118 found
Order:
Disambiguations
Mark Textor [112]Markus Textor [6]
  1.  26
    The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn Against Metaphysics: Austrian Philosophy 1874-1918.Mark Textor - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    Textor reveals the roots of analytic philosophy in a great age of Austro-German philosophy in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. He introduces Brentano, Mach, and other key figures, and traces the development of the landmark ideas that there can be 'psychology without a soul', and that metaphysics lies beyond the limits of knowledge.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  2.  56
    Brentano's Mind.Mark Textor - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Mark Textor presents a critical study of the work of Franz Brentano, one of the most important thinkers of the nineteenth century. His work has influenced analytic philosophers like Russell as well as phenomenologists like Husserl and Sartre, and continues to shape debates in the philosophy of mind. Brentano made intentionality a central topic in the philosophy of mind by proposing that 'directedness' is the distinctive feature of the mental. The first part of the book investigates Brentano's intentionalism as well (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  3. Tolerating Sense Variation.Eliot Michaelson & Mark Textor - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):182-196.
    Frege famously claimed that variations in the sense of a proper name can sometimes be ‘tolerated’. In this paper, we offer a novel explanation of this puzzling claim. Frege, we argue, follows Trendelenburg in holding that we think in language—sometimes individually and sometimes together. Variations in sense can be tolerated in just those cases where we are using language to coordinate our actions but are not engaged in thinking together about an issue.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  4. States of affairs.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   29 citations  
  5.  95
    Hope as a Primitive Mental State.Gabriel Segal & Mark Textor - 2015 - Ratio 28 (2):207-222.
    We criticize attempts to define hope in terms of other psychological states and argue that hope is a primitive mental state whose nature can be illuminated by specifying key aspects of its functional profile.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  6. Moods: From Diffusivness to Dispositionality.Alex Grzankowski & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The view that moods are dispositions has recently fallen into disrepute. In this paper we want to revitalise it by providing a new argument for it and by disarming an important objection against it. A shared assumption of our competitors (intentionalists about moods) is that moods are “diffuse”. First, we will provide reasons for thinking that existing intentionalist views do not in fact capture this distinctive feature of moods that distinguishes them from emotions. Second, we offer a dispositionalist alternative that (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  7.  27
    Deeper into Brentano’s mind: response to critics.Mark Textor - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (8):1440-1462.
    Laura Gow, Uriah Kriegel, Hamid Taieb, and David Woodruff Smith raised help – and insightful points of criticism about my book Brentano’s Mind. In this paper, I will defend and expand on the main claims of the book. My responses are organized around four topics: Psychology without a Soul, Plural Intentionality (and Conceptual Parts), Intentionality and Intentionality Primitivism, Mark of Mental.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  8. Frege on Judging as Acknowledging the Truth.Mark Textor - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):615-655.
    According to Frege, judgement is the ‘logically primitive activity’. So what is judgement? In his mature work, he characterizes judging as ‘acknowledging the truth’ (‘Anerkennen der Wahrheit’). Frege’s remarks about judging as acknowledging the truth of a thought require further elaboration and development. I will argue that the development that best suits his argumentative purposes takes acknowledging the truth of a thought to be a non-propositional attitude like seeing an object; it is a mental relation between a thinker, a thought, (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  9. Act-Based Conceptions of Propositional Content: Contemporary and Historical Perspectives.Friederike Moltmann & Mark Textor (eds.) - 2017 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Ever since Frege, propositions have played a central role in philosophy of language. Propositions are generally conceived as abstract objects that have truth conditions essentially and fulfill both the role of the meaning of sentences and of the objects or content of propositional attitudes. More recently, the abstract conception of propositions has given rise to serious dissatisfaction among a number of philosophers, who have instead proposed a conception of propositional content based on cognitive acts (Hanks, Moltmann, Soames). This approach is (...)
  10.  26
    Bolzanos Propositionalismus.Markus Textor - 1996 - New York: W. de Gruyter.
    In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  11. Brentano on inner consciousness.Mark Textor - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (4):411-432.
    I offer a reconstruction of Brentano's view of inner consciousness and show how Brentano prevented a regress of higher-order mental acts.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   24 citations  
  12.  73
    ‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force.Mark Textor - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):226-240.
