En marzo de 2021 se reformó la Constitución mexicana para transitar a un sistema de precedentes. Esta enmienda establece que las “razones” de las sentencias de la Suprema Corte serán obligatorias para los tribunales inferiores. Sin embargo, la reforma se enmarca en una arraigada práctica de tesis jurisprudenciales, i. e., enunciados abstractos identificados por la misma Corte al resolver un caso. Además, no hay consenso sobre qué son estas razones y por qué deberían ser vinculantes. El objetivo de este artículo (...) es identificar las posibles concepciones de razones para revelar los distintos roles de la Corte en la creación del derecho judicial. Se utilizan nociones de la ratio decidendi del common law como herramientas de introspección para identificar cuatro modelos de creación del derecho en la práctica mexicana, a saber: legislación judicial, reglas implícitas, justificaciones político-morales, y categorías sociales. Aunque la primera concepción parece ser la dominante, las alternativas amplían el abanico para entender cómo es que la Corte crea derecho dependiendo del contexto interpretativo en que opere. (shrink)

This paper proposes a model ofratio decidendi as a justification structure consisting of a series of reasoning steps, some of which relate abstract predicates to other abstract predicates and some of which relate abstract predicates to specific facts. This model satisfies an important set of characteristics ofratio decidendi identified from the jurisprudential literature. In particular, the model shows how the theory under which a case is decided controls its precedential effect. By contrast, a purely exemplar-based model ofratio (...) class='Hi'>decidendi fails to account for the dependency of precedential effect on the theory of decision. (shrink)

In March 2021, the Mexican Constitution was amended to transition to a system of precedents. This amendment mandates that the “reasons” of Supreme Court rulings will be binding on the lower courts. However, the reform is rooted in a long-standing practice of ‘Tesis’, i.e., abstract statements that the Court itself identifies when deciding a case. Moreover, there is no consensus as to what these reasons are and why they should be binding. The aim of this article is to identify the (...) possible conceptions of reasons to explore the Court’s different judge-made law roles. Different common law conceptions of the ratio decidendi are used as “mirrors” to identify four models of judicial lawmaking in Mexican practice, namely: judicial legislation, implicit rules, moral-political justifications and social categories. Although the first model seems to prevail, the others provide means for a broader understanding of how the Court creates law depending on the interpretative context in which it operates. (shrink)

Decision-making by a Data and Safety Monitoring Board (DSMB) regarding clinical trial conduct and termination is intricate and largely limited by cases and rules. Decision-making by legal jury is also intricate and largely constrained by cases and rules. In this paper, I argue by analogy that legal decision-making, which strives for a balance between competing demands of conservatism and innovation, supplies a good basis to the logic behind DSMB decision-making. Using the doctrine of precedents in legal reasoning as my central (...) analog will lead us to a decision-theoretic analogy for much more systematic documentation of decisions in clinical trials. My conclusion is twofold: every DSMB decision should articulate a clear general principle (a ratio decidendi) that gives reason for the decision; and all such decisions should be made public. I use Bartha’s (2010) theory of analogical arguments to both frame and assess my argument by analogy. (shrink)

In this article I argue for rule-based, non-monotonic theories of common law judicial reasoning and improve upon one such theory offered by Horty and Bench-Capon. The improvements reveal some of the interconnections between formal theories of judicial reasoning and traditional issues within jurisprudence regarding the notions of the ratio decidendi and obiter dicta. Though I do not purport to resolve the long-standing jurisprudential issues here, it is beneficial for theorists both of legal philosophy and formalizing legal reasoning to (...) see where the two projects interact. (shrink)

Stories can be powerful argumentative vehicles, and they are often used to present arguments from analogy, most notably as parables, fables or allegories where the story invites the hearer to infer an important claim of the argument. Case Based Reasoning in Law has many similar features: the current case is compared to previously decided cases, and in case the similarity between the previous and current cases is deemed sufficient, a similar conclusion can be drawn for the current case. In this (...) article, we want to take a further step towards computationally modelling the connection between stories and argumentation in analogical reasoning. We show how story schemes can be used to investigate and determine story similarity, and how the point of a story – that is, the conclusion that the storyteller intends the hearer to draw – can be likened to the ratio decidendi in a legal case. Finally, we present some formal tools for modelling stories based on computational models of practical reasoning. (shrink)

