U ratu se, prema Rozencvajgu, citava filozofija, tj.?idealizam?, pokazuje u svojoj lazi, odnosno, u svojoj neosnovanosti koja je istovremeno epistemoloska i egzistencijalna. Ta dvostruka pouka navodi ga da skicira konture jednog?novog misljenja? koje proizilazi iz loma univerzalne totalizacije svih partikularnosti. Taj lom se odvija kroz ponovno revitalizovani glas otpora singularnosti. Dakle, mora se preispitivati sta se kod Rozencvajga u Novom misljenju imenuje kao?sistem? Zvezde. Citajuci ovo remek-delo, a posebno njegov drugi deo, primecujemo dvostruku funkcionalnost Otkrovenja. Sa jedne strane, ono obasjava (...) celu knjigu, te citav?sistem? u izvesnom smislu, dakle, Ii IIdeo o Stvaranju, odnosno, o Izbavljenju. Sa druge strane, Otkrovenje rezultira suzenim, uskim smislom: ono obelodanjuje Stvaranje, takodje i obelodanjuje Izbavljenje, a ona sama se pokazuje kao?voljena dusa? u svom tragicnom ropstvu. U snaznijem ili sirem smislu, jedino Otkrovenje postoji, koje se tice stvaralacke proslosti i izbavljajuce buducnosti. Prema tome, u Zvezdi se ocrtava jedna opsta ekonomija flukseva, odnosno multipliciteta koji su otvoreni jedni spram drugih.?Sistem? je sistem vremena. Sistem jeste Otkrovenje.?Filozofiranje u formi sveta?, dakle, ono sto Rozencvajg promovise, razjasnjava se ovom konstatacijom koja zauzvrat stoji na celu poduhvata da se ponovo misli odnos filozofije prema religiji. (shrink)

The Hegel Lectures Series Series Editor: Peter C. Hodgson Hegel's lectures have had as great a historical impact as the works he himself published. Important elements of his system are elaborated only in the lectures, especially those given in Berlin during the last decade of his life. The original editors conflated materials from different sources and dates, obscuring the development and logic of Hegel's thought. The Hegel Lectures series is based on a selection of extant and recently discovered transcripts and (...) manuscripts. Lectures from specific years are reconstructed so that the structure of Hegel's argument can be followed. Each volume presents an accurate new translation accompanied by an editorial introduction and annotations on the text, which make possible the identification of Hegel's many allusions and sources. Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God Hegel lectured on the proofs of the existence of God as a separate topic in 1829. He also discussed the proofs in the context of his lectures on the philosophy of religion (1821-31), where the different types of proofs were considered mostly in relation to specific religions. The text that he prepared for his lectures in 1829 was a fully formulated manuscript and appears to have been the first draft of a work that he intended to publish and for which he signed a contract shortly before his death in 1831. The 16 lectures include an introduction to the problem of the proofs and a detailed discussion of the cosmological proof. Philipp Marheineke published these lectures in 1832 as an appendix to the lectures on the philosophy of religion, together with an earlier manuscript fragment on the cosmological proof and the treatment of the teleological and ontological proofs as found in the 1831 philosophy of religion lectures. Hegel's 1829 lectures on the proofs are of particular importance because they represent what he actually wrote as distinct from auditors' transcriptions of oral lectures. Moreover, they come late in his career and offer his final and most seasoned thinking on a topic of obvious significance to him, that of the reality status of God and ways of knowing God. These materials show how Hegel conceived the connection between the cosmological, teleological, and ontological proofs. All of this material has been newly translated by Peter C. Hodgson from the German critical editions by Walter Jaeschke. This edition includes an editorial introduction, annotations on the text, and a glossary and bibliography. (shrink)

