U radu se analizira slika danasnjeg hegemonog secanja na titoizam. Prikazane su raznovrsne instrumentalne redukcije u domacoj kulturi secanja koje obuhvataju demonizacije i negativne simbolizacije titoizma. Blize su razmotreni raznovrsni mitovi i ideologizacije kod pamcenja titoizma, zatim cinioci selektivnog secanja i novi sklop secanja na titoizam. Uoceno je da su privatizacija i retradicionalizacija glavni cinioci kreiranja novih okvira za pamcenje socijalizma i za novu negativnu simbolizaciju titoizma.

The paper discusses various aspects of the concept of “cultural memory” coined by Jan Assmann and related both to the problem of determining the categories of culture that became the first objects of philosophical reflection in the era of the Axial Age and to the issues of the modern crisis of the ideology of globalism and multiculturalism. Using the example of some categories of an archaic myth that have not lost their cultural and social relevance at present, the variability of (...) the genesis of philosophy in various civilizations of the epoch of the “Axial Age” is demonstrated - both those in which it arises as an independent form of worldview and those where this process stops at the stage of a highly speculative myth. Special attention is paid to the cultural and social aspects of memory and recollection of the past as forms of spiritual “resistance” to external cultural influences and the preservation of religious and ethnic identity, which is equally relevant both during the genesis of philosophy and in modern post-industrial society during the crisis of globalist ideology and the philosophy of multiculturalism. (shrink)

Many natural scientists of the past and the present have imagined that they pursued their activity according to its own inherent rules in a realm distinctly separate from the business world, or at least in a realm where business tended to interfere with science from time to time, but was not ultimately an essential component, ‘because one thought that in science one possessed and loved something unselfish, harmless, self-sufficient, and truly innocent, in which man’s evil impulses had no part whatever’, (...) as Nietzsche once commented (Nietzsche 1974, p.106). With the extreme technological changes that have occurred in the last fifty years and the orchestrated management changes in the culture of science, it is now obvious that science is intimately tied to private businesses, industry, and society. Within this structure, the scientist has generally unknowingly defined him or herself in accordance with obsolete myths that have tended to handicap the scientist’s freedom of action, by obscuring the modern political and economic realities of science, and neglecting the inherent responsibilities of the scientist as a critical actor in the theater of human civilization. The increasing incorporation of academic science and private industry, and the governmentally supervised nature of modem academic science, has corrupted the traditional freedom and character of the scientist. In order to navigate oneself and find meaning within the new structure of science, scientists now desperately need a fresh ethos that at once considers modern realities of the politics and management of science, societal urgencies, and global politics, as well as establishing a moral perspective where modern scientists can be actors with their own intentionality and responsibility. -/- In the culture of science, myths and ideologies are of critical importance for the formation of the scientist, because these ideas determine how scientists conceive of themselves as professionals and free individuals. More importantly, these ideas determine how scientists approach scientific activity, which exists in a social context, and which ultimately has the potential to dramatically change the characteristics of civilization as it is played out on the political and technological battlefield. It is a commonly held notion in the community of the natural sciences that science now is essentially what it was when it was described by the Nobel laureates of the past; those sweet, cushioning, pleasant words consecrating the ‘temple of science’; the picture of a humble, rational, and noble Einstein is imprinted into our memories. By dismantling these obsolete myths of the scientist and surveying contemporary trends in science, this article will explore a more realistic perspective toward the field of science. The goal of this investigation is to determine the modern reality and ultimate meaning of ‘science as a vocation’ (Shorett 2003). Finally, moral philosophy will be demonstrated to be a critical clement in the self-assertion of the scientist and the elucidation of the meaning of science as a vocation in a global technological society. -/- From the Postscript, 2015: This article took final form when I was a postdoctoral researcher in Canada. Reading it now, I recognize the article still has value, despite its many flaws, hyperboles, and idealism. Many issues in the article have become increasingly relevant, such as the need to make constant trade-offs in courses of action and continuously search for more morally significant research paths. Perhaps the greatest goals in writing the article were to increase intellectual control over the path of my scientific research, to escape the increasing conformity and constraints on modern life, to participate in an open society, to formulate my personal goals and goal hierarchies, to dispel any delusions of overconfidence, and to not be corrupted. (shrink)

The collective historical amnesia that reigns in contemporary Russia demands an explanation. In the first part of my article I will analyze the mechanisms that suppress historical memory. I will focus my attention on two historical representations of critical relevance for this matter. First, I will discuss the Western-oriented ideology of the post-Soviet intelligentsia. Second, I will analyze the functioning of the myth of the "Great Patriotic War." In the second part of my paper I will address the influence of (...) historical amnesia on contemporary Russian society. Deep distortions in moral judgments and social relations resulting from suppressed memory will be studied through an analysis of contemporary Russian fiction, especially fantasy. Finally, I will consider Russian Gothic society, which originates in historical amnesia. (shrink)

It is about analyzing the connection between just memory, narration and art, using an approach that mixes philosophy and visual arts. We will start from the perspective of the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur on fair memory, presented in his work Memory, History, Oblivion (2000), according to which there is an institutionalized ideologization of memory in which narrations are silenced or distorted by the so-called official history. In the process of recovering fair memory, these narratives need to be heard, recognized and (...) valued, deconstructing abusive mechanisms that silence them with the aim of producing oblivion or that manipulate them involve distorting the facts to benefit hegemonic discourses. Next, we will discuss how the myth of Brazilian racial democracy is an example of institutionalized ideologization of memory, considering mainly the reflections of Brazilian philosophy Sueli Carneiro in Device of raciality (2023). Finally, we will show how Elian Almeida's pictorial counter-narratives, especially the Vogue series (2020), work to strengthen and disseminate unofficial narratives about Brazil that have been suffocated by official history. (shrink)