This fourth edition of Precedent in English Law presents a basic guide to the current doctrine of precedent in England, set in the wider context of the jurisprudential problems which any treatment of this topic involves. Such problems include the nature of _ratio_ _decidendi_ of a precedentand of its binding force, the significance of precedents alongside other sources of law, their role in legal reasoning, and the account which must be taken of them by any general theory of law. Considerable (...) re-writing has been undertaken to update case-law and take account of the possibleimplications for the doctrine of precedent of the impact of European Community law, making it an indispensable work of reference for readers interested in the past history, present state, and future developments of English rules of precedent. (shrink)

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but (...) not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons. (shrink)

The question as to whether or not an argument isadditional may be decisive in the evaluation ofjudicial decisions. It is, however, often difficult todistinguish between arguments that are additional(obiter dicta) and arguments that are not (ratio decidendi). This paper will focus on twoproblems concerning this distinction: thecharacterization of obiter dicta and theiridentification. A pragma-dialectical approach toargumentation will be the framework in which theseproblems will be addressed. Its insights intodialogical aspects of argumentation will be used tocharacterize obiter dicta. And (...) its assessment oflinguistic clues for the recognition of argumentationstructures will be used for the identification ofobiter dicta. Problems related to the identificationof obiter dicta will be illustrated through ananalysis of decisions in which the expressions anyway, for that matter and if onlybecause are considered as indicative of obiter dicta. (shrink)

Law is a system of legal rules and legal principles. The distinction between them is a relative one. Always such definite major and minor premises are to be formed that the case can be subsumed under the rule and a conclusion, which includes the decision, can be drawn. This applies to legal principles that are operationalised by legal rules as well as to statutory forms of legal rules, which are often open as to their meaning and/or contain definitions that comprise (...) elements of principles. The basic characteristic of legal principles is that they are value measures directing the definition of legal rules as to their contents, the understanding of the rules, and the manner of their application. Legal principles aim at a goal, have weight, and define the scope of the meaning within which the legal rules move. The operationalisation of legal principles is the _ratio decidendi_ that the court has to achieve in order to be able to decide in a concrete case. Legal principles live through the rules that are the reasons for the decision in a concrete case. New cases can be solved by a new operationalisation of legal principles or by analogous application of precedents if the new cases, in their essential elements, correspond to cases that have already been decided. (shrink)

We discuss five kinds of representations of rationales and provide a formal account of how they can alter disputation. The formal model of disputation is derived from recent work in argument. The five kinds of rationales are compilation rationales, which can be represented without assuming domain-knowledge (such as utilities) beyond that normally required for argument. The principal thesis is that such rationales can be analyzed in a framework of argument not too different from what AI already has. The result is (...) a formal understanding of rationales, a partial taxonomy, and a foundation for computer programs that represent and reason with rationales.The five kinds of rationales are as follows: (c)ompression and (s)pecialization, which yield rules, and (d)isputation, which yields a decision. These are modeled as potentially changing the focus of the dispute. Then there are (f)it, a rationale for rules, and (r)esolution, a rationale for decisions. These cannot be modeled as simply; they force disputation to a meta-level, at least temporarily. (shrink)

The author argues that simple constructive dilemma is a valuable argument form for reasoning under relative conditions of uncertainty. When applied to legal argument this value of simple constructive dilemma is shown in its political, strategic, rhetorical, and especially economic, uses by lawyers and judges. After considering some examples of the use of the form by trial lawyers, the author gives examples of the more interesting use of the form by appellate courts. Research into the use of simple constructive dilemma (...) by appellate courts helps us to understand how those courts distribute judicial resources. It also helps us to understand the political role of the appellate courts with respect to the doctrine of the separation of powers. Given some of the specific examples of legal reasoning used by the appellate courts presented in this article, and given the discussion of the doctrine of precedent, the article’s focus is on common law legal systems of the Anglo-American-type. (shrink)

