In the Statesman , Plato brings together--only to challenge and displace--his own crowning contributions to philosophical method, political theory, and drama. In his 1980 study, reprinted here, Mitchell Miller employs literary theory and conceptual analysis to expose the philosophical, political, and pedagogical conflict that is the underlying context of the dialogue, revealing that its chaotic variety of movements is actually a carefully harmonized act of realizing the mean. The original study left one question outstanding: what specifically, in the metaphysical order (...) of things, motivated the nameless Visitor from Elea to abandon bifurcation for his consummating non-bifurcatory division of fifteen kinds at the end of the dialogue? Miller addressed in a separate essay, first published in 1999 and reprinted here. In it, he opens the horizon of interpretation to include the new metaphysics of the Parmenides , the Philebus , and the "unwritten teachings." "This study demonstrates how the Statesman is the culminating expression of Plato's lifelong effort, both in Athens and in the Academy, to bring metaphysical insight to the unending political crisis of his times."The Philosopher in Plato's Statesman a trail-blazing work. While not every reader will agree with the lessons Miller himself draws from this approach, none should fail to be impressed by its interpretive power. All this is exciting stuff. The interpretive pathway on which Miller has embarked has the potential for changing the face of scholarship on the late Platonic dialogues. Parmenides [Publishing] is to be commended for making these two important contributions available under a single cover." -- Kenneth Sayre, Professor of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame "Miller casts considerable light on virtually every aspect of the dialogue. . . . All in all, this book is an outstanding contribution to our understanding of the Statesman." -- Stanley Rosen, Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy, Boston University MITCHELL MILLER is Professor of Philosophy at Vassar College. He is the author of Plato's Parmenides. (shrink)

The Parmenides is arguably the pivotal text for understanding the Platonic corpus as a whole. I offer a critical analysis that takes as its key the closely constructed dramatic context and mimetic irony of the dialogue. Read with these in view, the contradictory characterizations of the "one" in the hypotheses dissolve and reform as stages in a systematic response to the objections that Parmenides earlier posed to the young Socrates' notions of forms and participation, potentially liberating Socrates from his dependence (...) on sensible simile and yielding a distinctively conceptual articulation of the difference and relation of forms and their sensible participants. The dialogue as a whole thereby functions as the means for the "conversion" of the soul to eidetic being for which Plato has the elder Socrates call in Republic VII. (shrink)

At Sophist 253d-e the Eleatic Visitor offers a notoriously obscure description of the fields of one-and-many that the dialectician “adequately discerns.” Against the readings of Stenzel, Cornford, Sayre, and Gomez-Lobo, I propose an interpretation of that passage that takes into account the trilogy of Theaetetus-Sophist-Statesman as its context. The key steps are to respond to the irony of Socrates’ refutations at the end of the Theaetetus by reinterpreting the last two senses of logos as directed to forms and to recognize (...) their correlation with the two different modes of diairesis practiced by the Eleatic Visitor. These steps position us to recognize in the Visitor’s remarks at Sophist 253d-e a schematic description of the two kinds of eidetic field that the two modes of diairesis trace. (shrink)

At 435c-d and 504b ff., Socrates indicates that there is a "longer and fuller way" that one must take in order to get "the best possible view" of the soul and its virtues. But Plato does not have him take this "longer way." Instead Socrates restricts himself to an indirect indication of its goals by his images of sun, line, and cave and to a programmatic outline of its first phase, the five mathematical studies. Doesn't this pointed restraint function as (...) a provocation, moving us to want to begin the "longer way" and to make use of its conceptual resources to rethink Socrates' images? I begin by finding a double movement in the complex trajectory of the five studies: they both guide the soul in the "turn away from what is coming to be ... [to] what is" (518c) and, at the same time, lead the soul back, albeit in the medium of pure intelligibility, to the sensible world; for the pure figures and ratios that they disclose constitute the core structures of sensible things. I then draw on what Socrates says about geometry and harmonics to address three fundamental questions that he leaves open: the nature of the Good in its responsibility for truth and for the being of the forms; the relations of forms, mathematicals, and sensibles as these are disclosed by dialectic; and the bearing of the philosopher's discovery of the Good on his disposition towards his community and the task of ruling. I close by marking six sets of further questions that these reflections bequeath for dialogues to come. (shrink)

A close reading of the Crito, with a focus on irony in Socrates' speech by the Laws and on the way this allows Socrates to chart a mean course between Crito's self-destructive resistance to the rule of Athenian law and Socrates' own philosophical reservations about its ethical limitations.

