlicher Diskriminierung: Ein „breach of promises“ oder eine Verletzung „fiduciary duties“ liegt hier stets vor, da Fälle staatlicher Diskriminierung regelmäßig Machtmissbrauch darstellen: Der Inhaber staatlicher Gewalt verletzt die Treuepflicht, das Mandat unparteilich auszuüben, das getreulich auszuführen er gelobt hat. Diskriminierung erscheint also weniger als ein Problem der angewandten Ethik denn als eines der politischen Philosophie. (shrink)

On the underwater environment and the mechanisms of deterioration of the materials likely to found on a shipwreck, and the theory and practice of conserving the artifacts recovered. Covers on-site storage, transport of artifacts, and requirements for exhibition after conservation treatment. Di Stefano (political science, U. of Washington) offers a new perspective on the dimension of gender in modern political thought in order to elucidate what is specifically masculine in political theory. Attempting to clear some conceptual space for feminist (...) political theory, she provides critical readings of Hobbes, Marx, and J.S. Mill. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR. (shrink)

The five-volume set Kant and Philosophy in a Cosmopolitan Sense contains the proceedings of the Eleventh International Kant Congress, which took place in Pisa in 2010. The proceedings consist of 25 plenary talks and 341 papers selected by a team of international referees from over 700 submissions. The contributions span 14 sections: Kant’s Concept of Philosophy; Theory of Cognition and Logic; Ontology and Metaphysics; Ethics; Law and Justice; Religion and Theology; Aesthetics; Anthropology and Psychology; Politics and History; Science, Mathematics, and (...) the Philosophy of Nature; Kant and the Leibnizian Tradition; Kant and the Philosophical Tradition; Kant and Schopenhauer; and Kant’s Heritage. Thanks to cooperation from the Schopenhauer Gesellschaft, the 2010 conference was the first in the history of the International Kant Congress to include a session on Kant and Schopenhauer. -/- . (shrink)

Resumen En este trabajo se analizan las pautas de elección entre los cuatro paradigmas gramaticales de segunda persona del español peninsular (los prototípicos, representados por los pronombres tú y vosotros, y los desplazados, por usted y ustedes), cuando se usan para indexar a interlocutores específicos, en un corpus de discurso radiofónico de la ciudad española de Salamanca. Se plantea la hipótesis de que los fundamentos cognitivos de las personas gramaticales se proyectan en su potencial sociopragmático como recursos para la configuración (...) de identidades contextuales. Tras clasificar a los participantes del corpus en cuatro tipos de identidad socioprofesional recurrentes en la comunicación radiofónica (locutores, personajes públicos, políticos y hablantes particulares), se calculan las frecuencias con que cada tipo dirige y recibe cada tratamiento de segunda persona. El análisis cuantitativo constituye un punto de partida para la observación cualitativa de los contextos de uso. Tras este se concluye que la elección entre las cuatro formas de segunda persona combina los parámetros sociopragmáticos de cercanía-distancia (que afecta a la elección entre formas prototípicas y desplazadas) e individualidad-grupalidad (que afecta a la elección entre formas singulares y plurales). Tales parámetros remiten, a su vez, al continuum discursivo-cognitivo entre la subjetividad y la objetividad. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to analyze Spanish first-person plural subjects as a cognitively grounded grammatical choice serving various discursive functions. Both the expressed and omitted variants of the subject will be considered, even if omission is by far the more frequent choice in Spanish and the more communicatively versatile one. The particularly vague reference of omitted nosotros ‘we’ – always involving an extension of the self towards a wider notional scope – results in a remarkable variety of possible (...) contextual projections. It can be used to signal speaker identities as well as manage interpersonal relationships through the iconic suggestion of viewpoint coincidence. First-person plural clauses are quantitatively and qualitatively investigated across two corpora of contemporary Spanish comprising a variety of spoken and written genres. It is found that, aside from the basic distinction between hearer-exclusive and hearer-inclusive first persons, a third, intermediate variant can be considered, that of empathic hearer-exclusive uses. These are typical of interactions where involvement of the audience is sought even if they are not referentially included in the subject, as is usual in some varieties of spoken mass-media discourse. Each one of the referential variants is used with different frequencies and contextual repercussions, depending on the socio-functional demands and goals of particular textual genres. (shrink)