_Memory, Myth, and Seduction_ reveals the development and evolution of Jean-Georges Schimek's thinking on unconscious fantasy and the interpretive process derived from a close reading of Freud as well as contemporary psychoanalysis. Contributing richly to North American psychoanalytic thought, Schimek challenges local views from the perspective of continental discourse. A practicing psychoanalyst, teacher, and consummate Freud scholar, Schimek sought to clarify Freud's concepts and theories and to disentangle complexities borne of inconsistencies in Freud's assumptions and expositions. This book is divided (...) thematically into three sections. The first concerns fantasy and interpretation as they play out in the analytic situation, and the manner in which analyst and patient coconstruct meaning and reconstruct and recover memory. The second consists of two seminal papers which provide the sequence of steps in the five revisions in Freud's seduction theory. Schimek's careful scholarship lays out the data of Freud's writing, which allows one to draw one's own conclusions about the implications of the changes in the theory that he made. In the third, more theoretical section, he provides a foundation for understanding many of today's discussions about unconscious fantasy, dreaming, remembering, consciousness, affect, self-reflection, mentalization, and implicit relational knowing. He clarifies and illustrates Freud's original formulations through a careful reading of sections of _The Interpretation of Dreams_, and a study of Freud's famous Signorelli parapraxis. Skillfully arranged and carefully edited by Deborah Browning and including a foreword by Alan Bass, this collection of Schimek's published and unpublished papers will be of interest to practicing psychoanalysts, psychoanalytically-oriented psychotherapists, and students of the history of ideas and philosophy who have a particular interest in fantasy, interpretation, and Freud. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:A National Shrine to Scapegoating? The Vietnam Veterans Memorial Washington, D.C. Jon Pahl Valparaiso University In a recent survey I conducted of visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial in Washington, D.C, 92 percent agreed that "the memorial is a sacred place, and should be treated as such."1 Clearly, this place, by some reports the most visited site in the U.S. capital, draws devotion. But how does a pilgrimage to (...) this memorial function?2 Does pilgrimage to "the wall" serve to "heal a nation," as its builders intended, or does pilgrimage to the memorial ironically legitimize structures of violence like those which led the United States into the Vietnamese conflict in the first place?3 My argument builds upon the work of René Girard to suggest that pilgrimage to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial can legitimize the violence of American culture by 'The survey was of 185 pilgrims attending ceremonies during Veterans Day, November 11, 1993 and 1994. Several recent works explore the interface between civil religion and violence, notably John E. Bodnar, Karal Ann Marling, and Edward T. Linenthal. On sacred places, the pioneering work of Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane, remains important but must be supplemented by Jonathan Z. Smith's Imagining Religion. 1 Victor and Edith Turner argue cogently that "if a tourist is half pilgrim, a pilgrim is half tourist" (20). Many visitors to the Vietnam Veterans Memorial understand themselves only as tourists, but their behavior appears to me to warrant treatment under the category of "pilgrimage." 3 I assume a "maximalist" definition of violence, which understands the word to refer not only to physical harm to individuals, but also to systemic, social structures of exclusion (such as racism), and ideological (or symbolic) justifications of violence (see Robert McAfee Brown; for a minimalist approach, see Gerald Runkle). 166Jon Pahi reinforcing scapegoating.4 At the same time, however, the established religious pluralism and voluntarism of American culture—evident in this pilgrimage process—diffuses violence. Furthermore, the democratic character of this pilgrimage empowers pilgrims to critique idolatrous worship of the nation, and to witness to authentic reverence for life. Mimesis on the mall A brief impressionistic portrait ofthe way visitors experience the Vietnam Veterans Memorial will demonstrate how the memorial draws pilgrims into a mimetic process—a key feature of Girard's theory. Many pilgrims stop at the memorial as part of a National Park Service 'Tourmobile' circuit of museums and memorials, or as part of another bus tour (school and senior citizens groups are especially common ). These busses disembark pilgrims at the base of the Lincoln Memorial, directly in front of the reflecting pool on the national mall, in sight of the Washington Monument and the Capitol. Pilgrims may, or may not, first climb the steps of the Lincoln Memorial (a powerful shrine with implications for understanding violence in its own right). Moving north, they eventually proceed along a sidewalk lined with Fig. 1 "Three Men Statue".,. several tents where veterans organizations sell T-shirts, medals, bumper-stickers, books, and other memorabilia. The first stop for many pilgrims is the "Three Men Statue" (Fig. 1) located in a grove just past the tents. 4 I summarize Girard's theory as follows: Beginning with mimetic desire, rivalry for an object escalates and threatens the social order. Religion—and notably sacrifice of the scapegoat—creates sufficient unanimity to restore a sense of social order, but does so through violence itself, masking through myth and ritual a vicious cycle of aggression we know as the history of human culture. A National Shrine to Scapegoating?167 This bronze statue (and the American flag which flies nearby) was not part ofthe original design for the memorial, and was dedicated in 1985, three years after the wall of names. It was the result of a compromise between founders of the Vietnam Veterans Memorial Fund led by veteran Jan Scruggs and a group led by 1992 Presidential candidate H. Ross Perot which was dissatisfied with the wall and felt the need for a more 'heroic' representation of the survivors ofthe war.5 Most pilgrims understand little of the history behind the statue, or its intent to create a more heroic... (shrink)

In a footnote of his La Communaute Desoeuvree, Jean Luc Nancy writes that it is necessary to investigate more closely the entry of myth into modern political thinking and more generally the relationship between myth and ideology (Nancy 1990, 116n). In this paper, I will explore the way in which we should understand this strange relation between myth and ideology. To do so, I will first briefly outline Nancy's now already known thinking of myth. Secondly, I will introduce a modern (...) understanding of ideology. In a concluding remark, I will discuss Nancy's idea of the entry of myth in ideology. (shrink)

U radu se analizira slika danasnjeg hegemonog secanja na titoizam. Prikazane su raznovrsne instrumentalne redukcije u domacoj kulturi secanja koje obuhvataju demonizacije i negativne simbolizacije titoizma. Blize su razmotreni raznovrsni mitovi i ideologizacije kod pamcenja titoizma, zatim cinioci selektivnog secanja i novi sklop secanja na titoizam. Uoceno je da su privatizacija i retradicionalizacija glavni cinioci kreiranja novih okvira za pamcenje socijalizma i za novu negativnu simbolizaciju titoizma.

