Heidegger, M. Andenken an Max Scheler.--Gadamer, H.-G. Max Scheler, der Verschwender.--Plessner, H. Erinnerungen an Max Scheler.--Kuhn, H. Max Scheler als Faust.--Dempf, A. Schelers System christlicher Geistphilosophie als Grundlage einer religiösen Erneuerung.--Scheler, M. Neun Briefe an Karl Muth.--Rombach, H. Die Erfahrung der Freiheit.--Landgrebe, L. Geschichtsphilosophische Perspektiven bei Scheler und Husserl.--Theunissen, M. Wettersturm und Stille.--Good, P. Anschauung und Sprache.--Welsch, W. Mit Scheler.--Avé-Lallement, E. Die phänomenologische Reduktion in der Philosophie Max Schelers.--Gehlen, A. Rückblick auf die Anthropologie (...) Max Schelers.--Schoeps, H. J. Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos.--Ströker, E. Der Tod im Denken Max Schelers.--Wyss, D. und Huppmann, G. Die Bedeutung Max Schelers für die Medizinische Anthropologie.--Lieber, H.-J. Bemerkungen zur Wissenssoziologie Max Schelers.--Fetscher, I. Max Schelers Auffassung von Krieg und Frieden.--Bochenski, J. M. Ist die Sprache Schelers in eine analytische übersetzbar? (shrink)

My own serious study of Max Scheler began in 1958 when I pre sented a Master's thesis to St. Louis University under the direction of Professor Vernon]. Bourke on Scheler's value-theory. Three years later when I returned to complete my doctorate work at St. Louis University I returned also to the study of Max Scheler. In the meantime, several more volumes of the Gesammelte Werke had appeared, several new translations of Scheler were published and the whole (...) area ofphenome nology began to be more favorably accepted by the American intel lectual community. My doctoral dissertation was on Scheler's theory of community under the expert and careful direction of Professor James Collins. The bulk of the present work is a direct result of my work at St. Louis University. I have never regretted the time and effort spent on the study of Scheler. He can be classified as nothing short of a genius, not only in the breadth of his interests but also in the vitality, unity and depth of his thought. Most students of Scheler criticize his lack of unity; I claim to find strong lines of inner consistency throughout his writings. In the second place, my study of Scheler has put me into contact with many of the most dominant intellectual influences of the day. (shrink)

Max Scheler seems to present two distinct approaches to philosophy of culture. In the early period of his Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik and “Ordo Amoris,” he describes cultures as being defined by their distinct order of value preferencings. In his later period of his “Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens,” however, Scheler explains the dynamics of culture in terms of the interaction of what he calls “real” and “ideal sociological factors,” rooted in various drives and (...) spirit, respectively. These approaches are fully compatible and complementary, the former describing culture’s vertical structure and the latter, its horizontal structure. Together these two approaches offer a comprehensive philosophy of culture, deserving greater attention. (shrink)

This article argues that Max Scheler’s conception of “religious acts” and his criticisms of types of “difference” help rethink the relevance of discernment and decision making, especially today, in an age in which we are faced with an unprecedented range of "options" in nearly every area of social lives. After elucidating Scheler’s engagements with religion in On the Eternal in Man, his work is then applied to rethinking more deeply the four steps of Christian discernment developed by the (...) 5th century Mystic, John Cassian. Since Scheler’s work offers detailed and passionate depictions of the religious relevance of "values", it is an untapped resource for expanding upon Cassian’s still relevant work on discernment; an expansion that is necessary in order to demonstrate the often overlooked importance of discernment. This article concludes by employing the work of these two thinkers to show how discernment can help “sort-out,” like good "money changers", the differences between 1) finite values and supreme values, 2) an authentic and inauthentic doctrine of God 3) true differences and superficial differences, and 4) the social imaginaries of theomorphism and anthropomorphism. (shrink)