A close reading of the poem of Parmenides, with focal attention to the way the proem situates Parmenides' insight in relation to Hesiod and Anaximander and provides the context for the thought of "... is". I identify three pointed ambiguities, in the direction of the journey to the gates of the ways of Night and Day, in the way the gates swing open before the waiting traveler, and in the character of the "chasm" that their opening makes, and I suggest (...) ways in which these ambiguities at once complicate and determine the significance of the thought of "... is" and its implications for the status of the opinions of mortals. (shrink)

Reflections on the linkage between and the provocative force of problems in the analogy of city and soul, in the simile-bound characterization of the Good, and in the performative tension between what Plato has Socrates say about the philosopher's disinclination to descend into the city and what he has Socrates do in descending into the Piraeus to teach, with a closing recognition of the analogy between Socratic teaching and Platonic writing.

A two-fold study, on the one hand of the thought-provoking mimesis by which Plato gives his hearer an occasion for self-knowledge and self-transcendence and of the typical sequential structure, an appropriation of the trajectory of the poem of Parmenides, by which Plato orders the drama of inquiry, and on the other hand a commentary on the Crito that aims to show concretely how these elements — mimesis and Parmenidean structure — work together to give the dialogues their exceptional elicitative power.

A close reading of Socrates' refutation of the final proposed definition of knowledge, "true opinion with an account." I examine the provocations to further thinking Socrates poses with his dilemma of simplicity and complexity and then by his rejections of the three senses of "account," and I argue that these provocations guide the responsive reader to that rich and determinate understanding of the sort of 'object' which knowledge requires that the Parmenides and the Eleatic dialogues will go on to explicate.

A close reading of Socrates’ arguments against the proposed definition of knowledge as true opinion together with a logos (“account”). I examine the orienting implications of his apparently destructive dilemma defeating the so-called dream theory and of his apparently decisive arguments rejecting the notions of “account” as verbalization, as working through the parts of the whole of the definiendum, and as identifying what differentiates the definiendum from all else. Whereas the dilemma implies of the object of knowledge that it must (...) be both simple and complex, the last two notions of “account” point to the kinds of discursive analysis that can do justice to its complexity; together the refutations suggest the relation between noesis, that is, eidetic intuition of the object in its simplicity, and discursive analysis of the object in its complexity that knowledge requires. (shrink)

An effort to track the movement of thought in the proem of the poem in order to discover in it the context for the disclosure of the "is" in fr. s 2 and 8. Close attention to symbolic imagery and historical allusions, and to the philosophical power of the unthinkable "nothing". (For a renewed and expanded effort, see the author's "Ambiguity and Transport: Reflections on the Proem to Parmenides' Poem," Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy xxx [2006], 1-47.).

A close reading of the poem of Parmenides, with focal attention to the way the proem situates Parmenides' insight in relation to Hesiod and Anaximander and provides the context for the thought of "... is". I identify three pointed ambiguities, in the direction of the journey to the gates of the ways of Night and Day, in the way the gates swing open before the waiting traveler, and in the character of the "chasm" that their opening makes, and I suggest (...) ways in which these ambiguities at once complicate and determine the significance of the thought of "... is" and its implications for the status of the opinions of mortals. (shrink)

A close reading of the dilemmatic argument and of the discussions of the three senses of logos by which Socrates appears to refute the proposal that knowledge is true judgment together with a logos. I argue that the determinateness of each of Socrates' arguments implies further lines of thought for the reader and that these lead to an understanding of the relations of intuition and discourse in inquiry and of the compossible simplicity and complexity of the object of knowledge. These (...) lines of thought find their home, as it were, in the critical turn to the conception of forms in the Parmenides and in the practice of dialectic in the Sophist and the Statesman. (shrink)

At Apology 33c Socrates explains that "some people enjoy … my company" because "they … enjoy hearing those questioned who think they are wise but are not." At Philebus 48a-50b he makes central to his account of the pleasure of laughing at comedy the exposé of the self-ignorance of those who presume themselves wise. Does the latter passage explain the pleasure of watching Socrates at work? I explore this by tracing the admixture of pain, the causes, and the "natural harmony" (...) that Socrates' general account of pleasure implies for laughing at comedy. These reflections precipitate an aporia about the moral effect of Socrates' elenchtic practice. I suggest a path through the aporia that keys from Socrates' notion of "human wisdom" and the distinctive structure Plato gives the dialogues. (shrink)

A short review of Coxon's study of the fragments of Parmenides.

A study of the significance of Plato's resumption of the simile of model and likeness in the Timaeus, with attention to the place of the Timaeus in the "longer way" that Plato has Socrates announce in the Republic. The reader embarked on the "longer way," I argue, will find in the accounts of the elements and of the kinds of animals unannounced but detailed exhibitions of the "god-given" method of dialectic that Plato has Socrates announce in the Philebus.

