This paper reports on an ongoing ARC Discovery Project that is conducting design research into learning in collaborative virtual worlds (CVW).The paper will describe three design components of the project: (a) pedagogical design, (b)technical and graphics design, and (c) learning research design. The perspectives of each design team will be discussed and how the three teams worked together to produce the CVW. The development of productive failure learning activities for the CVW will be discussed and there will be an interactive (...) demonstration of the project's CVW. (shrink)

This is a copy of the presentation given at the "Workshop on Agency and Distributed Cognition" at Macquarie University, March 2012. What is noteworthy about this piece of work is that (i) it is a very early foray into the pedagogy, ontology, and epistemology of virtual worlds (it's 2012, way before David Chalmers' book "Reality+" in 2022); and (ii) it was my first foray into "social epistemology" beyond the standard "S knows that p" epistemology, drawing on Vygotskian collaborative approaches to (...) learning and teaching, moving beyond analytic philosophy into educational research. Finally, (iii) there's a hyperlink to the actual virtual world in Unity3D created by a cross-disciplinary team of researchers from Sydney University and Macquarie University for the purposes of teaching scientific inquiry. (shrink)

This handbook presents a comprehensive introduction to the core areas of philosophy of education combined with an up-to-date selection of the central themes. It includes 95 newly commissioned articles that focus on and advance key arguments; each essay incorporates essential background material serving to clarify the history and logic of the relevant topic, examining the status quo of the discipline with respect to the topic, and discussing the possible futures of the field. The book provides a state-of-the-art overview of philosophy (...) of education, covering a range of topics: Voices from the present and the past deals with 36 major figures that philosophers of education rely on; Schools of thought addresses 14 stances including Eastern, Indigenous, and African philosophies of education as well as religiously inspired philosophies of education such as Jewish and Islamic; Revisiting enduring educational debates scrutinizes 25 issues heavily debated in the past and the present, for example care and justice, democracy, and the curriculum; New areas and developments addresses 17 emerging issues that have garnered considerable attention like neuroscience, videogames, and radicalization. The collection is relevant for lecturers teaching undergraduate and graduate courses in philosophy of education as well as for colleagues in teacher training. Moreover, it helps junior researchers in philosophy of education to situate the problems they are addressing within the wider field of philosophy of education and offers a valuable update for experienced scholars dealing with issues in the sub-discipline. Combined with different conceptions of the purpose of philosophy, it discusses various aspects, using diverse perspectives to do so. Contributing Editors: Section 1: Voices from the Present and the Past: Nuraan Davids Section 2: Schools of Thought: Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe Section 3: Revisiting Enduring Debates: Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson Section 4: New Areas and Developments: Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg. (shrink)

Going beyond the hype of recent fMRI "findings," this interdisciplinary collection examines such questions as: Do women and men have significantly different brains? Do women empathize, while men systematize? Is there a "feminine" ethics? What does brain research on intersex conditions tell us about sex and gender?

This book is the first collection of feminist essays on one of the central figures in the history of English-speaking philosophy.

Rape, claims Ann J. Cahill, affects not only those women who are raped, but all women who experience their bodies as rapable and adjust their actions and self-images accordingly. Rethinking Rape counters legal and feminist definitions of rape as mere assault and decisively emphasizes the centrality of the body and sexuality in a crime which plays a crucial role in the continuing oppression of women.

Objectification is a foundational concept in feminist theory, used to analyze such disparate social phenomena as sex work, representation of women's bodies, and sexual harassment. However, there has been an increasing trend among scholars of rejecting and re-evaluating the philosophical assumptions which underpin it. In this work, Cahill suggests an abandonment of the notion of objectification, on the basis of its dependence on a Kantian ideal of personhood. Such an ideal fails to recognize sufficiently the role the body plays in (...) personhood, and thus results in an implicit vilification of the body and sexuality. The problem with the phenomena associated with objectification is not that they render women objects, and therefore not-persons, but rather that they construct feminine subjectivity and sexuality as wholly derivative of masculine subjectivity and sexuality. Women, in other words, are not objectified as much as they are derivatized, turned into a mere reflection or projection of the other. Cahill argues for an ethics of materiality based upon a recognition of difference, thus working toward an ethics of sexuality that is decidedly ­and simultaneously ­incarnate and intersubjective. (shrink)

