Summary Young people differ widely in their sports behavior and show high drop-out rates from organized sports. One explanation from socialization theory refers to the transgenerational mediation of sports behavior and orientations toward sports within the family. The present study investigates the relevance of orientations toward sports and behavioral patterns within the family to young people’s sports behavior. Using methodological triangulation between multiple linear regression and qualitative interviews of young people between the ages of 15 and 20, the study investigates (...) the relationship between individual sports behavior and family influences such as the importance of sports, regularity of sports activity within the family, social support, sports-related health awareness, and communication about sports in the family. (shrink)

I both outline and criticize Millikan′s tripartite view on meaning. Besides hinting at an ontological problem raised by her notion of a “conception”, I especially argue that her radical externalist theory of reference presupposes referential atomism and is, therefore, incompatible with its presumed biological foundation. A sketch of an alternative picture of what reference might be completes the article.

The modification of Frege's semantics that consists in using only one reference (Bedeutung, denotate) truth instead of two references truth and falsity is proposed. According to Frege 1) every true sentence stands for truth, 2) every false sentence stands for falsity. We modify the second statement: 2*) every false sentence doesn't stand for truth. The modification of sentential logic interpretation will consist in change of semantic rules: a) every formula A stands either for truth or falsity, b.1) the (...) formula A has value T iff the formula A stands for truth, b.2) the formula A has value F iff the formula A stands for falsity. Let’s change rules a) and b.2) on: a*) every formula A either stands or doesn't stand for truth, b.2*) the formula A has value F iff the formula A doesn't stand for truth. So, we have only one reference but still two values. The proposed approach can be extended to non-classical cases, for which the bivalence principle doesn't take place. An ordered pair of the sentences A, ~A is put in correspondence to the sentence A. Each sentence of ordered pair can either stands or doesn't stand for truthindependently from the other. Thus for each pair of sentences we have four possible variants of reference which are generate four functional values. (shrink)

Common sense supposes that general terms, which are negative, non-referring or contradictory, may be quite understandable, i.e. meaningful. But attempts to give a theoretical explanation of this fact very oftenly came to the conclusion, that this must be false. This paper tries to show that Leibniz - thanks to his new understanding of ideas and notions - has been able to resolve a great part of meaning paradoxes, which are the consequences of that contradiction. The paper includes a comparison of (...) Leibniz's position with that of some other philosophers, especially that of Aristode and Locke. (shrink)

The article raises the question what is the content of Frege’s infamous notion of Bedeutung? It is claimed that the so–called standard interpretation of this notion – Bedeutung as referential relation between a name and an object – was developed and established evaluating Frege’s ideas in philosophy of language in isolation from his logicist ideas. However, precisely his logicist concerns have motivated Frege’s interest in semantic issues. A broader consideration of Frege’s works reveals an internalist and rationalist notion (...) of meaning, that is based on the context principle, and that should not be reduced to mere reference. The question of the meaning of subsentential components, for Frege, is closely related to the question of the meaning of the whole sentence, that is, the meaning of sub–sentential components should be construed as secondary with regard to the meaning of the whole sentence. (shrink)

The translation of both ‘bedeuten’ and ‘Bedeutung’ in Frege's works remains sufficiently problematic that some contemporary authors prefer to leave these words untranslated. Here a case is made for returning to Russell's initial choice of ‘to indicate’ and ‘indication’ as better alternatives than the more usual ‘meaning’, ‘reference’, or ‘denotation’. It is argued that this choice has the philosophical payoff that Frege's controversial doctrines concerning the semantic values of sentences and predicative expressions are rendered far more comprehensible by (...) it, and that this translational strategy fulfills the desiderata of offering a translation which is acceptable both before and after Frege introduced the distinction between sense and reference or, as this paper would have it, between the sense of an expression and what it indicates. (shrink)

For almost two decades, the concept of epistemic injustice has been a point of reference to discuss the extent to which persons can be disadvantaged in their role as knowers and what morally relevant consequences might follow from such violations. This volume brings together contributions that have significantly shaped debates about the concept of epistemic injustice and its meaning, as well as recent contributions on its implications and possible consequences of situations of epistemic injustice. With contributions by David Coady (...) | Katharina Eisenhut | Miranda Fricker | Orsolya Friedrich | Agomoni Ganguli-Mitra | Axel Gelfert | Hilkje C. Hänel | Julia A. Harzheim | Lars Leeten | José Medina | Ruben Sakowsky | Ela Sauerborn | Sebastian Schleidgen | Katharina Trettenbach | Verina Wild | Andreas Wolkenstein. (shrink)

