John Wilson's work as moral educator is summarized and evaluated. His rationalist humanistic approach is based on a componential characterization of the morally educated person. Such a person consistently manifests a unity of reflection, feeling, belief, and acting under the logically structured rubrics of PHIL, EMP, GIG and KRAT, and exemplifying the formal features of 'moral opinion'. The rationale and conceptual status of the components is discussed, as is the view that the concept of education entails that teachers be moral (...) educators. This involves cultivating autonomous rationality with respect to the unconscious, motivation, day-to-day moral decision-making, and the emotions; in the latter case there are extensive applications in religious education. Finally, certain weaknesses and pre-eminent strengths of Wilson's position are indicated, and comparisons briefly made with the views of McPhail, Peters, Frankena and Kohlberg. (shrink)

Ethics researchers advise managers of organizations to link rewards and punishments to ethical and unethical behavior, respectively. We build on prior research maintaining that organizations operate at Kohlbergs stages of moral reasoning, and explain how the over-reliance on rewards and punishments encourages employees to operate at Kohlbergs lowest stages of moral reasoning. We advocate designing organizations as ethical communities and relying on different assumptions about employees in order to foster ethical reasoning at higher levels. Characteristics associated with ethical communities are (...) identified and AES Corporation and Semco S/A serve as examples of corporations exhibiting the design characteristics and assumptions of ethical organizations. (shrink)

We assume that acting ethically is a skill. We then use a phenomenological description of five stages of skill acquisition to argue that an ethics based on principles corresponds to a beginner’s reliance on rules and so is developmentally inferior to an ethics based on expert response that claims that, after long experience, the ethical expert learns to respond appropriately to each unique situation. The skills model thus supports an ethics of situated involvement such as that of Aristotle, John Dewey, (...) and Carol Gilligan against the detached, rationalist ethics of Kant, John Rawls, Lawrence Kohlberg, and Jürgen Habermas. (shrink)

Kohlberg basamakları çerçevesine uymayan ahlâkî yargı sıklıkla geçiş basamaklarında değerlendirilmektedir. Bu konuların bir denge basamağında olmayıp, daha çok iç çatışma düzeyinde oldukları farz edilmektedir. Bu makalede, sözü edilen görüşe karşı çıkılmakta, 4 1/2 yargısının diğer herhangi bir ahlakî yargı tipinden daha tutarsız olmadığı ve Basamak 4 1/2'un ayrı bir basamak olarak kabulü gerektiği savunulmaktadır. Bu kabul ancak; ahlakî biliş mimarisinde ayrı bir köşe taşı olarak Basamak 4 1/2' u içine alan yeni bir basamak sınışandırması çerçevesi içinde mümkün olacaktır.

OBJECTIVES: To determine the relationship between ethical reasoning and gender and occupation among a group of male and female nurses and doctors. DESIGN: Partialist and impartialist forms of ethical reasoning were defined and singled out as being central to the difference between what is known as the "care" moral orientation (Gilligan) and the "justice" orientation (Kohlberg). A structured questionnaire based on four hypothetical moral dilemmas involving combinations of (health care) professional, non-professional, life-threatening and non-life-threatening situations, was piloted and then mailed (...) to a randomly selected sample of doctors and nurses. SETTING: 400 doctors from Victoria, and 200 doctors and 400 nurses from New South Wales. RESULTS: 178 doctors and 122 nurses returned completed questionnaires. 115 doctors were male, 61 female; 50 nurses were male and 72 were female. It was hypothesised that there would be an association between feminine subjects and partialist reasoning and masculine subjects and impartialist reasoning. It was also hypothesised that nurses would adopt a partialist approach to reasoning and doctors an impartialist approach. No relationship between any of these variables was observed. (shrink)

