Moral Realism by Other Means: The Hybrid Nature of Kant’s Practical Rationalism

In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 155-178 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


After qualifying in which sense ‘realism’ can be applied to eighteenth-century views about morality, I argue that while Kant shares with traditional moral realists several fundamental claims about morality, he holds that those claims must be argued for in a radically different way. Drawing on his diagnosis of the serious weaknesses of traditional moral realism, Kant proposes a novel approach that revolves around a hybrid view about moral obligation. Since his solution to that central issue combines elements of realism with elements of voluntarist ascent, Kant’s position can be characterized as an idealist version of moral realism or, more specifically, as the combination of a strong realism about the moral law with an idealist account of moral obligation.

Similar books and articles

Kant's moral anti-realism.Frederick Rauscher - 2002 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 40 (4):477-499.
Value and Obligation Once More.Ana Marta González - 2020 - Metaphilosophy 51 (1):71-86.
On the Alleged Laziness of Moral Realists.Daniel Weltman - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 54 (3):511-518.
The Problem of Obligation, the Finite Rational Will, and Kantian Value Realism.Anne Margaret Baxley - 2012 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (6):567-583.
Kantian Constructivism, Respect, and Moral Depth.Melissa Zinkin - 2017 - In Elke Elisabeth Schmidt & Robinson dos Santos (eds.), Realism and Anti-Realism in Kant’s Moral Philosophy. De Gruyter. pp. 21-42.
Facts, Values and Moral Realism.David Schejbal - 1991 - Dissertation, The University of Connecticut


Added to PP

328 (#64,978)

6 months
113 (#41,806)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Stefano Bacin
Università degli Studi di Milano

Citations of this work

Kant-Bibliographie 2018.Margit Ruffing - 2020 - Kant Studien 111 (4):647-702.

Add more citations

References found in this work

The sources of normativity.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Onora O'Neill.
Taking Morality Seriously: A Defense of Robust Realism.David Enoch - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Truth and Objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
The domain of reasons.John Skorupski - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
A treatise of human nature.David Hume - 2007 - In Elizabeth Schmidt Radcliffe, Richard McCarty, Fritz Allhoff & Anand Vaidya (eds.), Late modern philosophy: essential readings with commentary. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.

View all 30 references / Add more references