Journal of Political Philosophy, EarlyView.

Mueller et al. discuss the role of acoustic cues in detecting language structure more generally. Across languages, there are clear links between acoustic cues and syntactic structure. They show that AGL experiments implementing analogous links demonstrate that prosodic cues, as well as various auditory biases, facilitate the learning of structural rules. Some of these biases, e.g. for auditory grouping, are also present in other species.

The feedback arrow extending from the response to the distal state in the lens model, together with Brunswik's dictum that the organism is a stabiliser of systems, implies a dynamic view of behaviour. This paper describes the main problems in the study of dynamic decision making: feedback delays and the feedback structure of the tasks. It also describes microworlds, a methodology for studying dynamic decision making in the laboratory. The results from experiments with microworlds show that subjects have problems compensating (...) for feedback delays and side effects. These results are discussed in terms of Brunswik's distinction between perception and thinking. (shrink)

Volume IV of the edition of Martin Bucer's letters covers the period from January to September 1530. The main emphasis is on the controversy over Communion from the Disputation in Marburg in 1529 until the end of the Augsburg Imperial Diet in 1530.

English summary: Gilduin (1155) was, from 1113, the first abbot of the community of the Canons Regular of St Augustine, soon to become an abbey, under the auspices of St Victor of Marseille, on the left bank of the river Seine. After the death of his confrere Hugh, who was of German descent and the leading figure of the Victorines, on 11 February 1141, abbot Gilduin took care that the writings of Hugh were collected and compiled in a representative complete (...) edition. This 'Gilduin-edition' - as it is called in Medieval scholarship - comprises four volumes, the first of which is reconstructed herewith and presented in print. This volume follows the 2008 edition of Hugh's theological summa, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Then as now we are dealing with a critical albeit historical text. This new volume contains nine works, among which the first ever complete edition of Hugh's Cronica surely stands out. German description: Gilduin (+ 1155) war ab 1113 der erste Abt der einige Jahre zuvor gegrundeten und bald zur Abtei erhobenen Gemeinschaft von Augustinerchorherren unter dem Patronat des hl. Victor von Marseille, auf dem linken Ufer der Seine. Nach dem Tode seines Mitbruders Hugo, des aus Deutschland stammenden fuhrenden Kopfes der Viktoriner, am 11. Februar 1141 hat Abt Gilduin dafur gesorgt, daa die Schriften Hugos gesammelt und in einer reprasentativen Gesamtausgabe zusammengestellt werden. Diese in der internationalen mediavistischen Forschung so genannte,Gilduin-Ausgabe' der Werke Hugos von Saint-Victor umfaat vier Bande, deren erster hiermit rekonstruiert und im Druck vorgelegt wird. Dieser Band folgt somit auf unsere im Jahre 2008 besorgte Ausgabe der theologischen Summe Hugos, De sacramentis christiane fidei. Damals wie heute handelt es sich um einen kritischen, wenngleich historischen Text. Dieser neue Band umfaat neun Werke, unter denen insbesondere die uberhaupt erste vollstandige Ausgabe von Hugos Cronica hervorzuheben ist. (shrink)

In a petty German principality around 1700, an influential Court Jew wants a traditional Hebrew commentary published. The printer he commissions moves shop and starts printing, not aware of severe clerical censorship. With part of the job done he has to move to another location hoping for a more liberal policy there. Within the absolutist system the episode highlights the opportunities and the limits of Court Jew's influence, as well as the prince's wavering between the prospect of profiting from a (...) new trade and the fear of risking covert un-Christian propaganda. (shrink)

It is a popular thought that emotions play an important epistemic role. Thus, a considerable number of philosophers find it compelling to suppose that emotions apprehend the value of objects and events in our surroundings. I refer to this view as the Epistemic View of emotion. In this paper, my concern is with a rivaling picture of emotion, which has so far received much less attention. On this account, emotions do not constitute a form of epistemic access to specific axiological (...) aspects of their objects. Instead it proposes that they are ways of taking a stand or position on the world. I refer to this as the Position-Taking View of emotion. Whilst some authors seem sympathetic to this view, this it has so far not been systematically motivated and elaborated. In this paper, I fill this gap and propose a more adequate account of our emotional engagement with the world than the predominant epistemic paradigm. I start by highlighting the specific way in which emotions are directed at something, which I contrast with the intentionality of perception and other forms of apprehension. I then go on to offer a specific account of the valence of emotion and show how this account and the directedness of emotions makes them intelligible as a way of taking a position on something. (shrink)