Subtitled "Rejections of Cartesian Dualism" this collection of essays traces through western Philosophy the strong but often overlooked idea that the body and the mind are not two different kinds of entity somehow reconciled in man, but rather a unity that is man. The editor's introduction sets forth Aristotle's ideas, concentrating on the dictum that it is the same man that thinks and runs. Spicker also treats Descartes' view, and the view of the Cartesians, ably separating the two when necessary. (...) The rest of the book is basically arranged chronologically, starting with extracts from Spinoza's Ethics, an essay on these extracts by Hans Jonas, and then moving through Julien de la Mettrie and two short essays by Kant. The second part of the book contains interesting essays on the human body by John Dewey, Douglas Long, and B. A. O. Williams, all defending the essential unity of body and soul. The third and last section of the book is itself divided into two parts, the first of which, entitled "Philosophy of Embodiment" contains four extracts from the works of prominent phenomenologists, Max Scheler, Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. These essays all center around the necessity of a concept of the "lived body" to the understanding of man's being-in-the-world. In the last section, the quality of the essays drops, although it is delightfully leavened by a witty essay by Richard Griffith on the foot. This section contains essays on particular parts of the human body, such as sight and the upright posture, by Herbert Plügge, Hans Jonas, and Erwin W. Straus. There is a selected bibliography for those who are captured by this basic thread of western thought.--W. A. de V. (shrink)

Nishida Kitarō developed a revolutionary account of the I-Thou relation, according to which the true self, in its deepest recesses, is turned inside out so as to be radically open to alterity. He thus offers an original and significant contribution to a countercurrent to the tendency toward solipsistic subjectivity in the history of modern Western philosophy. With his watershed essay ›I and Thou‹ he deserves to be recognized as key figure in the revolutionary movement toward an appreciation of alterity, a (...) rethinking of community, and the development of an essentially dialectical, dialogical, interpersonal, and social conception of the self. The aim of this essay is to elucidate Nishida’s account of the I-Thou relation and to make a case for its contemporary significance by setting it in critical dialogue with other philosophers who have addressed this topic, including Scheler, Husserl, Buber, Lévinas and Ricoeur. (shrink)

This chapter discusses the problematic reception of Pragmatism in Europe, especially Germany, in the early twentieth century. It examines the important role played by American Pragmatism, especially Charles Sanders Peirce and William James, in the development of the sociology of knowledge and reflects on what lessons one might learn from such an historical investigation for social constructivist thought today. It looks into Max Scheler's complex reaction to the works of Peirce and James as their versions of Pragmatism relate to (...) Scheler's own sociology of knowledge. The chapter discusses some of the reasons German scholars have been slow to engage Dewey's ideas, and demonstrates some of the ways in which problems of translation still affect international studies in Pragmatism. (shrink)

Every scholar and reader of William James is aware of his frequent uses of "energy," especially in his discussions of ethics and most notably in his 1906 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, "The Energies of Men".[1] But while other interpretations treat James's use of "energy" as merely one of his several folksy metaphors, The Ethics of Energy: William James's Moral Philosophy in Focus is the first monograph, as its author, Sergio Franzese, rightly claims, to focus upon "energy" as (...) a central concept in James's ethics. Ethics, for James, is not about values, goods, or principles but about the organization of energy, especially into habits, in the service of personal, aesthetic ideals. As such this book is an original and valuable addition to the literature on James, and it does much to bring James into closer dialogue with other recent efforts to rethink ethics without appeal to some rule of reason, whether it be in the form of an utilitarian calculus or a categorical imperative. Such efforts include those of Friedrich Nietzsche, whom Franzese discusses extensively, Max Scheler, whom he mentions only briefly (51-52), and especially Michel Foucault, whom he does not mention at all. (shrink)

Peter Abelard (1079–1142 ce) was the most wide‐ranging philosopher of the twelfth century. He quickly established himself as a leading teacher of logic in and near Paris shortly after 1100. After his affair with Heloise, and his subsequent castration, Abelard became a monk, but he returned to teaching in the Paris schools until 1140, when his work was condemned by a Church Council at Sens. His logical writings were based around discussion of the “Old Logic”: Porphyry's Isagoge, aristotle'S Categories and (...) On Interpretation and boethius'S textbook on topical inference. They comprise a freestanding Dialectica (“Logic”; probably c.1116), a set of commentaries (known as the Logica [Ingredientibus], c. 1119) and a later (c. 1125) commentary on the Isagoge (Logica Nostrorum Petititoni Sociorum or Glossulae). In a work Abelard called his Theologia, issued in three main versions (between 1120 and c.1134), he attempted a logical analysis of trinitarian relations and explored the philosophical problems surrounding God's claims to omnipotence and omniscience. The Collationes (“Debates,” also known as “Dialogue between a Christian, a Philosopher and a Jew”; probably c.1130) present a rational investigation into the nature of the highest good, in which the Christian and the Philosopher (who seems to be modeled on a philosopher of pagan antiquity) are remarkably in agreement. The unfinished Scito teipsum (“Know thyself,” also known as the “Ethics”; c.1138) analyses moral action. (shrink)

