RESUMEN El presente artículo se propone mostrar que la idea de una "humaneidad no-incrementada", que define el concepto de lo político de Walter Benjamin a principios de la década de 1920, se continúa subrepticiamente en lo que, en los apuntes preparatorios a su ensayo sobre Karl Kraus de 1931, llama "humanismo real de lo no-humano". Las discrepancias que en cada caso Benjamin establece con la célebre noción de Übermensch acuñada por Friedrich Nietzsche será el hilo conductor que permite vincular (...) ambos momentos. A partir de ello, se muestra cómo emerge en los escritos de Benjamin una singular política de lo (post)humano. ABSTRACT This article shows that the idea of an "unenhanced humanness", which defined Walter Benjamin's concept of the political in the early 1920s, is surreptitiously continued in what, in the preparatory notes to his essay about Karl Kraus of 1931, he calls "real humanism of the non-human". The discrepancies that Benjamin establishes in each case with the famous Friedrich Nietzsche's notion of Übermensch will be the common thread that links both moments. From this, it is shown how a singular politics of the (post)human emerges in Benjamin's writings. (shrink)

Theodor Adorno has been quoted as responding to the Humanist Union stating ‘I might possibly be willing to join if your club had been called an inhuman union, but I could not join one that calls itself “humanist”’. Adorno’s opposition to forms of humanism (both liberal and Marxist) which posit the existence of our humanity is reflected in readings of The Frankfurt Institute’s history such as that produced by Martin Jay. While this is the case, one of Adorno’s highly (...) admired students, Alfred Schmidt, commemorated his teacher by proclaiming him a ‘philosopher of Real Humanism’. In categorising Adorno’s work as embodying a ‘Real Humanism’, Schmidt points towards an understanding and orientation towards the human (and our understanding of it) which cannot be accurately characterised through the philosophies of Humanism and Anti-Humanism as oppositional viewpoints. Rather, the Real Humanism of Adorno (as well as some of his fellow travellers) understands the human as the negative image of our currently existing society’s inhumanity, and urges us to take an ethical orientation towards the constitution of the human through the abolition of our inhumanity. If we, like Adorno, are to believe in the new categorical imperative that we must make sure ‘that Auschwitz never repeats itself, so that nothing similar ever happen[s] again’, then we must fundamentally orient ourselves towards the goal of ‘real humanism’ – a society free from the domination of ourselves and the other. (shrink)

This paper is a philosophical discussion about the link between utopianism and responsibility. It argues that our time demands a strong practice of political responsibility in both organizations and society based on what has been called ‘real utopianism’. It takes as a starting point Hans Jonas’ critique of utopianism. Keeping in mind the horrors of the Second World War this Jewish thinker disconnected the principle of responsibility from the idea of utopianism, and connected it to a ‘heuristics of fear’ (...) – we should be careful with ‘wild’ new technologies, but also with new utopian perspectives. In a second step Jonas’ predecessors and utopian thinkers Martin Buber, Ernst Bloch and Ernest Callenbach are revisited. They show that a fully conceptualized idea of utopianism includes at least three dimensions of responsibility: subsistence, justice and spirituality. I then argue that if one digs deeper into the work of Jonas, it seems that the concept of responsibility in fact implies the courage to overcome a heuristics of fear. This paper therefore argues that there is no need to radically disjunct responsibility from utopianism and that the concept of responsibility actually opens a path to ‘real utopianism’. Such a concept of responsibility can best be supported by a confessionally neutral but nonetheless spiritual eco-humanist worldview that develops a new attitude towards nature, in which (eco)asceticism, morality and spirituality become intertwined. (shrink)

The renaissance of humanist Leninist values and ideals of socialism is the principal goal of the revolutionary renewal of our society. It was not in vain that an orientation toward man was defined at the Nineteenth All-Union Conference of the CPSU as the prime, most important feature of socialism's countenance: "We see socialism as a system of true, real humanism, in which man is in fact the ‘measure of all things.’ The whole of the development of a society, (...) from its economy to its intellectual and ideological sphere, is directed toward the satisfaction of human needs and man's all-round development. All these things, moreover, are accomplished through the labor, the creativity, and the energy of people themselves.". (shrink)

Frankfurt am Main, Berlin, Bern, Bruxelles, New York, Oxford, Wien. The skeptical consequences of the psychologist and historicist thinking prevalent in the intellectual climate of the beginning of the twentieth century made it impossible to establish morality, religion and other humanistic sciences on an absolute foundation. Husserl saw in this situation factors which were causing real illnesses of the human spirit. It is the thesis of this work that Husserl, though well-motivated by the best humanistic intentions, fails to furnish (...) an adequate cure for the ills of the human spirit. He fails because his phenomenology lacks a metaphysical foundation and because the aim he has in mind - to remedy the sickness of the human spirit - cannot be attained through the power of human reason alone. In St. Thomas Aquinas we find a more adequate remedy for curing the sickness of the human spirit because of a metaphysically sound doctrine on man and the absence of a purely - this-world orientation in thought. The conclusion of this work is that St. Thomas' thought is the more adequate one to respond to the Husserlian problem of the human spirit's sickness. Contents: Husserl's Humanistic Intent as Expressed in Philosophie als Strenge Wissenschaft - Husserl's Humanistic Intent in Die Krisis de europaischen Wissenschaften - Husserl's Concept of Science Compared with the Aristotelian-Thomistic one - Husserl's Understanding of Essence in Comparison with that of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas - Norms and Objectivity in Husserl and in St. Thomas Aquinas - Husserl's Concept of Human Being and his Lack of a Metaphysical Foundation in Comparison with St. Thomas - The Self-Sufficient Nature ofConsciousness in Husserl - The Sense of Human Life According to Husserl and St. Thomas.". (shrink)

According to the origin of the word "humanism" and the concept of humanitas where the former comes from, management could be called humanistic when its outlook emphasizes common human needs and is oriented to the development of human virtue, in all its forms, to its fullest extent. A first approach to humanistic management, although quite incomplete, was developed mainly in the middle of the 20th century. It was centered on human motivations. A second approach to humanistic management sprang up (...) in the 80's and centered on organizational culture. This implied a wider approach to the human condition while taking into account the influence of culture on behaviors and decisionmaking, but it is incomplete, too. There is a third approach to humanistic management, which is still emerging, that considers a business enterprise as a real community of persons. That means promoting unity and favoring the acquisition of human virtues. This humanistic management approach is a real challenge in order to achieve a higher moral quality in management, human virtues among people and more efficient organizations. (shrink)

