Pt. 1. The journey inward. Breaking into the intellectual scene -- Awakening to the divine light in human action -- The original philosophy of the supernatural -- The vocation to philosophy -- Discourse on method for philosophy of religion -- Crisis of modernity for Catholic apologetics -- The broader social involvement -- The philosopher of Aix -- The philosophical itinerary -- The question of a Catholic philosophy -- Pt. 2. The systematic summation. The question of thought -- The responsibilities of (...) thought -- Ontology of consolidation in being in, through, and of itself -- Action as cooperation with the first cause -- The original philosophy of action revisited -- The expanded philosophy of the supernatural -- Symbiosis of the human and the divine in history -- Christian spirit and historical civilization. (shrink)

Two kinds of remarks can be made on Kainz’s book on the Phenomenology of Spirit. First, there are those that pertain to it as an instrument to help in the reading of the Phenomenology itself and, second, there are those that pertain to the questions that Kainz’s interpretation of the Phenomenology raises. Both of these issues deserve some attention in approaching Kainz’s book and, in a sense, they cannot be separated, since any reading of a philosophical work is already an (...) interpretation and this is especially true of a work like Hegel’s Phenomenology. Indeed, the peculiarity of the Phenomenology as a philosophical work, which Kainz remarks upon along with many others, makes it very susceptible to a variety of interpretations, all of which could be called into question. In this regard the Phenomenology might be likened, not just to a novel, as Kainz suggests, but also to a poem, whose meaning cannot be strictly paraphrased but stands and falls with the language and structure of the work itself. This may be why, apart from the inherent difficulty and complexity of the Phenomenology, we have had so few commentaries on it, in comparison say to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which itself is surely not lacking in difficulty. But it is not to say that the Phenomenology should not be analysed and commented upon. We do that even with the best of poems. It is only to say that there is no substitute for reading the Phenomenology itself, for its meaning grows out of the very creation of language which it represents and, in a sense, there is no other way of getting at its meaning than through its very movement leading to Absolute Knowing. If an analysis or a commentary can help to enter into this movement, so much the better. If they stand in the way or impede the movement, they must be set aside. For I am convinced that Hegel himself knew better than anyone else what he was up to in the Phenomenology and the way that he did it may well be the only way of doing what he wanted to do. This being said, however, in what follows I shall try to make comments on both the issue of instrument and the issue of interpretation in succession. (shrink)

This is another in the growing list of studies on Hegel’s Phenomenology. More specifically, it is designed for “the beginning student” and purports “to offer a reading which is less confusing than Hegel’s own text” and therefore uses “very little of Hegel’s terminology or style of writing”. After a brief introduction in which the general nature of Hegelian philosophy and some of its key ideas are presented, it goes on to discuss both the Preface and Hegel’s “Introduction” somewhat more critically (...) before going on to deal with the successive sections of the Phenomenology from “Sense Certainty” to “Absolute Knowledge” somewhat more exegetically, as the author herself puts it. After the section on Reason and before that on Spirit, a special chapter on “The State” is inserted, which discusses a number of topics from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right by way of introduction to subsequent parts of the Phenomenology. Three chapters are then devoted to the section on Spirit, followed by two relatively short chapters on “Religion in General” and “Absolute Knowledge.” A brief bibliography is added which includes only a few of the better known works on Hegel, but none of these sources seems to have influenced Dudeck much in her reading. This is very much her own work on the Phenomenology and it has to be viewed as such. Whether one likes it or not, agrees with it or not, will depend on one’s own reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and one’s own interpretation of its method. (shrink)

IN THE FOREWORD of Zur Seinsfrage Heidegger distinguishes two questions of being. One he speaks of in the form of the participle, die Frage nach dem Seiendem als Seiendem, the question about being as being. This he identifies with the tradition of metaphysics which he repudiates as forgetful of the real question of being. "The answering of this question," he adds, "refers at the same time to an interpretation of be [des Seins] which remains in what is unasked [im Fraglosen] (...) and provides the ground and the basis for metaphysics." What is unasked in this first question of metaphysics has to be thought of as a second question which is spoken of in the form of the infinitive: die Frage nach dem Sein als Sein, the question about be as be. This is the question which Heidegger tried to raise at the beginning of Sein und Zeit and which remains for him as the task of thinking at the end of philosophy. It is a question which Heidegger was ultimately unable to answer but which he was also unable to put to rest. It is a question in which we are still floundering, caught up in what remains for us the question of metaphysics. It is time perhaps to see if the question has been rightly framed. (shrink)

