Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations was the breakthrough of phenomenology. What made it a breakthrough was the new way of explicating truth or evidence as self-givenness or adequacy. Husserl did however also have another interpretation of truth: evidence as indubitability or certainty of apodicticity. Originally Husserl thought that apodicticity increases the evidence of something already adequately given. Yet, in the first Cartesian Meditation Husserl differentiates the two modes of evidence. In this article the way to this split up of evidence is (...) elaborated with the help of some recent publications in Husserliana. It is also suggested that the fact that Husserl has two separate views on truth is one reason for the dispersed state of Husserl-research. This article argues that Husserl's early view on evidence adequacy is more original and interesting. The real philosophical challenge, however, is to be able to join the two modes of evidence under one strenge Wissenschaft. (shrink)

The article explores a gradual refinement of the notion of reflection in Husserlian phenomenology. In his early period, Husserl takes phenomenological reflection to attain adequate evidence, since its object is self-given in an absolute and complete manner. However, this conception of reflection does not remain unchanged. Husserl later realizes that immanent perception or phenomenological reflection also involves a certain horizonality and naivety that has to do with its temporal nature and must be queried in a further critical, apodictic reflection. (...) Focusing more on the notion of apodicticity than adequacy, Husserl subsequently ascribes a new methodological role to reflection: instead of a mere epistemic warrant that guarantees for us the ultimate truth of our experiential life once and for all, phenomenological reflection ensures the strictness of phenomenology insofar as it entails an ethical-existential dimension as the norm of a life-form where the subject pursues full self-understanding and self-justification. (shrink)

A well-known paradox of strict verificationism is this one. Suppose we distinguish between evidence-statements and statements for the truth or falsity of which evidence statements are support, and suppose we could not come to know the non-evidential statements except by knowing the truth of the evidential ones. We must say: what we know is after all some set of evidential statements, and what we mean when we assert the non-evidential statement is after all a set of evidential statements. But the (...) point of calling a set of evidential statements evidential is simply to draw the distinction between evidence and what it is evidence for. What was the initial contrast therefore, and how did we come to think of it as a contrast? If what I mean by S is what would normally be considered evidence for the truth of S , then it cannot be evidence for the truth of S. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to present a paraconsistent formal system and a corresponding intended interpretation according to which true contradictions are not tolerated. Contradictions are, instead, epistemically understood as conflicting evidence, where evidence for a proposition A is understood as reasons for believing that A is true. The paper defines a paraconsistent and paracomplete natural deduction system, called the Basic Logic of Evidence, and extends it to the Logic of Evidence and Truth. The latter is a logic of (...) formal inconsistency and undeterminedness that is able to express not only preservation of evidence but also preservation of truth. LETj is anti-dialetheist in the sense that, according to the intuitive interpretation proposed here, its consequence relation is trivial in the presence of any true contradiction. Adequate semantics and a decision method are presented for both BLE and LETj, as well as some technical results that fit the intended interpretation. (shrink)

While working on various medieval philosophers, I have noticed an affinity between their remarks on the reasonableness of accepting propositions that are not matters of proof and strict deduction and St. John Henry Newman’s remarks that we accept unconditionally and rightly everyday ordinary propositions without calibrating them to demonstrable arguments. In particular, Cardinal Matthew of Aquasparta and Blessed John Duns Scotus both claim there is a sense in which assent to everyday propositions is tantamount to knowledge, even though there is (...) no adequate argumentation or demonstrative reasoning compelling us to assent to such propositions. Newman’s distinction between notional and real apprehension of propositions, notional and real assents, and his insistence on the existence of real assents to propositions that are not necessarily proved, or in some cases provable, seem, at first glance, a case parallel to that of the medieval philosophers we have mentioned. (shrink)

According to Richard Swinburne, the principle of simplicity is of great importance to theory choice scenarios and theoretical changes in the sciences. In particular, he holds that the theory choice criterion of fit with background evidence can be reduced to the criteria of simplicity and of yielding the data. We will, however, rebut this reduction thesis and show that three central aspects of theoretical change (confirming power of empirical data, reliability of experimental methods, and truth of new theoretical proposals) cannot (...) be adequately reconstructed if simplicity is regarded as a key criterion of theory choice. (shrink)