The paper applies Christian Humanism to management highlighting the role of relations in business and the entrepreneurial life. The claim is that such a dimension is important for everybody even from a secular point of view regardless of one’s belief. The first part shows how Biblical tradition inspired a rereading of relation in the first Christian thinkers, who had to recognize it in God. But this made possible to perceive that the relationships can be a real source of (...) being, as the example of a family shows. The thesis proposed is that within every Gesellschaft there is a Gemeinschaft, that is constituted by its relational dimensions, connecting the common good and profit also to relational goods. The second part draws consequences for management, recognizing through the example of the Inner Game three relational dimensions relevant for management: the one interior to the person; the relationships between coworkers; the interaction with the culture of the company. All of them should be considered to improve the Gemeinschaft dimension within the Gesellschaft. The last part of the article explains how Christian Humanism helps also to avoid an idealistic reading of the proposal, which always has to take into account the demands of confrontation with the external system intrinsic to the Gesellschaft, as the very etymology of management reveals. (shrink)

In the 18th century, the pre-modern Judeo-Greco-Christian problem of freedom and determinism is transformed by Kant into the modern problem of the freedom of human agency in the natural and cultural worlds of deterministic structures; it is this version of the freedom and determinism issue which centres the Science and Humanism debates, and thus marks the history of the social sciences. Anthony Giddens is credited with providing the new vocabulary of ‘structure’ and ‘agency’ in order to formulate the problem (...) of freedom and determinism in those terms, thus making this formulation fruitful. In this book, Charles R. Varela proposes that Kant originally formulated this problem, and makes a series of wide-ranging and groundbreaking observations based on Kant's metaphysics of realism which enables Varela to propose a solution to the structure/agency problem. Subjects revisited in this book include: · "Giddens’ Call" · The stalemate of the social and psychological sciences · The determinist tradition of modern science · Postmodernism This breadth of themes, drawn together by Varela with his work on Kant, fully realizes Giddens’ principle that human agency is a real causal force. It is Kant's conception of causal power that is the causal force Giddens' has called for. _Science For Humanism: The Recovery of Human Agency_ will be of particular interest to students of humanism and therefore realism, Kant and Giddens. (shrink)

This article addresses a tendency within postcolonial studies to place the work of Michel Foucault and Frantz Fanon in opposition. This has obscured the real, and potentially very productive, similarities between them. The most important of these links has to do with their shared critique of the sovereign subject of humanism: for Fanon and Foucault, this critique of the traditional humanist subject provides a way of opposing what they both see as the dangerous nostalgia for a lost moment (...) of origin. Furthermore, Fanon and Foucault both end in a moment of ethics, but it is an ethics without the sort of stable subjects assumed by humanism. I offer a consideration of some of the links that can be found in several texts by Fanon and Foucault. I then attempt to define the term I will be using to describe their shared strategy of an ethics without subjects: the “humanism effect.” I conclude by trying to suggest some of the strategic possibilities of an ethics without subjects in the postcolonial context. (shrink)

Sharrad, Scott The Council of Australian Humanist Societies has been in existence for over 50 years and in that time it has been kept running by some incredibly committed individuals. Over that time, the way CAHS and organised Humanism in general have operated in Australia has remained more or less the same. Indeed, in the September 1975 issue of the Australian Humanist - just 10 years after the formation of CAHS - Chairman Nick Stenning was lamenting the lack of (...) volunteers at the national level and real communication between state societies; a common complaint that is still to be heard around the traps today. (shrink)

Feminist and post-colonial theorists have embraced Deleuze and Guattari’s terminology of becoming-woman and nomadism, and have done so despite criticisms that these terms appropriate the struggles of real women and stateless persons. The force of the real has become especially acute in the twenty-first century in the wake of neoliberal mobilisations of feminism as yet one more marketing tool. Rather than repeat the criticism that identity politics deflects attention from real political struggles, we can see terms such (...) as ‘becoming-woman’ as creating a different conceptual terrain that refuses the opposition between real politics and the fabulations of identity. The problem with identity politics is not that it divides the polity but rather that it freezes such divisions and identifications at the level of humanist recognition. (shrink)

A survey of various approaches and positions that leading Humanists have taken towards the question of how Humanism can be put to work in 'the real world'.

