There is an apparent tension between the open-ended aspect of the ordinal sequence and the assumption that the set-theoretical universe is fully determinate. This tension is already present in Cantor, who stressed the incompletable character of the transfinite number sequence in Grundlagen and avowed the definiteness of the totality of sets and numbers in subsequent philosophical publications and in correspondence. The tension is particularly discernible in his late distinction between sets and inconsistent multiplicities. I discuss Cantor’s contrasting views, and I (...) conclude that his account of that distinction is only tenable if the definiteness of the set-theoretical universe is rejected. (shrink)

Our aim in this article is to define the difficulties that clinical ethics services encounter when they are asked to demonstrate the value a clinical ethics service (CES) could and should have for an institution and those it serves. The topic emerged out of numerous related presentations at the Un- Conference hosted by the Cleveland Clinic in August 2018 that identified challenges of articulating the value of clinical ethics work for hospital administrators. After a review these talks, it was apparent (...) that the field of clinical ethics may be at a crisis of sorts due to increased pressure to provide explicit measures to healthcare institutions to concretely demonstrate that CESs make a valuable difference in healthcare delivery. In this article, we grapple with how to satisfy the need for demonstrable value in a field in which metrics alone may not capture the scope of clinical ethics practice. We suggest that capturing the value of a CES has been difficult because the benefits of ethics consultation may be overt or attributable to the CES, but are often hidden due to the systems-level and process-oriented nature of clinical ethics work. Part of the difficulty in demonstrating the value of CESs is capturing and conveying all of the ways the integration of a CES throughout an institution positively affects patients, families, visitors, healthcare professionals, administrators, and the institution itself. Our aim is to (1) elucidate the multifaceted value added by a CES, including value that tends to be hidden and (2) suggest how to demonstrate value to others in a way that is not simplistic or reductionistic. (shrink)

Linking specific nursing actions to outcomes in the healthcare setting is challenging. Patient outcomes are varied and influenced by a myriad of factors, and always involve a wider team than any one nurse. It is difficult to control for a single action or set of actions of a particular nurse. Furthermore, practice is seldom about any ‘one’ action, for one thing leads to another, all within a complex interplay of influencing factors. In this article, we outline a research method which (...) combined Dewey's pragmatism with Gadamer's hermeneutics to explore the consequences of the nurse's use of advanced assessment skills in the acute care setting of medical and surgical wards. This pragmatic hermeneutic methodological approach allowed the complex interplay of influences to be revealed in the unfolding story. Reflection of the nurse brought insights that may otherwise have been passed over. The philosophical notions of Dewey drew attention to the play of ‘means’ and ‘ends’. A hermeneutic approach that calls for ‘thinking’ extends understanding and raises insights that can inform education and practice. (shrink)

[Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories. /// [Jane Heal] Tye claims (...) that an externalist should say that memory content invoking natural kind concepts floats free of the setting where the memory is laid down and is at later times determined by the context in which the memory is revived. His argument assumes the existence of 'slow switching' of the meaning of natural kind terms when a person is transported from Earth to Twin Earth. But proper understanding of natural kind terms suggests that slow switching (contrary to what is often presupposed) is likely never to be completed. Hence the situation of a person unknowingly transported to Twin Earth is not that his memories switch content but rather that he gets two natural kinds confused. (shrink)

Abstract In this paper I undertake an in-depth examination of an oft mentioned but rarely expounded upon state: suspended judgment. While traditional epistemology is sometimes characterized as presenting a “yes or no” picture of its central attitudes, in fact many of these epistemologists want to say that there is a third option: subjects can also suspend judgment. Discussions of suspension are mostly brief and have been less than clear on a number of issues, in particular whether this third option should (...) be thought of as an attitude or not. In this paper I argue that suspended judgment is (or at least involves) a genuine attitude. Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-17 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9753-y Authors Jane Friedman, St Catherine’s College, University of Oxford, Oxford, OX1 3UJ UK Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that suspension of judgment is intimately tied to inquiry and in particular that one is suspending judgment about some question if and only if one is inquiring into that question.

