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  1. Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous Vehicles.Geoff Keeling - 2017 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2017. Springer. pp. 259-272.
    Suppose that an autonomous vehicle encounters a situation where (i) imposing a risk of harm on at least one person is unavoidable; and (ii) a choice about how to allocate risks of harm between different persons is required. What does morality require in these cases? Derek Leben defends a Rawlsian answer to this question. I argue that we have reason to reject Leben’s answer.
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  • The Scope and Limits of Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Shang Long Yeo - 2020 - Dissertation, Australian National University
    Debunking arguments use empirical evidence about our moral beliefs - in particular, about their causal origins, or about how they depend on various causes - in order to reach an epistemic conclusion about the trustworthiness of such beliefs. In this thesis, I investigate the scope and limits of debunking arguments, and their implications for what we should believe about morality. I argue that debunking arguments can in principle work - they are based on plausible epistemic premises, and at least some (...)
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  • Saving Lives: For the Best Outcome?Xueshi Wang - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (1):337-351.
    In this article, I critique a moral argument developed in Frances Kamm’s Intricate Ethics: Rights, Responsibilities, and Permissible Harm. The argument, which I label the Best Outcome Argument, aims to criticize the Taurekian idea that it is not worse if more people die than if fewer do in conflict situations, where it is hard to distinguish individuals from one another solely by reference to the relative strength of their claims. I argue that the Best Outcome Argument is flawed for three (...)
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  • Moral Sunk Costs.Seth Lazar - 2018 - The Philosophical Quarterly 68 (273):841–861.
    Suppose that you are trying to pursue a morally worthy goal, but cannot do so without incurring some moral costs. At the outset, you believed that achieving your goal was worth no more than a given moral cost. And suppose that, time having passed, you have wrought only harm and injustice, without advancing your cause. You can now reflect on whether to continue. Your goal is within reach. What's more, you believe you can achieve it by incurring—from this point forward—no (...)
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  • Teasing Out Artificial Intelligence in Medicine: An Ethical Critique of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning in Medicine.Mark Henderson Arnold - 2021 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 18 (1):121-139.
    The rapid adoption and implementation of artificial intelligence in medicine creates an ontologically distinct situation from prior care models. There are both potential advantages and disadvantages with such technology in advancing the interests of patients, with resultant ontological and epistemic concerns for physicians and patients relating to the instatiation of AI as a dependent, semi- or fully-autonomous agent in the encounter. The concept of libertarian paternalism potentially exercised by AI has created challenges to conventional assessments of patient and physician autonomy. (...)
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  • What Would Taurek Do?Tyler Doggett - manuscript
    A very short, exegetical paper about Taurek's "Should the Numbers Count?," arguing against the view that Taurek requires giving chances.
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