We have synthesized a 582,970-base pair Mycoplasma genitalium genome. This synthetic genome, named M. genitalium JCVI-1.0, contains all the genes of wild-type M. genitalium G37 except MG408, which was disrupted by an antibiotic marker to block pathogenicity and to allow for selection. To identify the genome as synthetic, we inserted "watermarks" at intergenic sites known to tolerate transposon insertions. Overlapping "cassettes" of 5 to 7 kilobases (kb), assembled from chemically synthesized oligonucleotides, were joined by in vitro recombination to produce intermediate (...) assemblies of approximately 24 kb, 72 kb ("1/8 genome"), and 144 kb ("1/4 genome"), which were all cloned as bacterial artificial chromosomes in Escherichia coli. Most of these intermediate clones were sequenced, and clones of all four 1/4 genomes with the correct sequence were identified. The complete synthetic genome was assembled by transformation-associated recombination cloning in the yeast Saccharomyces cerevisiae, then isolated and sequenced. A clone with the correct sequence was identified. The methods described here will be generally useful for constructing large DNA molecules from chemically synthesized pieces and also from combinations of natural and synthetic DNA segments. 10.1126/science.1151721. (shrink)

Anterior cingulate cortex {ACC} is a part of the brain's limbic system. Classically, this region has been related to affect, on the basis of lession studies in human and in animals. In the late 1980s, neuroimaging research indicated that ACC was active in many studies of cognition. The finding from EEG studies of a focal area of negativity in scalp electrodes following an error response led to the idea that ACC might be the brain's error detection and correction device.

This book contains papers from a colloquium held in 1973 at Kings College, Cambridge. The contributions deal with the number of questions on which a great deal of current linguistic research and writing focus. These include the problem of quantification and reference in natural language; the application of formal logic to natural language semantics; the semantics of non-declarative sentences; the relation between natural language semantics and programming languages; the relation between sentences and their contexts of use; discourse meaning; and the (...) relation between surface syntax and logical meaning. An adequate treatment of these issues requires the interaction of a number of different linguistic approaches. As one of the contributors to the volume points out, there recently have developed three major new developments in areas of research into linguistic phenomena: transformational grammar, formal logic, and speech act theory. Although no one of these are represented singly in this volume, a number of the problems which are discussed involve issues which depend on the interfaces between these various approaches. (shrink)

While this work evidences considerable learning and contains many important insights, it seems to fall between the professional philosopher and the general reader: it is too dogmatic, terse, and occasionally superficial for the one, and too diffuse and erudite for the other. The critique of philosophy centers around a discussion of existentialism and analysis, neither of which, it is claimed, is adequate as a philosophy of man. Analysis cannot account for the emotive, religious and "profound" aspects of life, while existentialism (...) cannot account for the commonplace. The critique of religion moves largely at the level of theology, with Bultmann, Tillich and Niebuhr coming in for brief and unsympathetic discussion.--G. B. (shrink)

Richard Tuck’s book reconstructs the historical debate that led ultimately to the modern concept of natural right. His study has the virtue of supplying a critical perspective often missing in the current controversy over the nature and status of rights.

This is a lively and spirited discussion—perhaps more appropriately called one side of a debate—by Feyerabend against traditional views in the philosophy of science associated with such persons as Carnap, Hempel, and Popper. The central issue is whether or not there exists a neutral method for the construction of scientific systems and whether, more specifically, there is within that method some uniform, rational evaluation measure for arbitrating between competing theoretical models. Traditional positions, whether they be of a verificationist, conformationist, or (...) falsificationist sort, presuppose that there is some rational method for analyzing and evaluating scientific theories. Feyerabend maintains most emphatically that there is not. He rejects the distinctions between contexts of discovery and contexts of justification, between experience and theory, and between observation terms and theoretical terms. In the clash between traditional philosophies of science and the more historical and sociological approaches associated with the names of Kuhn and Hanson, the author sides with the latter. He goes even farther, however, and maintains what he calls an "anarchistic theory of knowledge" in which "anything goes." Within his approach it is not canons of rationality and logic which have dominated or ought to dominate scientific discussions. Rather, a proponent of a new theory utilizes persuasion and cunning rather than appealing to or using objective conditions for guiding choices between competing theories. New paradigms within science do not triumph because they are more rational; they depend on utterly new criteria of rationality. (shrink)