In this paper I look at belief and degrees of belief through the lens of inquiry. I argue that belief and degrees of belief play different roles in inquiry. In particular I argue that belief is a “settling” attitude in a way that degrees of belief are not. Along the way I say more about what inquiring amounts to, argue for a central norm of inquiry connecting inquiry and belief and say more about just what it means to have an (...) inquiry or question settled. (shrink)

This article provides current Schwartz Values Survey (SVS) data from samples of business managers and professionals across 50 societies that are culturally and socioeconomically diverse. We report the society scores for SVS values dimensions for both individual- and societal-level analyses. At the individual-level, we report on the ten circumplex values sub-dimensions and two sets of values dimensions (collectivism and individualism; openness to change, conservation, self-enhancement, and self-transcendence). At the societal-level, we report on the values dimensions of embeddedness, hierarchy, mastery, affective (...) autonomy, intellectual autonomy, egalitarianism, and harmony. For each society, we report the Cronbach’s α statistics for each values dimension scale to assess their internal consistency (reliability) as well as report interrater agreement (IRA) analyses to assess the acceptability of using aggregated individual level values scores to represent country values. We also examined whether societal development level is related to systematic variation in the measurement and importance of values. Thus, the contributions of our evaluation of the SVS values dimensions are two-fold. First, we identify the SVS dimensions that have cross-culturally internally reliable structures and within-society agreement for business professionals. Second, we report the society cultural values scores developed from the twenty-first century data that can be used as macro-level predictors in multilevel and single-level international business research. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that there is a class of attitudes that have questions (rather than propositions or something else) as contents.

In _influx & efflux_ Jane Bennett pursues a question that was bracketed in her book _Vibrant Matter_: how to think about human agency in a world teeming with powerful nonhuman influences? “Influx _& _efflux”—a phrase borrowed from Whitman's "Song of Myself"—refers to everyday movements whereby outside influences enter bodies, infuse and confuse their organization, and then exit, themselves having been transformed into something new. How to describe the human efforts involved in that process? What kinds of “I” and “we” can (...) live well and act effectively in a world of so many other lively materialities? Drawing upon Whitman, Thoreau, Caillois, Whitehead, and other poetic writers, Bennett links a nonanthropocentric model of self to a radically egalitarian pluralism and also to a syntax and style of writing appropriate to the entangled world in which we live. The book tries to enact the uncanny process by which we “write up” influences that pervade, enable, and disrupt us. (shrink)

In this paper I revisit Gilbert Harman's arguments for a "clutter avoidance" norm. The norm -- which says that we ought to avoid cluttering our minds with trivialities -- is widely endorsed. I argue that it has some fairly dramatic consequences for normative epistemology.

Philosophers and psychologists have often maintained that in order to attribute mental states to other people one must have a ‘theory of mind’. This theory facilitates our grasp of other people’s mental states. Debate has then focussed on the form this theory should take. Recently a new approach has been suggested, which I call the ‘Direct Perception approach to social cognition’. This approach maintains that we can directly perceive other people’s mental states. It opposes traditional views on two counts: by (...) claiming that mental states are observable and by claiming that we can attribute them to others without the need for a theory of mind. This paper argues that there are two readings of the direct perception claims: a strong and a weak one. The Theory-theory is compatible with the weak version but not the strong one. The paper argues that the strong version of direct perception is untenable, drawing on evidence from the mirror neuron literature and arguments from the philosophy of science and perception to support this claim. It suggests that one traditional ‘theory of mind’ view, the ‘Theory-theory’ view, is compatible with the claim that mental states are observable, and concludes that direct perception views do not offer a viable alternative to theory of mind approaches to social cognition. (shrink)

There has been much discussion about whether traditional epistemology's doxastic attitudes are reducible to degrees of belief. In this paper I argue that what I call the Straightforward Reduction - the reduction of all three of believing p, disbelieving p, and suspending judgment about p, not-p to precise degrees of belief for p and not-p that ought to obey the standard axioms of the probability calculus - cannot succeed. By focusing on suspension of judgment (agnosticism) rather than belief, we can (...) see why the Straightforward Reduction is bound to fail. I argue that, in general, suspending about p is not just a matter of having some specified standard credence for p, and in the end I suggest some ways to extend the arguments that will put pressure on other credence-theoretic accounts of belief and suspension of judgment as well. (shrink)

Computer-mediated webchat is fast replacing voice support in customer service. Whilst previous studies have explored how communication breaks down in customer service voice exchange in off-shored/outsourced multinational companies; studies into webchat exchange in the same industries are scarce. Given the high stakes of customer service interactions – for example customer satisfaction, return intention and loyalty to the company – there is an urgent need to understand how conversations unfold, in a linguistic sense, in successful and unsuccessful service. This study, using (...) interactional linguistics, has used a close interpretative process to analyse instances of problematic exchange showing two key causes of communicative disruption. This first relates to disrupted turn adjacency where the sequence and flow of the exchange becomes confusing. The second relates to conceptual misunderstandings of terms in the exchange that may have multiple meanings. As workplaces invest millions of dollar in recruiting, training and appraising global webchat agents to serve their customers, the findings of this study can fruitfully inform webchat training and coaching that impact performance at work and provide high satisfaction to customers. (shrink)

Can we understand other minds ‘from the inside’? What would this mean? There is an attraction which many have felt in the idea that creatures with minds, people, invite a kind of understanding which inanimate objects such as rocks, plants and machines, do not invite and that it is appropriate to seek to understand them ‘from the inside’. What I hope to do in this paper is to introduce and defend one version of the so-called ‘simulation’ approach to our grasp (...) and use of psychological concepts, a version which gives central importance to the idea of shared rationality, and in so doing to tease out and defend one strand in the complex of ideas which finds expression in this mysterious phrase. (shrink)

In this paper I explore the contours of a picture of normative epistemology that speaks centrally to the question of how to inquire rather than just the question of what to believe. What if normative epistemology were expanded to encompass inquiry in full? I argue that while a 'zetetic epistemology' builds on traditional normative epistemology in many appealing ways, it also faces some challenges.

ABSTRACT This paper examines some arguments which deny the existence of an individual right to remain ignorant about genetic information relating to oneself – often referred to as ‘a right to genetic ignorance’ or, more generically, as ‘a right not to know’. Such arguments fall broadly into two categories: 1) those which accept that individuals have a right to remain ignorant in self‐regarding matters, but deny that this right can be extended to genetic ignorance, since such ignorance may be harmful (...) to others, particularly those to whom one is genetically related (the ‘harm to others objection’) and 2) those which contend that, even if genetic ignorance is only self harming, it is not something to which individuals can rationally or morally claim to have a ‘right’ at all, since they defend their claims on autonomy‐respecting grounds and ignorance is inimical to autonomy (the ‘incoherence objection’). I argue that defenders of a right not to know have some plausible responses to the ‘harm to others objection’, but that in trying to respond to the ‘incoherence objection’, they and their opponents reach an impasse in which both sides are left voicing concerns about the paternalistic implications of the other's point of view. I conclude that defenders of a right not to know would, therefore, advance their position further by analysing it in terms of values other than those of autonomy and rights. (shrink)

This paper will consider the differing ways that empirical individuality is dealt with in Fichte’s philosophy, focusing especially on the System of Ethics. It will attempt to defend Fichte against some of his critics who suggest that individuality and individual freedom are lost within the more universalist account given in the System of Ethics, by showing how Fichte has different purposes in the doctrine of right and the doctrine of ethics. However, on the other side, it will also caution against (...) seeing Fichte as valuing individual freedom for the sake of individuality itself, in a way at odds with the directives of his ethics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Religious Perspectives on Bioethics, Part ILaura Jane Bishop (bio) and Mary Carrington Coutts (bio)This is Part One of a two part Scope Note on Religious Perspectives on Bioethics. Part Two will be published in the December 1994 issue of this Journal. This Scope Note has been organized in alphabetical order by the name of the religious tradition.Contents for Parts 1 and 2Part 1Part 2I.GeneralI.Native AmericanII.African Religious TraditionsReligious TraditionsIII.Bahá'í FaithII.Protestantism—willIV.Buddhism (...) and Confucianisminclude a general sectionV.Eastern Orthodoxyand sections focused onVI.Hinduismspecific denominations.VII.IslamIII.Roman CatholicismVIII.JainismIX.JudaismIntroductionThe many religions of the world bring diverse, and occasionally divergent, attitudes to bioethical issues. These beliefs may guide patients and health care professionals as they seek or provide health care. In an attempt to facilitate understanding of and access to information about these beliefs in our pluralistic and global society, this Scope Note identifies literature by the world's major religious groups on topics relating to bioethics.Topics covered by this Scope Note include general attitudes to health and [End Page 155] health care, the physician-patient relationship, treatment refusal, abortion, contraception, sterilization, reproductive technologies, genetics, mental health, human experimentation, organ transplantation and donation, death, euthanasia, suicide, and prolongation of life. Material was not available on all of these topics for each religion.The literature gathered here represents only a small portion of the available writing on religion and medicine, and is limited to that which comments explicitly on bioethical issues. Some faiths have a rich tradition of writing in bioethics; for others the literature is more limited. Variation in coverage is not intended to indicate the relative importance of a faith, but reflects accessibility and space constraints. Individuals interested in obtaining additional information are encouraged to contact the National Reference Center for Bioethics Literature.Specific citations about a region or country were chosen because of the predominance of a religious tradition within the population. In all cases, variation in spelling represents author usage. This Scope Note treats only the literature published in English, and every attempt has been made to identify English language sources for these faiths.It is important to remember that doctrinal and theological differences exist even within the same denomination and that views of individual patients, family members, and health care providers should be sought.Dictionaries and EncyclopediasMelton, J. Gordon, ed. Encyclopedia of American Religions. Fourth edition. Detroit: Gale Research, 1993. 1217 p. Basic information about the history, sacred texts, membership, educational facilities, publications, and North American addresses are provided for 1,730 churches, denominations, sects, and cults. Bibliographies for many faiths supplement this extensive resource.Reich, Warren T., ed. Encyclopedia of Bioethics. New York: Free Press, Macmillan, 1978. 4 volumes. Articles on all the major religions as they relate to bioethics are included in this highly-regarded encyclopedia. In addition, many of the topical essays feature a section on the views of various faiths on the topic under discussion. For the best use of the Encyclopedia, see the subject index in volume 4. (Note: a revised, second edition is due to be published by Macmillan in late 1994.)GeneralAmerican Psychiatric Association. Committee on Religion and Psychiatry. Guidelines Regarding Possible Conflict Between Psychiatrists' Religious Commitment and Psychiatric Practice. American Journal of Psychiatry 147 (4): 542, April 1990. The American Psychiatric Association recommends that psychiatrists respect their patients' religious beliefs and that they not impose their own [End Page 156] beliefs on their patients.Bankowski, Z., and Bryant, J. H. Health Policy, Ethics and Human Values: Proceedings of the XVIIth CIOMS Round Table Conference, Athens Greece. Geneva: Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, 1985. 336 p. Many sections of this volume address issues where religion impacts health policymaking. Africa, the Middle East, Europe, Latin America, and Asia are highlighted for the varied ways in which their religions and cultures are integrated into the provision of health care.Batchelor, Edward, ed. Abortion: The Moral Issues. New York: Pilgrim Press, 1982. 246 p. Batchelor compiles a collection of essays by experts on religious ethics as they relate to abortion. Includes... (shrink)

To consciously bolster behaviour that is disapproved by others (i.e., stigmatised behaviour) people may hold and report a favourable attitude toward the behaviour. However, achieving such bolstering outside awareness may be more difficult. Explicit attitudes were measured with self-report measures, and the Implicit Association Test was used to assess implicit attitudes toward behaviour held by stigmatised actors (smokers) and nonstigmatised actors (vegetarians and omnivores). Smokers' showed greater attitude-behaviour consistency in their explicit attitudes toward smoking that in their implicit attitudes. By (...) contrast, vegetarians and omnivores showed attitude-behaviour-consistency at both implicit and explicit levels. Smokers' implicit negative attitudes toward smoking may reflect its status as a stigmatised behaviour, or its addictive nature. (shrink)