Translated by Drew S. Burk and Anthony Paul Smith. Excerpted from Struggle and Utopia at the End Times of Philosophy , (Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing, 2012). THE END TIMES OF PHILOSOPHY The phrase “end times of philosophy” is not a new version of the “end of philosophy” or the “end of history,” themes which have become quite vulgar and nourish all hopes of revenge and powerlessness. Moreover, philosophy itself does not stop proclaiming its own death, admitting itself to be half dead (...) and doing nothing but providing ammunition for its adversaries. With our sights set on clearing up this nuance, we differentiate philosophy as an institutional entity, and the philosophizability of the World and History, of “thought-world,” which universalizes the narrow concept of philosophy and that of “capital.” We also give an eschatological and apocalyptical cause to this end, of “times” or “ages” rather than those of philosophical practice. Last but not least, it is the Future itself in the performativity of its ultimatum that determines this end times, reversing these times from the Identity the Future accorded to it, withdrawing the thought-world from the lie of its death. Why this style of axioms and oracles, these more or less subtle distinctions, old and debased, with an appeal to the ultimata , to end times and last words? We fight to give, parallel to the concept of Hell, its new theoretical position, for its philosophical return and its non-philosophical transformation. No more so than any other word, Hell is not a metaphor here, just the Principle of Sufficient World. Every man, no doubt, has his “hell” readily available, connivance, control, conformism, domestication, schooling, alienation, extermination, exploitation, oppression, anxiety, etc. We have our little list that the Contemporaries established in the previous century in the same way one used to construct lists of virtues and vices or honors and wealth. They invented it for us without knowing it, for us-the-Futures who have as our responsibility to invent its use. In the Christian and Gnostic tradition, the struggle of the End Times takes place “on earth.” The most sophisticated of believers have it taking place in Heaven as well, above all in Heaven. The various kinds of gnosis imagine infinite falls and vertiginous highs, the vertigo of salvation. On Earth as in Heaven, a hell is available. The Marxists have the law of profit and the control of production, the class struggle Capital imposes on man. The Nietzscheans, the dull grumble of the struggle in the foundations of World and History, the domestication of man, the society of control. The phenomenologists, the capture of being, the most superficial amongst them, the age of suspicion. But all of these “hells” are taken from World, History, Society, and Religion. What we call Hell is no longer of the order of these specific and total intra-worldly generalities, it is both more singular and more universal, no longer being at all of the same order, it is the determinant Identity of these small hells strung out through history but unified here in the name of the last Humaneity. It is even found within the French idiom for hell [ enfer ], en-fer literally means “in-irons.” We are as much “in-irons” as we are “alive” [ en-Vie ]. We believe in Hell but as non-philosophers and it is even because we are non-philosophers that we can believe in it outside of any sort of religion. Hell is less mythological than ideological, it combines philosophizability with universal capital. Under what form? A single term could work for them without being a metaphor or something they would participate in by analogy, a more innovative and conjectural term than control, more universal than profit. It would denote the growing and permanent extortion of a surplus-value of communication, of speed and of urgency in change, in productivity and in work, in the pressure of images and slogans. It would be worse than solicitation, more tenacious than capture, more active and persecutory than control, softer and more insidious than a frontal attack, just as perverse as questioning and accusation, less brutal and offensive than extermination, less ritualized than inquisition, it would be soft and dispersed, instantaneous and vicious, it would be a crime without declared violence. Collusion and conformism, it would be afraid to show itself. Related to rumor, from which it borrows its infinite and tortuous ways. It is harassment. As a modernized form of Hell, perhaps harassment has a long future in front of it, of innocent torture, slow assassination, in short the fall, but radical with no way of recovering and which tolerates only salvation. THE PHILOSOPHICAL PAST OF NON-PHILOSOPHY Non-philosophy is thus Man as the utopian identity of the philosophical form of the World, a utopia destined to transform it. We still have to understand these equations, in particular that of the being-uni-versed from Man, and this book adheres to this by re-exposing non-philosophy in a different way via one of its new possibilities. It uses this opportunity to once again take up formulations that lead to objections answering certain external critics, as well as revisiting diverging interpretations specific to non-philosophers. A portion of this book is devoted to going through these theories via a strict or “lengthy” presentation of non-philosophy, and its defense against more expeditious solutions. This work of rectification is the occasion, merely the occasion, for refocusing non-philosophy on Man (the “Man-in-person,” “Humaneity”), and in a more innovative manner, on its utopian vocation established since the book Future Christ . As for this “occasion,” it is quite obvious. A school of posture, not to say a school of thought, supposes a minimum of closure from the most liberating of knowledge, a heritage, its utilization, and its no less certain dispersal. Within its development, a variety of interpretations will no doubt appear, deviations that are as much normalizations, and a struggle against this multiplication of divergent tendencies. These are perhaps not inevitable evils, especially here, merely a normal development according to the twisting paths of history. But the problem is made worse by the fact that this school of non-philosophers is that of utopia. Not the former attempts devoted to commenting on the worst authoritarian and criminal forms of the past and the present, but utopia as the determinant principle for human life, or to put it another way, of the Future as an irreducible presupposition of (for) thinking the World and History. Non-philosophers are engaged in an aleatory navigation between the respect for the most rigorous utopia, whose rules are not that of the reproductive imagination but those from the Future determining imagination itself, as well as the temptations, diversions, and remorse of history. Little by little, we will begin to understand that the Future as we understand it no longer has any temporal consistency or positive content, without being an empty form or a nothingness, but that it is foreclosed to past and present History, just as it is foreclosed to the place of places, the World, and that it is the only method for establishing the practice of thinking in a non-imaginary instance. Because it is the World and History that are imaginary and have a terrible materiality, it is not necessarily utopia. We will overlap two objectives here: the defense of non-philosophy against the (non-) philosophers that we are, only occasionally, and the introduction of philosophy to a rigorous future. Together they set out to definitively render, without any possible return to philosophical conformism or towards the facilities of the past and present, the non-philosophical enterprise understood as utopia or uchronia. Imagination and speculation, left to themselves and thus undistinguished, are quite good for participating in the grand game of History but have little value or worse for the Future which is unimaginable and unintelligible and must be maintained as such. MAN-IN-PERSON AS SUSPENSION OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL CHORA The point where philosophical resistance is concentrated is without a doubt the invention of the Name-of-Man, first name, oracular as much as axiomatic, of the determining cause for the non-philosophical posture. And that which concentrates the differends is the style of non-philosophy as identity that possesses the dual aspect, of discipline and of the oeuvre, of the theorem and of the oracle. But the real difficulty in understanding the simplicity of non-philosophy is profoundly hidden in the depths of philosophy itself. Because philosophy, from Parmenides to Derrida, even Levinas, continues to be a divided gesture, without a veritable immanence, transforming its thematic contents of transcendence in also forgetting to transform the operative transcendence in the element from which the ontology of surface is established which we will call, in memory of Plato, the chorismos. The general effect of the chora literally gives place to philosophy, demanding binding and sutures to which we will once and for all “oppose” the Man-in-person, his power of cloning, and his future being. All philosophy contains a hinter-philosophy in which it deploys its operations and weaves its tradition like an understudy of a topographical nature and in the best of cases being itself topological. Philosophy as well consists of two levels, its pre-ontological operative conditions on the one hand, and its superficial theme on the other, it too has its presupposed, but is not aware of it or erases it within the unity of appearance named Logos. Rightly, the Logos, and its flash or lightning nature, possesses a “dark precursor,” the chora, which is as much a virtual image, and philosophy, dazzled by its own lightning flash, seems to completely forget about it at the same time it sets itself up within it. Non-philosophy risks taking this same path, of confusing what it believes to be the real with its phantom double, contenting itself to working on the thematic level of philosophy, not its surface objects and its idle chatter (we stopped talking about this a long time ago and in any case they are merely simple materials for inducing a work of transformation), but the transcendence-form of its objects. In the end it risks, through precipitation, taking back up the heritage of philosophy, a heritage of a misunderstood presupposed, even more profound than the play of transcendences. This is what the imperative of the radicality of immanence meant, to treat immanence in an immanent manner, not to make a new object out of it. And from here we get non- (philosophy) and its refusal of the Platonic chorismos , symbol of all abstraction, and thus all transcendental appearance. There are no illusions. The message will leave a heritage in tattered pieces and interpretations. But it was difficult not to dispute the differend to its core. There will be complete confusion of the multiple, possible, and necessary effectuations of non-philosophy with its interpretations. The non-philosophical or human freedom of philosophical effectuation and the philosophical freedom of interpretation. Effectuations demand non-philosophy to return to zero from the point of view of its philosophical material and thus also but within these limits the formulation of its axioms , but in no way providing from the outset divergent interpretations of the aforementioned axioms. They are divergent because they do not take into account the material from which these axioms are derived within non-philosophy, and because they do not see themselves as symptoms of another vision of the World. The utterances of non-philosophy are not mathematical theorems and pure axioms, they merely have a mathematical aspect . They are, by their extraction or origin, mathematical and transcendental. And by their determined function in-Real, within non-philosophy, they are identically in-the-last-Humaneity entities which have an aspect of an axiom and an aspect of interpretation (or an oracular aspect as we say) that attempts (sometimes it is ourselves who provide the occasion) to isolate and transform, in complete freedom of interpretation. There will be an