In his book Perché ancora la filosofia Carlo Cellucci argues that truth does not play any role in (modern) science: truth is only a chimera that prevents us «from adequately understanding the character of knowledge» and therefore «must be disposed of». I summarize Cellucci’s evidence for his contention that truth is a chimera. I then raise four objections to Cellucci’s views on truth. My conclusion is that, Cellucci’s arguments notwithstanding, a notion of truth is necessary for the human activity of (...) problem solving and therefore for an adequate understanding of the phenomenon of knowledge. (shrink)

The claim to truth has been common to both positive science and philosophy. But at present there is no consensus concerning what this claim to truth can mean for philosophical inquiry. Can a given philosophical position be regarded as true or false? Is it still possible to say that philosophical inquiry aims at truth at all? I argue that philosophy must be seen as oriented toward the disclosure of truth if it is to retain that critical dimension in which alone (...) constructive disagreement is possible. At the same time, I argue that the concept of truth which regulates philosophical inquiry is not that of the traditional correspondence theory. Rightly interpreted, the correspondence theory describes the meaning of truth for the positive sciences, which are concerned with facts; but it is adequate for an understanding of philosophy, which as a reflective enterprise is concerned with the meaning of facts. The aim of the dissertation, then, is to demonstrate the reflective connection between truth and meaning by exploring the concept of truth as developed in transcendental logic--the enterprise which thematizes the conditions which make knowledge of objects possible. ;In light of this problem, it is possible to see Heidegger's concept of truth in Being and Time as an important contribution to our understanding of the meaning of truth for reflection. Heidegger's theory of truth is often misinterpreted as an attempt to subvert the critical theory of truth as correspondence. However, it is in fact an attempt to situate the concept of propositional truth within a wider notion of truth as the disclosure of meaning as such, a notion which is necessary in order to understand the possibility of propositional truth. ;To show this, the dissertation traces the origin of Heidegger's concept of truth to its source in problems arising from the tradition of transcendental logic. This involves an examination of Heidegger's works prior to Being and Time, as well as a discussion of those philosophers from whom these works derive their inspiration. Most important among them are Emil Lask, whose revision of Kant's doctrine of categories led to a reflective identification of the object as such with meaning; and Edmund Husserl, whose concept of intuition and evidence allows us to see how such "original" meaning is given. But both Lask and Husserl remain tied to a correspondence theory in their attempts to explicate the relation between meaning and truth. Having subscribed to this position in his early works, Heidegger's reflection on the origin of meaning leads finally to the recognition that truth is first of all the historical disclosure of an horizon of meaning or intelligibility, within which alone it is possible to understand how a statement can "correspond" to the entity as it is in itself. ;The dissertation thus aims at establishing two points: that Heidegger's theory of truth is meant to describe a concept of truth adequate to the claims of philosophical reflection; and that this concept of truth must be seen as an answer to specific problems which arise from the theory of truth developed in the tradition of transcendental logic. (shrink)

We live in an age of evidence-based healthcare, where the concept of evidence has been avidly and often uncritically embraced as a symbol of legitimacy, truth, and justice. By letting the evidence dictate healthcare decision making from the bedside to the policy level, the normative claims that inform decision making appear to be negotiated fairly—without subjectivity, prejudice, or bias. Thus, the term ‘‘evidence-based’’ is typically read in the health sciences as the empirically adequate standard of reasonable practice and a (...) means for increasing certainty. Supporters believe that evidence-based medicine (EBM) can introduce rational order to the deliberative processes of healthcare decision making. It is perhaps puzzling, then, to come across critical perspectives (typically arising from the humanities and the more theory-driven social sciences) raising concerns about a seeming technogovernance being introduced by this deferral to the evidence where power interests can be obfuscated by way of technical resolve. The critics holding this minority view argue that technological solutions to problems of knowledge and practice cannot replace medicine’s normative content. Against EBM’s democratic leanings toward transparency and accountability, medical criteria alone cannot decide valueladen ethically charged decisions. This paper attempts to explain and evaluate this important debate in the philosophy of medicine, focusing specifically on the dispute over 'evidence-based women's health'. (shrink)