We present an experiment in which we add a common delay in a choice between two risky prospects. The results show that delay produces the same change in preferences as in the well-documented common ratio effect in risky lotteries. The added common delay acts as if the probabilities were divided by some common ratio. Moreover, we show that there is a strong magnitude effect, in the sense that the effect of delay depends on the magnitude of the outcome. (...) The results are consistent with the recently introduced probability time trade-off (PTT) model by Baucells and Heukamp. We present a parameterization of the model based on the experimental results, showing that the value function exhibits increasing relative risk aversion, the weighting function is s-shaped, and the intrinsic discount rate is decreasing. (shrink)

The ratio bias––according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers––has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient (...) and dominant incentives are provided. This holds true for both choice and valuation tasks. Also, adding context to the decision problem does not change this outcome. No ratio bias could be found in between-subject tests either, which leads us to the conclusion that the policy relevance of the phenomenon is doubtful at best. (shrink)

The 2D:4D-Ratio, as an indirect measure of the fetal testosterone to estradiol ratio, is potentially very important for understanding and explaining different personality traits. It was the aim of the present study to replicate the findings from Fink et al. (2004) about the relation between individual differences in 2D:4D-Ratios and the Five Factor Model in different cultural groups. Therefore a sample of n = 78 Chinese and n = 370 German participants was recruited. Every participant provided hand scans (...) of both hands, from which 2D:4D-Ratios were computed. Moreover, all participants filled in the NEO Five Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI). Significant sex differences were found for ratios of both hands in the expected direction, with females showing higher ratios than males. With respect to links between personality and the digit ratio, a positive association was observed between 2D:4D-Ratio and Neuroticism in females, as shown in the earlier study. These findings were observed in both female subsamples from China and Germany, as well as in the full sample of participants. But in contrast to the results for the whole and the German female sample, where 2D:4D-Ratio of both hands were related to Neuroticism, in the Chinese female sample only left hand 2D:4D-Ratio was significantly and positively related to Neuroticism. There were no significant correlations found in any of the male samples. Thus, prenatal exposure to sex steroids appears to influence the personality factor Neuroticism in females specifically. This finding potentially has implications for mental health, as Neuroticism has been shown to be a risk factor for various forms of psychopathology. (shrink)

In this paper, I delineate two major problems facing reliabilist approaches in epistemology. I argue that Alvin Goodman's (1986) position fails to solve either problem. I then suggest an alternative reliabilist approach that ties truth-ratio assessments to particular, well-specified cognitive tasks. I claim that a well-specified cognitive task is an empirical hypothesis about a system that involves the specification of input and output types and nomic correlations (including statistical correlations) that underlie the system's performance. On my approach, one characterizes (...) processes by reference to the system's dispositions across the situations consistent with the task. Characterization is best understood as revealing a strategy or a set of strategies for generating outputs from inputs relying on certain nomic correlations associated with the task. (shrink)

A close reading of the five mathematical studies Socrates proposes for the philosopher-to-be in Republic VII, arguing that (1) each study proposes an object the thought of which turns the soul towards pure intelligibility and that (2) the sequence of studies involves both a departure from the sensible and a return to it in its intelligible structure.

The ratio bias—according to which individuals prefer to bet on probabilities expressed as a ratio of large numbers to normatively equivalent or superior probabilities expressed as a ratio of small numbers—has recently gained momentum, with researchers especially in health economics emphasizing the policy importance of the phenomenon. Although the bias has been replicated several times, some doubts remain about its economic significance. Our two experiments show that the bias disappears once order effects are excluded, and once salient (...) and dominant incentives are provided. This holds true for both choice and valuation tasks. Also, adding context to the decision problem does not alter this finding. No ratio bias could be found in between-subject tests either, which leads us to the conclusion that the policy relevance of the phenomenon is doubtful at best. (shrink)

Clarke and Beck propose that the approximate number system (ANS) represents rational numbers. The evidence cited supports only the view that it represents ratios (and positive integers). Rational numbers are extensive magnitudes (i.e., sizes), whereas ratios are intensities. It is also argued that WHAT a system represents and HOW it does so are not as independent of one another as the authors assume.