opportunity to complain about the complex character of the language of non-philosophy, an idiom saturated with classical references, sophisticated in a contemporary way. Its freedom of decision up against the whole of philosophy demands these effects of “complication” and “privatization,” as the saying goes. But it also demands fighting against the drift [ dérive ] of the pedagogical-all and the mediatic-all that leads philosophy into the shallow depths of opinion, which is the site of its impossible death. The noble idealism of “pop-philosophy” has been consumed into a “philo-reality;” against this we propose philo-fiction. Parricide, which is at the bottom of these interpretations and which we can judge as being quite fertile, although it has informed tradition, only takes place once or within one lone meaning. In regards to Parmenides, it was possible; Plato introduced the Other as non-being and language, bringing into existence the philosophical system of the World, but is it possible to repeat it again with the same fecundity in regards to non-philosophy, this time in introducing (non) religion or (non) art, still mixing them without taking into account this mixture, alternatively as a philosophical or religious resentment? If philosophy begins via a crime, it is no doubt obliged to continue down similar pathways, to the effect that the crimes of philosophy, once the founding crime has been committed, are a reaction of self-defense. It is undoubtedly from this that we get Marx’s declaration that history begins by tragedy and repeats itself or ends in farce. The preservation of rigor and fecundity is, in every respect, a psychologically difficult task within a theory such as non-philosophy. Having posited an essential objective of liberation in regards to philosophy and its services, one has often understood this objective as an authorization of providing particular interpretations of its axioms and ends up obliterating their scope. This ends up confusing, on one hand, two kinds of freedoms in regards to non-philosophy, the freedom of its interpretations and the freedom of its effectuations. On the other hand, any defense of “principles” against precipitated interpretations is immediately taxed with a will to orthodoxy, a prohibitive objection when we are dealing with, as is the case here, a heretical theory of thought. Nevertheless, it is time to stop confusing heresy as the cause of thought with an ideology of heresies, which is certainly not at all our object, but rather a form of normalization. As for the “disciplinary” aspect, which is not the only aspect, it demands something other than philosophical “answers to objections,” a precision in the definition and use of its procedures in the formation of utterances, since non-philosophy is neither a supplementary doctrine interior to philosophy nor a vision of the world but one whose priority is a “vision of Man,” or rather Man as “vision” that implies a theory and a practice of philosophy. In the end, struggle is only one aspect of non-philosophy, not its whole or telos, struggle coming only from its materiality. In particular, if the discipline of non-philosophy is inseparable from struggle, it is not a question of reducing the monomaniacal obsession of its “marching orders.” This would reduce its complexity and kill its indivisibility, deploying it in a “long march” and a form of Maoization whose philosophical presuppositions no longer have any pertinence here, a case of the One and the Two, which are now cloned and no longer tied together. More generally, non-philosophy is a complex thought composed of a multitude of aspects, which is to say, unilateral interpretations, of a philosophical origin but reduced by their determination in-the-last-instance . The “liberalism” of non-philosophy is merely one of the aspects of which it is capable, not an essence. Similarly, it is only capable of having a “Maoist” aspect. Let us generalize. The weakness of non-philosophy is due to a specific cause, the determination-in-the-last-Humaneity of a subject for the World. Everything that has a right to the philosophical city can be said about it in turn and in a retaliatory mode since Man contributes nothing of himself that Man takes from the World. We can consider non-philosophy as being pretentious, absurd, idealistic, empty, materialistic, formalistic, contradictory, modern, post-modern, Zen, Buddhist, Marxist; it endures or tolerates, perhaps “appeals” to, or at least renders possible, sarcasms, ironies, and insults without even talking about the misunderstandings, partly for the same reason as psychoanalysis. All of this goes beyond simple “deviations.” They are its aspects, which is to say, its “unilateral” philosophical interpretations in both senses of the word, being either sufficient coming from the mouth of philosophers, or reduced to their absolute dimension of sufficiency and totality in the mouths of non-philosophers, and both times due to the weakness and strength of Man-in-person as their determination only in-the-last-instance. The non-philosopher is certainly not a Saint Paul fantasizing about a new Church. The non-philosopher is either a (Saint) Sebastian whose flesh is pierced with as many arrows as there are Churches, or a Christ persecuted by a Saint Paul. What is engaged in here is the practice of retaliation. A negative rule of the non-philosophical ethics of outlawed discussion by way of argumentation (the sufficient is you, the orthodox one is always you, you are the fashionable one, and when a master you are someone else) that is founded on the confusion of effectuations of non-philosophy and of its overall interpretations. Retaliation is the law but as with any too-human law, it must acquire a dimension that displaces it, or rather emplaces it and takes away its authority but not all of its effectiveness. If the non-philosopher is only authorized by himself, which is to say by philosophy but limited by the Real-of-the-last-instance, its critique of other non-philosophers can merely be retaliatory under the same conditions, only by the Real limited in-the last-instance. THE TREE OF PHILOSOPHICAL SAINTLINESS The thematic horizon or material of these debates is in the relationships between philosophy, religion as gnosis, and non-philosophy. It is inevitable, regarding non-philosophers in general (whether they are non-philosophers by name or simply its neighbors) that we often end up evoking Marx’s Holy Family and imagining, arranged on the neighboring branches of the tree of philosophy and annexed, sometimes abusively, to non-philosophy, authors who would quite evidently and quite rightly refuse this label. So it is that we find, for example, a Saint Michel, a Saint Alain, a Saint Gilles 1 without even mentioning the youngest who aspire as well to the freedom of “saintliness” and who make their muted voices heard here. If there is a Holy Family of non-philosophers, it extends completely beyond these three, provided that the sectarian spirit can save us. This book is organized in the following manner: To begin, in order to recall the essential part of the problematic, we have organized a Summary of Non-Philosophy , a vade-mecum of notions and basic problems, in a classical style. Secondly, there is Clarifications On the Three Axioms of Non-Philosophy , designed to posit their proper use as much as to elucidate their meaning. Thirdly, an analysis of Philosophizability and Practicity , both being extreme constituents of philosophical material or the contents of the third axiom. Fourthly, the heart of this work: Let us Make a Tabula Rasa of the Future or of Utopia as Method . Fifthly, we have a theoretical outline of a non-institutional utopia, The International Organization of Non-Philosophy, L’Organisation Non-Philosophique Internationale, (ONPHI) already created in practice but under the conditions of possibility and functioning from which here we put into question “de jure,” thus not without a perplexity concerning “facts,” in any case, without the capability of “getting to the bottom of things.” Sixthly, an essay characterizing The Right and the Left of Non-Philosophy , a brief topology of several philosophizing and normalizing positions of proponents or tenants of this problematic. Seventhly, Rebel in the Soul: A Theory of Future Struggle , a systematic discussion starting from a confrontation of non-philosophical gnosis and non-religious gnosis to the extent that they pose, posed or perhaps still will pose themselves as rivals to non-philosophy in a mixture of fidelity and infidelity. Despite the fact that it can also be read as putting non-philosophy into perspective: it pits against a standard Platonism two contemporary appropriations of Gnosticism. On the basis of the paradigm of Man who never ceases to come as the Future-in-person, each one of these moments strives to reestablish not the “true” non-philosophy and its orthodoxy, but the minimal conditions to respect in order to allow for its maximum fecundity. And in order to bring about one of the last possibilities of its development, making explicit Humaneity as a utopia-for-the-World. In introducing these considerations in the form of a “testament” and “ultimatum,” we want to indicate two things: First, that this is the last time we will intervene in order to caution non-philosophers against the temptation of returning and looking backwards towards philosophy. Only a disillusioned nostalgia for the former World and its traditions barely remain permissible to us.… Secondly, that non-philosophy is also a sort of ultimatum for considering one’s life and transforming one’s thought from the perspective of a uni-version rather than a conversion. Man as future is this ultimatum in action, not an impatient self-proclaimed genius, and philosophy is his testament. It is obviously the ultimatum that determines this testament as “old” with a view towards a life that is, itself, non-testamentary. In and of itself, the “old” can never bear a veritable eschaton. Thus, this book intersects according to the logic of this paradigm, under the sign of the ultimate or “last” as future, philosophy as testament and cautionary note for maintaining the non-philosophical oeuvre as “future” or “utopian.” We will see that between these two dimensions it cradles a theory of struggle. In the end, this book envisions non-philosophers in multiple ways. It inevitably sees them as subjects of knowledge, most often academics insofar as life in the world demands, but above all as close relatives of three great human types. The analyst and political militant are quite obvious, for non-philosophy is close to psychoanalysis and Marxism insofar as it transforms the subject in transforming philosophy. Here again, one must have a sense not of certain nuances but of aspects (of the interpretations, albeit unilateralized) and not in order to construct a simple proletarization or militarization of thought as theory. To be rigorous, rather than authoritarian or spiteful, is its task. And lastly, non-philosophy is a close relative of the spiritual but definitely not the spiritualist. Those who are spiritual are not at all spiritualists, for the spiritual oscillate between fury and tranquil rage, they are great destroyers of the forces of Philosophy and the State, which are united under the name of Conformism. They haunt the margins of philosophy, gnosis, mysticism, science fiction and even religions. Spiritual types are not only abstract mystics and quietists; they are heretics for the World. The task is to bring their heresy to the capacity of utopia, and their utopia to the capacity of the paradigm. NOTES We will recognize allusions, and sometimes references, to closely related or distant themes, but which are related, in the work of Michel Henry, Alain Badiou and via the representative of “non-religious” gnosis of a Platonic origin, in Gilles Grelet. It goes without saying that these discussions are current and local, neither concerning the ensemble of doctrines nor prejudging the eventual evolution of certain amongst them. This concerns defining certain proximities with non-philosophy (rather than adversaries which in some sense they are) and typological and emblematic differends (rather than conflicts with a certain author). (shrink)