This is another in the growing list of studies on Hegel’s Phenomenology. More specifically, it is designed for “the beginning student” and purports “to offer a reading which is less confusing than Hegel’s own text” and therefore uses “very little of Hegel’s terminology or style of writing”. After a brief introduction in which the general nature of Hegelian philosophy and some of its key ideas are presented, it goes on to discuss both the Preface and Hegel’s “Introduction” somewhat more critically (...) before going on to deal with the successive sections of the Phenomenology from “Sense Certainty” to “Absolute Knowledge” somewhat more exegetically, as the author herself puts it. After the section on Reason and before that on Spirit, a special chapter on “The State” is inserted, which discusses a number of topics from Hegel’s Philosophy of Right by way of introduction to subsequent parts of the Phenomenology. Three chapters are then devoted to the section on Spirit, followed by two relatively short chapters on “Religion in General” and “Absolute Knowledge.” A brief bibliography is added which includes only a few of the better known works on Hegel, but none of these sources seems to have influenced Dudeck much in her reading. This is very much her own work on the Phenomenology and it has to be viewed as such. Whether one likes it or not, agrees with it or not, will depend on one’s own reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology and one’s own interpretation of its method. (shrink)

IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT SUÁREZ WAS THE WATERSHED for much of modern metaphysics understood as the science or the philosophy of being, or as ontology. Not only was he the first to write a systematic treatise in metaphysics that broke with the centuries-long tradition of commenting on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, but he also set metaphysics on a new course that was to define the parameters for ontology as the modern version of the ancient science of being as being. (...) Heidegger himself recognized this significance of Suárez for modern metaphysics, as he was beginning to work out his own reconstruction of a philosophy of being in terms of an ontological difference between be and being, when he wrote of Suárez as “putting the ontological problems into a systematic form for the first time, a form which determined a classification of metaphysics that lasted through subsequent centuries down to Hegel.” I would argue that Heidegger should have included himself in that classification, along with Wolff, Kant, and Hegel, even though he was trying to break out of it by positing the ontological difference as the basis for raising anew the modern question of being. (shrink)

Two kinds of remarks can be made on Kainz’s book on the Phenomenology of Spirit. First, there are those that pertain to it as an instrument to help in the reading of the Phenomenology itself and, second, there are those that pertain to the questions that Kainz’s interpretation of the Phenomenology raises. Both of these issues deserve some attention in approaching Kainz’s book and, in a sense, they cannot be separated, since any reading of a philosophical work is already an (...) interpretation and this is especially true of a work like Hegel’s Phenomenology. Indeed, the peculiarity of the Phenomenology as a philosophical work, which Kainz remarks upon along with many others, makes it very susceptible to a variety of interpretations, all of which could be called into question. In this regard the Phenomenology might be likened, not just to a novel, as Kainz suggests, but also to a poem, whose meaning cannot be strictly paraphrased but stands and falls with the language and structure of the work itself. This may be why, apart from the inherent difficulty and complexity of the Phenomenology, we have had so few commentaries on it, in comparison say to Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, which itself is surely not lacking in difficulty. But it is not to say that the Phenomenology should not be analysed and commented upon. We do that even with the best of poems. It is only to say that there is no substitute for reading the Phenomenology itself, for its meaning grows out of the very creation of language which it represents and, in a sense, there is no other way of getting at its meaning than through its very movement leading to Absolute Knowing. If an analysis or a commentary can help to enter into this movement, so much the better. If they stand in the way or impede the movement, they must be set aside. For I am convinced that Hegel himself knew better than anyone else what he was up to in the Phenomenology and the way that he did it may well be the only way of doing what he wanted to do. This being said, however, in what follows I shall try to make comments on both the issue of instrument and the issue of interpretation in succession. (shrink)