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it (...) specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy (in particular towards popular sovereignty and democratic legitimacy) that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core (populist ideology) turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism (properly specified) can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal (purely electoral) as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious (liberal) conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

Many legal, social, and medical theorists and practitioners, as well as lay people, seem to be concerned with the harmfulness of discriminative practices. However, the philosophical literature on the moral wrongness of discrimination, with a few exceptions, does not focus on harm. In this paper, I examine, and improve, a recent account of wrongful discrimination, which divides into a definition of group discrimination, and a characterisation of its moral wrong-making feature in terms of harm. The resulting account analyses the wrongness (...) of discrimination in terms of intrapersonal comparisons of the discriminatee’s actual, and relevantly counterfactual, well-being levels. I show that the account faces problems from counterfactuals, which can be traced back specifically to the orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, welfarist - concept of harm. I argue that non-counterfactual and non-comparative harm concepts face problems of their own, and don’t fit easily with our best understanding of discrimination; hence they are unsuitable to replace the orthodox concept here. I then propose a non-orthodox - comparative, counterfactual, hybrid - concept of harm, which relies on counterfactual comparisons of ways of being treated. I suggest how such a concept can help us handle the problems from counterfactuals, at least for my account of discrimination. I also show that there are similar proposals in other harm-related debates. An upshot of the paper is thus to corroborate the case for a non-orthodox, hybrid concept of harm, which seems better able to fulfil its functional roles in a variety of contexts. (shrink)

Unlike most theologians of his age, Martin Bucer proved to be farsighted with respect to European affairs: In addition to his contacts within Alsace and Germany he established relations with almost every European country. It was his ecumenical attitude that always led him to mediate between the parties in the religious battles of his time. His deep commitment to the goal of reaching agreement can be traced in all his activities, works and letters. Since the first editor, Jean Rott, died (...) in 1998, Bucer's correspondence has been edited in Erlangen. This academic edition of source material provides future research with a broad basis for significant aspects of Reformation history about which very little is known. Volume VII covers the period from October 1531 to March 1532. (shrink)

The argument that Broca's area is preferentially involved in specific syntactic operations is based on a strong assertion regarding patterns of sentence comprehension found among patients with Broca's aphasia. This assertion is shown to be largely inconsistent with the available evidence from published studies, which indicates that only a subgroup of Broca patients demonstrate the target pattern.

This essay presents a novel approach to specifying the meaning of the concept of populism, on the political position it occupies and on the nature of populism. Employing analytic techniques of concept clarification and recent analytic ideology critique, it develops populism as a political kind in three steps. First, it descriptively specifies the stereotype of populist platforms as identified in extant research and thereby delimits the peculiar political position populism occupies in representative democracies as neither inclusionary nor fascist. Second, it (...) specifies on this basis analytically–normatively the particular stance towards liberal representative democracy that unifies populism’s political position and explains how populist politics can be compelling for democratic citizens. The normative core turns out to require no more than two general principles of legitimizing political authority by elections. Surprisingly, it does not need a separate anti-pluralist or exclusionary commitment: it entails it. Third, this normative model allows a response to a contested question in the theoretical discussion, namely, whether populism can be democracy-enhancing. The article defends the negative answer in virtue of the normative core alone and does so as much vis-à-vis a minimal as vis-à-vis a normatively ambitious conception of democracy. The reconstruction of the normative core of populist ideology enables a novel argument to show that populism is incompatible with the continued democratic legitimation of political authority even in the normatively most austere conception of ‘electoral democracy’, not just with ‘liberal democracy’. Assuming a normatively more ambitious concept of democratic legitimation in terms of political autonomy, the model also produces an extremely direct argument showing that populists cannot fulfil their promise of ‘taking back control’ over political decision-making to the population. (shrink)

State governments provide preprinted advance directive forms to the general public. However, many adults in the United States (US) lack the skills necessary to read and comprehend health care-related materials. In this study, we sought to determine the readability of state government-sponsored advance directive forms.