Le thème de la guerre appartient plutôt au domaine de la philosophie politique, domaine qui n’est pas celui sur lequel Marcel Conche a le plus travaillé. Dans ses derniers ouvrages, ce thème est néanmoins très présent. Au moment où la Seconde Guerre mondiale éclate, il a dix-sept ans. C’est dans ce contexte qu’il a choisi de devenir philosophe. Il aurait pu entrer dans la Résistance, mais il avait toute une enfance à rattraper. Le paradoxe est que cette période sombre (...) de notre histoire correspond pour lui à celle de sa libération. Cependant, on ne peut pas être sur tous les fronts : la philosophie, la lutte contre l’occupant. Quand il revient sur cette époque de sa vie, Marcel Conche évoque aussi la figure de Jean Cavaillès. Deux points de vue sur la guerre, deux attitudes différentes. Deux démarches qui, néanmoins, doivent être comprises ensemble. Toute la difficulté est en effet de donner la priorité à la vie sans renoncer à la liberté. (shrink)

Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion Jeffrey L. Kosky Reveals the interplay of phenomenology and religion in Levinas’s thought. "Kosky examines Levinas’s thought from the perspective of the philosophy of religion and he does so in a way that is attentive to the philosophical nuances of Levinas’s argument.... an insightful, well written, and carefully documented study... that uniquely illuminates Levinas’s work." —John D. Caputo For readers who suspect there is no place for religion and morality in postmodern philosophy, Jeffrey L. (...) Kosky suggests otherwise in this skillful interpretation of the ethical and religious dimensions of Emmanuel Levinas’s thought. Placing Levinas in relation to Hegel and Nietzsche, Husserl and Heidegger, Derrida and Marion, Kosky develops religious themes found in Levinas’s work and offers a way to think and speak about ethics and morality within the horizons of contemporary philosophy of religion. Kosky embraces the entire scope of Levinas’s writings, from Totality and Infinity to Otherwise than Being, contrasting Levinas’s early religious and moral thought with that of his later works while exploring the nature of phenomenological reduction, the relation of religion and philosophy, the question of whether Levinas can be considered a Jewish thinker, and the religious and theological import of Levinas’s phenomenology. Kosky stresses that Levinas is first and foremost a phenomenologist and that the relationship between religion and philosophy in his ethics should cast doubt on the assumption that a natural or inevitable link exists between deconstruction and atheism. Jeffrey L. Kosky is translator of On Descartes’ Metaphysical Prism: The Constitution and the Limits of Onto-theo-logy in Cartesian Thought by Jean-Luc Marion. He has taught at Williams College. Indiana Series in the Philosophy of Religion—Merold Westphal, general editor May 2001 272 pages, 6 1/8 x 9 1/4, bibl., index, append. cloth 0-253-33925-1 $39.95 s / £30.50. (shrink)