There are different Bayesian measures to calculate the degree of confirmation of a hypothesis H in respect of a particular piece of evidence E. Zalabardo (Analysis 69:630–635, 2009) is a recent attempt to defend the likelihood-ratio measure (LR) against the probability-ratio measure (PR). The main disagreement between LR and PR concerns their sensitivity to prior probabilities. Zalabardo invokes intuitive plausibility as the appropriate criterion for choosing between them. Furthermore, he claims that it favours the ordering of pairs evidence/hypothesis (...) generated by LR. We will argue, however, that the intuitive non-numerical example provided by Zalabardo does not show that prior probabilities do not affect the degree of confirmation. On account of this, we conclude that there is no compelling reason to endorse LR qua measure of degree of confirmation. On the other side, we should not forget some technicalities which still benefit PR. (shrink)

Clarke and Beck suggest that the ratio processing system may be a component of the approximate number system, which they suggest represents rational numbers. We argue that available evidence is inconsistent with their account and advocate for a two-systems view. This implies that there may be many access points for numerical cognition – and that privileging the ANS may be a mistake.

The paper deals with the problem of the ratio of unity in the work of Thomas Aquinas. More specifically, it tries to answer the question wherein the ratio of unity consists: whether it is a “positive entity of being” or rather the “negative aspect of being undivided.” In order to answer the question properly the paper is divided into four main parts. In the first two parts the constitutive characteristics of unity are explained and attention is focused on (...) the concepts division and negationof division. In the third part Aquinas’s statements that seem to reflect a negative conception of unity are expounded and the relationship of unity and goodness tothe “entitative principles” of being (essence and existence) are elucidated. Finally, in the fourth part the answer to the fundamental question of the article is givenand arguments for the “positive” conception of unity are presented. (shrink)

Many irreconcilable accounts of ratio legis in legal science, often concerned with legal interpretation, suffer from being disconnected from practical reasoning. Different theories of legal interpretation which result in one-sided views of ratio legis are by-products of one-sided semantics. The first part of the chapter diagnoses this problem by providing a model of three types of one-sided semantics—upstream, midstream and downstream—and explaining how they translate into respective accounts of legal interpretation and ratio legis. The second part of (...) the chapter presents an alternative to one-sided semantics in legal theory. The alternative account which combines semantics and practical reasoning in legal theory is based on Brandom’s inferential pragmatism. The usefulness of inferential pragmatism in legal theory with regard to the problem of ratio legis is tested and followed by extending an inferentialist account of ratio legis provided by Canale and Tuzet. A model of agent’s actions and reasons, and their impact on the reasoning of interpreters and decision-makers is the essential part of this extension. (shrink)

The design argument for the existence of God took a probabilistic turn in the 17 th and 18 th centuries. Earlier versions, such as Thomas Aquinas' 5 th way, usually embraced the premise that goal-directed systems (things that "act for an end" or have a function) must have been created by an intelligent designer. This idea – which we might express by the slogan "no design without a designer" – survived into the 17 th and 18 th centuries, 1 and (...) it is with us still in the writings of many creationists. The new version of the argument, inspired by the emerging mathematical theory of probability, removed the premise of necessity. It begins with the thought that goal-directed systems might have arisen by intelligent design or by chance; the problem is to discern which hypothesis is more plausible. With the epistemic concept of plausibility characterized in terms of the mathematical concept of probability, the design argument was given a new direction. The new probabilistic perspective did not extinguish the older idea of "no design without a designer." The two conflicting approaches coexisted, often with less than perfect clarity about their fundamental difference. At the same time, the details of how the probabilistic perspective ought to be articulated were slow in emerging. These characteristics of uneven development are exemplified in a debate that took place in the 18 th century among three probabilists – John Arbuthnot, Nicholas Bernoulli, and Abraham DeMoivre – on the proper explanation of human sex ratio. Arbuthnot proposed a probabilistic version of the design argument, claiming that it is intelligent design, not chance, that provides the better explanation of why slightly more boys than girls are born each year. Bernoulli rejected Arbuthnot's argument. DeMoivre defended Arbuthnot against Bernoulli's criticisms. The problem of explaining sex ratio, both in human populations and in the rest of nature, experienced another transformation after 1859 --it became a problem for the theory of evolution by natural selection. Darwin (1871) addressed the question in the first edition of The Descent of Man but withdrew his suggestion in the second (Darwin 1874). Carl Düsing (1884) provided a mathematical model that moved beyond the explanation Darwin offered. Fisher (1930) added the new idea of parental expenditure. Williams (1966) argued that the sex ratios found in nature provide the opportunity to test hypotheses of group selection against hypotheses of individual selection. Hamilton (1967) constructed a model that generalizes Fisher's approach and represents the effects of both group and individual selection. The theory of natural selection gradually developed the ability to predict sex ratios, not just explain them post hoc. (shrink)