This book exemplifies how current linguistic theory may be applied to traditional philosophical problems. It gives a defense of a traditional theory of concepts by basing that defense on arguments that can be found in transformational linguistic theory for concepts as theoretical entities. Concepts are regarded by the author as abstract entities, as ideas which play a role in thinking, and as universals in the sense of "shared" properties of particulars. Chapter one surveys the results of recent transformationally based semantic (...) theory, both in its Chomskyan and Generative Semantics forms, and identifies semantic markers and their structural interrelations as representing concepts. Chapter two is designed to analyze the structure of concepts both in their logical and grammatical form. The author assimilates concepts as semantic representations in linguistic theory to Frege’s notion of concepts and with this combination defends a concept of concept as the meaning of linguistic expressions which is predicative, transformational, and conceived of as a structure of concepts itself. Chapter three discusses the philosophical and psychological ramifications of this point of view. That chapter is mostly a philosophical critique of positions, particularly Quine’s, which argue against the existence and/or utility of concepts. The author also endeavors to make a case for the utilization of linguistics in the investigation of cognitive processes generally and in the concluding part of the chapter speaks briefly to the issue of reductionism. (shrink)

The question asked by the title of this book is certainly one which haunts much philosophical inquiry in this century. It is a question worth asking, and Hacking warns us not to expect to find some one, general answer to it. Instead of embarking on an abstract consideration of this issue, the author undertakes a series of case studies dealing with particular philosophers to see how they have approached language and its relation to philosophy. His inquiry falls into three main (...) parts: part A, entitled "The Heyday of Ideas," which deals with philosophical work done in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; part B, "The Heyday of Meaning," which deals with early twentieth century atomist/positivistic approaches to philosophy and language; and part C, "The Heyday of Sentences," which considers contemporary philosophers who study theory construction and sentential systems. There are many philosophers whom Hacking examines: part A includes a discussion of Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley, as well as the logic of the Port Royal school; part B discusses Chomsky, Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ayer; and part C discusses Feyerabend and Davidson, as well as introducing some of the ideas of Quine and Popper. (shrink)

This book differs from a number of other volumes recently published on language in that its primary aim is not a description of sui generis linguistic structures, but an attempt to locate language in a larger context of human behavior. Emphasis should be placed on the second word in the title, "behavior," for that is its main object of analysis. When language itself is discussed it is presented as one form of systematic communicative behavior, and the thesis is defended that (...) reference in linguistic theory to minds and mental events needs to be analyzed in terms of behavioral criteria. Hence, this work represents an approach to the study of language which is decidedly anti-Chomskyan, and the author is also careful to distinguish his position from recent work by Quine, Davidson, and Ziff. The author adopts an explicit meaning-nominalistic program, which makes individual instances of meaning the origin of successful linguistic communication, rather than taking a theoretical model of linguistic structure as the basis for understanding individual instances of language use. (shrink)

This volume of the Great American Thinkers series purports to let Thoreau speak for himself, primarily through passages quoted from his journals. Originally published in fourteen volumes, the journals represent over twenty years of Thoreau's life, and are the background and, in some cases, the original form of works more polished and more widely known. Murray has aptly considered Thoreau's wide range of thought and comment under several main headings, such as "Primacy or Purpose," "Society as Burden," and "Freedom and (...) Simplicity." In this arrangement, many of Thoreau's specific and often curt observations can be seen in a more general context, with Thoreau himself providing some of the keys to the transition.--G. B. S. C. (shrink)

A translation and abridgment to one third of the original length of Traité du caractère. The editor has omitted part of the author's theoretical and critical discussion of the problem, as well as much of the illustrative material. The work itself is in the tradition of Christian existentialism, attempting to discuss human character and personality in the light of recent French psychology and Catholic thought.--G.B.