This paper discusses Max Scheler’s early works, written between 1899 and 1906 in a neo-Kantian context. The very little attention the literature paid to them was almost always guided by the only aim to single the themes out which can be used as signs of Scheler’s future „conversion“ to phenomenology. In consequence of this predominant approach, the neo- Kantianism that characterizes Scheler’s early works has been treated as a vague notion and never examined as such. The paper (...) specifies this notion through an examination of Scheler’s early works which shows their most significant theoretical debts (to R. Eucken, W. Windelband and particularly to H. Cohen) and the questions they deal with, i.e. the relation between knowledge and morality as different kinds of objective forms of experience; the methodological problem in philosophy; the development of a transcendental logic as general science of objectivity. (shrink)

F. W. 니체가 르상티망을 인류가 그리스도교 윤리에 지배되어 노예의 삶을 살므로 인해 생기는 것으로 보는 반면에, M. 셸러는 인류가 생명 삶에 필요한 가치들만 추구하는 가운데 경쟁·비교의 결과 격차의식으로 말미암아 생기는 것으로 본다. 그러므로 인류가 생명 삶에 필요한 물질가치·향락가치·권력가치의 추구에만 얽매이지 않고, 정신 삶에 필요한 심적 가치·정신적 가치도 어느 정도 추구한다면, 비교본능이 덜 발동하고 그로 인해 인간들간의 격차의식도 약화되며 르상티망도 해소될 것이다. 알다시피 물질가치나 권력가치는 우리들이 함께 나눠가질 수 없는 반면에 심적 가치나 정신적 가치는 함께 나눠가질 수 있다. 그래서 전자 가치의 (...) 추구에는 비교본능이 발동하는 반면에 후자 가치의 추구에는 그렇지 않다. 비교하여 열등한 결과가 쌓여 실제 사회적으로 영향을 미칠 때, 그 영향에 피해를 입고 그 피해에 대한 무기력감과 허약성을 체험한 인간들이 쉽게 르상티망에 빠질 수 있다. 그런데 비교본능이 덜 발동하는 정신적 가치를 물질가치 못지않게 추구할 때, 물질가치 추구의 결과로 생겨난 르상티망으로부터 얼마간 자유로울 것이다.BR 그럼 심적 가치나 정신적 가치를 추구하도록 하기 위해서 어떻게 해야 하나? 셸러에 따르면, 이런 가치를 추구하도록 하기 위해 이런 가치를 바라볼 수 있는 눈을 개방해야 하고, 이 눈을 개방하기 위해서 정신적 감정을 일깨워야 한다. 생명의 삶을 잘 살도록 하기 위해 생명가치를 지향·추구할 생명감정은 본능적으로 개방되어 있지만, 아직 인간은 진화 상 덜된 인간으로서 정신적 감정이 온전히 개방되어 있지 않다. 이 정신적 감정을 개방하는 일은 ‘사랑’으로 가능하다. ‘사랑하라’는 그리스도교 윤리의 실천을 통해서 사랑의 힘으로 심정의 질서를 바로 잡아, 우리 인류는 이른바 저급한 가치의 추구에만 얽매이지 않고 고급의 정신적 가치를 추구함으로써 르상티망을 어느 정도 해소할 수 있다. 이상이 현대 자본주의사회에서 르상티망에 걸려 허덕이고 있는 인류를 그리스도교 윤리의 실천으로 구원하고자 하는 셸러 사상이라 추정해보는 바이다. (shrink)

The idols of self-knowledge.--Ordo Amoris.--Phenomenology and the theory of cognition.--The theory of the three facts.--Idealism and realism.

In the Transcendental Aesthetic (TA), Kant is typically held to make negative assertations about “things in themselves,” namely that they are not spatial or temporal. These negative assertions stand behind the “neglected alternative” problem for Kant’s transcendental idealism. According to this problem, Kant may be entitled to assert that spatio-temporality is a subjective element of our cognition, but he cannot rule out that it may also be a feature of the objective world. In this paper, I show in a new (...) way how Kant’s view (focusing on his conclusions about space) is not subject to this objection, by showing that he does not make the denial about mind-independent reality that he is typically held to make. The argument develops consequences of a new reading of Kant’s expression “an sich selbst” (‘in itself’; ‘in themselves’). I argue that “an sich selbst” or “per se” has a special, judgment-level role, so that this expression does not form new noun-terms adjectivally. It follows that the conceptual unit of Kant’s “Conclusions” in the TA is simply “things” (Dinge), since “things in themselves” is not a nominal expression; Kant adopts the Wolffian ontological use of “thing” as the basic kind-term for any existent. The arguments that things per se are not in space are arguments that space cannot be a necessary property or relations of things as a kind. I show that this does not involve the positive claim about mind-independent reality that inspires the neglected alternative objection. (shrink)

Explores, at different levels, the social emotions of fellow-feeling, the sense of identity, love and hatred, and traces their relationship to one another and to the values with which they are associated. This book reviews the evaluations of love and sympathy in different historical periods and in different social and religious environments.