"From his geometrical method to his theory of mind and body and from his account of the emotions to his doctrine of how to live well, Spinoza's philosophy is a philosophy of ratio"--Back cover.

The issue addresses the relationship between cosmology and ratio, or the dialectical and structural connection which links the same definition of “world” as a uniform, homogeneous, coherent and possible system with the very logical and narrative (and then uniform, homogeneous, coherent and possible) character of our rational description of it. Otherwise, every ratio mundi – understood both in a metaphysical or in an epistemological or in a phenomenological way – amounts, really because it is a ratio, as (...) an explication and an articulation of an object formerly pre-understood and, so to speak, invented, cum discursu, or rather into specific logic and descriptive categories. Because of this structural co-belonging of the concept of “cosmos” to his own narrative dimension, we may can reduce the history of cosmology to a long sequence of depictions, but overall of creations and re-creations of the world, that allow us to distinguish in a only partial way a physical and naturalistic discussion from a theological, a metaphysical or a linguistical-imaginative one. (shrink)

This paper discusses a challenge for Comparativists about belief, who hold that numerical degree of belief (in particular, subjective probability) is a useful fiction, unlike comparative belief, which they regard as real. The challenge is to make sense of claims like ‘I am twice as confident in A as in B’ in terms of comparative belief only. After showing that at least some Comparativists can meet this challenge, I discuss implications for Zynda’s [2000] and Stefánsson’s [2017] defences of Comparativism.

The paper deals with the problem of the ratio of unity in the work of Thomas Aquinas. More specifically, it tries to answer the question wherein the ratio of unity consists: whether it is a “positive entity of being” or rather the “negative aspect of being undivided.” In order to answer the question properly the paper is divided into four main parts. In the first two parts the constitutive characteristics of unity are explained and attention is focused on (...) the concepts division and negationof division. In the third part Aquinas’s statements that seem to reflect a negative conception of unity are expounded and the relationship of unity and goodness tothe “entitative principles” of being (essence and existence) are elucidated. Finally, in the fourth part the answer to the fundamental question of the article is givenand arguments for the “positive” conception of unity are presented. (shrink)

A sample from the Ubatuba fragment collected in Brazil in 1957 was tested with the intent of examining the isotope ratios of its primary element, magnesium, and the trace elements strontium, barium, copper, and zinc. As background, the history of chemical testing of the Ubatuba fragments during the 1960s-1980s at multiple labs with varying capabilities is reviewed and then the remainder of the paper examines recent tests completed in 2017 and 2018 that for the first time used HR-ICPMS techniques to (...) look at the isotopic ratios of the minor constituents as well as the primary magnesium makeup of the sample. The magnesium isotope ratios were found to fall within terrestrial limits while the results on the isotope ratios of the trace elements was inconclusive. Recommendations are made for improving the process of examining the trace elements. Keywords: Ubatuba, isotope, magnesium, HR-ICPMS, UFO. (shrink)

