Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments without Logical Omniscience

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (4):1117-1137 (2016)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of inductive inference, for example, inference to the best explanation. 1 Introduction2 Theory of Dialectical Structures3 Debate Simulations4 From Evidence and Arguments to Truth: The First Route5 From Evidence to Truth: The Second Route6 Conclusion

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,709

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Necessarily Adequate Evidence about Other Minds.T. Greenwood - 1972 - Philosophy 47 (182):359 - 370.
The love of truth.Anandi Hattiangadi - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (4):422-432.
Haack on Dummett: A note.Andrea M. Weisberger - 1989 - Philosophical Studies 55 (3):331.
Tracking truth: knowledge, evidence, and science.Sherrilyn Roush - 2005 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Instantiation, Confirmation, and Truth: A Problem in Inductive Logic.John Dickson Mclean - 1980 - Dissertation, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Cornea and Inductive Evidence.Justin P. McBrayer - 2009 - Faith and Philosophy 26 (1):77-86.
Is Truth a Chimera?Cesare Cozzo - 2014 - In Cesare Cozzo & Emiliano Ippoliti (eds.), From a Heuristic Point of View. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 107-24.
On the Ramification of Inexactness.La Verne Shelton - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:347-367.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-04-03

Downloads
129 (#141,052)

6 months
31 (#105,052)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Gregor Betz
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology