I selectively and critically review the state of knowledge about human evolution and the place of humans vis-à-vis living apes, with emphasis on bipedal posture and locomotion, expansion of the brain and associated cognitive capacities, speech, tool behavior, culture, and society. I end with a personal perspective on God and Heaven.

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, it (...) is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

Although Dilthey is increasingly recognized as a seminal philosopher whose thought finds significant expression in the works of Heidegger, Husserl, Jaspers, Mannheim, Weber, Spranger, Simmel, Troeltsch, and Buber, his writings are available in English in only the scantiest of excerpts. Book-size English commentaries on Dilthey can be counted without exhausting the fingers of one hand. The present, slim volume would, therefore, be of interest for no other reason than that it adds a reference to an all-too skimpy library. Fortunately, it (...) is of value for much better reasons. What Tuttle has attempted is the first systematic exposition of Dilthey's life-long attempt to establish an objectively valid basis for his theory of Verstehen and Nacherlebnis.. This may belie the subtitle of the book, but it can hardly be denied that the exposition is at least equal in importance to the critical analysis which follows it. The reconstruction of Dilthey's arguments consists of a description of: his concept of the special nature of human life which permits the subject and object of historical knowledge to be the same; the original descriptive psychology which Dilthey worked out as the basis for the study of history and of all the human sciences; his somewhat equivocal abandonment of psychology because of its ahistorical and law-like character in favor of an emphasis on empirical life assertions which are internalized by the method of Verstehen; his notion of human nature and the tension between its historically changing aspect and its unchanging epistemological aspect; the role of motives in Dilthey's system as causes of historical action; and his theory of ideal types as a methodological device for generalizing without having to utilize the causal explanations of natural science. The book begins and ends on the same note; namely, that Dilthey is unable to verify that the re-experience of the historian is actually a duplicate of the experience of the historical agent. But in between the opening statement and its repetition at the end, a wealth of insight into Dilthey's thought is provided.--H. B. (shrink)

"Using hundreds of examples from newsrooms large and small, author Ron F. Smith challenges readers to determine how they would face moral dilemmas on the job. Chapters evaluate the search for principles, accountability, truth and objectivity, errors and corrections, diversity, "faking" the news, reporters and their sources, privacy, the government watch, deception, compassion, the business of news, journalists and their communities, and financial concerns. New to this edition: a chapter on improving coverage of minorities, expanded discussion of broadcast journalism and (...) reporting on the Internet, and stories from recent front pages and TV news programs."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved. (shrink)

In 'Een handvol filosofen' staan de filosofen centraal die sinds de oprichting van de Vrije Universiteit in 1880 aan deze instelling verbonden zijn geweest. Het gaat hierbij niet alleen om de inhoud van hun werk, maar ook om de personen zelf. Er waren filosofiedocenten die zich met de universiteit identificeerden en zich volledig konden ontplooien. Er waren er echter ook voor wie dit niet gold, die geïsoleerd of in gewetensnood raakten. Veel filosofiestudenten waren actief betrokken bij wat er in hun (...) faculteit gebeurde. Zij namen initiatieven, protesteerden soms tegen de gang van zaken en kozen partij in conflictsituaties. Sinds het eind van de jaren zestig van de twintigste eeuw verloor de Vrije Universiteit geleidelijk haar christelijk karakter. Tegenwoordig werken alle stafleden vanuit hun eigen motivatie mee aan een hoofdzakelijk seculier geworden universiteit, die ruimte biedt voor religieuze en levensbeschouwelijke diversiteit. (shrink)

A model is developed which identifies and describes various factors which affect ethical and unethical behavior in organizations, including a decision-maker's social, government and legal, work, professional and personal environments. The effect of individual decision maker attributes on the decision process is also discussed. The model links these influences with ethical and unethical behavior via the mediating structure of the individual's decision-making process.

