Michael Woods provides us with a very fine literal translation of Books I, II, and VIII Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics. Apart from the books common to both the Eudemian Ethics and the Nicomachean Ethics, these are the most important for understanding this work. Book I presents a preliminary overview of happiness by means of those opinions Aristotle regards as most significant. This book corresponds to the first six chapters of Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. Woods's commentary is most detailed and (...) helpful for Chapter 8, the final chapter of Book I, which deals with the criticism of the Form of the Good. He also has useful discussions of the Aristotelian conception of eudaimonia, the distinction between practical and theoretical inquiries, and the various candidates for the good life. Book II discusses in outline what happiness is, the general nature of virtue of character, including a presentation of the doctrine of the mean, and the voluntary, including choice. It corresponds to Book I. 7 and Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. Woods analyzes the chapters on the voluntary very thoroughly and his commentary on the important first chapter, with its similarity to Book I.7 of the Nichomachean Ethics, is also very detailed. Book VIII contains a first chapter on the connection between virtue and knowledge, a second chapter on good fortune, and a third chapter on nobility or complete virtue, concluding with several references to "the god," which Woods interprets as meaning the unmoved mover of the Metaphysics in contradistinction to the view of the German commentator, Dirlmeier, who takes it to be theoretical reason. This book does not really correspond to any book of the Nicomachean Ethics but is unique. (shrink)

This excellent work on Platos most influential dialogue deserves the serious consideration of all who are interested in contemporary philosophy as well as those who concern themselves with ancient philosophy, especially Plato. Philo and Augustine, creators of medieval thought could engage Scripture in a dialogue with the first part of Timaeus speech; Kepler and Galileo, who helped to bring about modern thought, worked at perfecting the use of mathematics for the study of physical nature, inspired by the second beginning of (...) Timaeus speech, but a contemporary philosophical reflection similar to these has been unavailable. That desideratum has now been met with the publication of John Salliss book, appearing at the crossing of the old millennium with that of the new. His work continues the process of revisiting the past and heralding the future. It achieves this double goal by showing how Platos Timaeus displaces an account of the universe modeled on technical production with that of natural procreation and displaces the tentative distinction between the intelligible and the sensible by that of the chora, which both determines and limits that distinction and escapes being defined by either pole. The originary locus of the so-called Platonism of the West is revealed as the source of its most trenchant critique. (shrink)

Dr. Rhoades explains in his opening chapter that “Plato’s constant dramatic refrain is that the healing of a tyrannical eros is necessary to political wisdom. This implies that the study of eros is the study of politics and vice versa. Thus, the Platonic dialogues that we perceive as erotic are also political, and the dialogues that we classify as political are also erotic”. The working out of this thesis in his analysis of the Symposium and the Phaedrus constitute the bulk (...) of this work. But because Rhoades holds that Plato presents Socrates as having knowledge of eros, which is one of the greatest things, and maintains in the Seventh Letter that serious matters are in no way a spoken thing nor should they be written about, it becomes necessary to articulate where Plato and his Socrates stand on what Rhoades calls “their policy of refraining from writing or speaking about serious things” to which he gives the name “Silence.” The investigation of this issue requires a chapter on nineteenth- and twentieth-century commentators on Plato and another chapter presenting an extended reading of Plato’s Seventh Letter. (shrink)

This volume contains eleven essays with an introduction by James Bogen. Bogen's essay is a fine overall presentation of the issues that the papers encompass, all of which arose out of a working conference on predication and the history of philosophy and science at Pitzer College in 1981. The first five essays have as their primary focus the logical theories of Plato and Aristotle. The next two essays are respectively on Ockham and Buridan with the two following on Leibniz. The (...) collection concludes with an essay by Wilfrid Sellars on his own theory of predication and an appendix on "The Third Man Argument" by Alan Code. This work thus provides a fairly well-rounded presentation of the basic logical issues that have concerned several major philosophers from ancient times through the medieval period to the present. (shrink)

Viewable as either a development or an introduction to Dr. Sallis's earlier work, Chorology: On Beginning in Plato's Timaeus, the present volume exhibits the continuing relevance of the thought of the Platonic dialogues from Plotinus and Augustine to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Arendt, along with the writings of more recent philosophers and scholars, including Reiner Schuermann, Charles Scott, and Dennis J. Schmidt. These eight carefully crafted essays are superb dialogues with these writers and their thinking on Platonism, developing, enlarging, and supplementing (...) those thoughts in relation to Platonic texts. These essays anticipate, reflect, and recollect one another; it would require more than a simple review to reveal the riches of even one of them. The work also contains a general index, which includes reference to thirty-nine German words or phrases and a separate Greek index of ninety-seven words and phrases. (shrink)