    ABSTRACT Recently, the content/force distinction has had a bad press. It has been argued that the distinction is not properly motivated and that it makes the problem of the unity of the proposition intractable. I will argue that Frege’s version of the content/force distinction is immune from these objections. In order to do so, I will reconstruct his argument that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction between force and content. I will answer the concern about the unity of (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  13.  93
    ‘The Nature of the Question Demands a Separation’: Frege on Distinguishing between Content and Force.Mark Textor - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (2):226-240.
    The distinction between content and force is ‘a corner-stone of 20-century philosophy of language’ (Recanati 2013, 622). Yet, in recent years it has been argued that (a) the motivation for drawing the content-force distinction is flawed and (b) that making it bars us from solving the problem of the unity of the proposition. In this paper I will go back to the source of the content-force distinction in Frege’s work. Frege argued that ‘the nature of a question’ requires a distinction (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  14.  36
    Devitt on the Epistemic Authority of Linguistic Intuitions.Mark Textor - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (3):395-405.
    Michael Devitt has argued that a satisfactory explanation of the authority of linguistic intuitions need not assume that they are derived from tacit knowledge of principles of grammar. Devitt’s Modest Explanation is based on a controversial construal of linguistic intuitions as meta-linguistic central-processor judgements. I will argue that there are non-judgemental responses to linguistic strings, linguistic seemings, which are evidence for linguistic theories. Devitt cannot account for their epistemic authority. This spoils his ‘modest explanation’. Devitt’s opponent, the Voice of Competence (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   18 citations  
  15. Brentano on the dual relation of the mental.Mark Textor - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):465-483.
    Brentano held that every mental phenomenon has an object and is conscious (the dual relation thesis). The dual relation thesis faces a number of well-known problems. The paper explores how Brentano tried to overcome these problems. In considering Brentano's responses, the paper sheds light on Brentano's theory of judgement that underpins his philosophy of mind.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  16. Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception.Mark Textor - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):879-892.
    Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  17.  93
    Frege’s recognition criterion for thoughts and its problems.Mark Textor - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2677-2696.
    According to Frege, we need a criterion for recognising when different sentences express the same thought to make progress in logic. He himself hedged his own equipollence criterion with a number of provisos. In the literature on Frege, little attention has been paid to the problems these provisos raise. In this paper, I will argue that Fregeans have ignored these provisos at their peril. For without these provisos, Frege’s criterion yields wrong results; but with the provisos in place, it is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  18.  28
    Brentano on Act, Content and Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2023 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 100 (1-2):173-196.
    This article offers a reconstruction of Brentano’s notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. The author will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano’s philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate the proposed notion of content in the historical context of Brentano’s work as well as in his writings at the time of Psychologie. The author will defend this notion against (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  19.  38
    Schlick on the Source of the ‘Great Errors in Philosophy’.Mark Textor - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (1):105-125.
    Moritz Schlick’s work shaped Logical Empiricism and thereby an important part of philosophy in the first half of the 20th century. A continuous thread that runs through his work is a philosophical diagnosis of the ‘great errors in philosophy’: philosophers assume that there is intuitive knowledge/knowledge by acquaintance. Yet acquaintance, it is not knowledge, but an evaluative attitude. In this paper I will reconstruct Schlick’s arguments for this conclusion in the light of his early practical philosophy and his reading of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  20.  46
    Perceptual objectivity and the limits of perception.Mark Textor - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):879-892.
    Common sense takes the physical world to be populated by mind-independent particulars. Why and with what right do we hold this view? Early phenomenologists argue that the common sense view is our natural starting point because we experience objects as mind-independent. While it seems unsurprising that one can perceive an object being red or square, the claim that one can experience an object as mind-independent is controversial. In this paper I will articulate and defend the claim that we can experience (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  21. Brentano on Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2017 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Franz Brentano and the Brentano School. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 49-60.