Jesuit colleges and universities located in the United States in recent years have undergone profound changes. They have expanded their mission to embrace many nonCatholic students and faculty and in doing so they find themselves competing for these students with hundreds of other institutions. In seeking to appeal to this wider group of students these Jesuit schools in many cases have abandoned not merely the formal specifics of the curriculum outlined in the Ratio Studiorum but have also decreased the (...) emphasis on spiritual formation that is the reason for the existence of the Ratio. This essay does not argue for a literal return to the Ratio but for an open dialogue centering on questions of inculturation to the larger secularized academic community. It also raises the question of how faculty who have little knowledge of the Ratio can be brought into a conversation about its values. /// Os colégios e universidades dos jesuitas nos Estados Unidos sofreram em anos recentes profundas transformações. Expandiram a sua missão até abrangerem muitos estudantes e professores não Católicos e, ao procederem assim. encontraram-se a competir por estes estudantes com centenas de outras instituições. Em muitos casos. ao procurarem atrair um mais vasto numero de estudantes, estas escolas jesuiticas não apenas abandonaram os aspectos formais do curriculo contido na Ratio Studiorum. como também reduziram a importância da formação espiritual. a qual constitui a razão de ser da própria Ratio. O presente estudo não preconiza um regresso literal á Ratio, mas sim um diálogo aberto centrado em questões relacionadas com a inculturação numa mais alargada comunidade academica secularizada. Levanta-se igualmente a questão de como os docentes que mal conhecem a Ratio poderão vir a ser convertidos aos seus valores. (shrink)

Von der Grundlegung des Wissenschaftsbegriffs vor allem bei Descartes ausgehend wird ein Begriff der Rationalität exemplarisch entwickelt. Von da aus wird die Differenz zwischen wissenschaftlicher und allgemeiner Rationalität mittels der Unterscheidung der Funktion individueller Einbildungskraft innerhalb wissenschaftlicher und außerwissenschaftlicher Rationalität näher bestimmt, u.a. mit dem Ergebnis,daß individuelle Kunst und Geschieht lichkeit philosophisch als "Substanz” wissenschaftlichen Wissens zu begreifen sind.

This paper argues that Augustine did not take the proof inSoliloquia2.22-4, which centers on the Aristotelian notion of ‘being in a subject’, from a single source but constructed it in a deliberately imperfect manner from several passages from Porphyry’s works on Aristotle’sCategoriesin order to supplement it with further arguments in Book Three. InDe immortalitate animaeAugustine explicitly discloses the weaknesses of the proof and repairs them by means of a Neoplatonic notion of causality.