Some see the co-cognitive view of how we arrive at judgements about others' thoughts as a version of the analogy approach, where I reason from how I find things to be with me to how they will be for others. These thinkers think it a virtue of the view that it need not accept any linkage between thought and rationality. This paper will, however, defend the view that a co-cognitive view is a natural ally of theories which link thought and (...) rationality. It will try to show that exclusive stress on analogy is unduly sceptical about our cognitive capacities and overestimates our similarity to each other. (shrink)

It is typically thought that some epistemic states are valuable—knowing, truly or accurately believing, understanding. These are states it’s thought good to be in and it’s also said that we aim or want to be in them. It is then sometimes claimed that these sorts of thoughts about epistemic goods or values ground or explain our epistemic norms. For instance, we think subjects should follow their evidence when they form their beliefs. But why should they? Why not believe against the (...) evidence or ignore it completely in deciding what to believe? Here’s a compelling sort of answer: because epistemic subjects are or ought to be trying to know more and following their evidence is a means to that end or to fulfilling that obligation. In this paper I argue that this compelling thought cannot be right. Subjects who are trying to know more will regularly fail to conform to some of our most familiar epistemic norms. (shrink)

This paper presents selected findings from a historical analysis of change in the discursive construction of social identity in UK education policy discourse from 1972–2005. My chief argument is that through its linguistic forms of self-identification the government construes educational roles, relations and responsibilities not only for itself, but also for other educational actors and wider society. More specifically, I argue that New Labour's distinctive mode of self-representation is an important element in its hegemonic project, textually manufacturing consent over its (...) policy decisions, and helping to articulate its self-styled ‘enabling’ model of governance. As evidence for these claims I discuss two prominent trends in New Labour's education policy rhetoric, which I characterise as ‘personalisation’ and ‘managerialisation’. Respectively, these relate to the discursive representation of social identity and social action. (shrink)

This article identifies several critical problems with the last 30 years of research into hostile communication on the internet and offers suggestions about how scholars might address these problems and better respond to an emergent and increasingly dominant form of online discourse which I call ‘e-bile’. Although e-bile is new in terms of its prevalence, rhetorical noxiousness, and stark misogyny, prototypes of this discourse—most commonly referred to as ‘flaming’—have always circulated on the internet, and, as such, have been discussed by (...) scholars from a range of disciplines. Nevertheless, my review of this vast body of literature reveals that online hostility has historically posed a number of conceptual, methodological, and epistemological challenges due to which scholars have typically underplayed, overlooked, ignored, or otherwise marginalised its prevalence and serious ethical and material ramifications. Fortunately, lessons learned from my analysis suggests promising approaches for future research into this challenging form of new media discourse. (shrink)

This essay enacts a particular instance of the challenge post-structuralism poses to the study of history. In simpler, language, it concerns the difference that point of view makes when people are giving account of events, whether at first or second hand. The problem is that if all accounts of events are determined through and through by the observer’s frame of reference, then one will never know, in any given case, what really happened.I encountered this problem in concrete terms while preparing (...) to teach a course in colonial American literature. I’d set out to learn what I could about the Puritans’ relations with American Indians. All I wanted was a general idea of what had happened between the English settlers and the natives in seventeenth-century New England; post-structuralism and its dilemmas were the furthest things from my mind. I began, more or less automatically, with Perry Miller, who hardly mentions the Indians at all, then proceeded to the work of historians who had dealt exclusively with the European-Indian encounter. At first, it was a question of deciding which of these authors to believe, for it quickly became apparent that there was no unanimity on the subject. As I read one, however, I discovered that the problem was more complicated than deciding whose version of events was correct. Some of the conflicting accounts were not simply contradictory, they were completely incommensurable, in that their assumptions about what counted as a valid approach to the subject, and what the subject itself was, diverged in fundamental ways. Faced with an array of mutually irreconcilable points of view, points of view which determined what was being discussed as well as the terms of the discussion, I decided to turn to primary sources for clarification, only to discover that the primary sources reproduced the problem all over again. I found myself, in other words, in an epistemological quandary, not only unable to decide among conflicting versions of events but also unable to believe that any such decision could, in principle, be made. It was a moral quandary as well. Knowledge of what really happened when the Europeans and the Indians first met seemed particularly important, since the result of that encounter was virtual genocide. This was the kind of past “mistake” which, presumably, we studied history in order to avoid repeating. If studying history couldn’t put us in touch with actual events and their causes, then what was to prevent such atrocities from happening again? Jane Tompkins is professor of English at Duke University. She is the author of Sensational Designs: The Cultural Work of American Fiction, 1790-1860 and editor of Reader-Response Criticism: From Formalism to Post-Structuralism . Her current work concerns the construction of male identity in American popular culture. (shrink)