Volume 20, Issue 2, February 2020, Page 49-50.

Research on the cognitive abilities involved in decision making has shown that, under objective risk conditions (i.e., when explicit information about possible outcomes and risks is available), superior decisions are especially predicted by executive functions and exact number processing skills, also referred to as objective numeracy. So far, decision-making research has mainly focused on exact number processing skills, such as performing calculations or transformations of symbolic numbers. There is evidence that such exact numeric skills are based on approximate number processing (...) (ANP) skills, which enable quick and accurate processing of non-symbolic numbers (e.g. Chen and Li, 2014). Very few studies, however, have investigated ANP skills in the context of risky decision making and have analyzed direct associations among the aforementioned sub functions. Possible interactions between the closely related skills have not been considered. The current study (N = 128) examines interactions of ANP skills with executive functions and objective numeracy, in predicting risky choice behavior. ANP skills are represented by the accuracy in a dot-comparison task. Decision making is measured by two versions of the Game of Dice Task (GDT), which place different emphases on the reflection of potential risks. The results show two-way as well as three-way interactions between the measures of ANP skills, executive functions, and objective numeracy in predicting risky decisions in both GDT versions. The riskiest decisions were most frequently made in case of low scores in all of the three competencies, while good performance in any one of them resulted in significant reductions of disadvantageous decisions. The findings indicate that high ANP skills can positively affect choice behavior in individuals who have weaknesses in reflectively attributed skills, namely executive functions and objective numeracy. Potential compensatory effects and mechanisms of ANP in decision making are discussed. (shrink)

I argue against Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder's explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder's explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for an objectionable form of Pascalian encroachment or it fails to be a fully general explanation of pragmatic encroachment.

In this paper we distinguish two versions of the non-identity problem: one involving positive well-being and one involving negative well-being. Intuitively, there seems to be a difference between the two versions of the problem. In the negative case it is clear that one ought to cause the better off person to exist. However, it has recently been suggested that this is not so in the positive case. We argue that such an asymmetrical treatment of the two versions should be rejected (...) and that this is evidence against views according to which it is permissible to cause the less well off person to exist in the positive non-identity case. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the (re-)conceptualisation of responsible innovation by proposing an evolutionary economic approach that focuses on the role of consumers in the innovation process. After a discussion of the philosophical foundations and ethical implications of this approach, which bears an explanatory potential that has not been adequately considered in previous discussions of responsible innovation, we present a first step towards capturing the important but often neglected role of consumers in innovation processes (including responsible innovation): We propose an agent-based (...) model that incorporates a multidimensional space of characteristics in which new products or services are represented by more than the mere aspect of price and quality. Instead, innovations are denoted by a large set of characteristics, including also negative or harmful ones. The model is used to illustrate that consumers’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality – even if considered in a simple manner – indeed play a crucial role in the creation and diffusion of responsible innovation which can and should be used for further work in this field and for possible extensions of the model. (shrink)

The development of artificial intelligence (AI) in medicine raises fundamental ethical issues. As one example, AI systems in the field of mental health successfully detect signs of mental disorders, such as depression, by using data from social media. These AI depression detectors (AIDDs) identify users who are at risk of depression prior to any contact with the healthcare system. The article focuses on the ethical implications of AIDDs regarding affected users’ health-related autonomy. Firstly, it presents the (ethical) discussion of AI (...) in medicine and, specifically, in mental health. Secondly, two models of AIDDs using social media data and different usage scenarios are introduced. Thirdly, the concept of patient autonomy, according to Beauchamp and Childress, is critically discussed. Since this concept does not encompass the specific challenges linked with the digital context of AIDDs in social media sufficiently, the current analysis suggests, finally, an extended concept of health-related digital autonomy. (shrink)

