Military technology is difficult to restrain for many reasons. Military forces and associated technology serve important functions in the foreign policy of states. Military technology is also pursued to enhance military capability and cost-effectiveness of military forces, to ensure that one's own forces outperform those of an adversary, to play symbolic roles, and to preserve or improve stability in the international system. In addition, new military technology and new systems are advocated by military services and military equipment manufacturers for organizational (...) and economic as well as strategic reasons. To date, arms control agreements have not significantly restrained innovation in military technology, nor are they likely to do so in the future. This is a result of asymmetries between the forces of the United States and the Soviet Union and of the intrinsic difficulties of designing arms control agreements that restrain technological innovation m ways that are both meaningful and verifiable. Although the difficulty of restraining military technology should temper expectations for both nuclear and con ventional arms control, there is no reason to believe that meaningful arms control will be rendered impossible as a consequence. (shrink)

A well-known paradox of strict verificationism is this one. Suppose we distinguish between evidence-statements and statements for the truth or falsity of which evidence statements are support, and suppose we could not come to know the non-evidential statements except by knowing the truth of the evidential ones. We must say: what we know is after all some set of evidential statements, and what we mean when we assert the non-evidential statement is after all a set of evidential statements. But the (...) point of calling a set of evidential statements evidential is simply to draw the distinction between evidence and what it is evidence for. What was the initial contrast therefore, and how did we come to think of it as a contrast? If what I mean by S is what would normally be considered evidence for the truth of S , then it cannot be evidence for the truth of S. (shrink)

L’extension de la logique aristotélicienne ne doit s’entendre ni par voie d’opposition, ni par voie de simple développement, mais plutôt par voie de différenciation progressive. On trouvera ainsi dans cette logique tant la défense des fondements essentiels de la connaissance que le germe des développements possibles de la logique et la justification des acquisitions positives de la logique moderne.