Referentiality in Frege and Heidegger

Philosophy and Social Criticism 31 (1):37-52 (2005)
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Abstract

A juxtaposition of Frege’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of reference (Bedeutung and Verweisung) shows them to be complementary. The thesis that meaning determines reference has been attributed to both Frege and Heidegger. Contrary to the view that this commits them to linguistic idealism, I defend a weak version of the determination thesis according to which both Fregean and Heideggerian reference allow for the possibility of error and for the objectivity of discourse. Thus, what we refer to is accessible to us only by our grasping its sense of meaning; sense is a way of fixing reference, but does not constitute the referent as what it is.

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Barbara Fultner
Denison University

References found in this work

On sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 36--56.
Truth and meaning.Donald Davidson - 1967 - Synthese 17 (1):304-323.
Sense and reference.Gottlob Frege - 1948 - Philosophical Review 57 (3):209-230.
Ueber Begriff und Gegenstand.Gottlob Frege - 1892 - Vierteljahrsschrift Für Wissenschaftliche Philosophie 16 (2):192-205.

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