This work is essentially an attempt to refute the theory of legal positivism, and at the same time to advance the author's own somewhat unique formulation of natural law theory. Though Juha-Pekka Rentto makes a comprehensive and almost eclectic use of authors as diverse as, for example, Thomas Aquinas and Lawrence Kohlberg, he seems determined to approach legal philosophy from the natural law tradition, while adding a few notable exceptions of his own. In his opinion, natural law theories which attempt (...) to build a system on some one first principle ignore the practical importance of natural law. In fact, he will go on to say later that "rule-like principles are otiose in that they either are against the appropriate reasons for action, or they add nothing to them". His own via media involves an interesting twist on Finnis's theory of practical reason. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Paradox of Disability: Responses to Jean Vanier and L’Arche Communities from Theology and the Sciences ed. by Hans S. ReindersAdam ClarkThe Paradox of Disability: Responses to Jean Vanier and L’Arche Communities from Theology and the Sciences Edited by Hans S. Reinders Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010. 191pp. $18.00Jean Vanier introduces this collection of essays with a concise articulation of the themes that define L’Arche communities: those with (...) impairments “cry out” for loving service, yet love involves the receptivity by which those without obvious impairments learn to claim their own good amid a vulnerability that [End Page 205] appears to be its negation. Subsequent essays expand upon these themes, drawing on a range of theological and social-scientific perspectives. Most could serve as introductions for undergraduate or graduate classes. The volume also invites disability scholars to examine whether and how this “Vanier school” has succeeded in its attempt to reimagine and serve both those with and those without obvious impairments.For Vanier’s “school,” such reimagining entails perceiving those with impairments as “teachers.” Executing this, however, is difficult. Xavier Le Pichon, for example, argues that “the disabled” help us recover positive views of dependency in “childhood innocence” and “aged suffering” (since they embody both stages). Focusing on the suffering that human beings experience before death, he claims that paleo-anthropological evidence suggests that societies evolved as their care of the disabled taught them to accept suffering. His argument, however, risks strongly identifying persons with their impairments, thus reinforcing the social construction of “disability” as a marginalizing category in discourse and policy.Moreover, this difficulty is not limited to associations with disvalue. Hans Reinders draws on Søren Kierkegaard and Hans Ulrich in a comparison of the severely disabled to the “teachers” of Matthew 6: the birds and lilies. The disabled, he argues, embody a positive image of “humanity” characterized by dependence on God and a lack of competition with others. Such an image of grace “frees” one from a political economy that drives toward rational mastery of self and world. Yet, do the severely impaired always experience and manifest such dependence? If not, are they not being used to create a “human” image for others in which they, in fact, do not appear?Kevin Reimer’s essay contains similar difficulties. For him, the instructive values are “trust” and “gracious openness.” Citing studies that demonstrate how these values sustain communities—even absent rational agreement—he argues that they should replace rationality as the chief marker of moral maturity (as exemplified, e.g., in Lawrence Kohlberg’s stages of moral development). Like Reinders, Reimer clearly wants those with cognitive impairments to be appreciated as teachers of values that displace the rationalist ones that deprecate them. However, like Reinder’s argument, this easily slides toward defining “humanity” under a certain ideal form, thereby still implicitly devaluing those who do not embody that ideal form. Also, one finds here the danger of romanticizing that is often identified with Vanier: one only sees the form and not the real person.William Gaventa and Brian Brock, however, provide a counterresponse, the first pivotal turn in the book. Gaventa argues that the discovery of another’s value as “teacher” occurs only when one has already acknowledged her as a person (104). In other words, any “form” taught must come only after one has encountered a “person,” which is understood as a complete image of human [End Page 206] value. Here Vanier’s argument for mutual receptivity becomes a fundamental anthropology that grounds an ethic. Love must serve both persons—the teacher with impairments and the learning respondent—along distinct lines of practical action (107). In addition, Gaventa argues that persons need sources of support that are both familial and private, on the one hand, and institutional and public, on the other—thus transcending the usual splits between conservatives and liberals.Brock develops a similar anthropological ethic drawing on Martin Luther. Being human together simply means “becoming neighbors” through the absolute (Christological) imputation of personal value. Brock criticizes practices that negate this neighborly bond. In particular, he rejects the view, often endorsed by genetic counselors, that bearing potentially impaired... (shrink)

