Explains the concept of legal competence (or power). This book then discusses the analysis and definition of legal concepts in general; the relation between the concept of competence and (in)validity; what it means to exercise competence; different types of competence; and competence norms.

In this article, I argue,inter alia, that Kelsen’s mature view—as expressed in, and around the time of, the second edition ofReine Rechtslehre—was that of a metaethical relativist, and that the commitment to metaethical relativism was the reason why Kelsen defended democracy as well as tolerance in the shape of a constitutionally guaranteed freedom of thought. I also consider the possibility that in his post‐1960 phase Kelsen abandoned metaethical relativism for moral fictionalism, but argue that, on the whole, a relativist interpretation (...) of Kelsen’s late legal philosophy is to be preferred to a fictionalist interpretation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe aim of this article is to see whether we can account for the normativity of law within the framework of legal positivism and whether the idea of a social convention could be of help in this endeavour. I argue, inter alia, that we should distinguish between the problem of accounting for the normativity of law, conceived as a necessary property of law, and the problem of accounting for the use of normative legal language on the part of legal actors; (...) that the debate about the normativity of law, which mainly concerns, is more or less identical to the debate between legal positivists and non-positivists; that one cannot account for the normativity of law, conceived along the lines of, within the framework of legal positivism, and that the question of the normativity of law considered within the framework of legal positivism is not an open question. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss Alf Ross's claim that the concept of a legal right is best understood as a technical tool of presentation, which ties together a disjunction of operative facts and a conjunction of legal consequences, and that rights statements render the content of a number of legal norms in a convenient manner. I argue that while Ross's analysis is appealing, it is problematic in at least three respects. I also argue, however, that despite these difficulties Ross's analysis (...) deserves our continued attention, because the fundamental idea—that the concept of a legal right must be understood functionally—is sound. (shrink)

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study (...) of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence . I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law . I proceed to argue that legal decision‐making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision‐making thus conceived . Having done that, I discuss law's normativity , the normative force of legal justification , and the relation between the former and the latter . I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz’ understanding of the question of law's normativity. (shrink)

I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and (...) the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy. (shrink)

This book offers a critical appraisal of Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy. Based on Olivecrona's critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, the book argues that Olivecrona's legal philosophy is a unique contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. It shows how Olivecrona's philosophy can be used in the assessment of contemporary theories of law, such as those put (...) forward by Hart, Raz, Dworkin, and Alexy. In addition, the book argues that Olivecrona's various discussions of theories defended by key people in the history of legal and political philosophy are highly interesting contributions. They not only increase our understanding of the legal and political philosophy of previous generations, but also enhances our insight into legal-philosophical questions that remain with us today. (shrink)

Although the Common Law model of precedent and the Civil Law model of precedent differ in certain respects, they are also similar in important respects. In this chapter, I discuss the question of whether the common core of these models, which I call the shared view, can be squared with a theory called reasons holism. I argue (1) that if the usual reasons for following precedent are genuine, then any of these reasons may favor following precedent in some situations, but (...) not in others, and that this threatens the shared view. I also argue, however, (2) that we may coherently conceive of these reasons as conventional reasons, and that therefore the shared view will not be threatened. Moreover, I argue (3) that if ordinary legal reasons are genuine, the ratio decidendi of a precedent cannot be a genuine general norm, that following precedent can therefore not be understood as action in keeping with such a norm, and (4) that no alternative analysis of the ratio in terms of legal rules of thumb, or supervenience likeness, can solve these problems. I also argue, however, (5) that the shared view can nevertheless be defended, because the theory of reasons holism is actually rather problematic, and because even if this were not so, legal positivists could still defend the shared view, on the grounds that legal reasons are merely conventional reasons. (shrink)

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non-cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti-metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non-cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the (...) nature of law. I argue that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, that the objection to non-naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values and the world of time and space—is convincing, and that Kelsen's introduction of a so-called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms. (shrink)

The Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona did not pay much attention to questions of legal reasoning in his many works. He did, however, argue that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explained, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Olivecrona's line of argument is problematic, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term "evaluation" in a sense that is broad enough (...) to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide whether a case is false. (shrink)

The Scandinavian Realist Karl Olivecrona did not pay much attention to questions of legal reasoning in his many works. He did, however, argue that courts necessarily create law when deciding a case. The reason, he explained, is that judges must evaluate issues of fact or law in order to decide a case, and that evaluations are not objective. Olivecrona's line of argument is problematic, however. The problem is that Olivecrona uses the term “evaluation” in a sense that is broad enough (...) to cover not only evaluations, including moral evaluations, but also considerations that are not evaluations at all, and therefore his claim that judges must evaluate issues of law or fact in order to decide whether a case is false. (shrink)