While the idea of philosophy as conceptual analysis has attracted many adherents and undergone a number of variations, in general it suffers from an authority problem with two dimensions. First, it is unclear why the analysis of a concept should have objective authority: why explicating what we mean should express how things are. Second, conceptual analysis seems to lack intersubjective authority: why philosophical analysis should apply to more than a parochial group of individuals. I argue that Hegel’s conception of social (...) ontology, focused on his concept of “ethical life” (Sittlichkeit), helps to explain how concepts (and their explication) have both objective and intersubjective authority in the social domain. Hegel claims that modern institutions are the product of self-conscious purposes, so that they are conceptually constituted. Concepts do not just represent these objects and so depend on a contingent relation to them. As many contemporary social ontologists agree, this means that our concepts of these institutions are uniquely epistemically “transparent.” They have objective authority. Concepts have intersubjective authority in the modern world as well, according to Hegel. However, I show that this feature of Hegel’s account does not rely on the solution to a philosophical problem. Rather, since the concepts of modern ethical life are “essentially contested,” their content depends on the practical and political agreement of modern subjects. This means that concepts can only have objective authority if some prior intersubjective agreement has been reached. The role of philosophy as conceptual analysis is thus importantly dependent on political developments. (shrink)

The fundamental topic of the farticle is to present the role of feelings in the process of assessment. The major point of reference is Max Scheler’s phenomenology of feelings together with his comprehension of love as the basis of the Christian morality. I start my analysis with the short presentation of a system of values, which is formulated by Scheler from the point of axiological absolutism, and proceed to the influence of emotional functions onto our perceiving values, which (...) the philosopher considers to be the intentional feelings of values. Together with the consideration of human emotional life, Scheler’s conception of a human being as a spiritual centre that is the background for developing a particular bond between the man and the God should be paid attention to. The objective of the article is to present the outline of Scheler’s conception of love as a cornerstone for getting to know the absolute, i.e. the experience of love as the essence of Christian faith. (shrink)

Asperó and Schindler have completely solved the Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] problem. They have proved that if [Formula: see text] holds then Axiom [Formula: see text] holds, with no additional assumptions. The key question now concerns the relationship between [Formula: see text] and Axiom [Formula: see text]. This is because the foundational issues raised by the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. [Formula: see text] arguably persist in the problem of Axiom [Formula: see text] vs. (...) [Formula: see text]. The first of our two main theorems is that Axiom [Formula: see text] is equivalent to Axiom [Formula: see text], and as a corollary we show that Axiom [Formula: see text] fails in all the known models of [Formula: see text]. This suggests that [Formula: see text] actually refutes Axiom [Formula: see text]. Our second main theorem is that the [Formula: see text] Conjecture holds assuming [Formula: see text]. This is the strongest partial result known on this conjecture which is one of the central open problems of [Formula: see text]-theory and [Formula: see text]-logic. These results identify a fundamental asymmetry between the Continuum Hypothesis and any axiom which is both [Formula: see text]-expressible and which implies [Formula: see text], on the basis of generic absoluteness for the simplest of the nontrivial sentences of Third-Order Number Theory. These are the [Formula: see text]-sentences with no parameters. Such sentences are those which simply assert the existence of a set [Formula: see text] for which some property involving only quantification over [Formula: see text] holds. (shrink)

Introductory Remarks IN A MAJOR WORK planned for the near future I will attempt to develop a non-formal ethics of Values on the broadest possible basis of ...

Inleidend studieboek op universitair niveau over de Nederlandse rechtswetenschap.

Included are essays in epistemology, metaphysics, and philosophical psychology by one of the most important twentieth-century continental philosophers.

This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must (...) put their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

Nachdruck des Originals von 1916. Max Scheler wurde v.a. durch sein Werk Formalismus in der der Ethik und die materielle Wertethik bekannt, was erstmals 1913 erschien und hier in einer Ausgabe von 1916 vorliegt. Die von ihm vorgestellte Wertethik ist durch ein Loslösen von der kantschen Pfichtethik gekennzeichnet.