Discusses the bases of moral development, based on a review of relevant literature. L. Kohlberg's cognitive structural theory of moral development prescribes abstract egalitarianism as the ideal form of moral reasoning. It is argued that this conceptualization represents an overly modernist, individualist reading of Platonic moral philosophy. H. G. Gadamer , in contrast, sees Plato teaching that virtue is learned implicitly, through exemplifying a virtuous person. Belief that virtue must be justified rationally leads to the dissolution of social, communal bases (...) of moral learning. His view suggests a more humanly relevant rendering of Platonic moral reasoning than that suggested by Kohlberg. This view suggests the possibility that virtue is irreducibly social, seen in the meaningful differences that acts have for others, and in implicit interpersonal relatedness. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Values clarification was too quickly scorned, for its problems are also problems for other contemporary approaches to moral education - especially cognitive-developmental accounts. These problems show the need for better understanding of behavioural characterizations - particularly of the use of words for virtues and vices. The problems can best be corrected by reexamining the role of conversation in education along lines suggested by Freire and Habermas rather than Dewey and Kohlberg. -/- .

Frankena, W. K. Morality and moral philosophy.--Soltis, J. F. Men, machines and morality.--Chazan, B. I. The moral situation.--Phenix, P. H. Ethics and the will of God.--Moore, G. E. The indefinability of good.--Morgenbesser, S. Approaches to ethical objectivity.--Sartre, J. P. Existentialism and ethics.--Hare, R. M. Decisions of principle.--Singer, M. G. Moral rules and principles.--Hare, R. M. Adolescents into adults.--Wilson, J. Assessing the morally educated person.--Kohlberg, L. The child as a moral philosopher.--Frankena, W. K. Toward a philosophy of moral education.--Archambault, R. D. (...) Criteria for success in moral instruction.--Raths, L., Harmin, M., and Simon, S. Teaching for value clarity.--Bibliography (p. 188-192). (shrink)

Consciousness emerges as the key topic in this second edition of Owen Flanagan's popular introduction to cognitive science and the philosophy of psychology....

Calls for the expansion of ethics education in the business and accounting curricula have resulted in a variety of interventions including additional material on ethical cases, the code of conduct, and the development of new courses devoted to ethical development [Lampe, J.: 1996]. The issue of whether ethics should be taught has been addressed by many authors [see for example: Hanson, K. O.: 1987; Huss, H. F. and D. M. Patterson: 1993; Jones, T. M.: 1988–1989; Kerr, D. S. and L. (...) M. Smith : 1995; Loeb, S. E.: 1988; McDonald, G. M. and G. D. Donleavy: 1995]. The question addressed in this paper is not whether ethics should be taught but whether accounting students can reason more ethically after an intervention based on a discrete and dedicated course on accounting ethics. The findings in this paper indicate that a discrete intervention emphasising dilemma discussion has a positive and significant effect on students’ moral reasoning and development. The data collected from interviews suggest that the salient influences on moral judgement development include: learning theories of ethics particularly Kohlberg’s theory of cognitive moral reasoning and development; peer learning; and moral discourse. The implications from the findings in this study suggest that moral reasoning is responsive to particular types of ethics intervention and educators should carefully plan their attempts to foster moral judgement development. (shrink)