This paper investigates how "representation" is actually used in some areas in cognitive neuroscience. It is argued that recent philosophy has largely ignored an important kind of representation that differs in interesting ways from the representations that are standardly recognized in philosophy of mind. This overlooked kind of representation does not represent by having intentional contents; rather members of the kind represent by displaying or instantiating features. The investigation is not simply an ethnographic study of the discourse of neuroscientists. If (...) there are indeed two different kinds of representations, and the non-standard ones are the ones referred to in some areas of cognitive neuroscience, then we will have to give up the idea that appealing to inner representations with intentional contents is the defining distinction between cognitive neuroscience and behaviorist psychology (Montgomery, 1995). Further, if the conclusions of this paper are correct, many general accounts of how neural states represent are either false or theoretically ill-motivated. (shrink)

This article returns to a philosophical conundrum that has troubled feminist theory since the topic of sexual violence has been taken seriously, what I call the problem of the “heteronormative sexual continuum”: how sexual assault and hegemonic heterosex are conceptually and politically related. I continue my response to the work of Nicola Gavey, who has argued for the existence of a “gray area” of sexual interactions that are ethically questionable without rising to the category of sexual assault, but whose analysis (...) did not explicitly articulate what these two categories share or what distinguishes them from each other. After summarizing Gavey's position, I summarize my previous articulation of the common ground between instances of sexual assault and examples of sexual interactions in the “gray area.” I then develop a theoretical account of how the two categories differ, arguing that the victim's agency plays different roles in the two types of interactions. Both the fact of that distinction—that we are capable of providing a philosophical account of the difference between sexual interactions that fall into the gray area and those that constitute sexual assault—and its particular content are crucial for the development of a tenable feminist sexual ethics. (shrink)

In this paper I will present three reservations about the claims made by Hutto and Satnet. First of all, though TNOC is presented as drawing on teleological theories of mental content for a conception of Ur-Intentionaltiy, what is separated out after objectionable claims are removed from teleological accounts may not retain enough to give us directed intelligence. This problem raises a question about what we need in a naturalistic basis for an account of the mental. Secondly, I think that the (...) authors’ objections to cognitive science’s supposed notion of a mental representation in fact attack a philosophers’ invention, one that sprung into vibrant being in the mid-1970’s. It is not employed in cognitive neuroscience to any significant extent and it isn’t needed by other disciplines involved in cognitive science. Finally, I worry that the account of the origin of content – namely, explanatory narrative - presents us with a too limited view of human discourse, particularly as it is needed for a social theory of mind. (shrink)

This paper argues for two major revisions in the way philosophers standardly think of vision science and vision theories more generally. The first concerns mental representations and the second supervenience. The central result is that the way is cleared for an externalist theory of perception. The framework for such a theory has what are called Aristotelian representations as elements in processes the well-functioning of which is the principal object of a theory of vision.

Is causation either necessary or sufficient (or both) to make a belief-desire pair the reason for which one acts? In this paper I argue in support of a negative answer to this question, and thus attempt to shift the burden of proof onto the causal theorists. I also provide an outline of a different account of reasons and rationalization. Motivating my inquiry is a concern to show that ordinary ascriptions of reasons are not hostage to future accounts of how the (...) brain works. (shrink)

Drawing on a wide range of resources, including the history of philosophy, her role as director of a cognitive neuroscience group, and her Wittgensteinian training at Oxford, Jacobson provides fresh views on representation, concepts, perception, action, emotion and belief.

Might we have an instinctive tendency to perform helpful actions? This paper explores a model under development in cognitive neuroscience that enables us to understand what instinctive, helpful actions might look like. The account that emerges puts some pressure on key concepts in the philosophical understanding of folk psychology. In developing the contrast, a notion of embodied beliefs is introduced; it arguably fits folk conceptions better than philosophical ones. One upshot is that Humean insights into the role of empathy and (...) instinct in the production of helpful actions are affirmed. (shrink)

Bickle argues for both a narrow causal reductionism, and a broader ontological-explanatory reductionism. The former is more successful than the latter. I argue that the central and unsolved problem in Bickle's approach to reductionism involves the nature of psychological terms. Investigating why the broader reductionism fails indicates ways in which phenomenology remains more than a handmaiden of neuroscience.