1735 veröffentlichte Johann Georg Zur Linden in Jena die "Ratio meditationis hermeneuticae imprimis sacrae methodo systematica proposita". Sein Werk ist das Resultat eines unerwarteten Bündnisses zwischen der wolffschen Aufklärung und dem Pietismus nach dem harten Zusammenstoß dieser beiden Richtungen, der seinen Höhepunkt in der Verbannung Wolffs aus Halle fand. In den folgenden Jahren trat eine neue kulturelle Figur in Erscheinung, der Aufklärer-Pietist oder umgekehrt, der die Hoch- und Spätaufklärung beherrschte und zu dessen ersten Repräsentanten Zur Linden zählt. Obgleich die (...) Ratio von den Vorschriften der logischen Hermeneutik ausgeht, beruht sie auf einer Aufwertung der Themen der antiken Rhetorik und konzipiert die Hermeneutik als eine auf die Mittel-Zweck-Rationalität gestützte Technik, der die Aufgabe zukommt, die besten Mittel für das Verstehen von Texten und Reden festzulegen. Die heilige Hermeneutik von Zur Linden zeichnet sich durch wenigstens vier innovative Aspekte aus: 1. Den Vorschlag einer allgemeinen Hermeneutik probabilistischer Art. 2. Eine eingehende Untersuchung der verschiedenen Sinnbegriffe und ihrer Wechselbeziehungen. 3. Die Kritik am Besserverstehen als Auslegungsziel. Die kritischen Punkte des Textes dürfen nicht zugunsten seiner Nichtwidersprüchlichkeit ausgemerzt werden, weil jede Verbesserung leicht in eine Manipulation des Sinns ausarten kann. 4. Die mögliche Nichtübereinstimmung zwischen dem, was der Autor sagen will, und dem, was er tatsächlich sagt. Für Zur Linden hat der Textsinn unzweifelhaft Vorrang und bildet den einzigen möglichen Zugang zum Autorsinn. Seine autorbezogene Texthermeneutik stellt sich noch heute als originelle, beachtenswerte Leistung dar. In 1735 Johann Georg Zur Linden published his "Ratio meditationis hermeneuticae imprimis sacrae methodo systematica proposita" in Jena. His work was the result of an unexpected alliance between the Wolffian Enlightenment and Pietism, after the fierce clash between these two trends which had culminated in Wolff’s banishment from Halle. In the years that followed a new cultural figure appeared, the Enlightener-Pietist, or vice versa, who was to dominate the high and late Enlightenment and of whom Zur Linden was one of the first examples. Although the Ratio takes as its starting-point the rules of logical hermeneutics, it is based in an evaluation of the themes of classical rhetoric, and conceives hermeneutics as a technique, grounded in means-end rationality, the task of which is to determine the best method for understanding texts and speech. Zur Linden’s sacred hermeneutic theory is distinguished by at least four innovative aspects: 1. The proposal of a general hermeneutics of a probabilistic type. 2. An intensive examination of the different concepts of sense and their interrelationships. 3. The critique of better understanding as the goal of exegesis. The critical points of the text should not be obliterated in favour of its consistency. 4. The possible lack of agreement between what the author intends to say and what he actually says. For Zur Linden the sense of the text takes undoubted precedence and constitutes the only possible access to the author’s sense. His author-related textual hermeneutics can still be seen today as an original and noteworthy achievement. (shrink)

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a ratio-scale and a unique and constant biasing factor. This factor may favor or disfavor the preference for an object over another. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its value is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it (...) may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater value to be preferred. In this manner, the biasing factor reflects the extent to which preferences may depart from a maximization process. (shrink)

An analysis of ms Vat. Lat. 781 reveals ratio and limppiditas as two key notions in Albert the Great's teaching on the possibility of knowing God.

The book is dedicated to the theoretical problems concerning ratio legis. In the contexts of legal interpretation and legal reasoning, the two most important intellectual tools employed by lawyers, ratio legis would seem to offer an extremely powerful argument. Declaring the ratio legis of a statute can lead to a u-turn argumentation throughout the lifespan of the statute itself – in parliament, or in practice during court sessions, when it is tested against the constitution. Though the (...) class='Hi'>ratio legis argument is widely used, much about it warrants further investigation. On the general philosophical map there are many overlapping areas that concern different approaches to human rationality and to the problems of practical reasoning. Particular problems with ratio legis arise in connection with different perspectives on legal philosophy and theory, especially in terms of the methods that lawyers use for legal interpretation and argumentation. These problems can be further subdivided into particular aspects of activities undertaken by lawyers and officials who use the ratio legis in their work, and the underlying theories. In short, this book examines what ratio legis is, what it could be, and its practical implications. (shrink)

Throughout Anselm’s writings one can trace what seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in his treatment of reason (ratio), understanding (intelligere) andthought (cogitare). The Monologion begins by proposing that even an unbeliever can convince himself of truths about God, “simply by reason alone,” while in theProslogion Anselm claims, to the contrary, “I believe so that I may understand.” Much of this confusion can be resolved by clarifying Anselm’s distinctions betweenreason, understanding and thought. Thought follows reason, but reason can surpass (...) understanding; one need not understand a conclusion reached through reason. Ultimately, one must understand what God is—‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought’—in order to prove through reason that one cannot think of God as non-existent, but the deeper understanding that God exists must come, not from reason, but through God’s illumination of one’s soul. (shrink)

A close reading of the five mathematical studies Socrates proposes for the philosopher-to-be in Republic VII, arguing that (1) each study proposes an object the thought of which turns the soul towards pure intelligibility and that (2) the sequence of studies involves both a departure from the sensible and a return to it in its intelligible structure.