Contents: The Communist Party and the politics of cultural change in postwar Italy, 1945-50 / Stephen Gundle -- Writing and the real world : Italian narrative in the period of reconstruction / Michael Caesar -- The making and unmaking of Neorealism in postwar Italy / David Forgacs -- The place of Neorealism in Italian cinema from 1945 to 1954 / Christopher Wagstaff -- Tradition and social change in the French and Italian cinemas of the reconstruction / Pierre Sorlin -- (...) Humanism and national unity : the ideological reconstruction of France / Michael Kelly -- Les Lettres Franca̜ises and the failure of the French postwar "Renaissance" / Nicholas Hewitt -- The reconstruction of culture : Peuple et Culture and the popular education movement / Brian Rigby. The chameleon rearguard of cultural tradition : the case of Jacques Laurent / Colin Nettelbeck -- German literature in 1945 : liberation for a new beginning / Helmut Peitsch -- Continuity or change? : aspects of West German writing after 1945 / Keith Bullivant -- West German theatre in the period of reconstruction / Ursula Fries. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Humanism and Truth: Valla Writes against the Donation of ConstantineRiccardo FubiniTranslated by Anastasia Ananson and William ConnellThere has existed for a long time now in studies of Renaissance humanism (and not only as these have developed in a single country or disciplinary area) a tendency to consider from a prevalently formalist point of view what was instead an innovative and complex cultural experience. A particularly privileged position (...) has been reserved for the ars rhetorica, which, considered in its “purely formal instrumentality,” has been treated as though immune from ideological contamination. 1 The fear of becoming entangled in matters of ideological interpretation may, in turn, give rise to new and more seriously flawed readings. Although this is a matter which I shall not now emphasize, it should be clear that when the interpretation of a text is limited to its “purely formal instrumentality,” the vacuum that results can be filled more easily with matter that is new and different. Ideology chased from the doorstep may yet sneak in through the window, sometimes completely stripped of its real historical context. However, what is more important to note here as a premise to my discussion is that, along with the formalism already referred to, one finds in recent studies a tendency to diminish or minimize the significance of writings that were celebrated by the historical traditions of the last century and felt to belong to a shared cultural, religious, or political legacy.Among such writings the De falso credita et ementita Constantini donatione of Lorenzo Valla has certainly played an important part, beginning at least with the clamor that was raised on its behalf by Ulrich von Hutten and Martin Luther. Yet it is quite typical that the work’s most recent [End Page 79] editor, who has dedicated much careful research to Valla’s treatise and its reception, should have attempted to disconnect the meaning of Valla’s treatise in its own time from the influence it would later have, concluding that “the influence [of Valla’s work] manifested itself in accents quite different from those that have resulted from [current] interpretation.” 2 In the view of this scholar, at the time of the composition of Valla’s work, Constantine’s alleged “donation” was no longer a matter of contemporary relevance; rather, it furnished the theme for a brilliant exercise in legal rhetoric. He writes: “By then the Donation of Constantine was no longer an urgent theme for political theory. (Die Konstantinische Schenkung war damals kein beherrschendes Thema der politischen Theorie mehr.)” 3My discussion takes its cue from this point. Without dwelling at length on the various contributions of other scholars, I shall begin first by trying, on the basis of documentary evidence, to restore Valla’s treatise to life, to the climate of its day, in order then to gather and present its meaning along interpretative lines I have already laid out elsewhere. 4According to that usually trustworthy Florentine chronicler, Giovanni Cavalcanti, Filippo Maria Visconti, duke of Milan, at the end of 1443 made a diplomatic avance toward Florence. Principal among the issues dividing the two powers had been the protection afforded by the regime of Cosimo de’ Medici to Francesco Sforza, then holed up in his fiefdoms in the March of Ancona. The Duke now proposed that they should unite in common defense against the Pope, insofar as the latter was sovereign lord of the March. Beyond these particular circumstances, the accord was supposed to find its warrant in the partners’ shared interest in affirming the superiority of civil over ecclesiastical jurisdiction. So the Duke, according to Cavalcanti, advanced his proposal with words that allow us to suspect an early but not surprising echo of Valla’s treatise (first circulated in that very year): “It so happens that even if Constantine consigned to Sylvester so many and such rich gifts—which is doubtful, because such a privilege can nowhere be found—he could only have granted them for his [Sylvester’s] lifetime, [because] the Empire takes precedence over any lordship.” No differently from Valla, Duke Filippo Maria thought the sovereign impersonality of the [End Page 80] law was the prerogative only of the Empire (and... (shrink)

This paper will open with a focus on alienated and unfree activity as it is presented by Marx in his famous Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. My concern will be to bring out the most central dimensions of his view of such activity including: the alienated relation in such activity to other people, to one’s own activity, to the products of one’s activity, to the natural world, etc. Moreover, I will be especially concerned to bring out the mode of (...) reason that is embedded within alienated activity, as well as the kind of relation between cognition, conation, sensory experience, feeling, (etc.) that Marx projects as obtaining in such activity. Following this I will make a dialectical extrapolation from the analysis of alienated activity that Marx gives us, and go on to present a sketch of a humanistic-Marxist interpretation of unalienated and free activity. This will be seen to involve not only a very different structural relation to other people, to one’s own activity, and to the natural world than the one that obtains in alienated activity—but also a very different structural relation between cognition, conation, sensoryexperience, feeling, (etc.). Then I will give a sketch of a praxis-oriented interpretation of historical materialism, which will serve to bring out the historicity of reason, and the historicity of the modes of rationality that prevail at various stages in world history. The last section of this paper will argue: (1) that a transformation of reason is a real possibility; (2) that a transformation of reason in the direction of the kind of unalienated and free activity I have delineated earlier offers the best hope for a human future and a sustainable relation to the natural world; and also (3) that at this juncture in human history it has now become a practical necessity, if humankind is to lift itself out of the mounting world crisis—spiritual and otherwise—in which we are all enmeshed. (shrink)

Assesses the limits and possibilities of humanism for engaging with issues of pressing political and cultural concern. In his book The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism, William V. Spanos critiqued the traditional Western concept of humanism, arguing that its origins are to be found not in ancient Greece’s love of truth and wisdom, but in the Roman imperial era, when those Greek values were adapted in the service of imperialism on a deeply rooted, metaphysical level. Returning to that (...) question of humanism in the context of the United States’ war on terror in the post-9/11 era, Toward a Non-humanist Humanism points out the dehumanizing dynamics of Western modernity in which the rule of law is increasingly made flexible to defend against threats both real and potential. Spanos considers and assesses the work of thinkers such as Giorgio Agamben, Alain Badiou, Judith Butler, Jacques Rancière, and Slavoj Žižek as humanistic reformers and concludes with an effort to imagine a different kind of humanism—a non-humanist humanism—in which the old binary of friend versus foe gives way to a coming community without ethnic, cultural, or sexual divisions. William V. Spanos is Distinguished Professor Emeritus of English and Comparative Literature at Binghamton University, State University of New York. He is the author of many books, including American Exceptionalism in the Age of Globalization: The Specter of Vietnam and Herman Melville and the American Calling: The Fiction after Moby-Dick, 1851–1857, both also published by SUNY Press. (shrink)

Humanist sociologists are activists rooted in the reality of history and change and guided by a concern for the 'real life' problems of equality, peace, and social justice. They view people as active shapers of social life, capable of creating societies in which everyone's potential can unfold. Alfred McClung Lee introduces this volume with 'Sociology: Humanist and Scientific' and develops the theme that a sociology that is humanist is also scientific. The other nine selections are grouped into four parts: (...) 'The Individual and Social Life;' 'Social Institutions: Technology, Science, and Formal Organization;' 'Political Structures: Issues of Justice and Equality;' and 'Methodological Critiques and Counterproposals.'. (shrink)