Dmitri Nikulin extends his earlier study of oral dialogue (On Dialogue [Lexington, 2006]) to an investigation of dialectic, moving from a narrative of its development in Plato and the history of philosophy (ch.s 1-3) through a renewed phenomenological account of oral dialogue (ch.s 4-5) to a critique, from the perspective of oral dialogue, of the limitations of written dialectic (ch. 6). I take up some of the provocations of his bold and open-ended argument. Does his own “writing against writing” constitute (...) a performative contradiction, and if so, does this attest his critique of the limitations of dialectic or exhibit, in the elicitative force of its irony, the transcending of these limitations? How, if at all, may we reconcile Nikulin’s radical claim that oral dialogue is the very mode of being human with the drive of the turn to written dialectic to understand being itself and its relation to being human? Just insofar as the virtues distinctive of written dialectic — above all, precision, systematic elaboration, and universality — move the philosopher to suspend oral dialogue in its essential attention to a particular other and to the “who” that one emerges as for this other, may this very suspension also constitute a phase within ongoing oral dialogue? Are the last words of the “(Dialectical) Conclusion” with which Nikulin paradoxically closes his critique of dialectic really just the opening words of a conversation that the attentive reader’s very being moves him to pursue? (shrink)

A commentary on the Symposium as a challenge and a gift to Athens. I begin with a reflection on three dates: 416 bce, the date of Agathon’s victory party, c. 400, the approximate date of Apollodorus’ retelling of the party, and c. 375, the approximate date of the ‘publication’ of the dialogue, and I argue that Plato reminds his contemporary Athens both of its great poetic and legal and scientific traditions and of the historical fact that the way late fourth (...) century Athens appropriated them in some way led to the city’s demise at the turn of the century; thus the dialogue is Plato’s challenge to his contemporary Athens to recognize and overcome its flawed relation to its cultural resources. Heard in this way, the key moments are Aristophanes’ implied critique of Pausanias and Eryximachus and Socrates’ implied critique of Aristophanes and Agathon. Proceeding by a close reading, I argue that Plato exposes, for those moved to rise to his challenge, the failure of his great predecessors to conceive the divine in a way that, worthy of the height and otherness divinity requires, can provide substantive orientation for the burgeoning new reason that animates the city’s culture. (shrink)

A close reading of the five mathematical studies Socrates proposes for the philosopher-to-be in Republic VII, arguing that (1) each study proposes an object the thought of which turns the soul towards pure intelligibility and that (2) the sequence of studies involves both a departure from the sensible and a return to it in its intelligible structure.

At 287c of the Statesman the Eleatic Visitor — or, more deeply, Plato — faces a daunting task. Because statesmanship has been shown to collaborate with “countless” other arts that share with it the work of “caring” for the city, to understand statesmanship requires distinguishing these arts into an intelligible set of kinds and recognizing how these might go together. Accordingly, the Visitor abandons the mode of division he has practiced without exception up until this moment, bifurcation or “halving,” and (...) offers, instead, a sorting of the arts into fifteen kinds of work. How was Plato able to get his bearings towards the heterogeneous multiplicity of the arts in order to do this sorting? In this paper I suggest that he may have found a paradigm in the double octave matrix of notes from which, according to contemporary musical theory, the seven musical “modes” are drawn. To show the plausibility of this suggestion, I first reconstruct the double octave matrix, which was later to be called the Greater Perfect System, and then show a striking series of points of substantive and structural analogy that hold between this matrix and the Visitor’s division of the arts into fifteen kinds. (shrink)

The early Presocratics’ major speculative and critical initiatives—in particular, Anaximander’s conceptions of the justice of the cosmos and of the apeiron as its archē and Xenophanes’s polemics against immorality and anthropomorphism in the depiction of the gods and against any claim to divine inspiration—appear to break with Hesiod’s form of thought. But the conceptual, critical, and ethical depth of Hesiod’s own rethinking of the lore that he inherits complicates this picture. Close examination of each of their major initiatives together with (...) the relevant passages in Hesiod shows that even in the course of departing from his thought, Anaximander and Xenophanes also reappropriate and renew it. In a postscript I pose some questions for future inquiry into Heraclitus’s and Parmenides’s receptions of Hesiod. (shrink)

The essays in this collection, though ranging in their keys from the teacherly to the scholarly, are united by their search for the deepest questions Plato gives us. The title essay on the Republic is a paradigm case, exploring with a mix of speculative daring and Socratic pleasure in aporia the ring structure of the dialogue, the emergent perspective of a "knowing soul," dianoetic eikasia, and the implicit presence of the One and the Dyad in the metaphysical figures of the (...) central books. See also, especially, the two essays on the Phaedo's legacy of questions and the Minotaurs that threaten it. (shrink)

An examination on the one hand of Aristotle's report in Metaphysics A6 of Plato's teachings regarding the One, the dyad of the Great and the Small, and mathematical intermediates and on the other hand of key passages in Plato's Parmenides. I argue that we can find in those passages exhibitions of the teachings Aristotle reports and that these exhibitions help us to understand those teachings.