This is a study of Blondel's philosophy of the supernatural as it appeared only in the dissertation on Action of 1893. First, it reviews how Blondel brought philosophy to focus concretely on human action and what he focuses on in this action as the principle for its dialectical unfolding. Second, it shows how this focus brings him to a radical critique of superstition and any idea of natural religion, since even the latter is viewed as a kind of superstition. Third, (...) it examines how he proceeds to the affirmation of God as the necessary being of action and how this affirmation places the human being in a position of having to choose between saying yes or no to God at the core of his action. Fourth, it shows how Blondel argues from this existential exigency that the thought of the supernatural necessarily arises with regard to the question of human destiny and that such a thought, if it actualized in human action through a gratuitous initiative on the part of God, necessarily entails a revelation, a mediation, and a religious practice on the part of man. In conclusion it reflects on how this science of practice remains a philosophy, as distinct from theology, even though it has to do with religious practice in the most supernatural sense. /// O presente artigo constitui urn estudo sobre o problema do sobrenatural, tal como Blondel comeca por o tratar em sua tese de doutoramento sobre a Ácção, publicada em 1893. Em primeiro lugar, passa-se em revista não só o modo concreto como Blondel fez do problema da acção assunto para a filosofia, mas também se procura discernir aquilo que, segundo ele, na acção mesma constitui o princípio do seu desdobramento dialéctico. Em segundo lugar, mostra-se como a partir deste ponto de focagem Blondel procede a uma critica radical da superstição bem como de toda e qualquer ideia de religião natural, por ele igualmente vista como uma espécie de superstição. Em terceiro lugar, examina-se o modo como Blondel avança em direcção a uma afirmação de Deus como o ser necessário da acção e como esta mesma afirmação coloca o ser humano numa posicjio de, no fulcro do seu agir, ter de optar entre o dizer sim ou não a Deus. Em quarto lugar, mostra-se o modo como Blondel, partindo desta exigência existencial, argumenta no sentido de que o pensamento do sobrenatural necessariamente se dá em conexão com a questão do destino humano e de como tal pensamento, actualizado na acção humana graças a uma iniciativa gratuita da parte de Deus, necessariamente implica a ideia de revelação, mediação, e prática religiosa da parte do homem. Finalmente, em conclusão, reflecte-se sobre o modo como esta ciência da prática permanece filosofia, distinta da teologia, mesmo quando, enquanto tal, ela tern a ver com uma prática religiosa no sentido mais sobrenatural do termo /// Ceci est une étude de la philosophie du surnaturel de Blondel telle qu'elle parut uniquement dans la thèse sur L'Action de 1893. Premièrement, elle revoit comment Blondel a amené la philosophie à réfléchir concrétement sur l'action humaine et ce sur quoi cette réflexion s'appuie comme principe du déploiement dialectique de cette action. Deuxièmement, elle montre comment ce déploiement amène Blondel à une critique radicale de la superstition et de toute idée de religion naturelle, puisque cette dernière est vue comme une sorte de superstition. Troisièmement, elle examine comment Blondel avance vers une affirmation de Dieu comme Fetre necessaire de l'action et comment cette affirmation amène l'être humain à devoir choisir entre dire oui ou non face à Dieu au plus profond de son action. Quatrièmement, elle montre comment Blondel, à partir de cette exigence existentielle, arrive à poser que la pensée du surnaturel surgit nécessairement par rapport à la question du destin de l'être humain et comment une telle pensée, si elle devient réalite dans l'action humaine par une initiative gratuite du côté de Dieu. entraine du côté de l'homme la nécessité d'une révélation, une médiation et une pratique religieuse. En conclusion, l'étude se demande comment cette science de la pratique reste une philosophie, distincte de toute théologie, même si elle traite de la pratique religieuse dans son sens le plus surnaturel. (shrink)