Parallèlement à ses ouvrages de philosophe fondamentale dont Soi-même comme un autre représente la dernière étape, Paul Ricoeur n'a cessé de publier des articles dans des revues, mais aussi des préfaces dont la vertu pédagogique n'enlève rien à l'acuité de la pensée. Après lecture 1, consacré à la pensée politique, et Lecture 2, une galerie de portraits où défilent les grandes figures de la pensée du XXe siècle, Lecture 3 s'aventure aux " frontières de la philosophie ". Après une enquête (...) préliminaire sur le rôle de la philosophie de la religion dans les systèmes philosophiques de Kant et de Hegel, il traverse ces deux massifs de la pensée post-hégélienne que représente l'Etoile de la Rédemption de Franz Rosenzweig et l'œuvre d'Emmanuel Lévinas, en laquelle il voit d'abord une méditation vigoureuse sur le " témoignage ". S'écartant progressivement du logos philosophique ou de pensées qui ont entrepris de le déborder, Paul Ricoeur traite ensuite du prophétisme, du tragique et du mal. Autant d'interrogations qui fragilisent la spéculation et résistent à une appréhension conceptuelle, mais jamais Ricoeur ne franchit indûment les frontières entre philosophie et non-philosophie, entre philosophie et théologie. Plus que tout autre objet de réflexion, le mal se présente comme un défi décisif pour le philosophe et donc comme une invitation à relancer le travail de la pensée. Parallèlement à son œuvre philosophique, Ricoeur a beaucoup lu et interprété à la Bible, ce récit dont les " essais d'herméneutique " réunis ici montrent l'ampleur des réflexions qu'il suscite. Complètement indispensable de Temps et Récit et de Soi-même comme un autre, Lecture 3 témoigne d'un autre " régime de la pensée " qui souligne l'importance de l'œuvre de Paul Ricoeur. (shrink)