‘Reference’ was the term Max Black and I chose to render Frege's term ‘ Bedeutung ’ when we published English translations of some selections from his works. We preferred ‘stand for’ as a translation of the verb ‘ bedeuten ’; but from ‘stand for’ we could not form a general term to render the corresponding German noun. Our renderings were chosen because, like the German words, they were in themselves colourless and untechnical, and on that very account could (...) take on in context whatever special import Frege's way of thinking might give them. Black ! and I could not foresee how the English language was going to develop. T Like another familiar English word, the word ‘gay’, ‘reference’ has S become the badge or slogan of a certain set of people; those who do not belong to the set but go on using the word as they always have done may find themselves on occasion seriously misunderstood. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to offer an explanation why Frege has changed his Begriffsschrift account of identity to the one presented in Über Sinn und Bedeutung.The main claim of the paper is that in order to better understand Frege’s motivation for the introduction of his distinction between sense and reference, which marks his change of views, one should place this change in its original setting, namely the broader framework of Frege’s fundamental preoccupations with the foundations of (...) arithmetic and logic. The Fregean thesis that mathematics is contentful, and its defense against formalism and psychologism, provides us an valuable interpretative key. Thus, Fregean senses are not just the mere outcome of some profound reflections on language, rather they play an important role in the articulation of Frege’s program in the foundations of arithmetic. (shrink)

The goal of the paper is to offer an explanation why Frege has changed his Begriffsschrift account of identity to the one presented in Über Sinn und Bedeutung. The main claim of the paper is that in order to better understand Frege’s motivation for the introduction of his distinction between sense and reference, which marks his change of views, one should place this change in its original setting, namely the broader framework of Frege’s fundamental preoccupations with the foundations (...) of arithmetic and logic. The Fregean thesis that mathematics is contentful, and its defense against formalism and psychologism, provides us an valuable interpretative key. Thus, Fregean senses are not just the mere outcome of some profound reflections on language, rather they play an important role in the articulation of Frege’s program in the foundations of arithmetic. (shrink)

Das ethische Prinzip des Respekts vor der Autonomie des Patienten/Probanden hat in der modernen Medizin mittlerweile weltweit Bedeutung erlangt. Die Betonung der Autonomie des Patienten und Probanden in allen in der letzten Zeit verabschiedeten internationalen Deklarationen gibt dieser Tendenz unmissverständlich Ausdruck. Doch wenngleich diese Entwicklung unstrittig positiv ist, wirft sie dennoch eine Reihe von Fragen auf, die mit der Kodifizierung, Interpretation, Reichweite und Anwendung dieses universalen Prinzips verbunden sind. Die Antworten auf diese Fragen entscheiden darüber, ob Autonomie als hilfreiches, (...) emanzipatorisches oder als überforderndes, gar hegemoniales Prinzip begriffen wird. Diese normativen Probleme werden anhand von Beispielen aus der globalen Medizinethik verdeutlicht. Was in modernen Gesellschaften als Autonomie bezeichnet und für die Praxis fruchtbar gemacht wird, ist als ein soziales Konstrukt zu verstehen, nicht im Sinne einer Schimäre, sondern im Sinne einer soziokulturellen Leistung, die auf komplexen, historisch gewachsenen und kulturell geprägten Interaktionen von Gesellschaften, Institutionen und Individuen beruht. (shrink)

The meaning of material artifacts that remain unchanged in form can change through spatial references and through changes in context. In this volume, spatial, historical, topographical, and discursive contextual changes are analyzed in case studies, and their meanings and intersections are critically reflected upon.

Das ethische Prinzip des Respekts vor der Autonomie des Patienten/Probanden hat in der modernen Medizin mittlerweile weltweit Bedeutung erlangt. Die Betonung der Autonomie des Patienten und Probanden in allen in der letzten Zeit verabschiedeten internationalen Deklarationen gibt dieser Tendenz unmissverständlich Ausdruck. Doch wenngleich diese Entwicklung unstrittig positiv ist, wirft sie dennoch eine Reihe von Fragen auf, die mit der Kodifizierung, Interpretation, Reichweite und Anwendung dieses universalen Prinzips verbunden sind. Die Antworten auf diese Fragen entscheiden darüber, ob Autonomie als hilfreiches, (...) emanzipatorisches oder als überforderndes, gar hegemoniales Prinzip begriffen wird. Diese normativen Probleme werden anhand von Beispielen aus der globalen Medizinethik verdeutlicht. Was in modernen Gesellschaften als Autonomie bezeichnet und für die Praxis fruchtbar gemacht wird, ist als ein soziales Konstrukt zu verstehen, nicht im Sinne einer Schimäre, sondern im Sinne einer soziokulturellen Leistung, die auf komplexen, historisch gewachsenen und kulturell geprägten Interaktionen von Gesellschaften, Institutionen und Individuen beruht. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege's brief article Uber Sinn und Bedeutung (On Sense and Reference) has come to be seen, in the century since its publication in 1892, as one of the seminal texts of analytic philosophy. It, along with the rest of Frege's writings on logic and mathematics, came to mark out a whole new domain of inquiry and to set the agenda for it. This volume bears witness to the continuing importance and influence of that agenda. It contains original (...) papers written by leading Frege scholars for the conference held in 1992 in Karlovy Vary to celebrate the centenary of the publication of Frege's essay. The 14 essays show how the questions Frege discusses in that essay connect intimately with issues much debated in current philosophy of language and philosophy of mind. (shrink)