This study explores how in science fiction’s novels myths are intimately linked to their ideological dimension and criticism. It begins with a mythocritical analysis that leads to a mythoanalysis in order to understand how those myths and the big issues of the accelerating technoscientific progress in the 20th and 21th centuries are linked. My approach is based on the restricted example of Dan Simmons’ science fiction novels: by studying the myths he rewrites, I will show that those myths are representing (...) how technoscience can have an influence on history, on the development of humanity and on the issue of ethics. (shrink)

In his most recent work, McDowell argues that the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism can be avoided only by an ‘equipoise’ between the objective and the subjective. However, I argue that Adorno’s ‘cognitive utopia’ is a genuine 4th option distinct from equipoise and from the oscillation between the Myth of the Given and coherentism. McDowell’s inability to acknowledge the cognitive utopia is traced to his overly abstract conception of the disenchantment of nature, in contrast to Adorno’s (...) emphasis on the domination of nature. This difference is traced to their different interpretations of Hegel. (shrink)

Popular and technical usages yield unequivocal definitions of "myth"' and "ideology," terms which imply distinct meanings of "history" as both accumulated symbolic product and dynamic symbolic production. "Culture," the historical symbolic realm, is analyzable objectively as accumulation in terms of art, law, etc., or subjectively as dynamic process through mythology and ideology-the former dealing with beliefs originating in historical experience, value integration, and establishment of consensus, the latter with beliefs originating in competitive social situations and their communication and segregation. Irrational (...) mythologies spark historical dynamism, rational ideologies extend it. Sorel, Mannheim, and other writers here examined use these distinctions systematically in historical interpretation. (shrink)

Post-communist East-Central Europe is witnessing a clash of memories focused on its recent past. Whereas Western memory is constructed around the “politics of regret” and responsibility-assumption vis-à-vis the Holocaust, Eastern memory focuses to a large extent on responsibility-attribution for the trauma of communist rule. These are comparable traumatic experiences, but due to different “cognitive mapping” and different mnemonic social frameworks, Eastern memory has produced a post-mnemonic framework that allows for a creeping justification of interwar Radical Right ideologies; for the (...) transmogrification some of their standard-bearers into anti-communist heroes and martyrs; and the obfuscation World War II history. In some countries, religion and its past representatives are used for the same purpose. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper aims to unravel the ideological strategy that rises from the well-celebrated epistemic rigor of neoclassical economic thought. From the Economics Nobel Price Paul Krugman’s popularized connotation naming to "freshwater" economists as those fervent followers of the most orthodox academic creed, we will expose the logical inconsistency and empirical implausibility of such thought’s underlying assumptions: perfect competence and equilibrium’s approaching. From a critical analysis that will be conducted from each of those mentioned assumptions, we will argued (...) that the neoclassical thought is an ideological strategy subverting reality’s principles, overcoming "artificially" those relevant deficiencies and limitations of its theoretical approach. A lo largo de este trabajo se intenta desvelar la estrategia ideológica que emana del celebrado rigorismo epistémico del pensamiento neoclásico de economía. Desde la connotación popularizada por el Nobel Paul Krugman a los economistas de "agua dulce" como aquellos fervientes seguidores del credo académico más ortodoxo, expondremos la incoherencia lógica e imposibilidad empírica de los supuestos fundamentales de su pensamiento: competencia perfecta y aproximación al equilibrio. Desde un examen crítico que irá conduciéndose por cada uno de tales supuestos, resolveremos cómo el marco neoclásico no es más que una estrategia ideológica que subvirtiendo los principios de lo real consigue superar solo "artificialmente" las importantes deficiencias y limitaciones de su marco teórico. (shrink)