    Consider a perceptual activity such as seeing a colour, hearing a tone, tasting a flavour. How are these activities related to one’s awareness of them? I will use Brentano’s struggle with this question to guide the reader through the development of his view on consciousness. My starting point will be Brentano’s book Die Psychologie des Aristoteles (Brentano 1867), in which he developed an inner sense view of consciousness (§§1-2). Brentano’s early view is underexplored in the literature, but crucial for understanding (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  22.  74
    Towards a Neo-Brentanian Theory of Existence.Mark Textor - 2017 - Philosophers' Imprint 17:1-20.
    The paper presents an account of the concept of existence that is based on Brentano’s work. In contrast to Frege and Russell, Brentano took ‘exists’ to express a that subsumes objects and explained it with recourse to the non-propositional attitude of acknowledgment. I argue that the core of Brentano’s view can be developed to a defensible alternative to the Frege-Russell view of existence.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  23. Frege’s Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Extended.Mark Textor - 2015 - Mind 124 (495):823-847.
    According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  24.  24
    Literal and metaphorical meaning: in search of a lost distinction.Nicholas Allott & Mark Textor - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The distinction between literal and figurative use is well-known and embedded in ‘folk linguistics’. According to folk linguistics, figurative uses deviate from literal ones. But recent work on lexical modulation and polysemy shows that meaning deviation is ubiquitous, even in cases of literal use. Hence, it has been argued, the literal/figurative distinction has no value for theorising about communication. In this paper, we focus on metaphor and argue that here the literal–figurative distinction has theoretical importance. The distinction between literal and (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  25. Proper Names and Practices: On Reference without Referents.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):105-118.
    This is review essay of Mark Sainsbury's Reference without Referents. Its main part is a critical discussion of Sainsbury's proposal for the individuation of proper name using practices.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  26. Frege's concept paradox and the mirroring principle.Mark Textor - 2010 - Philosophical Quarterly 60 (238):126-148.
    Frege held that singular terms can refer only to objects, not to concepts. I argue that the counter-intuitive consequences of this claim ('the concept paradox') arise from Frege's mirroring principle that an incomplete expression can only express an incomplete sense and stand for an incomplete reference. This is not, as is sometimes thought, merely because predicates and singular terms cannot be intersubstituted salva veritate ( congruitate ). The concept paradox, properly understood, poses therefore a different, harder, challenge. An investigation of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  27.  54
    That’s correct! Brentano on intuitive judgement.Mark Textor - 2022 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 31 (4):805-824.
    Philosophers have long tried to articulate the specific epistemic status of judgements that neither need nor admit of justification by drawing on the metaphor of ‘the light of truth’. In contrast, in Brentano's account of intuitive judgement correctness is central: intuitive or immediately evident judgements are ‘characterized as correct (right)’. The aim of my paper is to introduce and explore Brentano’s correctness-based view. I will conclude by relating it to the work of his students Meinong, Stumpf, and Husserl, who gradually (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  28.  40
    From Mental Holism to the Soul and Back.Mark Textor - 2017 - The Monist 100 (1):133-154.
    In his Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt Brentano proposed a view of consciousness that neither has room nor need for a subject of mental acts, a soul. Later he changed his mind: there is a soul that appears in consciousness. In this paper I will argue that Brentano’s change of view is not justified. The subjectless view of consciousness can be defended against Brentano’s argument and it is superior to its predecessor.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  29.  74
    "Inner Perception Can Never Become Inner Observation”: Brentano on Awareness and Observation.Mark Textor - 2015 - Philosophers' Imprint 15.
    Self-representational theories of consciousness hold that a mental phenomenon is conscious if, and only if, it presents, among other things, itself. But in conscious perception one may lose oneself in the object perceived and not be aware of one’s perceiving. The paper develops a Brentano-inspired response to this objection. He follows Aristotle in holding that one is aware of one’s perceiving only ‘on the side’: when one perceives something one’s perception neither is nor can become observation of itself. I argue (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  30. Frege's Theory of Hybrid Proper Names Developed and Defended.Mark Textor - 2007 - Mind 116 (464):947-982.
    Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  31. A repair of Frege’s theory of thoughts.Mark Textor - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):105 - 123.