A defense of the translation of "bedeutung" by "meaning" in frege's "posthumous writings" (blackwell 1979). Objections made to such renderings as 'denotation' and 'reference'.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNGSeit den 80er Jahren des vorigen Jahrhunderts ist die Jesusforschung in eine neue Phase getreten. Dieser Beitrag nimmt sowohl die Forschungsresultate als auch die Diskussion auf und versucht, Konsequenzen für die systematisch-theologische Christologie zu ziehen. Dies geschieht in drei Schritten. Im ersten Teil wird die Debatte um den historischen Jesus und deren Aufnahme in die dogmatische Christologie dargestellt. Der zweite Teil zeichnet grundlegende Aspekte der neueren Jesusforschung nach. Unter dem Titel ›Christologie als Religionshermeneutik‹ wird schließlich die Bedeutung der third (...) quest für die dogmatische Christologie ausgeführt. Diese besteht darin, dass sie die vielfältigen Rezeptionen Jesu von Nazareth als Christus bewusst macht. Die Christologie hat die Aufgabe, das Ineinander von Faktum und Deutung zu explizieren, welches für jede Deutung von Geschichte grundlegend ist.SUMMARYThe research about Jesus has gone into a new phase since the 80th of the last century. This paper includes both: the results and the discussions of Jesus-research and tries to draw conclusions for the systematic-theological Christology. That happens in three steps. A first part reflects on the debate on the historical Jesus and its reception in dogmatic Christology. A second part refers to basic aspects of the present Jesus-research. Finally, a third part with the title “Christology as religious hermeneutics” explains the meaning of the third quest for dogmatic Christology which shows that there is a wide but not unequivocal variety of receptions of Jesus of Nazareth as Christ. Christology has got the task to explain the interaction between fact and interpretation which is fundamental for every interpretation of history. (shrink)

The author compares Frege's theory of sense and reference with Wittgenstein's Tractatus theory of "logical picturing through language." The aim of Frege's theory, according to Carl, is to arrive at a concept of judgment suitable for his logic and at a satisfactory account of the relation between thought and truth. In all this, Frege uses both linguistic and epistemological reflections. Wittgenstein's interest is different: his theory is concerned with the relation between language and reality, his concept of truth is (...) one of correspondence. The words "Sinn" and "Bedeutung" stand, in Tractatus, for the objective "correlates" of sentence and name respectively. The Sinn of a sentence is a function of the Bedeutung of the names occurring in it. Sentences have Sinn, words have Bedeutung. According to Carl, Frege and Wittgenstein ask different questions and pursue different explanatory goals. Frege's problem, unlike Wittgenstein's, is oriented by a Kantian understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge. That for Frege the Sinn is the fact that is represented in a sentence, points on the one hand to Frege's basically epistemological interest and, on the other, to Wittgenstein's linguistic-ontological concern. Tractatus gives a version of correspondence theory, which Frege explicitly rejects; just as Frege's concern with assertion and judgment are rejected by Wittgenstein as being of no logical importance. In spite of these fundamental differences in orientation, they do have, according to Carl, common theories and thematic interconnections. Both connect the idea of Sinn with understanding of linguistic expressions, both have a functional interpretation of the sense or the reference of complex expressions. Both accord centrality to the concept of truth. (shrink)

Frege’s distinction between sense (Sinn) and meaning (Bedeutung) is his most influential contribution to philosophy, however central it was to his own projects, and however he may have conceived its importance. Philosophers of language influenced by, or reacting against the distinction, and historians of philosophy commenting on it, have all contributed to the voluminous literature surrounding it.1 Nonetheless in this essay I hope to shed new light on the distinction by considering it in the context of the development of (...) Frege’s thought, and connecting it more intimately than is usually done with Frege’s interests in logic, especially his views on judgment, truth and inference, which were central to his own projects as he conceived them. (shrink)

I consider a common objection to assimilating arts and languages and show that it depends on the view that meaning in language is exhausted by reference (frege's "bedeutung"). if meaning in art is viewed as involving sense (frege's "sinn") as well as reference, the common objection fails. the notion of sense also seems valuable in formulating problems about meaning in art, despite its obscurity. i also suggest that problems about meaning in art, treated in this way, may (...) prove to illuminate problems about meaning in language. (shrink)