The German humanist Johann Reuchlin (1455-1522) defended the value of Jewish scholarship and literature when it was unwise and unpopular to do so. As G. Lloyd Jones points out, "A marked mistrust of the Jews had developed among Christian scholars during the later Middle Ages. It was claimed that the rabbis had purposely falsified the text of the Old Testament and given erroneous explanations of passages which were capable of a christological interpretation." Christian scholars most certainly did not advocate learning (...) the Hebrew language. Reuchlin was exceptional in pursuing and promoting Hebrew studies, believing that a working knowledge of that language was essential for a true appreciation of the Bible and rabbinic literature. Refusing to join Christian contemporaries who wished to destroy the Kabbalah and the Talmud, he spoke out against ignorance. Christians could have a useful dialogue with Jews if they gained a thorough knowledge of the writings of Jewish exegetes and philosophers. Toward that end he proposed university endowments that aroused the fury of opponents and led to the famous "battle of the books." Reuchlin's keen interest in Jewish mysticism resulted in the publication of De arte cabalistica in 1517. The first part of this dialogue reflects on messianism, the second part on the relation of the Pythagorean system to the Kabbalah, and tdhe third on the "practical Kabbalah." According to Jones, "Reuchlin demonstrates how Christians can make profitable use of Jewish mystical writings, and therefore shares with the reader his understanding of the art of the Kabbalah." That art will reach more readers in this modern English-language translation by Martin and Sarah Goodman.In addition to an introduction by G. Lloyd Jones, this edition of On the Art of the Kabbalah features a new introduction by Moshe Idel, a professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem and the author of many books, including Kabbalah: New Perspectives. (shrink)

Purpose. The article is aimed to show the specificity and heuristic value of the humanism of the French existentialist J.-P. Sartre, represented both in his early works, where the isolationist position prevailed, and considering his evolution to various types of collective responsibility and attempts to build a universal morality on the basis of ontological integral humanity. Theoretical basis. Taking into account the relevance of the topic of person’s searching for authentic existence in the modern world, the author analyzes the (...) concept of Sartre’s humanism, which remains poorly researched in the Ukrainian philosophical space, since most of his works of the later period remained untranslated and unknown to the Ukrainian community. That is, there is a need to consider the phenomenon of a human and his/her basic characteristics, which ultimately determine what type of humanism deserves further support and development. The author places the existentialist dimension of a human being, which is one of the most important determinants of human behavior and the ways of human self-determination of his/her existence, in the context of the general development of the humanistic tradition of modern anthropology. Originality. The article substantiates the thesis that Sartre’s position concerning humanism is conditioned by the specificity of his understanding of the authentic human existence as a constant self-transcendence, the person’s realization of the project that makes a person the creator of the values. Therefore, Sartre’s humanism can only be understood in the context of this self-construction and responsibility of a person for his/her choice. The author proved that although this concept was subsequently changed, the basic intention of the Sartre’s approach remains the same. Thus, having combined the existentialism and Marxist understanding of the historical process, Sartre nevertheless emphasizes that the primal intentionality of human existence is decisive in all subsequent actions and doings, despite the fact that real practice may demonstrate deviations and even regression concerning humanity. Having defined the universality of the human situation in the world as the presence of certain a priori restrictions, the philosopher comes to the recognition of intersubjectivity, which allows him to reach a new type of morality, which defines "integral humanity" or "full-fledged human" as its goal. Conclusions. The interpretation of humanism by early Sartre relied on the idea of a person as such, who is in constant transcendence, constantly constructing him/herself; he/she is oriented towards the future. In this case, a person is the creator of the values and their legislator in this world. At the same time, the late Sartre emphasized that since a person exists in a society where he/she is usually in a state of alienation, the question under which conditions and by what means is it possible to reproduce and realize a truly humanistic dimension is inevitable. Sartre’s position is based on the fact that there is a primal need for self-realization, to be human. (shrink)

Resumen: Mencio heredó el camino de la “benevolencia” de Confucio y formó una teoría política de la benevolencia relativamente completa. El concepto de “gobierno benévolo” es también un “camino real”. Su contenido principal es controlar la propiedad de las personas, tomar posesión de las personas, no violar las temporadas agrícolas y dar importancia a la educación moral. El núcleo del gobierno benévolo es la ideología orientada a las personas de Mencius. La concentración de su ideología orientada al pueblo se (...) refleja en los siguientes tres aspectos: aquellos que ganen los corazones del pueblo ganarán el mundo, la relación entre el pueblo y el monarca, y la forma de servir al monarca y servir al ministro. La teoría política de Mencius esbozó el modelo para gobernar el país en la antigua sociedad china y tuvo un profundo impacto en la política tradicional china. Comenzando desde la perspectiva del “gobierno benévolo” y la ideología orientada a las personas de Mencius, este documento analiza sistemáticamente la ideología de gobierno de Mencius, destacando así el significado especial y el encanto de la filosofía política de Mencius. La ideología orientada a las personas en la teoría política de Mencius ha inspirado la construcción de una sociedad armoniosa orientada a las personas en la sociedad contemporánea. Mencius valora el concepto central de la educación moral en el gobierno del país, proporcionando inspiración para la construcción de la civilización política y espiritual en la sociedad actual. (shrink)

Medical ethics changed dramatically in the past 30 years because physicians and humanists actively engaged each other in discussions that sometimes led to confrontation and controversy, but usually have improved the quality of medical decision-making. Before then medical ethics had been isolated for almost two centuries from the larger philosophical, social, and religious controversies of the time. There was, however, an earlier period where leaders in medicine and in the humanities worked closely together and both fields were richer for it. (...) This volume begins with the 18th century Scottish Enlightenment when professors of medicine such as John Gregory, Edward Percival, and the American, Benjamin Rush, were close friends of philosophers like David Hume, Adam Smith, and Thomas Reid. They continually exchanged views on matters of ethics with each other in print, at meetings of elite intellectual groups, and at the dinner table. Then something happened, physicians and humanists quit talking with each other. In searching for the causes of the collapse, this book identifies shifts in the social class of physicians, developments in medical science, and changes in the patterns of medical education. Only in the past three decades has the dialogue resumed as physicians turned to humanists for help just when humanists wanted their work to be relevant to real-life social problems. Again, the book asks why, finding answers in the shift from acute to chronic disease as the dominant pattern of illness, the social rights revolution of the 1960's, and the increasing dissonance between physician ethics and ethics outside medicine. The book tells the critical story of how the breakdown in communication between physicians and humanists occurred and how it was repaired when new developments in medicine together with a social revolution forced the leaders of these two fields to resume their dialogue. (shrink)