    Frege’s writings contain arguments for the thesis (i) that a thought expressed by a sentence S is a structured object whose composition pictures the composition of S, and for the thesis (ii) that a thought is an unstructured object. I will argue that Frege’s reasons for both (i) and (ii) are strong. Frege’s explanation of the difference in sense between logically equivalent sentences rests on assumption (i), while Frege’s claim that the same thought can be decomposed differently makes (ii) plausible. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  32. Mach’s Neutral Monism.Mark Textor - 2021 - Hopos: The Journal of the International Society for the History of Philosophy of Science 11 (1):143-165.
    The father of neutral monism, Ernst Mach, argued that the fundamental constituents of the world are neither mental nor physical and that the distinction between the mental and physical ought to be erased. This article offers a reconstruction of Mach’s view. There is a “pure drive for knowledge” (reiner Erkenntnistrieb), and satisfying it, Mach argues, requires abandoning the mental/physical distinction. The reconstruction given will help to articulate and assess the differences between Mach’s position and Russell’s neutral monism, in which the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  33.  53
    Lexical Modulation without Concepts.Nicholas Allott & Mark Textor - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (3):399-424.
    We argue against the dominant view in the literature that concepts are modulated in lexical modulation. We also argue against the alternative view that ‘grab bags’ of information that don’t determine extensions are the starting point for lexical modulation. In response to the problems with these views we outline a new model for lexical modulation that dispenses with the assumption that there is a standing meaning of a general term that is modified in the cases under consideration. In applying general (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  34. Vacuous Names in Early Analytic Philosophy: Frege, Russell, and Moore.Mark Textor - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (6):316-326.
    Empty proper names give rise to intriguing questions. Frege, Moore and Russell stand at the beginning of analytic philosophy's engagement with these questions. In this paper I will therefore introduce and assess their views on the topic of empty names and draw connections to recent work.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  35.  7
    The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy.Mark Textor (ed.) - 2006 - New York: Routledge.
    Although an important part of the origins of analytic philosophy can be traced back to philosophy in Austria in the first part of the twentieth century, remarkably little is known about the specific contribution made by Austrian philosophy and philosophers. In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy , prominent analytic philosophers take a fresh look at the roots of analytic philosophy in the thought of influential but often overlooked Austrian philosophers including Brentano, Meinong, Bolzano, Husserl, and Witasek. The contributors to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  36. Brentano's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Intentionality.Mark Textor - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):50-68.
    Brentano's Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental is central to analytic philosophy of mind as well as phenomenology. The contemporary discussion assumes that it is a formulation of an analytic definition of the mental. I argue that this assumption is mistaken. According to Brentano, many philosophical concepts can only be elucidated by perceiving their instances because these concepts are abstracted from perception. The concept of the mental is one of these concepts. We need to understand Brentano's Thesis (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  37.  30
    Logically Analytic Propositions: A Posteriori?Mark Textor - 2001 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 18 (1):91 - 113.
  38. Unsaturatedness: Wittgenstein's challenge, Frege's answer.Mark Textor - 2009 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt1):61-82.
    Frege holds the distinction between complete (saturated) and incomplete (unsaturated) things to be a basic distinction of logic. Many disagree. In this paper I will argue that one can defend Frege's distinction against criticism if one takes, inspired by Frege, a wh -question to be the paradigm incomplete expression.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  39.  31
    Bolzano et Husserl sur l'analyticité.Mark Textor & Jocelyn Benoist - 2000 - Les Etudes Philosophiques:435-454.
    L'auteur expose la tentative faite par Bolzano de définir le concept de proposition en soi analytique à l'aide du concept de variation de représentation. Puis, il discute les difficultés qui résultent de ce modèle quant à la définition bolzanienne du concept étroit de vérité logiquement analytique ou de vérité logique. En conclusion, il compare la définition bolzanienne du concept de proposition en soi analytique et la définition husserlienne: celle-ci se découvre être une application de l'idée fondamentale de Bolzano — employer (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  40.  98
    Samples as symbols.Mark Textor - 2008 - Ratio 21 (3):344-359.
    Nelson Goodman and, following him, Catherine Z. Elgin and Keith Lehrer have claimed that sometimes a sample is a symbol that stands for the property it is a sample of. The relation between the sample and the property it stands for is called 'exemplification' (Goodman, Elgin) or 'exemplarisation' (Lehrer). Goodman and Lehrer argue that the notion of exemplification sheds light on central problems in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind. However, while there seems to be a phenomenon to be captured, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  41.  11
    Bolzano and Analytic Philosophy.Wolfgang Künne, Mark Siebel & Mark Textor (eds.) - 1997 - BRILL.