This article, written from research data, focuses on the possible meaning of the data rather than on detailed statistical reporting. It defines whistleblowing as an act of the international nursing ethical ideal of advocacy, and places it in the larger context of professional responsibility. The experiences, actions, and ethical positions of 24 Japanese nurses regarding whistleblowing or reporting a colleague for wrongdoing provide the data. Of these respondents, similar in age, educational level and clinical experience, 10 had previously reported another (...) nurse and 12 had reported a physician for a wrongful act. These data raise questions about overt actions to expose a colleague in a culture that values group loyalty and saving face. Additional research is needed for an in-depth understanding of whistleblowing, patient advocacy and professional responsibility across cultures, especially those that value group loyalty, saving face and similar concepts to the Japanese Ishin Denshin, where the value is on implicit understanding requiring indirect communication. Usually, being direct and openly discussing sensitive topics is not valued in Japan because such behavior disrupts the most fundamental value, harmony (wa). (shrink)

Every epistemological theory needs to be able to articulate some version of the following principle: If S's belief "q" is to make S's belief "p" justified (or is to make "p" something S knows), then "q" must possess some positive epistemic merit. This paper argues that naturalizing epistemologies do not have access to this principle. The central problem is that of providing a naturalistic account of the notion of a reason-for-which one believes while avoiding internalist commitments. The discussion, which focuses (...) on the work of Alvin Goldman, is part of a general argument against causal accounts of reasons-for-which. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Inductive Scepticism and Experimental Reasoning in Moral Subjects in Hume's Philosophy Anne Jaap Jacobson According to its title page, Hume's Treatise Concerning HumanNature is An ATTEMPT to introduce the experimental Method ofReasoning INTO MORAL SUBJECTS."1 And from the first section onwards, Hume makes statements about the human mind which are given an unqualified generality;An Enquiry ConcerningHuman Understanding is marked by a similar assurance that much about human understanding (...) can be known. Because of this, exegesis which attributes to Hume an unrestrained scepticism about the experimental method appears to attribute to him inconsistency on such a scale as to render the interpretation itselfquestionable. Nonetheless, there is, atleast on the face ofit, considerable justification for ascribing to Hume just such a scepticism. In this paper I explore sceptical features, some ofthem important but little noticed, in Hume's treatment of causality and our beliefs about the unobserved. Though I end by suggestinghow to avoidviewing Hume in this area as simply lamentably inconsistent, Hume's use of the experimental method doesremain problematic, as, I suggest, Hume himselfthought. The first three of the following sections in this paper treat connected themes in Hume's philosophy which, when taken together, present us with a very sceptical view of experimental reasoning. I. Necessity as projected impression Hume holds that our beliefs about causality in the objects are in large part the result of a projection of an internal impression of (some kind of) necessity. The thesis ofprojection is not entirely straightforward; to see this, let us ask the question, is the impression which is projected semantically simple or complex? There are excellentreasonsforregarding the impression as simple as Hume conceives of "simple" in this context. Hume himselfappears to sayitis simple (E 64, n. 1). Andmuch of Hume's discussion ofnecessity is driven by the principle that there can be no idea without a preceding impression, and this principle applies only to simple ideas. But the consequent reading is far from satisfactory. To see the problem, let us look at what seems to be the Volume XV Number 2 325 ANNE JAAP JACOBSON most entrenched understanding ofHume, one perhaps amark ofKemp Smith's influence. This is the view that Hume is saying that the impression source of our idea of necessity is a feeling of anticipation. The problem is this: ifa feeling ofanticipation is a simple impression, it is not at all clear that the impression can do the job Hume has for it. Remember that if the impression is in content itselfrelational, then it is not a simple impression on Hume's own account, since ideas of relations are for him complex (T 13). Hence, we might take the impression to be of the sort described by Stroud, according to whom the impression yielding our idea of necessity is semantically unrelated to the elements of the relation. But such a reading robs Hume of the explanatory position he so clearly thinks he has. If we have a semantically simple impression it becomes a mystery why the spreading has the effects that it does: when we transfer the determination ofthe thought to external objects, andsuppose any real intelligible connexion betwixt them. (T 168, my emphasis) Why does spreading some simple, indefinable feeling result in our supposing there is a real intelligible connection between the objects on which the mind has spread? To get this result it looks as though the mind will have tomake two mistakes: thefirstmistake is the spreading, and the second mistake consists in the mind's inferring from the experience of the impression as spread that somehow the causal inference itself is also out there in nature as an intelligible connection. But, while Hume does sometimes seem to suggest we make this sort of two-step error (T 223, for example), such a picture makes it seem that the impression spread is not really the semantic source of (that is, wholly determinate of the content of) our idea ofnecessity. Rather, on the two-step error model, our belief that there are connections enters as a result of an inference following upon the spreading; however, for Hume, an inference is not the way an impression ofX gives rise to an idea ofX... (shrink)