This study is an attempt to examine the relationships between religious belief and the humanism of the Enlightenment in the philosophy of Hegel and of a group of thinkers who related to his thought in various ways during the 1840's. It begins with a study of the ways in which Hegel attempted to evolve a genuinely Christian humanism by his demonstration that the modern understanding of man as a free and rational subject derived its strength and validity from the union (...) of God and human existence in the incarnation. The rest of this study is con cerned with two different forms of opposition to Hegel: first, the criti cal discipleship of the Young Hegelians and Moses Hess, who insisted that Hegel's notion of Christian humanism was false because religious belief was necessarily inimical to a clear consciousness of social evil and the determination to abolish it; second, the religious opposition to the Enlightenment in the thought of Schelling and Kierkegaard, which emphasized God's transcendence to human reason and the insig nificance of secular history. In the years leading up to the revolution of 1848, Hegel's synthesis was rejected in favour of the assertion of atheistic humanism or religious otherworldliness. Chapter One, after discussing the young Hegel's critique of the social and political effects of Christianity, examines the union of religi ous belief, speculative philosophy and the rational state in Hegel's mature system. (shrink)

Totalité et infini (1961), oeuvre majeure d'Emmanuel Levinas, est l'exposé de l'éthique de l'altérité qui a fait de lui l'une des figures les plus marquantes de la philosophie du XXe siècle. Dans la trace de lectures multiples (Husserl, Heidegger, Descartes, Platon ou encore Rosenzweig), il y déploie une philosophie éthique qui se départit de tout fondement ontologique. Si Totalité et infini est bien une "oeuvre de ruptures", c'est qu'elle se donne pour projet de rompre avec l'histoire de la philosophie qui (...) donne le primat au même et à la totalité. Penser l'existence, l'advenue au monde et sa signification, à partir de la présence d'autrui, tel est l'ambitieux projet d'Emmanuel Levinas. Ne plus inscrire le "Je" comme fondement de la pensée, tel est son geste révolutionnaire. La relance du motif fondamental de l'"il y a", les gestes de rupture avec la figure de la totalité et certaines traditions de la phénoménologie, de l'épistémologie, voire de la philosophie analytique, l'actualité de l'oeuvre et l'apport pratique de Totalité et infini à l'interprétation du monde contemporain (justice, politique, éducation), le dialogue entre Totalité et infini et des pensées qui ont nourri ou qui ont croisé certains motifs de la pensée de Levinas - Henri Bergson, René Girard, Maurice Blanchot : tels sont les enjeux explorés dans ce livre. (shrink)

Modern philosophy has had difficulty attempting to show the unbreakable unity of the individual with communal aspects of human existence. A number of modern thinkers began their treatises by rationally, even geometrically, constructing a more or less real or ideal community based on a multiplicity of individuals. Yet others, convinced that no form of individualism could ever supply insight into the communal structure of human life, saw all individuals from the outset as members — or even as organs — of (...) a collective whole. While the former struggled in vain to show that contracts or other forms of freely chosen exchangenecessarily mutate into communal dispositions and institutions, the latter had to cope with the modern dogma that all philosophy must begin from an autonomous ego. Modern philosophy, then, has not produced a wholly satisfactory synthesis of individualism and communitarianism. This failure could be a symptom of a faulty start, which may be due to the initial questions: Can individuality and commonality be opposed? Does their distinction concerntwo aspects, two levels, two dimensions of one reality? How do they evoke, provoke, imply, and fortify one another? (shrink)

As we know, the whole system of Hegel 's thought is based totally on the self-development process of the Geist. In other words, according to dialectical scheme of neoplatonism which Proclus systematized as a triad, μονή-πρόοδος-ἐπιστροφή, Hegel says that the Geist remains in himself, comes out from himself, and then returns to himself. With this process of self-development of the Geist, Hegel tries to explain the realities in general such as nature, history, art, religion, and philosophy. This process of the (...) development of the Geist makes a circle mode with the triadic way of an sich - für sich - an und für sich, but itself as the final destination of the Geist after finishing the whole process, is not a mere itself at the beginning, but the completed itself filled with the self-consciousness and freedom in full bloom. The last moment when the Geist returns to itself, Hegel says it is ‘Ruhe in Gott’. This is the final moment which the Geist as reality of the world and the history arrives and also the conclusion of his philosophy. Then, what happens to this final stage of the return of the Geist to itself, and what does it mean? Most of all, Hegel saw that, as the goal of world history is the achievement of self-consciousness of the Geist on its freedom and the realization of the freedom, this goal was achieved in the self-return of the Geist. And he has seen that the finite and the infinite, which showed constant opposition in the history of Western thought, are united here. According to Hegel, the infinite and finite in the bad concept that came out of the intellect(Verstand) are confronted with each other, and existence and non-existence are substantially separated. However, in the true concept of the infinite derived from reason(Vernunft), is formed the unified moment, in which the confrontations of both parties has been resolved and everything had been included in itself. The transcendence that he advocates is not a transmundane transcendence that is separated absolutely from the finite sensory world in existence and then unreachable absolutely, but a ‘right transcendence’ in which the finite and the infinite are really inseparable and remain as moments of the process of the Geist. In his view, the former which Platonism represents in Western philosophy, is an 'empty transcendence,' but the transcendence that he speaks is a 'full transcendence' that encompasses all moments of the finite in itself. The return of the absolute idea to itself means not only the sublation (Aufhebung) of the finite but also the the sublation of the reality, of the other, of the outwardness, of the abandonment of history, and secures the opposites to those such as ideality, self-identity, inwardness, and trans-historicity. Hegel's Geist as returning to itself has self-consciousness recognizing that it negates and rules the world and the history at the same time. In other words, it is honored and then the glorifying of God has been achieved in the consciousness of itself as the Absolute that it has been the only subject and the sole ruler of world history. According to Hegel, this glorifying of God is the most valuable object of the Geist and history. The Geist that has completed the process of self-development in the return to the itself enjoys the serenity, which is not a 'vacant serenity' but a ‘full serenity’ integrating the finite and the infinite into its inner simplicity. Hegel regarded the transition from the other to being self-internal as a transition from necessity to freedom, and in this serenity the Geist enjoys the freedom that it has in its own nature, as possible as it can. That is to say, in this serenity, the Geist becomes absolutely free and became itself, negating and sublating all other-being(Anderssein). In his view, the "Serenity in God," where the Geist becomes itself and its absolute freedom is obtained, is the ultimate goal of the Geist, and the omega point of the history. (shrink)