    Inhaltsverzeichnis/Table of Contents: Vorbemerkung/Preface. Dagfin FØLLESDAL: Bolzano's Legacy. Jan BERG: Bolzano, the Prescient Encyclopedist. Jan SEBESTIK: Bolzano, Exner and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy. Paul RUSNOCK: Bolzano and the Traditions of Analysis. Peter SIMONS: Bolzano on Collections. Ali BEHBOUD: Remarks on Bolzano's Collections. Mark SIEBEL: Variation, Derivability and Necessity. Edgar MORSCHER: Bolzano's Method of Variation: Three Puzzles. Rolf GEORGE: Bolzano's Programme andObjects. Mark TEXTOR: Bolzano's Sententialism. Wolfgang KÜNNE: Propositions in Bolzano and Frege. Michael DUMMETT: Comments on Wolfgang Künne's Paper. Carsten (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  42. Introduction.Mark Textor - 2006 - In Markus Textor (ed.), The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy. New York: Routledge.
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  43.  35
    "Enjoy your Self": Lotze on Self-Concern and Self-Consciousness.Mark Textor - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (2):157-79.
    Current work on first-person thought takes its distinctive feature to be epistemological. First-person thinking is non-observational and immune to errors to which other varieties of thought about us are open. In contrast, the nineteenth century philosopher Hermann Lotze (1817-81) put the distinctive concern we have for the object of first-person thought at the center of his account. His arguments suggest that first-person thought is essentially evaluative. In this paper I will reconstruct and defend the core of Lotze’s view of self-consciousness.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  44.  42
    The Austrian contribution to analytic philosophy.Markus Textor (ed.) - 2006 - New York: Routledge.
    Although an important part of the origins of analytic philosophy can be traced back to philosophy in Austria in the first part of the twentieth century, remarkably little is known about the specific contribution made by Austrian philosophy and philosophers. In The Austrian Contribution to Analytic Philosophy prominent analytic philosophers take a fresh look at the roots of analytic philosophy in the thought of influential but often overlooked Austrian philosophers, including Brentano, Meinong, Bolzano, Husserl, and Witasek. The contributors to this (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  45.  34
    Frege on Language, Logic & Psychology, by Eva Picardi.Mark Textor - forthcoming - Mind:fzad034.
    This volume does what it says on the tin: it collects Eva Picardi’s (1984-2017) essays on themes in Frege’s philosophy. The first part, ‘Frege in Context: Logic.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  46.  14
    Bolzano's Sententialism.Mark Textor - 1997 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 53 (1):181-202.
    Bolzano holds that every sentence can be paraphrased into a sentence of the form "A has b". Bolzano's arguments for this claim are reconstructed and discussed. Since they crucially rely on Bolzano's notion of paraphrase, this notion is investigated in detail. Bolzano has usually been taken to require that in a correct paraphrase the sentence to be paraphrased and the paraphrasing sentence express the same proposition. In view of Bolzano's texts and systematical considerations this interpretation is rejected: Bolzano only holds (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  47. Frege on) sense and reference.Mark Textor - 2019 - In Claudia Maienborn, Klaus von Heusinger & Paul Portner (eds.), Semantics: foundations, history and methods. Boston: De Gruyter.
  48. ch. 5. Bolzano's anti-Kantianism : from a priori cognitions to conceptual truths.Mark Textor - 2013 - In Michael Beaney (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of The History of Analytic Philosophy. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
    No categories
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  49.  57
    Unity without self: Brentano on the unity of consciousness.Mark Textor - 2013 - In Denis Fisette & Guillaume Fréchette (eds.), Themes from Brentano. New York, NY: Editions Rodopi. pp. 44--67.
  50. Routledge philosophy guidebook to Frege on sense and reference.Markus Textor - 2011 - New York: Routledge.
    The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Frege On Sense and Reference helps the student to get to grips with Frege's thought, and introduces and assesses:the ...
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
1 — 50 / 118