In the Categories Aristotle defined substance as that which is neither predicable of nor in another. In saying that a substance is not predicable of another, Aristotle meant to exclude genera and species from the category substance. Aman is a substance but not man. In saying that a substance is not in another, Aristotle meant to exclude property particulars from the category. A man is a substance, not his color. The Categories treats substances as simples. Though a particular substance, Bucephalus (...) the horse, has parts, it is nevertheless a single entity in the category substance and, hence, incomplex in the way a black thing or a running man are not. Black things and runners are complex because they are aggregates of substances and property particulars. Even if a horse is one substance and, thus, an entity, a horse is made of parts and one may wonder how it is related to its parts, as well as how its being made of parts coheres with the definition of substance given in the Categories. (shrink)

This paper examines an important but neglected topic in Suárez’s metaphysics–—namely, his theory of efficient causation. According to Suárez, efficient causation is to be identified with action, one of Aristotle’s ten highest genera or categories. The paper shows how Suárez’s identification of efficient causation with action helps to shed light on his views about the precise nature of efficient causation, and its role in his ontology. More specifically, it shows that Suárez understands efficient causation to be a distinctive or sui (...) generis type of entity, and that he thinks we must adopt this view in order to account for the facts of efficient causation. The paper also examines several objections to Suárez’s account. (shrink)

Introduction: Platonic dramatology -- The political and philosophical problems. Using pre-Socratic philosophy to support political reform: the Athenian stranger ; Plato's Parmenides: Parmenides' critique of Socrates and Plato's critique of Parmenides ; Becoming Socrates ; Socrates interrogates his contemporaries about the noble and good -- Paradigms of philosophy. Socrates' positive teaching ; Timaeus-Critias: completing or challenging Socratic political philosophy? ; Socratic practice -- The trial and death of Socrates. The limits of human intelligence ; The Eleatic challenge ; The trial (...) and death of Socrates -- Conclusion: Why Plato made Socrates his hero. (shrink)

Many people are worried about the harmful effects of climate change but nevertheless enjoy some activities that contribute to the emission of greenhouse gas (driving, flying, eating meat, etc.), the main cause of climate change. How should such people make choices between engaging in and refraining from enjoyable greenhouse-gas-emitting activities? In this chapter, we look at the answer provided by decision theory. Some scholars think that the right answer is given by interactive decision theory, or game theory; and moreover think (...) that since private climate decisions are instances of the prisoner’s dilemma, one rationally should engage in these activities provided that one enjoys them. Others think that the right answer is given by expected utility theory, the best-known version of individual decision theory under risk and uncertainty. In this chapter, we review these different answers, with a special focus on the latter answer and the debate it has generated. (shrink)

In this philosophically sophisticated and historically significant work, John H. Zammito reconstructs Kant's composition of The Critique of Judgment and reveals that it underwent three major transformations before publication. He shows that Kant not only made his "cognitive" turn, expanding the project from a "Critique of Taste" to a Critique of Judgment but he also made an "ethical" turn. This "ethical" turn was provoked by controversies in German philosophical and religious culture, in particular the writings of Johann Herder and the (...) Sturm und Drang movement in art and science, as well as the related pantheism controversy. Such topicality made the Third Critique pivotal in creating a "Kantian" movement in the 1790s, leading directly to German Idealism and Romanticism. The austerity and grandeur of Kant's philosophical writings sometimes make it hard to recognize them as the products of a historical individual situated in the particular constellation of his time and society. Here Kant emerges as a concrete historical figure struggling to preserve the achievements of cosmopolitan Aufkl-rung against challenges in natural science, religion, and politics in the late 1780s. More specifically Zammito suggests that Kant's Third Critique was animated throughout by a fierce personal rivalry with Herder and by a strong commitment to traditional Christian ideas of God and human moral freedom. "A work of extraordinary erudition. Zammito's study is both comprehensive and novel, connecting Kant's work with the aesthetic and religious controversies of the late eighteenth century. He seems to have read everything. I know of no comparable historical study of Kant's Third Critique."-Arnulf Zweig, translator and editor of Kant's ;IPhilosophical Correspondence, 1759-1799;X "An intricate, subtle, and exciting explanation of how Kant's thinking developed and adjusted to new challenges over the decade from the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason to the appearance of the Critique of Judgment. "--John W. Burbidge, Review of Metaphysics "There has been for a long time a serious gap in English commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment Zammito's book finally fills it. All students and scholars of Kant will want to consult it."--Frederick Beiser, Times Literary Supplement. (shrink)