In Imagining Europe, Chiara Bottici and Benoît Challand explore the formation of modern European identity. Europe has not always been there, although we have been imagining it for quite some time. Even after the birth of a polity called the European Union, the meaning of Europe remained a very much contested topic. What is Europe? What are its boundaries? Is there a specific European identity or is the EU just the name for a group of institutions? This book answers these (...) questions, showing that in Europe's formation, myth and memory, although distinct, are often merged in a common attempt to construct an identity for its present and its future. In a time when Europe is facing an existential crisis, when its meaning is being questioned, Imagining Europe explores a vital and often unacknowledged aspect of the European project. (shrink)

Selling “existences” for $25 a shot, hypnotists in 1950s America took their soul-searching clients back before birth to access memories from their previous lives. This brief “nationwide preoccupation” with past-life regression is one of eleven episodes richly documented in Alison Winter’s history of memory in the twentieth century. It followed reports from Morey Bernstein, a Colorado businessman, that when he hypnotized a local housewife, she remembered vivid details of her life as “Bridey Murphy” in nineteenth-century Ireland. A “giddy salon culture” (...) developed in the wake of public thrill at Bridey’s precise and emotional personal memories, transmitted across incarnations. While party invitations instructed guests to “come as you were”, one teenager’s suicide note announced his desire to explore reincarnation “in person”. (shrink)

In this article, apart from a brief review of the relationship between mythos and logos, the author, who has based his study on the Freudian category of the social unconscious and Durkheim’s category of social consciousness, presents the characteristics of three modes of social memory: unconscious memory, interconscious memory and conscious memory. Based on Gilbert Durand’s mytho-analytical tool, the structure of the triad of memory: THE UNCONCIOUS – AWAITING – THE CONSCIOUS is shown as the memory of the Father, Son (...) and Mother. The mythological aspect of elapsing, past, reminiscence, living memory and anticipation is captured on the examples taken from Postmodern (the global society), Modern and even Pre-Modern). In this way, the author concludes that the contemporary transformation of memory into hallucinations means the beginning of anticipation for the End of History. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Sacred and the Myth: Havel's Greengrocer and the Transformation of Ideology in Communist Czechoslovakia Marci Shore University ofToronto There is nothing a free man is so anxious to do as to find something to worship. But it must be something unquestionable, that all men can agree to worship communally. For the great concern ofthese miserable creatures is not that every individual should find something to worship that he (...) personally considers worthy ofworship, but that they should find someming in which they can all believe and which they can all worship in common; it is essential that it should be in common. And it is precisely that requirement ofshared worship that has been the principal source of suffering for individual man and the human race since the beginning of history. In their efforts to impose universal worship, men have unsheathed their swords and killed one another.Fyodor Dostoevsky (306) Thus the conflict between the aims of life and the aims of the system is not a conflict between two socially defined and separate communities; and only a very generalized view (and even that only approximative) permits us to divide society into the rulers and the ruled. Here, by the way, is one of the most important differences between the post-totalitarian system and classical dictatorships, in which this line of conflict can still be drawn according to social class. In the post-totalitarian system, 1 64Marci Shore this line runs defacto through each person, for everyone in his or her own way is both a victim and a supporter ofthe system. Vaclav Havel (37) The Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia arrived as a symbolically gentle conclusion to a half-century long era ofharrowing violence and totalitarianism in Eastern Europe. It was an era that saw the emergence ofNazism, Stalinism, and various indigenous fascisms, effecting a startling demonstration of the potency of ideology to co-opt minds and to wreak violence. The existence of communist ideology as a myth cohering communist totalitarian societies has been widely enough asserted. Yet this analysis can be taken to a further level through the aid oftwo paradigms. The first is a theory of human relationships developed by René Girard, which blends the disciplines ofliterary criticism, anthropology, philosophy, and political science. The second is a model arising from Vaclav Havel's parable of the greengrocer, told in "The Power ofthe Powerless" (1979). Girard's model posits the existence ofthe sacred, that locus of power that was once the pole of primitive religions. The core of the sacred is transfigured human violence. Girardian scholar Robert Hamerton-Kelly explains the process by which the sacred comes into being: Girard tells us that [the sacred] is a mendacious representation of human violence; "it is the sum ofhuman assumptions resulting from collective transferences focused on a reconciliatory victim at the conclusion of a mimetic crisis." The element of "the overwhelming" defines the Sacred...but its primary content is violence understood as being...outside ofnormal human control. (142) The sacred is established as the result of a crisis, one which finds resolution in the purging ofa relatively arbitrary scapegoat. Following this catharsis, three expressions sustain the sacred: myth, ritual, and prohibition. An examination ofthe evolution ofthese expressions in Czechoslovakia from the Stalinist period through normalization (the so-termed "posttotalitarian " period described by Havel in his essay) reveals much about the paradoxical dynamics ofideologically-based totalitarianism—which Havel defines most poignantly by suggesting that at the essence of ideological totalitarianism is the collapsing of the traditional dichotomy between victim and oppressor. The Sacred and the Myth: Havel's Greengrocer165 A Girardian deconstruction of Stalinism A political space for Stalinism developed in Czechoslovakia through the tumultuous period of Nazi occupation and the communist nature of anti-Nazi resistance. By the eve ofthe 1948 communist coup, the communists had claimed thirty-eight percent ofthe popular vote in free elections. Milan Kundera describes the coup as a usurpation of power "not in bloodshed and violence, but to the cheers of about half the population" (1986, 8). Defining this initial fanaticism was its honesty, especially among the younger generation. A young Stalinist later to become a reformist, and still later a dissident, Zdenek Mlynár, explains... (shrink)