The Bayesian theorem on convergence to the truth states that a rational inquirer believes with certainty that her degrees of belief capture the truth about a large swath of hypotheses with increasing evidence. This result has been criticized as showcasing a problematic kind of epistemic immodesty when applied to infinite hypotheses that can never be approximated by finite evidence. The central point at issue—that certain hypotheses may forever be beyond the reach of a finite investigation no matter how large one’s (...) reservoir of evidence—cannot be captured adequately within standard probability theory. As an alternative, I propose a nonstandard probabilistic framework that, by using arbitrarily small and large numbers, makes room for the type of fine-grained conceptual distinctions appropriate for a deeper analysis of convergence to the truth. This framework allows for the right kind of modesty about attaining truth in the limit. (shrink)

This book examines Husserl's concept of necessary, a priori, and absolutely certain indubitable evidence, which he terms apodictic, and his related concept of complete evidence, which he terms adequate. To do so it explicates some of the more general relevant features of phenomenology as a whole.

This article critically engages Paul Moser’s “Divine Hiddenness Response” to the problem of evil—an approach to have recently come out of traditional free-will theism. I begin with identifying the initial common ground between Mosers thought and process theology that arguably coincides with what can be called the "Four Noble Truths of Christianity. ” Howevery when confronted with the problem of evil that threatens the credibility of these truths. Moser offers an epistemic strategy to address this threat without modifying the classical (...) concept of omnipotence and without having a full-explanation theodicy. I will argue that, far from helping the situation, this approach exacerbates it and is therefore strongly undesirable. In addition, Moser’s assumption of the absence of an adequate theodicy is unjustified in light of the demonstrable merits of process theodicy in accomplishing what omnipotence-preserving approaches cannot do—defusing the defeaters to Christianity’s Four Noble Truths effectively. Thusy it is desirable andy in the absence of better optionsy epistemically obligatory that omnipotence be modified and replaced with a version of God’s perfect power that is more coherent and evidence-based, and is also in line with a significant strand within the Bible. (shrink)

Pour résister à la destruction de la vérité qui menace la pensée contemporaine, on se propose de revenir à la thèse de Husserl : à la position d’un point de vérité qui s’identifie à l’évidence absolue de l’ego cogito, telle qu’il se donne dans sa chair. Mais cette évidence apodictique n’est pas forcément adéquate : il faut alors se demander ce que doit être la vérité de l’ego pour s’entrelacer à de la non-vérité et ce que doit être la chair (...) pour que l’auto-donation incarnée de l’ego se dissimule à elle-même. Une reconstruction transcendantale de la théorie merleau-pontyenne du chiasme tactile permettra de répondre à ces interrogations.In order to resist the destruction of Truth in contemporary Thinking, we need to come back to Husserl. According to him, there is a point of Truth which is identical to the absolute self-evidence of the Ego Cogito, giving itself in its own Flesh. However, this apodictic self-evidence is not necessarily adequate. What could be the Truth of the Ego, if it intertwines itself with Non-Truth ? And what could be the Flesh, if the carnal self-giving of the Ego could conceal itself to itself ? A transcendental reconstruction of the Merleau-Pontyan theory of the tactile chiasm will help us to answer those questions. (shrink)