Legal realism comes in two main versions, namely American legal realism and Scandinavian legal realism. In this article, I shall be concerned with the Scandinavian realists, who were naturalists and non-cognitivists, and who maintained that conceptual analysis is a central task of legal philosophers, and that such analysis must proceed in a naturalist, anti-metaphysical spirit. Specifically, I want to consider the commitment to ontological naturalism and non-cognitivism on the part of the Scandinavians and its implications for their view of the (...) nature of law. I argue that the Scandinavians differ from legal positivists in that they reject the idea that there are legal relations, that is, legal entities and properties, and to varying degrees defend the view that law is a matter of human behavior rather than legal norms, and that they do not and cannot accept the idea that there is a ‘world of the ought’ in Kelsen's sense. I also argue, more specifically, that the objection to non-naturalist theories raised by the Scandinavians—that there is and can be no connection between the higher realm of norms and values and the world of time and space—is convincing, and that Kelsen's introduction of a so-called modally indifferent substrate does nothing to undermine this objection. In addition, I argue that the Scandinavians can account for the existence of legal relations that do not presuppose the existence of morally binding legal norms by embracing conventionalism about the existence of the sources of law, while pointing out that in doing so they would also be abandoning their legal realism for legal positivism. Finally, I argue that the implications for legal scholarship of the realist emphasis on human behavior instead of legal norms is not well explained by the realists and appear to amount to little more than a preference for teleological interpretation of legal norms. (shrink)

In his new book, The Force of Law, Frederick Schauer maintains that law has no necessary properties, and that therefore jurisprudents should not assume that an inquiry into the nature of law has to be a search for such properties. I argue, however, that Schauer's attempt to show that legal anti-essentialism is a defensible position fails, because his one main argument is either irrelevant or else incomplete, depending on how one understands it, and because the other main argument is false.

In my view, the moral case for giving animals legal protection is strong. This is so whether or not we think of animals as having moral rights, such as a right to be cared for, or at least a right not to be harmed, because even if animals do not have moral rights, humans have moral duties toward animals, such as a general duty not to harm animals, say, by performing experiments on them, or raising them for food, or having (...) them perform tricks to amuse tourists. The question I wish to consider in this article, however, is not what moral rights animals have, or even what our moral duties to animals are, but whether we have reason to think of animal law not only as imposing legal duties on humans, but also as conferring legal rights on animals. This is not a moral question, but a question about how to conceptualize legal positions, and the arguments in favor of or against competing conceptualizations should be of a theoretical nature. Although the focus of legal scholars is only rarely on conceptual questions, such questions are nevertheless important. For having a reasonably thought-out view of the structure, content, and applicability of relevant legal concepts will be conducive to clear legal thinking, and clear legal thinking in turn is conducive not only to correct legal thinking, but also to efficiency. I shall argue that while there are good moral reasons to impose legal duties on humans regarding the treatment of animals, there are good theoretical reasons not to think of animals as legal right-holders, because doing so would either be pointless, on the interest-theory analysis, or else incoherent, on the will-theory analysis. On route to this conclusion, I shall also argue that in the field of law, the method of explication is in many cases, including the elucidation of the concept of a legal right, preferable to conceptual analysis, strictly conceived; that we should think of legal rights as complexes of Hohfeld-elements and distinguish accordingly between claim-rights, liberty-rights, power-rights, and immunity-rights; that when discussing animal rights we should focus on claim-rights; and, finally, that an explication of the concept of a legal right along the lines of the will-theory of legal rights is preferable to an explication along the lines of the interest-theory. (shrink)

Kelsen defends monism, that is, the view that international law and the various state legal systems taken together constitute a unified normative system, and the primacy of international law over state law within the monistic framework. He argues in support of the -claim that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, according to which cognition requires the unity of the object of cognition, that the norm conflicts that are said by the critics of monism to undermine monism are harmless (...) because they are not norm contradictions, but only norm contrarieties, and that the doctrine of dualism collapses into solipsism due to its dependence on the doctrine of recognition. And he argues in support of the -claim that the idea of the primacy of international law within the monistic framework is necessary to account for the existence of states that are legally coordinated and separated from one another in their spheres of validity. In this article, I discuss critically claims and and the arguments - that Kelsen adduces in support of these claims. I argue, more specifically, that while Kelsen is right that only monism is compatible with the epistemological postulate, the claim is unpersuasive that norm contrarieties, as distinguished from norm contradictions, are harmless from the point of view of this postulate, and that in any case not all the norm conflicts identified by the critics of monism are norm contrarieties. I also argue that if the above-mentioned claim had been persuasive, the dualists, too, might have invoked it and avoided Kelsen’s criticism of dualism via the criticism of the doctrine of recognition, and that Kelsen’s claim is well founded that dualism collapses into solipsism because of the collapse of the doctrine of recognition. Finally, I suggest that contrary to what Kelsen appears to think, the epistemological postulate rules out locating law in a higher realm of norms and values that is sharply separated from the world of time and space. (shrink)

In this short paper, I argue that legal philosophers ought to focus more than they have done so far on problems of legal reasoning. Not only is this a field with many philosophically interesting questions to consider, but it is also, in my estimation, the field in which legal philosophers can contribute the most to both the study and the practice of law. For even though reasoning and interpretation are at the center of what legal practitioners and legal scholars do, (...) neither legal practitioners nor legal scholars reason with the same care and precision as philosophers do. Against this background, I suggest that the following three types of questions regarding legal reasoning are especially worthy of serious consideration. The first is that of the possible relevance of the theory of reasons holism to legal reasoning in general. The second is the question of how to analyze legal statements in a way that does not undermine the rationality of legal reasoning. And the third is the question of whether legal arguments are to be understood as deductive arguments, or as inductive arguments, or both, and if so how. (shrink)

Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the (...) argument from injustice, for the status of Alexy's inquiry. (shrink)

Relativistic theories and arguments are fairly common in legal thinking. A case in point is Stanley Fish's theory of interpretation, which applies to statutes and constitutions as well as to novels and poems. Fish holds, inter alia, (i) that an interpretation of a statute, a poem, or some other text can be true or valid only in light of the interpretive strategies that define an interpretive community, and (ii) that no set of interpretive strategies (and therefore no interpretation) is truer (...) or more valid than any other. In this article, I discuss these claims critically and argue that the very idea of an interpretive community is more or less unintelligible, and that in any case Fish's theory is self-refuting. I begin with a few words about the methods and techniques of statutory interpretation(Section 2). I proceed by introducing Fish's theory of interpretation, giving special consideration to some difficulties in Fish's account of the concept of an interpretive community (Sections 3-4). I then introduce two types of relativism, cognitive and moral (Section 5), and argue that Fish's theory asserts cognitive relativism in the shape of conceptual relativism and relativism about truth (Section 6). Having done that, I consider Donald Davidson's well-known objection to alternative conceptual schemes (Section 7) as well as the popular charge that relativism about truth is self-refuting (Section 8). (shrink)

Joseph Raz defends the authoritative intention thesis, which has it that to the extent that law derives from deliberate law-making, its interpretation should reflect the intention of the law-maker. The idea is that as a matter of conceptual necessity, if one follows legislation, then one interprets the relevant piece of legislation in such a way that it reflects the intention of the law-maker. Raz’s position, then, is that legal content (as well as form) that is the result of deliberate law-making (...) is necessarily communicated content. While I find the authoritative intention thesis appealing, I do not find the arguments that Raz adduces in support of the thesis persuasive. Raz adduces two main arguments in support of the thesis, which I shall refer to as the no-prediction argument and the argument from authority, as well as a third, highly condensed argument, which he mentions in passing in a discussion of another question; and all three arguments involve the assumption that as a matter of conceptual necessity, law aims to function as an authority, and the claims that legal directives that are not interpreted in accordance with the law-maker’s intention, will, strictly speaking, not be the law-maker’s directives, and that this in turn means that the law-maker cannot be in control of the process of legislation and can consequently not function as an authority. As I try to show, all three arguments fail, though in different ways. (shrink)

Legal positivism is one of the fundamental theories of jurisprudence studied in law and related fields around the world. This volume addresses how legal positivism is perceived and makes the case for why it is relevant for contemporary legal theory. The Cambridge Companion to Legal Positivism offers thirty-three chapters from leading scholars that provide a comprehensive commentary on the fundamental ideas of legal positivism, its history and major theorists, its connection to normativity and values, its current development and influence, as (...) well as on the criticisms moved against it. (shrink)

Offers analysis of MacCormick's positivistic account of legal reasoning, partially in response to Dworkin's claim that positivism is inadequate as a theory of law because it cannot account for the nature of legal reasoning. Having analyzed MacCormick's theory and having applied it to some cases, we are now ready to evaluate it. My conclusion is that inmany cases MacCormick's theory can indeed give the judge the kind of concrete guidance he needs when with a hard case. The reason why MacCormick's (...) theory is successful in this regard is that it offers the judge a reasonably firm ranking of the interpretive arguments, and that it is rather easy to understand and apply. The former circumstance is of course important - unless we rank the interpretive arguments, the theory simply will not be able to give the judge any guid ance at all. But the latter circumstance is also cause itmeans that judges will be able to apply the theory even be though they may lack a deep understanding of the relevant field of substantive law. Judges, as is well known, are usually gen eralists, not experts in any particular field. So unlike Ronald Dworkin's subtle and intriguing theory of adjudication,80 MacCormick's theory might actually be applied by real judges in any jurisdiction. This must be considered quite an advantage. To be sure, applying MacCormick's theory to a concrete case is not always easy. But the difficulties we have encountered in applying the theory have been difficulties that would create problems for any theory of legal reasoning. Moreover, with one these difficulties can be handled within the frame work of the theory as it stands. For example, the problem of choosing between a technical and an ordinary version of plain exception which we encountered in the Boxer case, can in most cases be solved by reference to the value that underlies the textual approach, namely predictability. The problem about intentionalist arguments, which we encountered in the case of the Statutory Share, can be solved by simply adding the cate gory of intentionalist arguments toMacCormick's typology of interpretive arguments, or perhaps by placing intentionalist arguments in the category of textual arguments.81 The problem of linguistic indeterminacy, however, which we encountered in theWeber ase, appears to be more or less impossible to solve. If and to the extent that the words that occur in the statute are vague or ambiguous - in their ordinary or in their technical meaning, or in both - the value of the textual approach is clearly reduced. The judge must then proceed to consider systemic and teleological arguments in that order. (shrink)