A critical examination of Carol Gilligan's study of “psychological theory and women's development,” this essay begins by exploring her concerns about malebiased developmental theorizing. I consider in detail Gilligan's criticisms of Sigmund Freud and her own empirical studies of moral development, as they relate to the work of L. Kohlberg. After defending Freud to some degree, I propose various alternative interpretations of her data-interviews with males and females about hypothetical ethical dilemmas and with females about actual abortion decisions. I contend (...) that Gilligan is too willing to concede the adequacy of Kohlberg's categories for fathoming the moral reasoning of males and that she may, in consequence, exaggerate differences between males and females. Noting the ironic similarities between Gilligan's claims and Schopenhauer's misogyny, I suggest that there may be something undesirably self-limiting about the ‘different’ course of development she sketches. To move toward a morally preferable, feminism-compatible version of an “ethic of care,” I recommend that it be extended — by the imagination — beyond the ‘here and now’ and that it not be restricted to existing webs of personal relationships. (shrink)

이 논문에서 우리는 인공지능 행위자의 행위의 도덕성 검증을 위한 하나의 기준을 제시하고 그것의 이론적 토대를 설계하고자 한다. 이를 위해 인공적 도덕 행위자의 도덕성 수준을 10세 아동 수준으로 설정하고 그것의 도덕성 검증을 위한 전형으로 앨런 튜링(A. Turing)의 「Computing machinery and intelligence」로부터 전개되는 튜링테스트를 취한다. 행동주의(Behaviorism)에 입각하여 인공지능, 구체적으로 말해 컴퓨터의 사고가능성을 판단하기 위한 사고실험인 튜링테스트의 원칙과 방법에 착안하여 인공지능 행위자의 도덕성소유여부, 나아가 그것의 단계를 구획할 수 있는 윤리학적 기준을 제시해 보겠다. 그 배경으로 콜버그(L. Kohlberg)의 인지발달론에 따른 도덕판단 3수준구분을 취하고, 이로부터 인공적 (...) 도덕행위자의 ‘명령의 무조건적 수행’, ‘상벌에 따른 결과주의’, ‘사회적 규약의 준수’라는 도덕발달 3단계를 도출하겠다. 그리고 이를 가정용 헬스케어 로봇 시나리오 예를 검토함으로써 실생활에의 적용 가능성을 타진하겠다. (shrink)

Lo studio della personalità umana ha impegnato, per lungo tempo, la riflessione di Habermas non solo perché egli interessato a indagare l’apporto delle funzioni soggettive al processo di riproduzione simbolica delle altre componenti del mondo vitale e, viceversa, come queste forniscano il contesto socio-culturale dell’ontogenesi. Il confronto con l’epistemologia genetica di Piaget, Kohlberg e Selman, la psicologia sociale di Mead e la psicoanalisi freudiana dischiude, soprattutto, l’orizzonte interpretativo all’interno dal quale Habermas ricercava un modello per la configurazione metodologica delle scienze (...) sociali in una prospettiva ricostruttiva. Questa è la ragione fondamentale per cui è opportuno interessarsi al tentativo habermasiano di applicare il modello ricostruttivo nel campo della teoria della socializzazione. (shrink)

En primer lugar, este artículo ofrece una breve sinopsis del acervo disponible en el área del desarrollo moral, una visión que combina las contribuciones de Lawrence Kohlberg y de Martin L. Hoffman a esta área. Luego, reconociendo que para explicar el comportamiento moral se necesitan constructos o variables adicionales, se centra sobre los avances que yo y un buen número de colegas y colaboradores hemos alcanzado en cuanto a la comprensión y tratamiento del comportamiento antisocial en jóvenes. Esto incluye una (...) descripción detallada de algunas características comunes básicas de estos jóvenes: retrasos en el desarrollo del juicio moral; distorsiones cognitivas interesadas o egoístas ; y deficiencias en cuanto a habilidades sociales. También se incluye la discusión de un caso ilustrativo; información sobre un instrumento de medida —el cuestionario Cómo Pienso ; e información sobre un exitoso enfoque de tratamiento, el Programa equipo. Finalmente, se subrayan las profundas conexiones teóricas y prácticas entre la percepción moral verídica, y el tratamiento del comportamiento antisocial a través de los principios de la confianza, la justicia y la democracia. (shrink)