It has become almost a cliché to say that we live in a post-truth world; that people of all trades speak with an indifference to truth. Speaking with an indifference to how things really are is famously regarded by Harry Frankfurt as the essence of bullshit. This paper aims to contribute to the philosophical and theoretical pragmatics discussion of bullshit. The aim of the paper is to offer a new theoretical analysis of what bullshit is, one that is more encompassing (...) than Frankfurt’s original characterization. I part ways with Frankfurt in two points. Firstly, I propose that we should not analyze bullshit in intentional terms (i.e. as indifference). Secondly, I propose that we should not analyze it in relation to truth. Roughly put, I propose that bullshit is best characterized as speaking with carelessness toward the evidence for one’s conversational contribution. I bring forward, in the third section, a battery of examples that motivate this characterization. Furthermore, I argue that we can analyze speaking with carelessness toward the evidence in Gricean terms as a violation of the second Quality maxim. I argue that the Quality supermaxim, together with its subordinate maxims, demand that the speaker is truthful (contributes only what she believes to be true) and reliable (has adequate evidence for her contribution). The bullshitter’s main fault lies in being an unreliable interlocutor. I further argue that we should interpret what counts as adequate evidence, as stipulated by the second Quality Maxim, in contextualist terms: the subject matter and implicit epistemic standards determine how much evidence one needs in order to have adequate evidence. I contrast this proposed reading with a subjectivist interpretation of what counts as having adequate evidence and show that they give different predictions. Finally, working with a classic distinction, I argue that we should not understand bullshit as a form of deception but rather as a form of misleading speech. (shrink)

This book is highly recommended for those who want to break into the current realism/anti-realism debate, as it ranges over the fields of Philosophy of Science, Linguistic Analysis, Cognitive Science, etc. It would make an ideal text for those teachers who want to give their students a "map of the territory," indicating the various positions and implications of positions, and stances of the major "players"--Kuhn, Feyerabend, Van Fraasen, Davidson, Dummett, Putnam, Quine. In Devitt's view, two errors plague much of the (...) contemporary discussion: There is a confusion between what constitutes realism and what should be evidence for realism. The issue of truth is attacked first, and only subsequently the issue of realism. The order should properly be reversed. The more encompassing theory of the world takes up the realism/anti-realism debate; this should be settled first, on the usual grounds for accepting any theory-usefulness, plausibility, etc. The semantic issue of truth arises only in the relatively parochial and circumscribed sub-set of our general theory, the theory of people and their behavior, especially, for Devitt, their teaching, learning, and general communication. Our answer to the latter should not reflect back upon and control our answer to the former, as it has often done in the modern period, where the issue of certainty confused the issue of truth and made anti-realism more attractive than realism. Devitt gives the best description of his own position as follows: "he theory of understanding is the wrong place to start. The task is to put together the most plausible comprehensive theory of the phenomena that confront us. Theories of language and understanding are only two among many scientific theories that must be fitted into the comprehensive picture. Realism is an overarching empirical theory or principle. It is initially plausible. It is supported by arguments that make no appeal to theories of language or understanding. Its rivals all fail. What firmer place could there be to stand than Realism, as we theorize in such undeveloped areas as those of language and understanding? In contrast, the poor state of theories in those areas, whether verificationist or not, makes them a bad place from which to start theorizing, particularly in determining overarching principles about the nature of reality. To think otherwise is to put the cart before the horse". The arguments for the above claims are tight and reward the effort needed to work through them. Frequent cross-references keep the reader from losing the forest for the trees. The realist has felt naked and defenseless before the recent onslaughts of the above-mentioned anti-realists. Devitt, following the lead of Hartry Field, gives him a suit of clothes, indeed, in this reader's opinion, a suit of armor. Devitt chases down the enemies of realism into their rabbit holes; not the least impressive aspect of this work occurs when Devitt indicates the valid criteria of what should count as an "adequate explanation"--what should rationally be demanded--and how these can be abused. Devitt unmasks the "coyness" of certain well-known anti-realists for what it is--an inability to provide an explanation when one is truly needed, an inability camouflaged by demanding of the realist an "explanation" where none in fact is needed. This is an unusually comprehensive work, and a powerful, first-rate performance.--Patrick Madigan, Loyola University, New Orleans. (shrink)