Si, contre la conception hégélienne de l’histoire de la philosophie comme succession de systèmes, Deleuze et Guattari proposent l’idée d’une coexistence de plans, c’est pour éviter de penser la relation entre les philosophies comme opposition, réfutation ou dépassement, pour construire un cadre à partir duquel apprécier la singularité de chaque philosophie. Alors pourquoi proclament-ils ensuite Spinoza « le Christ des philosophes »? Et l’idée même d’une coexistence de plans, d’une coexistence des grands philosophes, des véritables créateurs de concepts, ne suppose-t-elle (...) pas elle aussi une sélection, la constitution d’un panthéon philosophique? La relation entre l’histoire de la philosophie hégélienne et la deleuzienne se révélera beaucoup plus complexe qu’une opposition. De fait, il est possible de repérer différents modèles historiographiques dans l’oeuvre de Deleuze, de même que dans celle de Hegel. Par conséquent, on verra osciller la place du second par rapport au premier selon l’histoire qu’on prendra comme cadre de référence. (shrink)

This exceedingly rich book can be understood as an attempt to grasp the nature of Hegel’s system, specifically the relationship obtaining between that system and its vaunted "transitions." This attempt is carried out through a study of Hegel’s account of Vorstellung and thought. The operational point d'appui of the study is what Clark identifies as the central paradox essentially inherent in his subject, which may be variously formulated as: how language can be the "other" of thought and yet sublated in (...) thought; how pure thought can abide an other; how the Logic can from within itself develop its categories to absolute fulfillment and yet refer beyond itself to its fulfillment; how Hegel can be understood to have "completed" philosophy in the first quarter of the nineteenth century; how one makes sense of the notion of an essentially temporal eternality; how the Logic and the Phenomenology of Mind can each presuppose the other. The developing treatment of this paradox constitutes almost an object lesson in the "preserved" aspect of aufhebung—The or a methodological enactment of the second book of the Logic—for Clark wrestles with the tacky conceptual framework upon which rests the topic under investigation. The whole is deftly handled. Particularly inspired is the close analysis of the Theoretical Mind chapter of the Philosophy of Spirit and its bearing upon the Logic’s "Essence." This coupling, together with a treatment of the Philosophy of Religion constitutes one of the two foci of the book. What comes clear from this extended study is an appreciation of the fundamental difficulties connected with any philosophical explanation that has failed to resolve satisfactorily the relationship between ground and consequent and treats them either as being simply different or from the standpoint of a simply presumed totality. Clark’s considered position is that Hegel’s thought is paradoxical precisely in its intelligibility. Ultimately, he can only reiterate the paradox one final time: "The paradox of a Logic that is at once the whole and but a part of experience is thus a systematic expression of the need for reconciliation of a standpoint that is simply accomplished and a standpoint that is ever accomplishing itself." Now for the misgivings, which are for the most part issues of form. There is an obstinate problem of indistinctness running through the work. The recurrent summaries, both internal and thematic, the forecasts, the exhaustively particularized table of contents, are all tacit concessions to the existence of this problem. Seldom do positions come ringing through with conviction; often, notwithstanding the above-mentioned signposts, their origin, their precise connection to the text, is obscure. This is particularly true of the truncated final passages, where interpretation converts to criticism. In short, a fuller statement of significance might well have been supplied. A second problem, or at the least an annoying inconvenience, is the decision not to translate most of the abundant quotations from Hegel’s works into English. Some of the quotations are, for no apparent reason, in fact translated; and with well over 900 footnotes in a 200-page text anyway, translations would hardly constitute a stylistic blemish.—R. J. G. (shrink)

This article is a brief commentary on Donald Turner and Ford Turrell’s “The Non-Existent God: Transcendence, Humanity, and Ethics in Emmanuel Levinas.” While I agree with Turner and Turrell’s general presentation of Levinas’s existential conception of God and ethics, I reflect primarily on the reference the authors make to Kierkegaard as an existentialist forefather of Levinas. I show certain basic similarities between Levinas and Kierkegaard as existentialist thinkers, but also note their differences, also taking into consideration the influence of Hegel. (...) This paper was delivered in the APA Pacific 2007 Mini-Conference on Models of God. (shrink)