This work is the most complete study of the Sophist in any language and the most original account of this dialogue to appear in many years. Virtually every line is subject to exhaustive scrutiny. The major contemporary approaches to reading the Sophist, especially the analytic, are also carefully criticized. The current analytic position maintains or presupposes--and usually little argumentation is given on this point--that the "combination of forms" presented in the Sophist is best understood on the model of grammatical predication. (...) Such an interpretation Rosen argues transposes that doctrine into an Aristotelian or Fregean framework, with which it is wholly incompatible. While predicates are contained in their subjects, the forms combine but remain monoeidetic, for as primary units they do not undergo internal articulation. Furthermore, a study of the text shows that the Eleatic Stranger always distinguishes between language and the forms, making it impossible for the latter to be legitimately subsumed under the former. (shrink)

This study is a comprehensive account of Plato's ontology as found in the dialogues. The author shows a thorough knowledge of most of the work done in the English speaking analytic tradition on Plato. The work's major thesis is that there are a number of significant changes in Plato's works, which either reflect a clear development or a radical revision of both methods and interests. The author is especially against a unitarian interpretation of the dialogues, which sees the Forms as (...) the major topic throughout Plato's works. He does not, though, simply side with a revisionist interpretation, for he presents Plato as returning to previous approaches even in a late dialogue. (shrink)

Prior to the appearance of this work, the posthumously published book, Plato's "Charmides" by T. G. Tuckey was the only book-length commentary in English on the Charmides. Unlike Tuckey and the more recent German writers on this dialogue Hyland has broader aims than explicating Plato's analysis of sophrosyne, although he does that as well. Hyland sees the present philosophical and cultural scene pervaded by the two apparently opposite but intimately interrelated stances of mastery and submission. To these he proposes an (...) alternative--the interrogative stance maintained by Socrates in the Platonic dialogues. Such an orientation maintains "a precarious balance" between mastery and submission. One neither accepts any answer as completely satisfactory nor does one despair of any meaningfulness to the range of answers available. Thus one avoids imposing a theory upon the facts as well as being overly submissive to whatever events are present as the manifestation of Being. This attitude, also called "responsive openness," is believed by Hyland to be the real meaning of sophrosyne, the virtue investigated in the Charmides. Such a stance is the existential attitude adopted by the philosopher; indeed, it is the virtue of philosophy. In the Charmides Socrates is presented as the mean between the submission exhibited by Chaerephon, who too uncritically accepts Socrates' way of life, and Charmides and Critias, who exhibit potential tyrannical qualities in their attempts to master those around them. (shrink)

In the Treatise of Human Nature , Hume argues that, because we have adequate ideas of the smallest parts of space, we can infer that space itself must conform to our representations of it. The paper examines two challenges to this argument based on Descartes's and Locke's treatments of adequate ideas, ideas that fully capture the objects they represent. The first challenge, posed by Arnauld in his Objections to the Meditations , asks how we can know that an idea is (...) adequate. The second challenge, implicit in Locke's Essay , asks how an empiricist can characterize an idea as inadequate, as both picking out an object and yet failing to capture it fully. In showing how Hume responds to these challenges, his theory of perceptual representation is explained and his treatment of space is related to his scepticism. His conclusion is shown not to be a characterization of space as it exists wholly apart from our powers of conception. Instead, in an adumbration of Kant, his claim is restricted to space as it appears to us. (shrink)

This textbook is a flexible and affordable collection of classic and contemporary primary sources in philosophy. The readings cover seven basic topics of Western Philosophy. The selections are long enough to present a self-contained argument but not so lengthy that students lose track of the main point. Each reading has an outline with study questions, questions for reflection and discussion, and an annotated bibliography. The book includes a glossary and an appendix on logic and argumentation.

David Hume is famous as a sceptical philosopher but the nature of his scepticism is difficult to pin down. Hume's True Scepticism provides the first sustained interpretation of Part 4 of Book 1 of Hume's Treatise: his deepest engagement with sceptical arguments, in which he notes that, while reason shows that we ought not to believe the verdicts of reason or the senses, we do so nonetheless. Donald C. Ainslie addresses Hume's theory of representation; his criticisms of Locke, Descartes, (...) and other predecessors; his account of the imagination; his understanding of perceptions and sensory belief; and his bundle theory of the mind and his later rejection of it. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Scepticism About Persons in Book II of Hume’s TreatiseDonald C. AinslieBook ii of Hume’s Treatise—especially its first two Parts on the “indirect passions” of pride, humility, love, and hatred—has mystified many of its interpreters.1 Hume clearly thinks these passions are important: Not only does he devote more space to them than to his treatment of causation, but in the “Abstract” to the Treatise, he tells us that Book II (...) “contains opinions that are altogether as new and extraordinary” (T 659) as those found in Book I. And, he says, these opinions constitute “the foundation” (T 646) for his treatment of morals and politics in Book III.2 The mystery arises, however, because in the actual text of [End Page 469] Book II Hume never spells out what makes his opinions on the passions “new and extraordinary,” nor why they are foundational for his moral theory.Thus some of his interpreters, notably Norman Kemp Smith, conclude that Hume was simply mistaken in his assessment of his treatment of the passions. While his accounts of the will and of motivation (in the early Sections of Part iii of Book II) are significant, Kemp Smith takes the extended analysis of the indirect passions to spring merely from his misplaced enthusiasm for associationist psychology. As such, the philosophical lessons to be learned from the first two Parts of Book II are slim.3 Páll Árdal, in contrast, tries to construct for Hume what he seems to have omitted—a philosophical rationale for his obvious interest in the indirect passions. Árdal starts by drawing attention to the role these passions play in Hume’s moral philosophy, in particular, his repeatedly connecting the indirect passions to the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. Árdal concludes that Hume means to equate the moral sentiments with particular kinds of indirect passions. The first two Parts of Book II are of interest, on Ardal’s reading, because it is there that he shows us how moral sentimentalism can be founded on something more fully naturalistic than Hutcheson’s somewhat mysterious “moral sense.”4I argue against Árdal’s interpretation in §2. But this reopens the problem of accounting for Hume’s interest in the indirect passions. I offer my view in §§3–5 where, like Árdal, I provide a reconstruction of Hume’s discussion of these passions in order to show how it has an underlying philosophical motivation. My claim is that Hume relies on the indirect passions to explain how we form beliefs about persons as bearers of features that make them into who [End Page 470] they are. It is by feeling an indirect passion towards someone that we think of her as more than accidentally related to some quality, such as her country, her riches, her family, or even her character traits. In support of my interpretation I point to the many parallels Hume draws between the indirect passions and the associative mechanism he offers to explain our forming causal beliefs (I.iii). And I suggest that, just as Hume’s associative explanation of causal beliefs is necessitated by his scepticism about intrinsic “necessary connexions,” so also his associative mechanism for our beliefs about persons—the indirect passions—is necessitated by a certain kind of scepticism about persons. This is not the scepticism about persons that we find in “Of personal identity” (I.iv.6), where Hume argues against the view that our perceptions inhere in a simple soul; it is rather a scepticism about there being intrinsic features of persons that define them as who they are.But, before I explain in more detail what my claim amounts to, it will help to have available a brief description of the mechanism that Hume’s takes to explain the indirect passions.1. THE MECHANISM FOR THE INDIRECT PASSIONSA passion, for Hume, is a simple impression felt in response to various circumstances. Because of their simplicity, we cannot define passions by putting their characteristic feeling into words; instead, Hume thinks, we can only delineate “such circumstances, as attend them” (T 277). Passions are indirect if those circumstances include as an outcome the focusing of attention onto a person... (shrink)

When Archimedes, while bathing, suddenly hit upon the principle of buoyancy, he ran wildly through the streets of Syracuse, stark naked, crying "eureka!" In The Moment of Proof, Donald Benson attempts to convey to general readers the feeling of eureka--the joy of discovery--that mathematicians feel when they first encounter an elegant proof. This is not an introduction to mathematics so much as an introduction to the pleasures of mathematical thinking. And indeed the delights of this book are many and (...) varied. The book is packed with intriguing conundrums--Loyd's Fifteen Puzzle, the Petersburg Paradox, the Chaos Game, the Monty Hall Problem, the Prisoners' Dilemma--as well as many mathematical curiosities. We learn how to perform the arithmetical proof called "casting out nines" and are introduced to Russian peasant multiplication, a bizarre way to multiply numbers that actually works. The book shows us how to calculate the number of ways a chef can combine ten or fewer spices to flavor his soup (1,024) and how many people we would have to gather in a room to have a 50-50 chance of two having the same birthday (23 people). But most important, Benson takes us step by step through these many mathematical wonders, so that we arrive at the solution much the way a working scientist would--and with much the same feeling of surprise. Every fan of mathematical puzzles will be enthralled by The Moment of Proof. Indeed, anyone interested in mathematics or in scientific discovery in general will want to own this book. (shrink)

This textbook is a flexible and affordable collection of classic and contemporary primary sources in philosophy. The readings cover seven basic topics of Western Philosophy. The selections are long enough to present a self-contained argument but not so lengthy that students lose track of the main point. The book includes a glossary and an appendix on logic and argumentation.