How should driverless vehicles respond to situations of unavoidable personal harm? This paper takes up the case of self-driving cars as a prominent example of algorithmic moral decision-making, an emergent type of morality that is evolving at a high pace in a digitised business world. As its main contribution, it juxtaposes dilemma decision situations relating to ethical crash algorithms for autonomous cars to two edge cases: the case of manually driven cars facing real-life, mundane accidents, on the one hand, (...) and the dilemmatic situation in theoretically constructed trolley cases, on the other. The paper identifies analogies and disanalogies between the three cases with regard to decision makers, decision design, and decision outcomes. The findings are discussed from the angle of three perspectives: aspects where analogies could be found, those where the case of self-driving cars has turned out to lie in between both edge cases, and those where it entirely departs from either edge case. As a main result, the paper argues that manual driving as well as trolley cases are suitable points of reference for the issue of designing ethical crash algorithms only to a limited extent. Instead, a fundamental epistemic and conceptual divergence of dilemma decision situations in the context of self-driving cars and the used edge cases is substantiated. Finally, the areas of specific need for regulation on the road to introducing autonomous cars are pointed out and related thoughts are sketched through the lens of the humanistic paradigm. (shrink)

How should driverless vehicles respond to situations of unavoidable personal harm? This paper takes up the case of self-driving cars as a prominent example of algorithmic moral decision-making, an emergent type of morality that is evolving at a high pace in a digitised business world. As its main contribution, it juxtaposes dilemma decision situations relating to ethical crash algorithms for autonomous cars to two edge cases: the case of manually driven cars facing real-life, mundane accidents, on the one hand, (...) and the dilemmatic situation in theoretically constructed trolley cases, on the other. The paper identifies analogies and disanalogies between the three cases with regard to decision makers, decision design, and decision outcomes. The findings are discussed from the angle of three perspectives: aspects where analogies could be found, those where the case of self-driving cars has turned out to lie in between both edge cases, and those where it entirely departs from either edge case. As a main result, the paper argues that manual driving as well as trolley cases are suitable points of reference for the issue of designing ethical crash algorithms only to a limited extent. Instead, a fundamental epistemic and conceptual divergence of dilemma decision situations in the context of self-driving cars and the used edge cases is substantiated. Finally, the areas of specific need for regulation on the road to introducing autonomous cars are pointed out and related thoughts are sketched through the lens of the humanistic paradigm. (shrink)

In this essay Ernst Cassirer addresses two currents of the philosophical reflection about man and culture that emerged at the end of the 18th century. Th e naturalistic one, conceives of man and culture as an outcome of the processes that takes place beyond the reach of human will and consciousness. Among such naturalistically oriented philosophies Cassirer includes Hegel’s idealism, Taine’s positivism and Spengler’s psychologism. All of them imply a characteristic kind of historical fatalism. In opposition to such a deterministic (...) vision of human development stands a philosophy that emphasizes the importance of individual decision and responsibility for the course of history. Cassirer names it “humanistic” as it places man in the very middle of its research. The initiators of this tradition were Johann Gottfried Herder and Wilhelm von Humboldt, foremost representatives of the German romantic movement. The philosopher who took up their humanistic thought and elevated it to the importance of a distinct knowledge was Wilhelm Dilthey. While bearing in mind who is the real creator of culture all these thinkers pay special attention to the question of man’s responsibility for culture as well as for himself. The problem of human responsibility that totally escaped the attention of naturalistically oriented philosophers is somehow a distinguishing characteristic of all humanistic philosophies of culture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Judith Butler’s “New Humanism”A Thing or Not a Thing, and So What?Sina KramerA few thinkers in the last few years, such as Stefan Dolgert and Miriam Leonard, but especially political theorist Bonnie Honig, have argued that Judith Butler’s most recent work (Antigone’s Claim, 2000; Undoing Gender, 2004; Precarious Life, 2005; Frames of War, 2009) institutes a new form of humanism, based on the universality of grief, mourning, (...) vulnerability, and precariousness that Butler describes in these texts. These critiques call into question an incipient foundationalism in the feminist political theory Butler produces in these texts, one seemingly at odds with her previous antifoundationalist commitments. In this article I will argue that, while these critiques oversimplify the relationship between politics and ethics or politics and ontology in their critique of Butler’s new mortalist humanism, the problem of the relation of politics to ethics or ontology—or, more exactly, the problem of the relation of politics to its outside, or to its conditions—remains nevertheless a real problem in Butler’s work. This is because, without a clear account of a method of rendering foundations contingent, or of rendering ontologies provisional, we tend to repeat the political move to establish an apolitical ground on which we can found a politic. This foundationalist move thus shields that ground from political critique and transformation—a move that Butler herself has done so much work to expose and displace.In this article, I ask whether feminist theory must repeat a recourse to foundations by examining the charge that Butler does so her in most recent work. The article will proceed as follows: in the first section, I examine the [End Page 25] charge that Butler is instituting a new humanism. In the second section, I look at some of Butler’s discussion of humanism, and look more closely at the relation between ethics and politics the question of humanism opens up in her work. In the third, I explore whether or not the charge that Butler is instituting a new humanism is correct. And in the fourth, I question what is at stake in this charge. Essentially, the article asks of this new humanist charge: Is this a thing or not a thing, and so what? I argue that, while the charge is somewhat overdetermined, it does point to a larger problem in Butler’s work, and that is the recourse to foundations, or to gesturing to an outside of or beyond of politics as the condition for altering political conditions. I will conclude by arguing that a greater attention to method can help to avoid the reification of the distinction between politics and its conditions that leads to the recourse of foundations.Butler’s New Mortalist HumanismIn her 2010 article “Antigone’s Two Laws: Tragedy and the Politics of Humanism”—as well as in her 2013 book Antigone, Interrupted—Bonnie Honig argues that Butler’s ethical turn institutes a new mortalist humanism, predicated on the “ontological fact of mortality, not the capacity to reason but the vulnerability to suffering” (Honig 2010, 1). She differentiates this new mortalist humanism, which she also diagnoses in the work of Nicole Loraux and Stephen White, from earlier rationalist forms of humanism that are based on the universal principle of human rationality, and from forms of antihumanism based on the “signs of a monstrous, dehumanizing animality” (Honig 2010, 3). Either form is problematic, Honig argues, insofar as they both seek to settle essentially political questions by recourse to a position beyond politics: through a stable and recognizably human figure who either secures its belonging to the polity by means of its rationality, or an exclusion rendered through the dehumanization of otherwise ostensibly human figures.This new mortalist humanism Honig diagnoses in Butler’s recent work falls into the same problem: in this version, Butler settles political questions by recourse to a principle of mortality, or the universal experience of mourning. This would seem to be contrary to Butler’s earlier commitments to a radical critique of foundationalism, especially in her famous critique of the naturalization of sex as the grounds for a political understanding of gender. This is... (shrink)