Die im vorliegenden Band veröffentlichte Vorlesung "Einleitung in die Philosophie" aus dem Wintersemester 1922/23 ist aus vier 1922 von Husserl in London unter dem Titel "Phänomenologische Methode und phänomenologische Philosophie" gehaltenen Vorträgen hervorgegangen. Die Vorlesung befasst sich vor allem mit dem für die Grundlegung eines philosophischen Systems zentralen Problem der Letztbegründung. Radikale philosophische Letztbegründung ist gemäß Husserl nur möglich in einer sich in apodiktischer Selbstkritik bewährenden phänomenologischen Transzendentalphilosophie. Die tatsächliche Durchführung einer solchen letzten, in seinen späten Schriften und Vorlesungstexten immer (...) wieder geforderten Kritik, findet sich nur in der vorliegenden Vorlesung "Einleitung in die Philosophie". Mit diesem unverzichtbaren Bestandteil seiner Ersten Philosophie bringt der vorliegende Band eine wichtige Ergänzung zu der in den Bänden VII und VIII veröffentlichten Vorlesung "Erste Philosophie" von 1923/24. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Studies in Plato's Two-Level ModelIan MuellerHolger Thesleff. Studies in Plato's Two-Level Model. Helsinki: Societas Scientarum Fennica, 1999. Pp. vi + 143. N. P.After some 30 years of incisive intervention in Platonic scholarship, Holger Thesleff here offers us "an attempt to elaborate and ground more firmly some basic theses which I have propounded in various contexts before," (1) a rather modest description of what he also describes as an (...) attempt to contribute toward "a more general agreement on how to read and interpret Plato" (5). The richness of this book makes it impossible to describe in any detail, and I shall content myself with indicating some of what I take to be its principal points of view.Thesleff"s concern for agreement arises from his perception of the vastly discrepant schools of Plato interpretation, of which the most important for him might be labeled esotericist, analytic, and "literary." The last, which can hardly be called a school at all, includes a variety of scholars who downplay "literal" interpretation and emphasize such things as "dramatic artistry, the structure of the dialogues, the characterization of settings and persons, shifts of style, allusions, play, and irony" (3). Thesleff's sympathies clearly lie with these people, perhaps to an extent which, as I shall suggest, will limit the effectiveness of his attempt to move toward a consensus.As the title indicates Thesleff builds his reading around what he calls Plato's two-level model. This two-level model is not, as one might suppose, what has been called Plato's two worlds view, the belief in a world of pure being beyond the perceived world we inhabit. Indeed, it is not a doctrine or set of doctrines at all. Rather "it is an intuitive 'vision' which offers only crude basic patterns and frames for the structures of Plato's thinking, feelings, intuitions, and intentions, from his youth to his old age, and for our understanding of them" (123). Clearly one cannot expect a full and precise articulation of this vision. Thesleff proceeds by discussing in terms of their role in the earlier dialogues ten hierarchic pairs which form part of Plato's vision: divine/human, soul/body, leading/being led (particularly important in the conduct of a Socratic discussion), truth/appearance, knowledge/opinion, intellect/senses, defined/undefined, stability/change, one/many, same/different. These hierarchic or asymmetric pairs are contrasted by Thesleff with what he calls polar opposites like large/small and light/dark. He also stresses that the hierarchic pairs of Plato's two-level model involve no separation (chorismos), but rather a communion (koinônia).As the words "from his youth to his old age" in the quotation of the previous paragraph indicate, Thesleff is a "unitarian" in his approach to Plato. His Plato is not a philosopher whose positions changed through time as a result of reasoned argument. What many scholars take to be doctrines later given up, e.g., the view that learning is being reminded (anamnêsis), are "thought experiments," which are not followed up, thought experiments made within the context of the unchanging two-level vision.Although Thesleff is a unitarian in the sense I have indicated, he does believe that a kind of order of composition can be constructed for the dialogues. I say "kind of" because Thesleff's chronology involves assumptions of revisions over time, multiple authorship, and even dialogues "written down" by people other than Plato. The resulting chronology is complex, and I here only indicate it in rough form in a way which [End Page 272] brings out what I take to be its major points. Leaving out of account those Socratic" dialogues which Thesleff takes to be latish and the posthumously completed Laws, we can say that a series of late dialogues starts with the Parmenides and includes the Timaeus, Critias, Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. All other dialogues, including the Theaetetus, were written prior to the Parmenides with the exception of the Republic, which Thesleff proposes is in its ultimate shape a late work, representing "only and purely Plato's 'own' and personal philosophy" (115). As for the other late dialogues, which have played an important... (shrink)