Breath is invisible and yet ever present and vital for living beings. The concept of invisibility in relation to breath operates in concrete and metaphorical ways to extend ideas about breath and breathlessness across disciplines, in clinical spaces and in life experience. Using a critical medical humanities approach, I demonstrate that the poverty of narrative accounts and language for breath outside the health context have had a crucial influence enabling clinically mediated interpretations and accounts to dominate. These third-person accounts are (...) important in the articulation of the ‘lived body’, but I balance this with a consideration of the subjective sensation of interoception, which has important implications for the visibility of breathlessness in both clinical and lay contexts. This article illustrates the rich potential of the subjects of breath and breathlessness within body studies and this special issue is a key step in making breath such an emergent topic. (shrink)

An emerging view of science rejects an infallible observational given and takes consensus as the starting point for confirmation. Theory and Observation are seen as mutually correcting. I argue that the same is true of ethics, such as Rawls' "reflective equilibrium." Though epistemologically similar, their truth conditions may differ. Ethics may be reducible to physics; but even if it is not, that does not imply that it has no truth conditions. The options for truth in ethics are the same as (...) those of other abstract fields such as mathematics. (shrink)

The proposal to allow assisted dying for people who are not severely ill reignited the Dutch end‐of‐life debate when it was submitted in 2016. A key criticism of this proposal is that it is too radical a departure from the safe and well‐functioning system the Netherlands already has. The goal of this article is to respond to this criticism and question whether the Dutch system really can be described as safe and well functioning. I will reconsider the usefulness of the (...) suffering criterion, and I will ultimately argue this criterion should be rejected altogether. Instead, we should consider moving towards an autonomy‐only approach to assisted dying. This would resolve some significant issues occurring under the current system of assisted dying in the Netherlands and ultimately make the process safer and better functioning. I will then consider some possible objections to adopting an autonomy‐only approach and provide some preliminary responses to these also. I will finally highlight some potential areas where further research may be necessary, namely, how to mitigate the effect of external factors such as poverty or other life aspects that may have the potential to distort the individual's ability to make autonomous decisions. I will also consider some possible international lessons that can be taken from both current as well as the proposed practice in the Netherlands. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Henry James—Aristotle's Ally, An Exclusive Pact?Jane SingletonIMany claims are advanced for the importance of narrative art works in philosophy. This paper will concentrate on one specific thesis put forward by Martha Nussbaum about the relationship between certain works of literature and moral philosophy. Although Nussbaum explores many roles for narrative artworks in philosophy,1 I shall concentrate on those works where she argues for a close connection between the novels (...) of Henry James and Aristotle's ethics. These are Love's Knowledge,2 where other authors other than James are also considered, and "Exactly and Responsibly: A Defense of Ethical Criticism," an article that formed part of a debate with Richard Posner and Wayne Booth in 1997 and 1998 in Philosophy and Literature.3 It is this latter work that provides the central thesis to be considered.I argue that there are least four possible attributes or combinations of them that Nussbaum might be suggesting are present in James's novels when she claims that James is an ally of Aristotle. My claim will be that James can only be regarded as an ally of Aristotle with respect to some of these attributes. It is a second question to determine precisely how the legitimate attributes isolated in James's novels are to be used to provide an ally for Aristotle's ethics. I shall claim that in any sense in which it is legitimate to regard James as an ally of Aristotle, he could also be regarded as an ally of a generalist theory. This is an important point to emphasise since Nussbaum explicitly enlists James as an ally of Aristotle because of the normative primacy that he gives to the particular. I shall use Kant's theory as an example