THE central idea of modern empiricism has been that, if there is to be such a thing as justification at all, empirical knowledge must be seen as resting on experiential "foundations." To claim that knowledge rests on foundations is to claim that there is a privileged class of beliefs the members of which are "intrinsically credible" or "directly evident" and which are able, therefore, to serve as ultimate terminating points for chains of justification. An important development in current epistemology has (...) been a revival of the debate between philosophers who favor this conception of knowledge and those who think that an adequate account of justification can be given in terms of "coherence." Thus Dummett, Pollock, and Quinton, in varying degrees, have based their recent defenses of traditional empiricist views on what they take to be the clear untenability of coherentist alternatives. Harman and Lehrer, on the other hand, have tried to show that defensible versions of the coherence theory can be developed. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the 1970s, the Federal Trade Commission declared that allowing medical providers to advertise directly to consumers would be “providing the public with truthful information about the price, quality or other aspects of their service.” However, our understanding of the advertising content is highly limited.ObjectiveTo assess whether direct-to-consumer medical service advertisements provide relevant information on access, quality and cost of care, a content analysis was conducted.MethodTelevision and online advertisements for medical services directly targeting consumers were collected in two major urban (...) centres in Nevada, USA, identifying 313 television advertisements and 200 non-duplicate online advertisements.ResultsBoth television and online advertisements reliably conveyed information about the services provided and how to make an appointment. At the same time, less than half of the advertisements featured insurance information and hours of operation and less than a quarter of them contained information regarding the quality and price of care. The claims of quality were substantiated in even fewer advertisements. The scarcity of quality and cost information was more severe in television advertisements.ConclusionThere is little evidence that medical service advertising, in its current form, would contribute to lower prices or improved quality of care by providing valuable information to consumers. (shrink)

According to the knowledge view of evidence notoriously defended by Timothy Williamson (2000), for any subject, her evidence consists of all and only her propositional knowledge (E=K). Many have found (E=K) implausible. However, few have offered arguments against Williamson’s positive case for (E=K). In this paper, I propose an argument against Williamson’s positive case in favour of (E=K). Central to my argument is the possibility of the knowledge of necessary truths. I also draw some more general conclusions concerning theorizing about (...) evidence. (shrink)

I distinguish a priori knowledge from a priori truths or statements. A priori knowledge either is evident or is derived from evident premisses by means of correct reasoning. An a priori statement is one that reflects features of the conceptual framework within which it is placed. The statement either describes semantic relations between concepts of the framework or it characterizes the application of the framework to experience and the world. An a priori statement is not necessarily part of anyone’s a (...) priori knowledge. I also distinguish empirical knowledge from empirical statements. Both statements and theories are empirical if they are designed to characterize features of experience and the world. Knowledge is empirical if it fits experience; thus, one must check to see whether it fits. We do not obtain knowledge of logical systems by rational insight of evident truths and careful deductions from evident truths. Adequate logical systems are developed by trial and error. Logical knowledge is empirical knowledge that is not generally a priori. It is empirical knowledge of a priori truths and principles of our conceptual systems. Logical systems are empirical theories of these truths and principles. (shrink)

I discuss Andrea Iacona’s idea that logical form mirrors truth conditions, and that logical form, and thus truth conditions, are in turn represented by means of adequate formalization. I criticize this idea, noting that the notion of adequate formalization is highly indefinite, while the pre-theoretic idea of logical form is often much more definite. I also criticize Iacona’s claim that certain distinct sentences, with the same truth conditions and differing only by co-referential names, must be formalized by the (...) same formula (in the same context). I criticize this claim, noting that it imposes implausible demands on adequate formalization. Finally, I offer some brief remarks on the connection between Iacona’s ideas and the distinction between logical and non-logical constants. (shrink)

Reid had a theory of the human mind containing a theory of truth, both of our evidence of truth and the conditions of truth, fully consistent with empiricism. The justification and evidence of first principles is something felt in consciousness rather than some external relation. This is the result of our faculties, original and natural powers of our constitution. Original convictions and conceptions arise from our faculties in response to experience as a result of our natural development. Reid combines elements (...) of foundationalism, coherentism, falliblism and nominalism. I distinguish and compare Reid to Hume, Moore, Quine, James and Wittgenstein. (shrink)

This article focuses on the events surrounding a homosexual Romanian man's attempt to be recognized as a refugee in Britain. Numerous themes emerge such as the nature of authenticity, knowledge, identity, pleasure, evidence and the homosexual refugee as being caught in between two legal apparatuses (that is, fleeing from the hostility of one legal regime and then trying to gain refugee status, and thus legal protection, via a British Immigration Tribunal). In this article, the corporeality and sensuality of legal practices (...) are exposed in the form of `practices of truth'. That is, in this case medico-legal `living individuals' were to perceive, hear, speak, touch and penetrate the `secrets' of Mr Vraciu's body in order to authenticate his sexual identity for the purposes of law. This case also demonstrates the existence of a differend between what I describe as the self-knowledge of homosexuality and the `legal' fact-based, or authorized knowledge of homosexual identity produced through practices of truth. (shrink)