In his Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl criticizes John Stuart Mill’s account of meaning as connotation, especially Mill’s failure to separate the distinction between connotative and non-connotative names from the distinction between the meaningful and the meaningless. According to Husserl, both connotative and non-connotative names have meaning or “signification”, that is, what Gottlob Frege calls the sense (“Sinn”) of an expression. The distinction between connotative and non-connotative names is a distinction between two kinds of meaning (or sense), attributive and non-attributive meaning (...) (“attributive und nicht-attributive Bedeutung”). Attributive (connotative) names denote (refer to) objects through their attributes, whereas a non-attributive name means a thing directly (“direkt”). In this paper I examine the concepts of attributive and non-attributive meaning by means of the semiotic theory of Charles S. Peirce, and compare Peirce’s account with the views of Frege, Husserl, Alexius Meinong, and David Kaplan and Gareth Evans. (shrink)

This paper states an analogy between Kant's categories of Pure Reason and the theoretical terms in sciences. The analogy consists in two points, namely the questions: Do the categories have empirical meaning and reference at all? If so, what then is their empirical meaning and reference? With respect to the categories, Kant answers in the Transcendental Deduction, within the Critique of Pure Reason, and he answers in his book Metaphysical grounds of Natural Science. Thesetwo answers are mapped onto (...) a case from the science of social and economic history. An attempt is made to solve the problems of a particular theoretical term of this discipline in the Kantian manner, i.e.: aprioristic and metaphysical. (shrink)

ZusammenfassungDer Text versucht in Auseinandersetzung mit den Ansätzen von Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Baptist Metz und Odo Marquard und im Anschluss an lutherische Theologie zu einer Verhältnisbestimmung von Theodizeefrage und Kreuzestheologie zu gelangen. Dabei wird Luthers Einsicht fruchtbar gemacht, dass Gott verborgen im Leiden wirkt, das Leiden aber nicht zu seiner Wesenseigenschaft wird. Vielmehr eröffnet sich in der Klage des leidenden Menschen die Möglichkeit, das Leiden an Gott zu beenden und gegen Gott zu Gott zu fliehen. Von Luthers Kreuzestheologie her ist (...) eine gegenseitige Durchdringung von Theodizeefrage, Hamartiologie, Kreuzestheologie und Eschatologie anzumahnen. Gleichzeitig verhelfen Klage und Anklage dazu, sich aufgrund von erfahrenen Leiden nicht in sich selbst zu verschließen, sondern kontrafaktisch an Gott festzuhalten.SummaryDiscussing the thoughts of J. Moltmann, J. B. Metz and O. Marquard the essay attempts – whilst following Martin Luther's theologia crucis – to find a relation between the theodicy-question and the theology of the cross. For this concern it refers to the aspect that God acts in suffering in a hidden way but does not posses suffering as an intrinsic characteristic. Rather, the lament of suffering people address to God, as we find it in the Psalms, gives the opportunity of bringing suffering from God's hiddenness to an end and to “flee from God to God”. Returning to Luther's theologia crucis should lead to further reflections on theodicy, sin, theology of the cross and eschatology. At the same time, lamentation as bringing human suffering before God provides an aid for suffering people not to lock their suffering in themselves, but to maintain the relationship to God – even against the supposedly factual evidence of the experience of suffering. (shrink)

The bipolar type systems in the sense ofKretschmer, Jaensch, Jung and psychology of form current in presentday psychology are subjected to criticism from the point of view of their practical utility for the diagnosis of human beings, since they are unable to do justice to the complexity of human nature. The author sees two chief problems in the concept of type. According to their function, types are comparable with ultimate forms in which conclusions are drawn from a number of familiar (...) characteristics as to the simultaneous occurrence of the remaining characteristics which are more difficult to apprehend empirically. Their nature places types in close analogy to forms and melodies. Assignment to certain types is not a mere classification, but a heuristic speculation. The response of primitive organisms to complexes of characteristics represents a phylogenetically older form of typological conclusion. Special emphasis is laid upon the intimate relation existing between the typological method of apprehension and the active side of organisms. Brief reference is made to the way in which types can be statistically derived, the apriority problem of the type and the transmission of types by heredity.Les systèmes de types bipolaires usuels dans la psychologie actuelle d'aprèsKretschmer, Jaensch etJung et la psychologie de la structure de formes sont soumis à une critique établie du point de vue de son application pratique au diagnostic humain, car ils ne permettent pas de venir à bout de la nature humaine. L'auteur voit dans la notion des types deux problèmes principaux: d'après leur fonction les types sont comparables à des syllogismes dans lesquelles à l'intérieur d'une série de caractères associés on déduit d'un certain nombre de caractères connus la présence de caractères individuels difficiles à saisir empiriquement. D'après leur nature les types sont en analogie avec les figures et les mélodies. L'ordonnancement des types n'est pas une simple classification mais une entreprise heuristique. La recherche des complexes de caractères dans les organismes primitifs représente une forme phylogénétiquement ancienne de la déduction typologique. La relation étroite entre le mode de conception typologique et la manière d'agir des organismes est particulièrement souligné. La déductibilité statistique, la question d'apriorité des types et leur hérédité sont brièvement effleurées. (shrink)