Throughout Anselm’s writings one can trace what seems to be a paradoxical inconsistency in his treatment of reason (ratio), understanding (intelligere) andthought (cogitare). The Monologion begins by proposing that even an unbeliever can convince himself of truths about God, “simply by reason alone,” while in theProslogion Anselm claims, to the contrary, “I believe so that I may understand.” Much of this confusion can be resolved by clarifying Anselm’s distinctions betweenreason, understanding and thought. Thought follows reason, but reason can surpass (...) understanding; one need not understand a conclusion reached through reason. Ultimately, one must understand what God is—‘that-than-which-a-greater-cannotbe-thought’—in order to prove through reason that one cannot think of God as non-existent, but the deeper understanding that God exists must come, not from reason, but through God’s illumination of one’s soul. (shrink)

This paper addresses the question, which sex ratio will evolve in a population that is subject to mutation and drift. The problem is analyzed using a simulation model as well as analytical methods. A detailed simulation model for the evolution of a population's allele distribution shows that for the sex ratio game a wide spectrum of different population states may evolve from on the one hand a monomorphic state with one predominant allele and with all other alleles suppressed (...) by the forces of selection, to on the other hand a polymorphism determined by recurrent mutations. Which of these states will evolve depends on the population size, the mating system and the rate of mutations. For the sex ratio game the evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS), as defined by evolutionary game theory, can only predict the population sex ratio but not the underlying stable population state. A comparison of different approaches to the problem shows that false predictions of the stable population states might result from two simplifying assumptions that are fairly common in evolutionary biology:a) it is assumed that mutations are rare events and there is never more than one mutant gene present in a population at any one time; b) a deterministic relationship is assumed between the fitness assigned to an individual's strategy and the individual's contribution to the gene pool of future generations. (shrink)

In the face of growing skepticism and relativism, “believe in reason” is the central message in Pope John Paul II’s Fides et Ratio. Only by the two wings of reason and faith together can the human spirit soar. The current work, Ratio et Fides, is its philosophical counterpart. It is not a watered-down introduction but a “leading-into” the heart of philosophic thinking. Firmly rooted in the phenomenological description of an ordinary artifact, a mailbox, the book uses the principles (...) involved in the description to examine key figures in the history of thought. We focus on three areas: the Soul, Morality, and God. We consider seven thinkers. Plato and Aristotle, who founded the tradition, were taken up by Augustine and Aquinas in developing their theologies. Descartes launched the distinctively modern tradition, culminating in Hegel’s systematic presentation of the whole Western tradition, philosophical and religious. More recently, Heidegger approached that tradition in terms of its hidden ground in the Mystery of Being, recalling us to meditative thinking as the secular counterpart to prayer. Armed with this background, students will be able to approach with profit the Fathers of the Church and major theologians and philosophers, past and recent. (shrink)

The western consensus is that obese women are considered attractive by Afro-Americans and by many societies from nonwestern developing countries. This belief rests mainly on results of nonstandardized surveys dealing only with body weight and size, ignoring body fat distribution. The anatomical distribution of female body fat as measured by the ratio of waist to hip circumference (WHR) is related to reproductive age, fertility, and risk for various major diseases and thus might play a role in judgment of attractiveness. (...) Previous research (Singh 1993a, 1993b) has shown that in the United States Caucasian men and women judge female figures with feminine WHRs as attractive and healthy. To investigate whether young Indonesian and Afro-American men and women rate such figures similarly, female figures representing three body sizes (underweight, normal weight, and overweight) and four WHRs (two feminine and two masculine) were used. Results show that neither Indonesian nor Afro-American subjects judge overweight figures as attractive and healthy regardless of the size of WHR. They judged normal weight figures with feminine WHRs as most attractive, healthy, and youthful. The consensus on women’s attractiveness among Indonesian, Afro-American, and U.S. Caucasian male and female subjects suggests that various cultural groups have similar criteria for judging the ideal woman’s shape. (shrink)