Blair, David Concerning David Tribe's rejoinder to my 'Science works better than that' , it's pleasing to see that there are some points on which we agree. Unfortunately he continues to make a strong and unjustified attack on the scientific community as a whole-essentially on the grounds that, of the conclusions of science that later turned out to be false, virtually all of them were at some time 'believed' by most scientists. In reply, I shall show that it is his (...) underlying framework that needs to be altered-quite radically. He does not understand what the activity of scientists is like-indeed what it has to be like, when faced with the task of extracting knowledge from the real world. (shrink)

Star Trek creator Gene Roddenberry's humanism is well known. While it may be that the inclusion of talk about gods reflected the interest in religion in his own time, the way that the show talked about gods reflects a humanist theology that's at least compatible with, and perhaps an expression of, Roddenberry's own vision. If the relationship of Star Trek to humanism has been unambiguous, its relationship to, and view of, posthumanism is less clear. Posthumanism can refer to (...) the notion that an all‐embracing ethos of the kind offered by humanism ought to be reconfigured to incorporate other beings besides terrestrial ones. If compassion is the defining attribute of a god, then Star Trek's humanist theology encourages not only to believe that divinity is a real possibility for humanity in the future, but also to recognize it as a possibility in the present. (shrink)

It's only natural to wonder about the higher purposes in one's life. Religious people sometimes argue that because they discover and enjoy a higher purpose to life, then religious beliefs appear quite natural and reasonable. This argument can be turned around, to make humanism look unnatural and unreasonable, if humanism denies any higher purpose to life. Either way, humanism seems inhumanly cold towards the very notion of ‘higher purpose’, but is this matter really so clear-cut and simple? (...) Religious humanists stand as counter examples to the notion that a religious life is incompatible with a humanistic philosophy. Secular humanists might be said to enjoy a spiritual aspect to their lives as well, if that aspect simply means devoted pursuit of higher purposes in this life. The confusions in these sorts of arguments probably originate in the ambiguous phrase, ‘a higher purpose to life’, which can be understood in several ways. If we discriminate between the more common meanings, and consider them separately, then any real disagreement between religion and humanism should begin to emerge. People can be heard to talk about ‘having a higher purpose in life’. Some say that they seek a ‘purpose higher than life’. Others talk about wanting a ‘higher purpose for life’. In which ways can humanism endorse such talk of a ‘higher purpose’? (shrink)

In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline,’ Williams is mistaken in thinking that I accused him of thinking that that we can describe the world ‘as it is anyway’ without using concepts. Our real disagreement is over whether it makes sense to think that the concepts of physics do this. The central issue is this: the notion of ‘absoluteness’ is defined using at least one semantical notion. If Williams' view is to work, I argue, at least one semantical notion needs (...) to be absolute. But Williams himself concedes that semantical notions cannot be reduced to physical ones, and the ‘absolute conception’ is supposed to be given in terms of primary qualities alone. (shrink)

In this paper, in response to Nicolson’s claim that South African liberation theology is non‐realist – or at least is non‐realist in its language – I suggest that Albert Nolan’s important book God in South Africa is not based on such an “exotic” philosophical basis but is a reflection using the populist Marxism of the anti‐apartheid struggle of the 1980s. The clue here is Nolan’s use of the Colonialism of a Special Type thesis, an integral part of ANC and Communist (...) Party discourse since the 1960s. Nolan himself has described his work as “historical materialist” in its philosophical language. Such a position seems far removed from non‐realism, although they certainly sound similar in Nolan’s God‐language.I then examine non‐realist theologian Don Cupitt’s model of “militant religious humanism” and conclude that a non‐realist liberation or political theology along these lines suffers too much from a sense of relativism or absurdity for it to be of use to those who use liberation theology. From this I try to suggest how a non‐realist liberation theology might be developed. In the end, however, I conclude that though such a theology could be constructed, it would probably not be effective: liberation theology requires a real God who really sides with the poor. (shrink)

In this paper, in response to Nicolson’s claim that South African liberation theology is non‐realist – or at least is non‐realist in its language – I suggest that Albert Nolan’s important book God in South Africa is not based on such an “exotic” philosophical basis but is a reflection using the populist Marxism of the anti‐apartheid struggle of the 1980s. The clue here is Nolan’s use of the Colonialism of a Special Type thesis, an integral part of ANC and Communist (...) Party discourse since the 1960s. Nolan himself has described his work as “historical materialist” in its philosophical language. Such a position seems far removed from non‐realism, although they certainly sound similar in Nolan’s God‐language.I then examine non‐realist theologian Don Cupitt’s model of “militant religious humanism” (from his Life‐Lines) and conclude that a non‐realist liberation or political theology along these lines suffers too much from a sense of relativism or absurdity for it to be of use to those who use liberation theology. From this I try to suggest how a non‐realist liberation theology might be developed. In the end, however, I conclude that though such a theology could be constructed, it would probably not be effective: liberation theology requires a real God who really sides with the poor. (shrink)

The body of this essay is free of philosophical jargons. Since however some readers are accustomed to thinking about the free-will problem in terms of the compatibilism/incompatibilism divide, I wish to briefly comment on why this emphasis is not very helpful. If by “freedom” one means that a person’s will is the ultimate choicemaker free from prior causes, then the position of this essay is that “freedom is incompatible with determinism”; but if by “freedom” one means that there is harmony (...) between the intended consequences of a choice and the nature of the choice-maker, the position of this essay is that “freedom is compatible with determinism.” This illustrates that unless there is first an agreement on what is meant by “freedom,” it is premature to put the focus on whether freedom is compatible with determinism. (shrink)