This article is devoted to a phenomenological analysis and interpretation of the basic concepts involved in phenomenology. The first concept that deserves our attention is that of “apodicticity” along with the related concept of “apodictic evidence”. The next concept is that of “correlation,” which manifests its apodictic character in bringing together all transcendental facts. With the transition from traditional discourses to modern discourse, the concept of apodicticity continues to deepen; at the same time, it is accepted that some metaphysical presuppositions (...) continue to lurk at the foundation of this concept. Apodicticity, as the principle of knowledge, is an idea that lies in the infinity of universal experience, which includes both agreed and mismatched moments. This mismatch, in turn, refers to correlative connections between the transcendental Ego, the world and intersubjectivity. Transcendental subjectivity has a correlative nature, which is due to its self-transcending character, resulting in gaps and distinctions being found within subjectivity. (shrink)

Sherrilyn Roush defends a new theory of knowledge and evidence, based on the idea of "tracking" the truth, as the best approach to a wide range of questions about knowledge-related phenomena. The theory explains, for example, why scepticism is frustrating, why knowledge is power, and why better evidence makes you more likely to have knowledge. Tracking Truth provides a unification of the concepts of knowledge and evidence, and argues against traditional epistemological realist and anti-realist positions about scientific theories and for (...) a piecemeal approach based on a criterion of evidence, a position Roush calls "real anti-realism." Epistemologists and philosophers of science will recognize this as a significant original contribution. (shrink)

Is truth in the law just plain truth - or something sui generis? Is a trial a search for truth? Do adversarial procedures and exclusionary rules of evidence enable, or impede, the accurate determination of factual issues? Can degrees of proof be identified with mathematical probabilities? What role can statistical evidence properly play? How can courts best handle the scientific testimony on which cases sometimes turn? How are they to distinguish reliable scientific testimony from unreliable hokum? These interdisciplinary essays explore (...) such questions about science, proof, and truth in the law. With her characteristic clarity and verve, Haack brings her original and distinctive work in theory of knowledge and philosophy of science to bear on real-life legal issues. She includes detailed analyses of a wide variety of cases and lucid summaries of relevant scientific work, of the many roles of the scientific peer-review system, and of relevant legal developments. (shrink)