Recent social‐psychological research suggests that a considerable amount of, for example, racial and gendered discrimination may be connected to implicit biases: mental processes beyond our direct control or endorsement, that influence our behaviour toward members of socially salient groups. In this article I seek to improve our understanding of the phenomenon of implicit bias, including its moral status, by examining it through the lens of a theory of discrimination. In doing so, I also suggest ways to improve this theory of (...) discrimination, by creating conceptual space for implicit bias discrimination. I explore two ways of distinguishing direct and indirect discrimination and spell out the resulting four different forms of discrimination. The resulting taxonomy provides some room for implicit bias discrimination. I also deal with four challenges to my proposal for capturing implicit bias within discrimination theory: the metaphysical challenge, the moral insignificance challenge, the causal connection challenge, and the challenge from irreducibly collective bias. (shrink)

J’ai souvent songé que le propre du clerc dans l’âge moderne est de prêcher dans le désert. Je crois que j’y suis passé maître.Julien Benda Faute de savoir dans quelle catégorie vous classer, on ne vous inscrit dans aucune.Louis Rougier.

J’ai souvent songé que le propre du clerc dans l’âge moderne est de prêcher dans le désert. Je crois que j’y suis passé maître.Julien Benda Faute de savoir dans quelle catégorie vous classer, on ne vous inscrit dans aucune.Louis Rougier.

Anläßlich ihres 75-jährigen Jubiläums hat die Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Sankt Georgen in Frankfurt am Main am 19. und 20. Oktober 2001 eine Tagung zu "Vernünftig. Ansätze gegenwärtiger Religionsphilosophie" veranstaltet, deren wissenschaftlicher Ertrag mit diesem Band öffentlich zur Diskussion gestellt wird. In zwei thematischen Einheiten haben zuerst Philosophen und dann Theologen neue Überlegungen aus ihren Forschungsgebieten vorgetragen und aktuelle Fragestellungen referiert, auf die jeweils ein Vertreter der anderen Fakultät mit kritischen Anfragen erwidert hat. Alle Gesprächseinheiten dieser Art bilden den ersten Teil des (...) vorliegenden Bandes (C.S. Evans/A. Kreiner, P. Valadier/M. Sievernich, F. Ricken/M. Kehl; D. Böhler/H. de Ternay, H.-J. Höhn/M. Dreyer, J.A. Martínez Camino/H.-D. Mutschler, H. Verweyen/J. Splett). Darüber hinaus enthält der Band Beiträge aus dem Kreis der Teilnehmer, die auf die Diskussionen während der Tagung zurückgehen. Zwei geistesgeschichtlich orientierte Aufsätze eröffnen diesen zweiten Teil (R.M.W. Stammberger, R. Berndt). Zwei weitere Texte unterziehen zeitgenössische religionsphilosophische Entwürfe einer kritischen Analyse (G. Kruck, H.-L. Ollig), bevor systematische Skizzen das Buch abschließen (H. Watzka, R. Audi, R. Wimmer). (shrink)

When facing a choice between saving one person and saving many, some people have argued that fairness requires us to decide without aggregating numbers; rather we should decide by coin toss or some form of lottery, or alternatively we should straightforwardly save the greater number but justify this in a non-aggregating contractualist way. This paper expands the debate beyond well-known number cases to previously under-considered probability cases, in which not (only) the numbers of people, but (also) the probabilities of success (...) for saving people vary. It is shown that, in these latter cases, both the coin toss and the lottery lead to what is called an awkward conclusion, which makes probabilities count in a problematic way. Attempts to avoid this conclusion are shown to lead into difficulties as well. Finally, it is shown that while the greater number method cannot be justified on contractualist grounds for probability cases, it may be replaced by another decision method which is so justified. This decision method is extensionally equivalent to maximising expected value and seems to be the least problematic way of dealing with probability cases in a non-aggregating manner. (shrink)