of a generalist theory. Henry [End Page 61] James, I argue, can be an ally of both Aristotle and Kant but both can adopt an isolationist policy.IIThe specific thesis put forward by Nussbaum in 1998 is as follows:My claim is that in order to investigate this Aristotelian ethical view fully and fairly, we need to turn to texts in which the case for that sort of rationality is made out in a powerful and convincing way—and this cannot be done if we confine ourselves to works written in the abstract style characteristic of most contemporary theory... Aristotle's conception is much more dependent on "allies" who will make out the force of such obscure claims as the claim that "the discernment rests with perception," and that correct action "lies in a mean." Because Aristotle's conception leaves so much to particularized contextual judgment, one cannot well assess the conception without studying complex examples of such particularized judgment; and of course Aristotle's text does not supply such material. I claim that Henry James is a powerful ally of Aristotle, and one whom Aristotle badly needs if he is to convince us of his claims.("ER," pp. 347–48)It is the clarification and discussion of this that provides my point of departure. I shall then consider the four possible characteristics of James's novels that I have isolated. These are: exemplars of good choice, illustrations of the direction of thought to follow for the discernment of the particular, vehicles for developing imagination and sources that enable us to develop an understanding of and engagement of emotions. In each case I shall consider how, if at all, these characteristics enable James to be an ally of either Aristotle or Kant.IIINussbaum's thesis is limited to the late novels of James. "I assert that there is a distinctive type of ethical view... that requires literary works of a very specific type, primarily exemplified by the late novels of James, for its complete investigation" ("ER," p. 348). These include The Wings of the Dove (1902), The Ambassadors (1903), and The Golden Bowl (1904). I shall use examples from each of these although, as Posner notes, The Wings of The Dove, is one book that Nussbaum does not discuss in the article.4 [End Page 62]What attributes or characteristics do these late novels of James possess? They all have in common... (shrink)

This paper investigates three morphosyntactic alternations in Estonian – those between the exterior locative cases allative, adessive and ablative and the corresponding postpositionspeale‘onto’,peal‘on’ andpealt‘off’. Based on the Complexity Principle (e.g., Rohdenburg, Günter. 2002. Processing complexity and the variable use of prepositions in English. In Hubert Cuyckens & Günter Radden (eds.),Perspectives on prepositions, 79–100. Tübingen: Niemeyer), we expect cognitively more complex constructions to use more explicit (i.e., morphologically more substantial) marking by means of a postposition. Further, we expect variation to be (...) conditioned similarly in all three semantic categories. For each of the three alternations, a random sample of the two outcomes (case vs. postposition) from the Estonian National Corpus is used, resulting in 3,000 data points. Using properties of the Landmark phrase as independent variables in Bayesian mixed-effects logistic regression models, we predict the choice of postpositions over case-marked realisations. Of the patterns found, only the frequency-related one supports our complexity-related hypothesis. We conclude that the Complexity Principle, in its general form, has little explanatory power for the Estonian constructions at hand and, in particular, that the derived principle of ‘analytic support’ is not generally applicable. We show, however, that the grammatical knowledge of Estonian exterior locative cases and the corresponding postpositions is regulated by our three factors in a relatively uniform way. (shrink)

In 1936 Tarski sketched a rigorous definition of the concept of logical consequence which, he claimed, agreed quite well with common usage-or, as he also said, with the common concept of consequence. Commentators of Tarski's paper have usually been elusive as to what this common concept is. However, being clear on this issue is important to decide whether Tarski's definition failed (as Etchemendy has contended) or succeeded (as most commentators maintain). I argue that the common concept of consequence that Tarski (...) tried to characterize is not some general, all-purpose notion of consequence, but a rather precise one, namely the concept of consequence at play in axiomatics. I identify this concept and show that Tarski's definition is fully adequate to it. (shrink)