Frege's extension of his distinction between Sinn and Bedeutung to predicate terms is widely considered to be problematic. Interpreters generally assume that the notion of Bedeutung comprises the name/bearer relation as a prototype and that the extension is justified only in so far as the relation of predicate terms to their alleged referents is analogous to the relation of names to their bearers. However, interpreters have generally paid insufficient attention to Frege's own dealing with the issue. By examining (...) the relevant passages in Frege's writings, I show that the standard ways of talking about Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates as optional, less evident than the ascription of Sinn, and in need of justification are not in accord with Frege's own conception of predicate reference. There is no textual evidence that the extension takes place for analogical reasons and, in particular, no evidence for the claim that the name/bearer relation is used as a prototype. Frege is visibly not concerned with the relation between predicate terms and their referents, but applies the notion of Bedeutung for reasons of principle. There is indeed the invocation of an analogy, but if we consider the argument in which it occurs it appears that it does not play the justificatory role interpreters attribute to it. In sum, Frege's ascription of Bedeutung to predicates does not imply any mysterious or dubious referentiality of predicate terms. (shrink)

Frege supposedly believes that vague predicates have no referent (Bedeutung). But given other things he evidently believes, such a position would seem to commit him to a suspect nihilism according to which assertoric sentences containing vague predicates are neither true nor false. I argue that we have good reason to resist ascribing to Frege the view that vague predicates have no Bedeutung and thus good reason to resist seeing him as committed to the suspect nihilism. In the process, (...) I call attention to several under-appreciated texts in which Frege suggests that a vague predicate, though lacking a Bedeutung of its own, can come to acquire a Bedeutung in certain contexts. The upshot of this suggestion is that vague predicates can serve the purposes of ordinary communication quite well, even if they are useless for logical purposes. (shrink)

A summary of the philosophical career and intellectual contributions of Gottlob Frege (1848–1925), including his invention of first- and second-order quantified logic, his logicist understanding of arithmetic and numbers, the theory of sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung) of language, the third-realm metaphysics of “thoughts”, his arguments against rival views, and other topics.

El primer capítulo del libro The Varieties of Reference de Gareth Evans, denominado ‘Frege’, abre las puertas a nuevas perspectivas de análisis de la teoría fregeana. Este artículo tiene como objetivo revisar la interpretación que Evans presenta de la teoría semántica fregeana, analizar algunas de las consecuencias que se derivan de tal interpretación y proponer una versión de la teoría semántica fregeana que pueda dar cuenta de los casos problemáticos para el análisis de un lenguaje natural. El presente artículo (...) está dividido en dos partes generales: en los primeros ocho apartados se reconstruye y analiza el argumento de Evans; y en las conclusiones, se presenta un análisis de las conclusiones a las que llega Evans a partir de su argumento y una propuesta para hacer compatible el principio de composicionalidad y el principio de contexto en el marco fregeano con el fin de resolver algunos de los casos conflictivos para una teoría semántica fregeana para el lenguaje natural. (shrink)

A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference (Bedeutung and Verweisung) shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is (...) accessible to us only by our grasping its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is. (shrink)

The article aims at exposition, commenting and interpreting Frege’s theory of meaning, based on the requirement to distinguish, in the meaning of a sign, the level of sense (Sinn) and the correlative level of reference (Bedeutung). The author directs attention to some logico-linguistic reasons which seem to have urged Frege to advocate the differential conception of meaning. In accordance with Frege’s decision to use the theoretical notions of sense and reference, the relevant semantic features of a proper (...) name as well as of a declarative sentence are explored. Since only something which constitutes what someone who understands the word or expression implicitly grasps can be counted as a possible ingredient in meaning, the claim is made that entities on the level of reference (objects, truth-values) are not undeniable ingredients of meaning. Sense therefore is left in the role of a genuine semantic concept. Keywords: Frege, language, meaning, sense, reference. (shrink)

In their correspondence in 1902 and 1903, after discussing the Russell paradox, Russell and Frege discussed the paradox of propositions considered informally in Appendix B of Russell’s Principles of Mathematics. It seems that the proposition, p, stating the logical product of the class w, namely, the class of all propositions stating the logical product of a class they are not in, is in w if and only if it is not. Frege believed that this paradox was avoided within his philosophy (...) due to his distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung). However, I show that while the paradox as Russell formulates it is ill-formed with Frege’s extant logical system, if Frege’s system is expanded to contain the commitments of his philosophy of language, an analogue of this paradox is formulable. This and other concerns in Fregean intensional logic are discussed, and it is discovered that Frege’s logical system, even without its naive class theory embodied in its infamous Basic Law V, leads to inconsistencies when the theory of sense and reference is axiomatized therein. (shrink)