Hume's "other words" which follow his first definition of causality in the "enquiry" are standardly read as giving us a counterfactual conditional. I argue that a more accurate reading reveals them to constitute a factual conditional, One reflecting a temporal restriction implicit in the first definition. The other words, So understood, Tell us merely that a component of the relation defined in the first definition is symmetrical.

In this commentary, I focus on several problems that the authors' understanding of group identity raises: the legality of avoiding background diversity, the problem of effectively unshareable knowledge, the practical quality of some outcomes arrived at by groups with homogeneous backgrounds, and moral issues about fairness. I note also that much recent research challenges the view that background diversity is more likely to be a detriment than a benefit.

This pilot study had two purposes: (1) to review recent Japanese nursing literature on nursing advocacy; and (2) to obtain data from nurses on advocacy. For the second purpose, 24 nurses at a nursing college in Japan responded to a questionnaire. The concept of advocacy, taken from the West, has become an ethical ideal for Japanese nurses but one that they do not always understand, or, if they do, they find it difficult to fulfil. They cite nursing leadership support as (...) necessary to enacting this role. Discussion on the meaning of and the rationale for advocacy in a society where goodness or badness is relative to social situations and its impact may reveal two parallel but overlapping views of morality. Such a situation would not only influence notions of advocacy but also possibly render them more complex. (shrink)

Some feminist theorists have argued that emphasizing women's self-defense mistakenly emphasizes women's behavior and choices rather than male aggression as a cause of sexual violence. I argue here that such critiques of self-defense are misguided, and do not sufficiently take into account the ways in which feminist self-defense courses can constitute embodied transformations of the meanings of femininity and rape. While certainly not sufficient to counter a rape culture by themselves, self-defense courses should remain a crucial element in feminist anti-rape (...) activism. (shrink)

In this article I will revisit the question of what I term the continuum of heteronormative sexual interactions, that is, the idea that purportedly ethically acceptable heterosexual interactions are conceptually, ethically, and politically associated with instances of sexual violence. Spurred by recent work by psychologist Nicola , I conclude that some of my earlier critiques of Catharine MacKinnon's theoretical linkages between sexual violence and normative heterosex are wanting. In addition, neither MacKinnon's theory nor my critique of it seem up to (...) the task of providing an ethical account of the examples of “unjust sex” that Gavey has described. I come to the conclusion that an ethical analysis of sexual interactions requires a focus on sexual desire, but that desire cannot take on the by now heavily criticized role of consent. Rather than looking for the presence or absence of sexual desire prior to sexual encounters as a kind of ethical certification of them, we ought instead to focus on the efficacy of that sexual desire, that is, its ability (or lack thereof) to shape an encounter in substantial and meaningful ways. (shrink)

A new, provocative study of the ethical, political, and social meanings of the everyday voice. Utilising the framework of feminist philosophy, authors Ann J. Cahill and Christine Hamel approach the phenomenon of voice as a lived, sonorous and embodied experience marked by the social structures that surround it, including systemic forms of injustice such as ableism, sexism, racism, and classism. By developing novel theoretical constructs such as "intervocality" and "respiratory responsibility," Cahill and Hamel cut through the static between theory and (...) praxis and put forward exciting theories on how human vocal sound can perpetuate -- and challenge -- persistent inequalities. Sounding Bodies presents a powerful model of how the seemingly disparate disciplines of philosophy and voice/speech training can, in conversation with each other, generate illuminating insights about our vocal lives and identities. (shrink)