In the last several years, there has been an uptick of scholarly interest in Aristotelian theories of efficient causation. Much of this interest has focused on the late scholastic figure Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). This paper clarifies an important but neglected aspect of Suárez's theory of efficient causation—namely, his account of active causal powers. Like other Aristotelians, Suárez understands active causal powers as features that enable their subjects to perform certain sorts of actions. For example, a fire is able to heat (...) in virtue of its power or capacity for heating. However, it is not immediately clear which items in an Aristotelian ontology perform the role of an active power. The paper explains and motivates Suárez's answer to this question, and shows how this answer influences his position in a scholastic controversy about the causal roles of substantial and accidental forms in substantial change. (shrink)

The late scholastic philosopher Francisco Suárez articulates and defends an extraordinarily detailed account of efficient causation. Some of the most interesting and difficult questions connected with this account concern the particular types of efficient causation he acknowledges. This paper clarifies one of the most fundamental distinctions Suárez employs in the course of his treatment of efficient causation—namely, that between motion or change, on the one hand, and creation ex nihilo, on the other. The paper shows that, although motion and creation (...) differ in systematic and important ways, they nevertheless can both be captured by Suárez’s general theoretical model of efficient causation. Moreover, the paper shows that creation serves as a kind of limit case of efficient causation, and accordingly that it informs how Suárez understands motion or change as well. (shrink)

There is another set of entities that needs to be brought into the conversation about the ethical, legal, and social implications of scientific conduct. This widely varied group includes not‐for‐profit educational, academic, public‐service, and philanthropic organizations other than the type mentioned above as well as for‐profit businesses. Despite their major differences, these organizations may all be in a position to make decisions, directly or indirectly, about the conduct of scientific research. And those decisions may have a significant impact on the (...) parties normally involved in thinking and talking about obligations and concerns—the researchers, the subjects, and the general public. Yet there are few if any conceptual frameworks to help organizations address the ethical, legal, and social issues related to conducting scientific research. There are also few resources to help organizations find and develop the expertise required to make responsible decisions or communicate those decisions in ways that could support and advance the ethical conduct of research.In what follows, we try to identify and explore the duties, rights, and interests of one such organization, the Center for Talented Youth at Johns Hopkins University, when asked to play a supporting role in research on the genetics of intelligence. As central agents in this case, we hope to demonstrate why organizations like CTY cannot be neglected in the broader effort to ensure trustworthy research into the genetics of intelligence. (shrink)

Extract in lieu of Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to propose a hypothesis to illuminate Ortega's critical response to Heidegger's question of being (Seinsfrage). While Ortega integrated the classical requirements for the idea of Being into his idea of human life as radical reality, Heidegger's delineation of human life (Dasein) was only preliminary to the final philosophical task of understanding the question of Being itself (Sein) as the transcendent horizon for human life. For Ortega human life is not (...) merely a preliminary ontology that points to another transcendent reality, but final reality itself. I shall argue here that: (1) Ortega saw Heidegger's Seinsfrage as both empty and dead-ended as a philosophical enterprise; (2) by Heidegger's refusal to understand human life and its circumstances as the final goal of philosophy, he failed to account for the reality of human life in its circumstantial, historical, and methodological dimensions; and (3) Heidegger's philosophical project results in a frozen and metaphysical concept of human nature that transcends the historicality of humanity's actual existence and artificially bifurcates history into opposed metaphysical and empirical dimensions that only Ortega's doctrine of historical reason can synthesize. (shrink)

This Is A New Release Of The Original 1896 Edition.