The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular condition concerning the possession (...) of evidence. The core position adopted here then is that false propositions that are approximately true reports of measurements can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. So, it will be argued that evidence is only quasi-factive in this very specific sense. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 132-133 [Access article in PDF] Book Review The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology Donn Welton. The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi + 496. Cloth, $54.95. Few philosophers have been as ill-served by their reception as Husserl. The books he managed to publish during his lifetime provide a very limited perspective (...) on his thought but have determined what Donn Welton, in this magnificent treatise, calls the "Standard Interpretation," shared by analytic and deconstructionist readers alike, in which Husserl is a neo-Cartesian wedded to epistemological immanentism, methodological solipsism, and ontological idealism. That a very different Husserl is found in his vast Nachlass has long been known, but because of its sheer volume and relative inaccessibility it has had little impact on the Husserl-reception beyond a small circle of specialists. Hence in recovering the "Other" Husserl, Welton's aim is not the usual historical one of stripping away anachronistic readings to arrive at an original reception, but one of negating this Rezeptionsgeschichte to reveal a philosophy that has, in a certain sense, never been present.In this, the book succeeds wonderfully. Welton threads through the tangle of the Nachlass to reconstruct the unfulfilled "great systematic work" that occupied Husserl off and on from about 1920 until his death, uncovering thereby the revolutionary implications of Husserl's move from "static" to "genetic" phenomenology that force us to reconsider the Standard Interpretation point by point. While admitting that Husserl never abandoned his Cartesian proclivities altogether, Welton shows how these can be read as dependent moments in a system of "transcendental phenomenology" that ends up "much closer to Heidegger's approach than is usually thought" (233). The relevance for current debates in philosophy is made plain, such that Husserl is, at last, our contemporary.Briefly reviewing a book as ambitious as this inevitably distorts it, but let me comment on its central methodological claim. Transcendental phenomenology emerged from the pre-transcendental phenomenology of the Logische Untersuchungen when Husserl began seeking the "ultimate ground" for scientific cognition (chapters 1-4). This approach, dubbed the "Cartesian Way" by Husserl himself, generated the "Cartesian Enclosures" (chapter 5) of the Standard Interpretation: demanding evidence that is apodictic, adequate, and directly intuitive, Husserl identifies "transcendental subjectivity" with the individual, indeed solipsistic, "stream of consciousness" and interprets this ontologically as the "relativity" of the world. In his pivotal chapter 6, however, Welton shows that Husserl's reflections on time and memory forced him to admit that the "transcendental field" could not be secured by appeal to "adequate evidence" (154). Hence Husserl adopted a "Kantian Way" (158) that supplements intuitive evidence with elements of transcendental "construction" (148). The concept of transcendental "subjectivity" is thereby transformed from an egocentric stream of consciousness to an intersubjective, communicative, embodied, and historical site of the "transcendental genesis" of meaning.Chapters 7-9 detail how Husserl's increasing interest in the genesis of meaning in the 1920s calls forth this transformation. Tracing the problem on the levels of "speech" and "experience," Welton carefully elucidates how, in moving from static through constitutive to genetic analyses, Husserl came increasingly to see that his original "leading clue"--the phenomenon of cognitive act-intentionality--depended upon the passive syntheses and contexts of "motivation" that make up the world-horizon of pre-cognitive "life." Chapters 10 and 12 argue that Husserl's desire to force these insights into a Cartesian framework yielded the dead-end of "transcendental psychologism" and the dubious teleology of an ethico-political "one-worldism." Meanwhile in chapters 13-15, Welton sketches a phenomenologically more defensible concept of world as "horizon"--a nonperceptual, inherently plural, space of meaning structured as "context" (speech) and "background" (embodiment).Chapter 11 is central to the argument, since it describes how the Kantian notion of transcendental deduction ("construction") is to be integrated into phenomenological method. Things move very quickly. Welton relies heavily on Jay Rosenberg's idea that transcendental deduction is a species of "practical reasoning," and on Charles Taylor's... (shrink)

I discuss three potential sources of evidence for truth in set theory, coming from set theory’s roles as a branch of mathematics and as a foundation for mathematics as well as from the intrinsic maximality feature of the set concept. I predict that new non first-order axioms will be discovered for which there is evidence of all three types, and that these axioms will have significant first-order consequences which will be regarded as true statements of set theory. The bulk of (...) the paper is concerned with the Hyperuniverse Programme, whose aim is to discover an optimal mathematical principle for expressing the maximality of the set-theoretic universe in height and width. (shrink)

This essay explores Edmund Husserl's significance for contemporary truth theory. Focusing on his Logical Investigations, it argues that early Husserl's conception of truth unsettles a common polarity between epistemic and nonepistemic approaches. Unlike contemporary epistemic conceptions of truth, he gives full weight to “truth makers” that have their own being: objective identity, perceptible objects, and states of affairs. Yet, unlike contemporary nonepistemic conceptions, he also insists on the intentional givenness of such truth makers and on the complexity of the experiences (...) within which propositional truth claims arise. To develop this argument, the essay explains how early Husserl's conception of truth builds on his phenomenology of intentional experience and knowledge. By emphasizing an objective identity between what is signitively meant and intuitively given, Husserl's approach provides a way to resituate propositional truth within a broader and more dynamic conception of truth. (shrink)