A close exegesis of the principles of the so-called "god-given method" of dialectic in the Philebus (16bff., 23cff.) and an account of the division of the fifteen kinds of art that "care" for the well-formed city in the Statesman (287bff., 303cff.). I show how this division conforms to and, so, illustrates the "god-given method.".

Dmitri Nikulin extends his earlier study of oral dialogue (On Dialogue [Lexington, 2006]) to an investigation of dialectic, moving from a narrative of its development in Plato and the history of philosophy (ch.s 1-3) through a renewed phenomenological account of oral dialogue (ch.s 4-5) to a critique, from the perspective of oral dialogue, of the limitations of written dialectic (ch. 6). I take up some of the provocations of his bold and open-ended argument. Does his own “writing against writing” constitute (...) a performative contradiction, and if so, does this attest his critique of the limitations of dialectic or exhibit, in the elicitative force of its irony, the transcending of these limitations? How, if at all, may we reconcile Nikulin’s radical claim that oral dialogue is the very mode of being human with the drive of the turn to written dialectic to understand being itself and its relation to being human? Just insofar as the virtues distinctive of written dialectic — above all, precision, systematic elaboration, and universality — move the philosopher to suspend oral dialogue in its essential attention to a particular other and to the “who” that one emerges as for this other, may this very suspension also constitute a phase within ongoing oral dialogue? Are the last words of the “(Dialectical) Conclusion” with which Nikulin paradoxically closes his critique of dialectic really just the opening words of a conversation that the attentive reader’s very being will move him to pursue? (shrink)

A close reading of the final chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, with special attention to phenomenological method, to the structure of overcomings and preservations that makes for the integrated totality of the ascent to the absolute, to the determinate negations that bind ch.s 6c on Objective Spirit and 7c on Revealed Religion to one another and to ch. 8 on Absolute Spirit, and to the relations of the absolute standpoint to time and to history.

At Republic 435c-d and again at 504b-e, Plato has Socrates object to the city/soul analogy and declare that a “longer way” is necessary for gaining a more “exact grasp” of the soul. I argue that it is in the Philebus, in Socrates’ presentation of the “god-given” method of dialectic and in his distinctions of the kinds of pleasure and knowledge, that Plato offers the resources for reaching this alternative account. To show this, I explore (1) the limitations of the tripartition (...) of the soul that Socrates’ own objections in the Republic suggest, (2) the route of the “longer way” through the Eleatic dialogues to the Philebus, (3) the procedures that constitute the “god-given” method and the structure of the eidetic field it discloses, and (4) the resources that, considered in light of the method, Socrates’ distinctions of the kinds of pleasure and knowledge provide for the more “exact grasp” of the soul. (shrink)

A close reading of the final chapter of Hegel's Phenomenology, with special attention to dialectical method, to the relation of ch.s 6c on Objective Spirit and 7c on Revealed Religion to ch. 8 on Absolute Spirit, and to the relations of the absolute standpoint to time and to history.

A close examination of the implicit logic that guides Hesiod's account of the genesis of the cosmos in the Theogony 116-133, with special attention to his choice of Chaos as the first born and to the logical relations between opposites and between whole and parts as these emerge within, as the structuring principles of, Hesiod's ordering of the births of cosmic elements.

Sayre finds deep connections between collection and division, the two kinds of measure distinguished in the Statesman, the conceptions of Limit and Unlimited in the Philebus, and the Dyad that Aristotle reports was a key principle in the "unwritten teachings." The Stranger's dialectical account of statesmanship practices due measure; by "cutting down the middle," the Stranger shows how Forms — understood as Limits as, in turn, "numbers in the sense of measures" — "mark off a middle ground between [the] extremes (...) [implied by] the Unlimited" and, thus, preserve the mean. I suggest a number of critical reconfigurations of these seminal insights. (shrink)

