Discusses the bases of moral development, based on a review of relevant literature. L. Kohlberg's cognitive structural theory of moral development prescribes abstract egalitarianism as the ideal form of moral reasoning. It is argued that this conceptualization represents an overly modernist, individualist reading of Platonic moral philosophy. H. G. Gadamer , in contrast, sees Plato teaching that virtue is learned implicitly, through exemplifying a virtuous person. Belief that virtue must be justified rationally leads to the dissolution of social, communal bases of moral learning. His view suggests a more humanly relevant rendering of Platonic moral reasoning than that suggested by Kohlberg. This view suggests the possibility that virtue is irreducibly social, seen in the meaningful differences that acts have for others, and in implicit interpersonal relatedness. 2012 APA, all rights reserved)
Keywords L. Kohlberg's cognitive structural theory of moral development vs H. G. Gadamer's view on Plato's social theory of morality
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Reprint years 1995
DOI 10.1037/h0091146
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