European civilization largely lost its sense of direction after World War One when its humanist consensus, that promoted human betterment, collapsed into a fruitless political opposition between left and right wing extremism. This collapse is here exemplified by the breakdown in relationship between left winger Bertrand Russell and right winger D.H. Lawrence during WW1. However, the real causes of the loss of the humanist consensus are more deep-rooted, as that consensus has its roots in the Renaissance andn Enlightenment movements (...) when the influence of humanist views was at its height. By the late 19th century imperialism and militarism threatened the consensus, and the senseless slaughter of WW1 brought it to an end. The humanist consensus re-emerged post-WW2, largely through American influence, but it has declined since. To restore the consensus, it is argued here that humanism can be strengthened by dualist theory and by a process of contextualization that brings humanity to the fore. By using ‘connecting contexts’ we can open our minds to larger perspectives. In that way, we are collectively more inclined to be optimistic about our prospects. The future of humanity seems to depend on such developments in our critical thinking about ourselves. (shrink)

In ‘Philosophy as a Humanistic Discipline,’ Williams is mistaken in thinking that I accused him of thinking that that we can describe the world ‘as it is anyway’ without using concepts. Our real disagreement is over whether it makes sense to think that the concepts of physics do this. The central issue is this: the notion of ‘absoluteness’ is defined using at least one semantical notion (‘convergence’). If Williams' view is to work, I argue, at least one semantical notion (...) needs to be absolute. But Williams himself concedes that semantical notions cannot be reduced to physical ones, and the ‘absolute conception’ is supposed to be given in terms of primary qualities alone. (shrink)

Kevin Yuill goes straight to the heart of a difficult issue. Critical of both sides of the discussion, this book presents an up-to-date analysis of the direction discussion is taking, showing that atheists, libertarians, those favouring abortion rights and stem-cell research should stand beside their religious compatriots in opposing legalization of assisted suicide. The author shows that the real issue behind the debate is not euthanasia but suicide. Rather than focusing on tragic cases, he indicates the real damage (...) that will be done if we affirm the suicidal wishes of even a small segment of the population. Analyzing the movement for the right to die in historical terms, Yuill shows that, though many proponents of a change in the law believe they are rationalist heirs of such thinkers as John Stuart Mill, legalizing assisted suicide will reduce privacy and freedom. Finally, Yuill suggests a radical alternative to legalization of assisted suicide that would embrace both the cause of freedom and the anxieties of many about securing good deaths. (shrink)

From the editors of Voprosy filosofii:From August 17 to 22, the Eighth International Congress on the Logic. Methodology, and Philosophy of Science will convene in Moscow. The theme of this congress is "Man, Science, Humanism."The work of the congress will be organized in the following sections: 1. Foundations of mathematical reasoning. 2. The theory of models. 3. Foundations of calculability and recursion theory. 4. The theory of sets. 5. General logic. 6. The general methodology of science. 7. Foundations of (...) probability and statistical inference. 8. Foundations of the physical sciences. 9. Foundations of the biological sciences. 10. Foundations of psychology and the cognitive sciences. 11. Foundations of the social sciences. 12. Foundations and philosophy of linguistics. 13. The history of logic, methodology, and the philosophy of science.Two symposia are planned for the congress: "Science and Ethics" and "The New Style of Scientific Thinking in Natural Science." In addition to the main sections, several round tables will be organized at the congress on the following topics: J. The methodology of solving global problems of the modern epoch: a systems approach. 2. Methodological and social problems of computerization. 3. Factors in the development of modern scientific knowledge. 4. Methodological problems in the all-around development of man.The journal Voprosy filosofii has published a number of articles related to these problems over the past year . Soviet scholars are taking an active part in the preparation and organization of this congress. The journal plans in subsequent issues to publish materials for the congress under the most varied rubrics. In this issue, with D. P. Gorskii's article "The Concept of Real and Ideal Types," we are opening a special section in which we shall publish basic materials devoted to the Eighth International Congress on the Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science. (shrink)

© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Many have pointed to Blade Runner's humanization of its 'replicants' as a compelling statement against exploitation and domination. I argue, however, that the film has another kind of agenda: a Rousseauvian concern about the dangers of representation, about confusing the imitation with the real and confusing the consumption of images with political action. Rather than humanizing the other, Blade Runner's central concern is to humanize our own social and political relationships, which are in danger (...) of falling into the same trap Rousseau outlined in his Letter to D'Alembert. To do so, we must learn to appreciate the difference between mutual surveillance and mutual regard. To live freely in any regime, we must understand the dangers of representation, even if, in a large state, we must continue to make use of it. (shrink)

© 2015 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. Many have pointed to Blade Runner's humanization of its 'replicants' as a compelling statement against exploitation and domination. I argue, however, that the film has another kind of agenda: a Rousseauvian concern about the dangers of representation, about confusing the imitation with the real and confusing the consumption of images with political action. Rather than humanizing the other, Blade Runner's central concern is to humanize our own social and political relationships, which are in danger (...) of falling into the same trap Rousseau outlined in his Letter to D'Alembert. To do so, we must learn to appreciate the difference between mutual surveillance and mutual regard. To live freely in any regime, we must understand the dangers of representation, even if, in a large state, we must continue to make use of it. (shrink)