On analyse ici le paragraphe 70 de la Théorie de la justice de Rawls, qui a pour titre « La morale de l’autorité ». Mais d’abord il faut brièvement situer ce paragraphe dans l’économie générale du livre. Le thème de cette morale de l’autorité relève d’une théorie générale du développement moral de l’enfant, et Rawls dira en ce sens explicitement qu’il se situe là dans un champ de questions ouvert par Rousseau, Freud, Piaget et Kohlberg. Mais pourquoi le théoricien de (...) la justice est forcé d’en venir à ce type de question, et quel éclairage il apporte sur l’efficace des institutions, c’est ce qu’il faut d’abord expliquer. (shrink)

This article points out, descriptive moral psychology of human behavior patterns in the handling, in fact, from the outset exceed the boundaries of philosophy, and Cole tried to resort to ethics Fort formalism in order to avoid this problem in practice, can not be established. • Henry Rachael is further motivation for ethical behavior and the psychological concept of Cole Castle together. Although this is certainly an important contribution to the Fort Cole, but Cole Fort critical reflection on the lack (...) of methodology adopted only; secondly that the ideology behind their psychological factors; finally made ​​sense to remedy in the treatment program: to give up on life and psychological describe their condition or results of work. Authors propose a new proposal of psychology, first identified the relationship between psychologists and their research object, this object is, as the subject of people; secondly, from the possibility of speech. Description, either by himself or a third person described in the description, will be replaced by speech interaction. Authors proposed the concept of an interactive framework of doctrine, in which Cole and Rachael • Fort Henry's theory of language games can get a different position. This article attempts to demonstrate that the descriptive psychology, in its treatment of ethical problems, seems to have transgressed the boundary line against philosophy. This problematic situation cannot be circumvented by resorting to an ethical formalism-as L. Kohlberg does in his research program. Rachael M. Henry pushes one step forward to tie the psychodynamic aspect of moral behavior with Kohlberg's concept. The present author, all in affirming the important contribution of Kohlberg to psychology, indicates the insufficiency of a mere reflection of methods in Kohlberg's works. Then he dissects the ideologemes behind Kohlberg's psychology. At last he suggests a therapeutic proposal: the demand for describing psychic life, its conditions or effects, shall be dropped. The author proposes instead a program of new psychology that derives first from the relation of psychologist to his object, the human as subject; and second, from the possibilities of speech in communicative interaction. Description, whether made by oneself or by a third person, shall be substituted by speech interactions. These interactions are considered as successful when the partners in a discussion declare themselves to be understood. Within the framework of this interactionist concept, Kohlberg's and Rachael M. Henry 's theories could assume the status of various language-games. (shrink)

The term fuzzy logic is used in this paper to describe an imprecise logical system, FL, in which the truth-values are fuzzy subsets of the unit interval with linguistic labels such as true, false, not true, very true, quite true, not very true and not very false, etc. The truth-value set, , of FL is assumed to be generated by a context-free grammar, with a semantic rule providing a means of computing the meaning of each linguistic truth-value in as a (...) fuzzy subset of [0, 1].Since is not closed under the operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication, the result of an operation on truth-values in requires, in general, a linguistic approximation by a truth-value in . As a consequence, the truth tables and the rules of inference in fuzzy logic are (i) inexact and (ii) dependent on the meaning associated with the primary truth-value true as well as the modifiers very, quite, more or less, etc. (shrink)

In recent years, the image of biotechnology has been transformed from one of danger and uncertainty to one of opportunity and familiarity. This article explores the process of issue definition by examining the efforts of private interests and public officials. An analysis of interview data, public documents, and other sources reveals four methods of issue definition: establishing the "biotechnology industry" as a collective voice, forging alliances with established public and private interests, associating biotechnology with popular issues on the policy agenda, (...) and discrediting opponents and critics of biotechnology. These methods of issue definition reveal the importance not only of defining a specific issue but also of influencing the context in which it is considered. (shrink)