Many epistemological terms, such as investigation, inquiry, argument, evidence, and fact were established in law well before being associated with science. However, while legal proof remained qualified by standards of ‘moral certainty’, scientific proof attained a reputation for objectivity. Although most forms of legal evidence continue to be treated as fallible ‘opinions’ rather than objective ‘facts’, forensic DNA evidence increasingly is being granted an exceptional factual status. It did not always enjoy such status. Two decades ago, the scientific status of (...) forensic DNA evidence was challenged in the scientific literature and in courts of law, but by the late 1990s it was being granted exceptional legal status. This paper reviews the ascendancy of DNA profiling, and argues that its widely-heralded objective status is bound up with systems of administrative accountability. The ‘administrative objectivity’ of DNA evidence rests upon observable and reportable bureaucratic rules, records, recording devices, protocols, and architectural arrangements. By highlighting administrative sources of objectivity, this paper suggests that DNA evidence remains bound within the context of ordinary organisational and practical routines, and is not a transcendent source of ‘truth’ in the criminal justice system. (shrink)

How do issues of form and content shape the documentary film? What role does visual evidence play in relation to a documentary’s arguments about the world we live in? In what ways do documentaries abide by or subvert ethical expectations? Are mockumentaries a form of subversion? Can the documentary be an aesthetic experience and at the same time have political or social impact? And how can such impacts be empirically measured? Pioneering film scholar Bill Nichols investigates the ways documentaries strive (...) for accuracy and truthfulness and simultaneously fabricate a form that shapes reality. Such films may rely on reenactment to re-create the past, storytelling to provide satisfying narratives, and rhetorical figures such as metaphor or devices such as irony to make a point. Documentaries are truly a fiction unlike any other. With clarity and passion, Nichols offers incisive commentaries on the basic questions of documentary’s distinct relationship to the reality it represents, as well as close readings of provocative documentaries from this form's earliest days to its most recent incarnations. These essays offer a definitive account of what makes documentary film such a vital part of our cultural landscape. (shrink)

Newton da Costa and Steven French have argued that the concept of partial truth plays an important role in our understanding of significant aspects of scientific practice: from the status of scientific theories through the understanding of inconsistency in science to the nature of induction (see da Costa and French 2003). In this paper, I use the concept of partial truth and the associated framework of partial structures to offer a formulation of the concept of visual evidence, and I examine (...) some of the roles that this notion plays in scientific activity. DOI:10.5007/1808-1711.2011v15n2p249. (shrink)

Among other interesting proposals, Juan Comesaña’s _Being Rational and Being Right_ makes a challenging case that one’s evidence can include falsehoods. I explore some ways in which we might have to rethink the roles that evidence can play in inquiry if we accept this claim. It turns out that Comesaña’s position lends itself to the conclusion that while false evidence is possible and not even terribly uncommon, I can be rationally sure that I don’t currently have any and perhaps also (...) that I won’t get any, and (absent certain evidence to the contrary) you are not afflicted with any either. This conclusion might seem too good to be true. I finish by raising a puzzle about one of the main motivations for Comesaña’s view. (shrink)

The relationship between truth and politics has rarely seemed more vexed. Worries about misinformation and disinformation abound, and the value of expertise for democratic decision-making dismissed. Whom can we trust to provide us with reliable testimony? In Truth and Evidence, the latest in the NOMOS series, Melissa Schwartzberg and Philip Kitcher present nine timely essays shedding light on practices of inquiry. These essays address urgent questions including what it means to #BelieveWomen; what factual knowledge we require to confront challenges like (...) COVID-19; and how white supremacy shapes the law of evidence. (shrink)

Adrian Heathcote and I agree that a stopped clock does not show—as the adage has it—the right time twice a day, but he thinks, as I do not, that it does show what time it stopped. To think that it does is to treat the position of its hands as evidence of its stopping at the time it did. Add to the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge the requirement that the evidence on the basis of which the believer is justified be (...) evidence of what is believed in this sense, and you have the long-sought fourth condition to block Gettier cases. I argue that requiring that one’s evidence be evidence in this sense is incompatible with the fallibilism on which Gettier cases are predicated. (shrink)

Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...) inductive inference, for example, inference to the best explanation. 1 Introduction2 Theory of Dialectical Structures3 Debate Simulations4 From Evidence and Arguments to Truth: The First Route5 From Evidence to Truth: The Second Route6 Conclusion. (shrink)