In Sartre’s 1946 article “The Humanism of Existentialism,” Sartre places existentialists into two categories, Christian or atheist, and contends that existentialism works differently for each of them. This paper argues that such a distinction should not have been made because existentialist beliefs, views, and themes do not differ based on one’s religiosity. This paper specifically examines three examples in Sartre’s article which undermine his position, and further argues that Sartre made an equivocation fallacy by conflating two different types of (...) essence, one’s innate essence and one’s character essence. The paper then explores six central existentialist themes to demonstrate that in their existentialist beliefs both the theist and the atheist agree. Those six themes are authenticity, sincerity vs. bad faith, the absurdity of life, the meaning of life, choice, and responsibility. The paper also examines the issue of moral objectivity vs. non-objectivity, and argues that not only is this not an existentialist issue, but even if it were one’s belief on moral objectivity does not cleanly correspond to one’s religious beliefs, so here again there is no basis to distinguish the Christian and the atheist. The paper concludes that any disagreement between existentialists who are Christian and those who are atheist comes down to differences in their religious beliefs, not their existentialist views. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Status of the Person in the Humanism of Giovanni Gentile" A. ROBERT CAPONIGRI THE HUMANISMOf Giovanni Gentile has gradually come to be recognized as one of the major speculative achievements of our time. The great strength and appeal of this position lie chiefly in the manner in which it meets the exigencies of the modem analysis of man and human existence while retaining the basic classical insights (...) of western thought. It achieves a synthesis which possesses at once historical, speculative, and cultural value and which rectifies many of the unilateral analyses so much in evidence. At the same time, serious limitations have been alleged to mar the Gentilean view of man. The most important of these allegations concerns the notion most intimately associated with the humanism of the west: the person. Strangely, it has been charged that the humanism of Gentile not only fails to develop an adequate concept of the person but directly involves the diminution and constriction of this concept as it has developed historically and influenced the western view of man. His, it is asserted, is a humanism without the person, which is but a small remove from the paradoxical assertion that it is a humanism without man? In many ways this charge is most perplexing. Were it correct, it would certainly have the limiting and constrictive effects his critics have pointed out. The real perplexity resides, however, not in spelling out the probable consequences of the allegation, but in determining how it might ever have arisen and gained such credence and championship. The fact is that nothing could be further from Gentile's intention and (what is more important) more alien to the burden of his text than the least diminution of the person. On the contrary, the person constitutes the central and pivotal notion of the entire structure of Gentilean humanism. The constructive effort of his thought is directed principally to the elaboration and validation of this * This paper was read before the Thirteenth International Congress of Philosophy, Mexico City (September, 1963), but has not been included in the Proceedings of the Congress. 1 M. F. Sclacca, II XX Secolo (1947), Vol. I, pp. 400 ft.; R. Holmes, The Idealism of Giovanni Gentile (1957), passim; H. S. Harris, The Social Philosophy of Giovanni Gentile (1960), passim. [6q 62 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY concept of the person. Once established, this concept becomes the cardinal principle upon which all his subsequent explorations and assertions in the areas of art, ethics, social and political theory, and education hinge. Consequently, it seems of utmost importance, for the comprehension of his thought and of its place in the total prospect of contemporary philosophy, to place in clear relief the basic lineaments of the concept of the person as it emerges from the critical stages of Gentile's thought as well as the role it plays in all subsequent constructive efforts. Formation of the Concept of the Person in Gentile's Thought To understand the emergence of the concept of the person in actualism, it is necessary to determine clearly Gentile's basic point of departure. This is established firmly in the history of philosophy: a fact which corroborates Harris's perception that Gentile's thought is essentially an historical enterprise? One of Gentile's chief and most sustained fields of effort is the history of philosophy and his work in this area served a double purpose. The first was the properly historical and critical work of establishing an interpretation of the course of the history of western philosophy; s the second was to locate his own thought in the context of the history of philosophy as thus established and thus to endow it with a firm scientific and "public" character, to assign it a "public" basis. This public basis was the achievement of western philosophy which his analysis had recognized as solid and beyond cavil. This achievement, he reasoned, must constitute the point of departure of any further relevant speculation. Gentile took the philosophical position of Hegel as representing this indubitable achievement of western thought in its most salient features. This statement must be correctly understood to be of any help and importance in approaching his thought. Gentile did not... (shrink)

En aquesta arrencada del segle XXI, en què la tecnologia ens afalaga i alhora ens domina, ens calen humanistes que ens ajudin a interpretar la realitat i a tenir criteris per a abordar-la. Josep Maria Puigjaner, l'autor d'aquest llibre, s'ha proposat apropar al lector, a través de la narració d'alguns retalls -reals o imaginaris- de les seves vides, la personalitat de vuit humanistes que ens transmeteren, durant el segle XX, la seva manera d'entendre la vida i l'home. Són escriptors que (...) mereixen el qualificatiu de clàssics, és a dir que parlen des d'una perspectiva interior, profunda i arrelada en el coneixement i en l'experiència del significat de la naturalesa humana i els seus ideals de futur. (shrink)

In this unusual and much-needed reappraisal of Freud's clinical technique, M. Guy Thompson challenges the conventional notion that psychoanalysis promotes relief from suffering and replaces it with a more radical assertion, that psychoanalysis seeks to mend our relationship with the real that has been fractured by our avoidance of the same. Thompson suggests that, while avoiding reality may help to relieve our experience of suffering, this short-term solution inevitably leads to a split in our existence. M. Guy Thompson forcefully (...) disagrees with the recent trend that dismisses Freud as an historical figure who is out of step with the times. He argues, instead, for a return to the forgotten Freud, a man inherently philosophical and rooted in a Greek preoccupation with the nature of truth, ethics, the purpose of life and our relationship with reality. Thompson's argument is situated in a stunning re-reading of Freud's technical papers, including a new evaluation of his analyses of Dora and the Rat Man in the context of Heidegger's understanding of truth. In this remarkable examination of Freud's technical recommendations, M. Guy Thompson explains how psychoanalysis was originally designed to re-acquaint us with realities we had abandoned by encountering them in the contest of the analytic experience. This provocative examination of Freud's conception of psychoanalysis reveals a more personal Freud than we had previously supposed, one that is more humanistic and real. (shrink)

This essay interrogates the common assumption that good care is necessarily human care. It looks to disruptive fictional representations of robot care to assist its development of a theory of posthuman care that jettisons the implied anthropocentrism of ethics of care philosophy but retains care’s foregrounding of entanglement, embodiment and obligation. The essay reads speculative representations of robot care, particularly the Swedish television programme Äkta människor (Real Humans), alongside ethics of care philosophy and critical posthumanism to highlight their synergetic (...) critiques of neoliberal affective economies and humanist hierarchies that treat some bodies and affects as more real than others. These texts and discourses assist me in proposing a theory of care that regards vulnerability as the normative effect of posthuman vital embodiment, as opposed to an anomalous state that can be overcome or corrected via neoliberal practice. (shrink)