Theories of understanding and of language use cannot be detached from theories of truth and reference as many have recently attempted to say. Wittgenstein's early picture theory and his theory of reference {Bedeutung) is part and parcel of his view on understanding meaningful sentences {Sätze), and the use of expressions. His later theory of meaning as use of expressions is inseparable from his view on what kind of objects these expressions refer to. As logical analysis is a (...) quest for definiteness of sense and is not reductionism, not all objects of the Tractatus are of one kind. Singular propositions have no privileged role in linking language to the world. Understanding propositions with proper names or with demonstratives imply understanding of general propositions. This does not entail a definite description view of the sense of proper names. It does suggest that demonstrative pronouns are often not used anaphorically and never purely ostensively. (shrink)

Theories of understanding and of language use cannot be detached from theories of truth and reference as many have recently attempted to say. Wittgenstein's early picture theory and his theory of reference {Bedeutung) is part and parcel of his view on understanding meaningful sentences {Sätze), and the use of expressions. His later theory of meaning as use of expressions is inseparable from his view on what kind of objects these expressions refer to. As logical analysis is a (...) quest for definiteness of sense and is not reductionism, not all objects of the Tractatus are of one kind. Singular propositions have no privileged role in linking language to the world. Understanding propositions with proper names or with demonstratives imply understanding of general propositions. This does not entail a definite description view of the sense of proper names. It does suggest that demonstrative pronouns are often not used anaphorically and never purely ostensively. (shrink)

Frege made a derivative of the distinction that he made between the meanings of senses (Sinn) and references (Bedeutung) on judgments, and named the judgments which he treats as hollow functions; ‘Unsaturated’ (ungesättigt) phrases and the phrases which completed an argument as, ‘Saturated’ (gesättigt) phrases. Saturated phrases consist of first and second level concepts and are considered to be meaningful expressions with an accurate value. Frege became the founder of modern symbolic logic with the language of formal logic he (...) developed in ‘Concept Writing’, and based all this formal analysis on the distinction of ‘function (Funktion) – argument (Argument)’ and ‘concept – coverage’. The philosopher, who makes sense of the judgments as their ‘thoughts’; determines the logical value accuracy of the reference on the basis of this distinction, has adopted a contradictory acceptance in terms of both considering the judgments as a condition of being able to receive a truth value and reducing them to the senses of the sentences. Then, if the thoughts were indeed the sense of the sentences, as Frege thought, then it would not be possible to speak of sentences that were meaningful but lacked truthfulness. That is why, to overcome this distress, we propose to change the definition of thought in Frege's theory and to consider it as function values, not the sense of sentences. Likewise for us, thoughts are not the senses of the sentences, nor are they references. Contrariwise, thoughts are the function value of the sentences. To put it in a different way, if a sentence lacks function value, it can be meaningful but not true or false, and if the sentence has a function value, it can be true or false. Thus, for us, thoughts are neither the expression of the sentence in the language nor the logical value of the sentence; thoughts are function values that can be true or false. (shrink)

Since classical antiquity, theorists have struggled with the problem of self-reference originating in the Liar Paradox of Eubulides: “Does someone who says ‘I am lying’ lie?” Does he speak truly or falsely? The consensus resolution has been to dismiss the contention “This statement is false” as meaningless incoherent on grounds of self-contradiction. Leibniz also deemed the claim incoherent, but not on grounds of self-contradiction incoherence however on grounds of embarking on an infinite and incompletable series of meaningfulness-presuppositions. He thus (...) introduced a novel and constructive mode of semantical analysis. (shrink)

Since classical antiquity, theorists have struggled with the problem of self-reference originating in the Liar Paradox of Eubulides: “Does someone who says ‘I am lying’ lie?” Does he speak truly or falsely? The consensus resolution has been to dismiss the contention “This statement is false” as meaningless incoherent on grounds of self-contradiction. Leibniz also deemed the claim incoherent, but not on grounds of self-contradiction incoherence however on grounds of embarking on an infinite and incompletable series of meaningfulness-presuppositions. He thus (...) introduced a novel and constructive mode of semantical analysis. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Frege on Function, Concept and Object Sinn (Sense) and Bedeutung (Reference) Identity Statements and Bearerless Names: Russell's View of Names as Associated with Descriptions Names and Communication Russell's Theory of Descriptions Indirect Discourse Conclusion.