Many educational studies reference ideology, imaginary, and myth constructs represented in programs of study, textbooks, and school rituals. In the fields of history, civic, and social studies education, for example, many scholars frequently employ these terms to examine mythic groundings of particular nationalisms entwined with the ways in which we perceive history and citizenship education. However, the lack of philosophical clarity about these concepts raises some crucial questions: in what ways should we distinguish these often overlapping key terms? How might (...) they be put into relation for the purposes of researching such and engaging these terms pedagogically? To respond to these questions, I seek to outline the characteristics of and entwined relationships among ideology, subject, imaginary, and myth by engaging key influential scholarly and historical works. With the considerations of these characteristics and relationship, I attempt to add more precision to the conceptual bases crucial to elucidate unequal relations of power in curricula and schooling practices addressed across many fields constituting educational studies. In doing so, I hope that this groundwork provides curriculum scholars and teachers with meaningful ways to deliberate and employ these key concepts in the contexts of educational research and everyday schooling practices. (shrink)

In this lecture I argue that it is not possible for social scientists or others engaged in making causal claims about the world to be neutral with respect to the question of what causation is. One need not be in possession of a full-blown account, but one must know whether or not, in saying that something is the cause of a given outcome, one intends to say that it has actively produced or generated that outcome. Following Brian Ellis, I refer (...) to accounts according to which the answer would be ‘No’ as ‘passivist’. One is free to be a passivist, but it is not possible to be neither a passivist nor an anti-passivist. (shrink)

Introduction : up against Carl Schmitt -- An afterlife for Carl Schmitt? -- On politics, law and ideology -- Mobilising direct political action: Sorel, myths and counter-myths -- Myths of parliamentarism -- Leviathan : a political myth misfired? -- Hamlet as an instructive prototype of a political myth? -- Political myths underpinning democracy.

Simona Nicoarã, Natiunea modernã. Mituri, simboluri, ideologii Ed. Accent, Cluj, 2002, 360 p.

There is a widespread tendency to see the perils of postsocialism in the revival of the ghosts and myths from the past—namely ethnocentrism, nationalism, exclusiveness, bickering, collectivist-authoritarianism, expansionist chauvinism, and victimisation. I suggest that postsocialism's perils rest with a myth from the future, namely, the myth of capitalism. Those perils, I argue, are rooted in the fetishisation of capitalism by the postsocialist societies as a reflection of their deeply ingrained teleological way of perceiving the future. Political leaders are taking advantage (...) of this situation by putting themselves in the position of those who would lead toward such a utopia. As a consequence, individual freedoms are sacrificed at the altar of communitarian bliss. I suggest that the only hope that we have to secularise the newly re-religiosised postsocialist societies rests with intellectuals. (shrink)