In any society influenced by a plurality of cultures, there will be widespread, systematic differences about at least some important values, including moral values. Many of these differences look like deep disagreements, difficult to resolve objectively if that is possible at all. One common response to the suspicion that these disagreements are unsettleable has always been moral relativism. In the flurry of sympathetic treatments of this doctrine in the last two decades, attention has understandably focused on the simpler case in (...) which one fairly self-contained and culturally homogeneous society confronts, at least in thought, the values of another; but most have taken relativism to have implications within a single pluralistic society as well. I am not among the sympathizers. That is partly because I am more optimistic than many about how many moral disagreements can be settled, but I shall say little about that here. For, even on the assumption that many disputes are unsettleable, I continue to find relativism a theoretically puzzling reaction to the problem of moral disagreement, and a troubling one in practice, especially when the practice involves regular interaction among those who disagree. This essay attempts to explain why. (shrink)

Les «ateliers palatiaux» constituent un chapitre très important de l'histoire et du fonctionnement des palais minoens. Selon l'opinion traditionnellement admise, formulée par A. Evans et largement reprise par ses successeurs, à l'intérieur des palais fonctionnaient en permanence des ateliers bien outillés, spécialisés dans la fabrication de certaines catégories d'objets. Cependant, une présentation sommaire des ateliers identifiés dans les palais de Cnossos, Phaistos et Malia, accompagnée d'une approche plus exhaustive des ateliers encore inédits de Zakros, conduit à réexaminer en partie l'opinion (...) première : les espaces de travail identifiés à ce jour n'étaient ni aménagés spécialement ni bien équipés, et n'abritaient pas d'ateliers à production strictement spécialisée. Il semble au contraire qu'y aient travaillé occasionnellement, en fonction de leurs besoins, des artisans habiles dans plus d'un art, pour répondre aux commandes de toutes sortes que passaient leurs fournisseurs de haut rang. Il est donc préférable d'employer le terme d'« artisans — ou artistes — palatiaux», qu'incarne parfaitement le personnage plus tard mythique de Dédale. (shrink)

Nous examinons ici un type très caractéristique d'installation artisanale, fréquente dans les habitats ou les bâtiments isolés de l'époque minoenne. Elle est composée, dans sa forme la plus simple et la plus courante, d'un récipient tronconique avec bec verseur placé sur une plate-forme artificielle ou un banc et, en immédiate relation avec lui, d'un grand vase situé à un niveau inférieur, servant à recueillir un liquide. On a donné des interprétations variées de ces installations : servaient-elles à séparer deux liquides (...) (huile et eau), au cours de la production de l'huile? à écraser les raisins pendant la fabrication du vin? à laver les vêtements? Après avoir dressé un catalogue, aussi complet que possible, des installations minoennes de ce type connues à ce jour, on tente de comprendre leur fonctionnement, à l'aide de données comparatives et de parallèles iconographiques diachroniques. Enfin, on examine le rôle de ces installations dans le cadre socio-économique plus large de l'époque minoenne. (shrink)

I argue that environmental ignorance is a group-based form of substantive ignorance that is analogous to race-based ignorance, showing that they are structurally and functionally similar and sometimes overlap. While race theorists offer promising solutions toward eliminating race-based ignorance, I argue that something far more is needed in the environmental case. I turn to panpsychism as a possible solution. Though I conclude that it is too radical for most Americans to willingly embrace, I incorporate a notion of “encounter” to argue (...) that an expanded conception of home helps with the conceptual overhaul needed to overcome environmental ignorance. (shrink)

A weak form of intuitionistic set theory WST lacking the axiom of extensionality is introduced. While WST is too weak to support the derivation of the law of excluded middle from the axiom of choice, we show that beefing up WST with moderate extensionality principles or quotient sets enables the derivation to go through.