Welche Bedeutung haben Eigennamen wie "Kurt Gödel", Artnamen wie "Tiger" oder Indexikalia wie "ich"? Auf welche Weise beziehen sich solche Ausdrücke auf etwas? In den letzten Jahren hat sich eine intensive Diskussion über diese Fragen entwickelt, die nicht nur für Sprachphilosophen von Interesse ist: Die in der Debatte vorgebrachten Argumente haben z. B. zu heteodoxen erkenntnistheoretischen Positionen und zu einer Erneuerung des philosophischen Interesses an essentiellen Eigenschaften geführt. In diesem Band sind Arbeiten - größtenteils erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung - (...) zusammengestellt, die den Grundgedanken der Neuen Theorien entwickeln und einzelne Folgeprobleme für diese Neuen Theorien zu lösen versuchen. (shrink)

Welche Bedeutung haben Eigennamen wie "Kurt Gödel", Artnamen wie "Tiger" oder Indexikalia wie "ich"? Auf welche Weise beziehen sich solche Ausdrücke auf etwas? In den letzten Jahren hat sich eine intensive Diskussion über diese Fragen entwickelt, die nicht nur für Sprachphilosophen von Interesse ist: Die in der Debatte vorgebrachten Argumente haben z. B. zu heteodoxen erkenntnistheoretischen Positionen und zu einer Erneuerung des philosophischen Interesses an essentiellen Eigenschaften geführt. In diesem Band sind Arbeiten - größtenteils erstmals in deutscher Übersetzung - (...) zusammengestellt, die den Grundgedanken der Neuen Theorien entwickeln und einzelne Folgeprobleme für diese Neuen Theorien zu lösen versuchen. (shrink)

First I argue that the prohibition of linguistic self-reference as a solution to the antinomy problem contains a pragmatic contradiction and is thus not only too restrictive, but just inconsistent (chap.1). Furthermore, the possibilities of non-restrictive strategies for antinomy avoidance are discussed, whereby the explicit inclusion of the – pragmatically presuposed – consistency requirement proves to be the optimal strategy (chap.2). The central question here is that about the actual reason for antinomic structures. It turns out to be a (...) form of negative self-conditioning (chap.3). This makes it necessary to clarify the status of negative concepts (chap.4). The generalization of these considerations (chap.5) leads to the actual analysis of the antinomic basic structure (chap.6): Decisively for the pragmatics of the concept is that it positively owns a meaning, so that positivity is always constituted by the concept qua concept. Thus a negative concept is characterized by a fundamental ambivalence: From a semantic point of view it has negative character, in its pragmatic status as a concept, however, it has positive character. If the meaning is especially that of a negative self-reference, the ambivalence leads to the antinomic constellation of a negative self-condition – that is the crux of the matter here! The concept thus possesses the property defined by it exactly when it does not possess it and vice versa. A closer analysis shows that the function of reflective structures for the occurrence of antinomies has to be judged much more differentiated than previous opinions suggest. Not only are four forms of reflectivity to be distinguished in this context – ontic, semantic, pragmatic reflectivity, and especially the form of negative self-condition; but it is also apparent that these are intertwined with each other in a way that is difficult to be understood. The astonishing variety of relationships associated with this makes the irritation that has always emanated from the antinomy problem appear more comprehensible. In the developed pragmatic perspective furtheron parallels to the structure of self-consciousness become visible (chap.7). I conclude with considerations about the significance of the antinomic structure for the problem of dialectics, especially for the synthesis formation of mutually exclusive terms (chap.8). ---------- Zunächst wird gezeigt, dass das Verbot sprachlicher Selbstreferenz als Lösung des Antinomienproblems einen pragmatischen Widerspruch enthält und damit nicht nur zu restriktiv, sondern geradezu inkonsistent ist (Kap.1). Ferner werden Möglichkeiten nicht-restriktiver Strategien zur Antinomienvermeidung diskutiert, wobei sich die explizite Einbindung der – pragmatisch präsupponierten – Konsistenzforderung als optimale Strategie erweist (Kap.2). Zentral ist hier die Frage nach dem eigentlichen Grund antinomischer Strukturen. Er erweist sich als eine Form von negativer Selbst-Bedingung (Kap.3). Dies nötigt zu einer Klärung des Status negativer Begriffe (Kap.4). Die Verallgemeinerung dieser Überlegungen (Kap.5) leitet über zur eigentlichen Analyse der antinomischen Grundstruktur (Kap.6): Entscheidend zur Pragmatik des Begriffs gehört, dass ihm eine Bedeutung positiv zukommt, sodass durch den Begriff qua Begriff stets auch Positivität konstituiert ist. Dadurch ist ein negativer Begriff durch eine prinzipielle Ambivalenz gekennzeichnet: In semantischer Hinsicht hat er negativen Charakter, in seinem pragmatischen Status als Begriff hingegen positiven Charakter. Ist die Bedeutung insbesondere die eines negativen Selbstbezugs, führt die Ambivalenz zur antinomischen Konstellation einer negativen Selbst-Bedingung – das ist hier der springende Punkt! Der Begriff besitzt so die durch ihn definierte Eigenschaft genau dann, wenn er sie nicht besitzt und umgekehrt. Die nähere Analyse zeigt, dass hierbei die Funktion reflexiver Strukturen für das Auftreten von Antinomien weitaus differenzierter zu beurteilen ist, als bisherige Auffassungen nahelegen. Nicht nur dass in diesem Kontext vier Formen von Reflexivität – ontische, semantische, pragmatische Reflexivität und insbesondere auch die Form negativer Selbstbedingung – unterschieden werden müssen; es zeigt sich auch, dass diese in schwer durchschaubarer Weise ineinander verschränkt sind. Die damit verbundene erstaunliche Beziehungsvielfalt läßt die Irritation, die seit je vom Antinomienproblem ausging, begreiflicher erscheinen. In der entwickelten pragmatischen Perspektive werden ferner Parallelen zur Struktur von Selbstbewußtsein sichtbar (Kap.7). Ich schließe mit Überlegungen zur Bedeutung der antinomischen Struktur für das Problem der Dialektik, insbesondere zur Synthesebildung einander ausschließender Bestimmungen (Kap.8). (shrink)

Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not (...) do justice to Frege: that we speak of a sense by means of quotation marks, and that all Frege does to cope with phrases that might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. Second, we will show that Russell omitted the fact that Frege’s theory provided some answers for the puzzles presented by Russell in his essay. (shrink)

_Naming and Necessity_ has had a great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions of natural and metaphysical necessity and to the connections between these and theories of naming, and of identity. This seminal work, to which today's thriving essentialist metaphysics largely owes its impetus, is here reissued in a newly corrected form with a new preface by the author. If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics, or in philosophy of language, this is (...) it. (shrink)

The „Paradox of the Concept Horse" arises on the assumption of the Reference Principle: that co-referential expressions should be cross-substitutable salva veritate in extensional contexts and salva congruitate in all. Accordingly no singular term can co-refer with an unsaturated expression. The paper outlines a number of desiderata for a satisfactory response to the problem and argues that recent treatments by Dummett and Wiggins fall short by their lights. It is then pointed out that a more consistent perception of the (...) requirements of the Reference Principle leads not to the Paradox but to the result that Frege had no business extending the notion of Bedeutung to unsaturated expressions in the first place. Rather the relation between, e.g., predicates and the entities that comprise the range of higher-order logical variables must be logically unlike that between singular terms and their referents; the way is therefore opened for singular terms to refer to entities of the former kind after all. The Concept Horse is a concept (and a Fregean object too.). (shrink)

In formulating the puzzle about cognitive significance in ‘Über Sinn und Bedeutung’, Frege rejects the approach he suggested in the Begriffsschrift on the ground that if the utterance of a sentence of the form a = b is understood as ‘a’ and ‘b’ referring to the same object we lose the subject matter. In this note, we will show how Frege’s concerns can be understood and circumvented.

The reflections recorded in this paper arise from three moments in the theory of definition and of conceptual analysis. The moments are: Frege’s review of Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, the discussion there of the paradox of analysis, and the division that Frege marks, ensuing upon his distinction of Sinn/sense from Bedeutung/reference, between two different conceptions of definition; Leibniz’s still serviceable account of a distinction between the clarity and the distinctness of ideas---a distinction that prompts the suggestion that the (...) guiding purpose of lexical definition is Leibnizian clarity whereas that of real definition is inseparable from the pursuit of Leibnizian distinctness; Leibniz’s speculations concerning the limit or terminus of analysis. The apparent failure of these speculations, casting doubt as it does upon the aspirations that give rise to them, points to the long-standing need to reconfigure the philosophical business of enquiry into concepts. (shrink)

In this paper I will critically assess a very popular interpretation of Heidegger’s early thought, according to which meaning (Bedeutung) is conceived as ontologically dependent on human existence (Dasein). In order to criticize this subjectivist understanding of meaning, I will offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of signs in Being and Time (§17). This will reveal two main things: first, that the ubiquity of sign-phenomena is founded on the universality of the structure known as reference (Verweisung); second, that (...) Heidegger’s idea of reference offers a non-substantialist understanding of meaning and its relation to the world. (shrink)

Though Fregeś second semantical theory is worked out excellently, he did not precisely and explicitly answer the question, which of the two semantical notions he used in his semantics - sense and reference -, could be taken as proper explication of an intuitive notion of meaning. Intuitively, meaning of a word can be connected with an understanding of the word: if we understand the word, we know its meaning. Our problem seems to be accute in connection with present tendency (...) to render words "meaning" and "význam" as proper translations of German word "Bedeutung", used by Frege to refer to named or signed objects . Fregeś basic concepts of both periods of developing of his thinking - Inhalt, Sinn and Bedeutung -, having been outlined, the author tries to explicate this intuitive notion of meaning as wordś content, or wordś sense and reference, respectively. This attempt is aimed to give a possible Fregeś answer to the above question. Then the discussion about a few counter-arguments follows and its main profit is in illumination of some less clear aspects of our interpretation of Fregeś conceptual apparatus. In the end the author argues that the word "meaning" as translation of "Bedeutung" does not cohere with Fregeś possible intentions, and defends the words like e. g. "denotation" as much better and clearer translations than the above one. (shrink)