In his “Noesis and Logos in the Eleatic Trilogy, with a Focus on the Visitor’s Jokes at Statesman 266a-d,” Mitchell Miller explores the interplay of intuition and discourse in the Statesman. He prepares by considering the orienting provocations provided by Socrates’ refutations of the proposed definition of knowledge — namely, “true judgment and a logos” — in the closing pages of the Theaetetus, by the Eleatic Visitor’s obscure schematization at Sophist 253d-e of the kinds of eidetic field discerned by dialectic, (...) and by his discussion at Statesman 277a-278e of the use of paradigms. Miller then seeks to show how the Visitor’s odd medley of geometrical and Homeric jokes at Statesman 266a-d aims, in the language of the Seventh Letter, to “spark” an intuition of the nature of statesmanship, an intuition whose “self-nourishing” motivates the subsequent rejection of the initial definition of the statesman as shepherd of the human herd, the turn to the paradigm of the weaver, and the rejection of bifurcatory division in favor of the non-bifurcatory account of the kinds of art that function as the “limbs” of a well-formed city. (shrink)

Must the interpreter of the Platonic dialogues choose between the so-called "unwritten teachings" reported by Aristotle in Metaphysics A6 and the dialogues? I argue, on the contrary, that a reading of the dialogues that is sensitive to their pedagogical irony will find the "unwritten teachings" exhibited in them. I identify the key teachings in Metaphysics A6, show how the Parmenides and the Philebus point to them, and explicate a full exhibition of them in the Statesman.

A appreciation and critical discussion of RE Allen's Plato's Parmenides. I argue that, contra Allen, the Parmenides is not an aporetic dialogue and that the eight hypotheses are not governed by the so-called "dilemma of participation." Rather, the apparent contradictions between and within the hypotheses function to elicit from the reader a distinction in kind between the sorts of one that forms, on the one hand, and their sensible participants, on the other, are and to illumine the 'relation' of participation.

A reflection intended to orient a reading of the Laws as a whole, with special attention to the range of philosophical issues included and excluded from the Athenian's reach, as this is indicated by the dramatic context, to the vision of the god as the measure of the laws that provides the centering goal of the Athenian's labors, and to the dialectical structure of the Athenian's address to the Magnesians.

Acknowledging with Professor Clay the important methodological principle that interpretation must begin within the dramatic horizon of each dialogue, I argue that there are analogies between discontinuities within single dialogues and discontinuities between certain dialogues. Recognizing this opens up the possibility of thinking of certain groups of dialogues as a series of fresh beginnings that lead the reader through different levels of understanding. I illustrate this idea by considering the unity of the Republic and the Parmenides.

In memoriam of Vernon Venable, American philosopher who for four decades was a master teacher in the history of Western philosophy, author of an important study of Marx, and the seminal spirit in the development and flourishing of the program in philosophy at Vassar College.

A close reading of the presentation of the method of dialectic at Philebus 16c-18d and, I argue, of its display in the account of the kinds of art necessary for a good city at Statesman 287c-290a and 303d-305e.

A close reading of the five mathematical studies Socrates proposes for the philosopher-to-be in Republic VII, arguing that (1) each study proposes an object the thought of which turns the soul towards pure intelligibility and that (2) the sequence of studies involves both a departure from the sensible and a return to it in its intelligible structure.

A review of Edward Halper's brilliant exegesis of the middle books of Aristotle's Metaphysics, in which he shows that Aristotle keys his search for the hierarchy of senses of being to his quest for the hierarchical array of the senses of unity.

A close reading of Theogony 116-133, showing the logic of opposites and of whole/part relations that governs Hesiod's account of cosmogenesis, refuting the traditional interpretation of the birth of Chaos as the split between heaven and earth, and providing evidence that Hesiod considered and decided against making Tartaros the parent of the cosmos.

A review of Drew Hyland's Questioning Platonism.

A review of Patricia Curd's Legacy of Parmenides, with a stress on her seminal recognition of the implications of his immediate successors' apparent acceptance of plurality within the unity of being.

A close study of Hesiod's understanding of the birth of Chaos as the beginning of the cosmos, in which I (1) show why this beginning is better interpreted as the differentiation of earth from Tartaros than as the splitting of earth from sky, (2) explicate the differentiation on three levels that structures the cosmos, and (3) reflect on the semantic and ethical implications that may have led Hesiod to this vision of the cosmos.

A close study of Hesiod's understanding of the birth of Chaos as the beginning of the cosmos, in which I (1) show why this beginning is better interpreted as the differentiation of earth from Tartaros than as the splitting of earth from sky, (2) explicate the differentiation on three levels that structures the cosmos, and (3) reflect on the semantic and ethical implications that may have led Hesiod to this vision of the cosmos.