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume's treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume's project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. the belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think (...) of their perceptions. the author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet. (shrink)

The article presents a new interpretation of Hume’s treatment of personal identity, and his later rejection of it in the “Appendix” to the Treatise. Hume’s project, on this interpretation, is to explain beliefs about persons that arise primarily within philosophical projects, not in everyday life. The belief in the identity and simplicity of the mind as a bundle of perceptions is an abstruse belief, not one held by the “vulgar” who rarely turn their minds on themselves so as to think (...) of their perceptions. The author suggests that it is this philosophical observation of the mind that creates the problems that Hume finally acknowledges in the “Appendix.” He is unable to explain why we believe that the perceptions by means of which we observe our minds while philosophizing are themselves part of our minds. This suggestion is then tested against seven criteria that any interpretation of the “Appendix” must meet. (shrink)

This textbook is a flexible and affordable collection of classic and contemporary primary sources in philosophy. The readings cover seven basic topics of Western Philosophy. The selections are long enough to present a self-contained argument but not so lengthy that students lose track of the main point. Each reading has an outline with study questions, questions for reflection and discussion, and an annotated bibliography. The book includes a glossary and an appendix on logic and argumentation.

The state that we inhabit plays a significant role in shaping our lives. For not only do its institutions constrain the kinds of lives we can lead, but it also claims the right to punish us if our choices take us beyond what it deems to be appropriate limits. Political philosophers have traditionally tried to justify the state's power by appealing to their preferred theories of justice, as articulated in complex and wide-ranging moral theories—utilitarianism, Kantianism, and the like. One of (...) John Rawls's greatest contributions to political philosophy has been his recognition that this is the wrong way for this field to approach its task. He points to what he calls “the fact of reasonable pluralism,” which is the incontestable fact that in a free society people striving to lead their lives ethically will subscribe to conflicting moral and religious doctrines, many of which will be “reasonable” in the special sense of leaving their adherents willing to cooperate with those with whom they have moral disagreements. And this means that political philosophers can no longer rely on any particular “comprehensive” doctrine in their attempts to justify the state. For doing so would be unfair to those who subscribe to a conflicting reasonable doctrine; it would mean that the coercive power of the state would not be justified to them in terms they can accept, even while they were forced to abide by its terms. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: Introduction Locke on Personal Identity Hume's Critique of Locke The Belief in Mental Unity Hume's Second Thoughts Some Interpretations Unity in Reflection References.

Revered for his contributions to empiricism, skepticism and ethics, David Hume remains one of the most important figures in the history of Western philosophy. His first and broadest work, A Treatise of Human Nature, comprises three volumes, concerning the understanding, the passions and morals. He develops a naturalist and empiricist program, illustrating that the mind operates through the association of impressions and ideas. This Companion features essays by leading scholars that evaluate the philosophical content of the arguments in Hume's Treatise (...) while considering their historical context. The authors examine Hume's distinctive views on causation, motivation, free will, moral evaluation and the origins of justice, which continue to influence present-day philosophical debate. This collection will prove a valuable resource for students and scholars exploring Hume, British empiricism and modern philosophy. (shrink)

Bioethicists have virtually assumed that Tarasoff generated a duty to warn the sexual partners of an HIV‐positive man that they risked infection. Yet given the views of sex and of AIDS that have evolved in the gay community, in many cases the parallels to Tarasoff do not hold. Bioethicists should at the least attend to the community's views, and indeed should go beyond doing mere “professional ethics” to participate in the moral self‐exploration in which these views are located.

Many believe that the rational evaluation of actions depends on the rational evaluation of even basic desires. Hume, though, viewed desires as "original existences" which cannot be contrary to either truth or reason. Contemporary critics of Hume, including Norman, Brandt and Parfit, have sought a basis for the rational evaluation of desires that would deny some basic desires reason-giving force. I side with Hume against these modern critics. Hume's concept of rational evaluation is admittedly too narrow; even basic desires are, (...) despite their nonrepresentational nature, subject to rational evaluation. But this evaluation is not relevant to their tendency to generate reasons for action, and does not undermine the spirit of the Humean view of rational action. (shrink)

Neo-Humean instrumentalists hold that anagent's reasons for acting are grounded in theagent's desires. Numerous objections have beenleveled against this view, but the mostcompelling concerns the problem of ``aliendesires'' – desires with which the agent doesnot identify. The standard version ofneo-Humeanism holds that these desires, likeany others, generate reasons for acting. Avariant of neo-Humeanism that grounds anagent's reasons on her values, rather than allof her desires, avoids this implication, but atthe cost of denying that we have reasons to acton innocent whims. (...) A version of neo-Humeanismthat holds that an agent has reason to satisfyall of her desires that are not in conflictwith her values appears to allow us to grantthe reason-giving force of innocent whims whiledenying the reason-giving force of alien desires. (shrink)

One of the attractions of the Humean instrumentalist theory of practical rationality is that it appears to offer a special connection between an agent's reasons and her motivation. The assumption that Humeanism is able to assert a strong connection between reason and motivation has been challenged, most notably by Christine Korsgaard. She argues that Humeanism is not special in the connection it allows to motivation. On the contrary, Humean theories of practical rationality do connect reasons and motivation in a unique (...) and attractive way, though the nature of this connection has sometimes been misunderstood by both defenders and detractors of the theory. (shrink)

Neo-Humean instrumentalist theories of reasons for acting have been presented with a dilemma: either they are normatively trivial and, hence, inadequate as a normative theory or they covertly commit themselves to a noninstrumentalist normative principle. The claimed result is that no purely instrumentalist theory of reasons for acting can be normatively adequate. This dilemma dissolves when we understand what question neo-Humean instrumentalists are addressing. The dilemma presupposes that neo-Humeans are attempting to address the question of how to act, 'simpliciter'. Instead, (...) they are evaluating actions from the agent's normative perspective. (shrink)

I owe thanks to Annemarie Butler, Jonathan Cottrell, and Barry Stroud for their thoughtful criticism of my interpretation in Hume's True Scepticism of David Hume's epistemology and philosophy of mind as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature.1 Butler focuses on my account of the mental mechanisms Hume provides for our everyday beliefs about external objects. She also challenges my appeal to what Hume calls "secondary" ideas in my explanation of Humean introspection. Cottrell raises questions about my interpretation of perceptions (...) generally, both introspective and non-introspective, as well as my understanding of Hume's conflicted statements about... (shrink)

Common-sense holds that morality requirespeople who know that they are infected with theHuman Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV) to disclosethis fact to their sexual partners. But manygay men who are HIV-positive do not disclose,and AIDS Service Organizations (ASOs) promotepublic-health policies based on safer sex byall, rather than disclosure by those who knowthat they are infected. The paper shows thatthe common-sense view follows from a minimalsexual morality based on consent. ASOs'seeming rejection of the view follows fromtheir need to take seriously widespreadweakness of will (...) in the realm of sexuality. The author argues that gay men take themselvesto follow the common sense view, but hold thatthe possibility of a partner's HIV infection isbackground information that need not bedisclosed for sexual consent. This suggestionis criticized. The paper concludes with aconsideration of HIV disclosure and sexualethics outside of the gay community and oflegal restrictions on the sexuality of theHIV-positive. (shrink)

In Hume's True Scepticism, I offer a new interpretation of David Hume's epistemology and philosophy of mind as presented in A Treatise of Human Nature.1 I approach this task by developing what I take to be the first comprehensive2 investigation of Part 4 of Book 1. The arguments Hume offers there have frequently been addressed by the secondary literature in a piecemeal fashion, especially his account of personal identity and of our belief in the external world. But I argue in (...) HTS that they should be read as a sustained investigation of the human temptation to form philosophical systems. Consider its title: "Of the sceptical and other systems of philosophy". Hume, I suggest, is... (shrink)

This article explains Aquinas's attempt to show, within an Aristotelian framework, how the soul can be both a substance in its own right and the form of the body. I argue that although Aquinas' theory is logically consistent, its plausibility is weakened by the fact that it requires a significant modification of the Aristotelian conceptions of both substance and form.

The thesis of this book is that despite Freud's low opinion of philosophy and despite his claim that psychoanalysis avoids value judgements, psychoanalytic theory does contain a moral philosophy.