Derrida’s Glas can be interpreted against the background of a confrontation with Hegel, after and with Levinas. Derrida’s position in front of the great shadows of tradition (see “Violence and Metaphysics”) becomes in Glas an exceeding of the limits, searching for the other than logos, for instance, remains or writing. Glas is interpreted on the background of Derrida’s reading of Levinas: against the archeologic totality of Hegel’s system, Glas does not oppose nevertheless the eschatological infinity of a metaphysical alterity, but (...) rather the finite infinity of a transgressive desire for contingency. Language, art, and literature, much more than the ethical or religious dimension, are external phenomenological transcendence, against which Hegel’s system of absolute knowledge and Genet’s literary experiments are constantly measured. (shrink)

Modern philosophy has had difficulty attempting to show the unbreakable unity of the individual with communal aspects of human existence. A number of modern thinkers began their treatises by rationally, even geometrically, constructing a more or less real or ideal community based on a multiplicity of individuals. Yet others, convinced that no form of individualism could ever supply insight into the communal structure of human life, saw all individuals from the outset as members — or even as organs — of (...) a collective whole. While the former struggled in vain to show that contracts or other forms of freely chosen exchangenecessarily mutate into communal dispositions and institutions, the latter had to cope with the modern dogma that all philosophy must begin from an autonomous (individual or transcendental) ego. Modern philosophy, then, has not produced a wholly satisfactory synthesis of individualism and communitarianism. This failure could be a symptom of a faulty start, which may be due to the initial questions: Can individuality and commonality be opposed? Does their distinction concerntwo aspects, two levels, two dimensions of one reality? How do they evoke, provoke, imply, and fortify one another? (shrink)

Neither according to Hegel nor according to Levinas is it possible to define the person independently of collectivity. For both, dialogues play a strategic role in the orientation towards the collective. For Hegel, the “good conscience” is significant because it is a reference for describing the assumptions, and the results of a dialogue. I describe these implications in my first section. In the second section, I present Levinas’s objections to the “good conscience.” Instead of a “good conscience,” for Levinas, conscience (...) is an instance that does not confirm the subject but accuses it. In the third section, I explore Levinas’s understanding of dialogue. In his view, dialogue resists a “priority of knowledge” and has an antecedence that points to the common origin of language and ethics. In my conclusion, I describe the resulting intersections and breaks and how a dialogue between Hegel and Levinas can be established against this background. (shrink)

De 1805 a 1830, Hegel professe neuf series de cours sur l'histoire de la philosophie. Explorant et meditant les pensees de ses predecesseurs, il en nourrit sa pensee et les eclaire en retour de la sienne. A ce titre, K.L. Michelet, a qui l'on doit la restitution de ces lecons a partir des notes de Hegel et de celles de ses auditeurs, voit dans ce texte la meileure cle pour la comprehension de son oeuvre. C'est par le berceau de la (...) philosophie, la Grece, que Hegel commence son exploration de l'histoire de la philosophie. Divisant la pensee grecque en trois periodes (la premiere s'etend de Thales a Aristote; la seconde englobe epicurisme, stoicisme et scepticisme; la troisieme, Platon et Aristote), il s'agit pour lui de partir du commencement de la pensee philosophante pour aboutir au stade ou l'idee prend la forme de la totalite. Ce deuxieme tome presente, au sein de la premiere periode, les lecons dediees aux sophistes (Protagoras, Gorgias), a Socrate et aux trois grandes ecoles socratiques: megarique (Euclide, Eubulide, Stilpon), cyrenaique (Aristippe, Theodore, Hegesias, Anniceris), cynique (Antisthene, Diogene et cyniques posterieurs). (shrink)

Les Lecons sur la logique, donnees par Hegel dans l'ete 1831, quelques mois avant sa mort, livrent son ultime pensee dans le domaine de cette science qui constitue l' ame du systeme. Le texte de l'abrege encyclopedique n'est, comme il l'ecrit a Cousin, qu'une suite de theses, dont le developpement et l'eclaircissement est reserve aux cours. On trouve donc, dans les rares manuscrits et cahiers de ses etudiants, le veritable echo de l'enseignement et des explications du maitre, permettant de comprendre (...) de nombreux paragraphes commentes par Hegel de maniere nouvelle selon les annees. Les notes de cours prises par Karl Hegel, son propre fils et son etudiant alors, fiables, completes et homogenes, sont l'un des deux seuls temoignages des lecons faites sur la base de la derniere edition du manuel encyclopedique (1830). Leur interet est d'autant plus grand que ces lecons sont professees durant la periode d'elaboration de la seconde edition de la Doctrine de l'Etre de la Science de la Logique qui paraitra en 1832. Elles beneficient donc de cette proximite qui leur confere une clarte singuliere due a la maturation profonde de la pensee hegelienne. Retrouvees et publiees recemment par des membres du Hegel-Archiv de Bochum, ces pages, traduites par les chercheurs du Centre Alpin de Philosophie Allemande (Universite de Grenoble2 - ENS-LSH), constituent donc un outil indispensable a la comprehension de la Logique que Hegel a enseignee tous les ans, de 1818 a sa mort. (shrink)

Hegel n'a de cesse de souligner l'enracinement de la modernite dans la culture hellenique: la Grece apparait en effet comme premiere patrie de l'Esprit, c'est la que l'homme a commence a etre chez soi. Que ce soit dans le domaine esthetique (invention d'une religion de l'art) ou ethique (invention de la Cite comme ideal republicain), la Grece est pensee par Hegel comme une etape majeure de l'histoire entendue comme developpement d'une rationalite immanente. Pour autant, Hegel n'a rien d'un idolatre. L'hellenisme (...) des debuts, de rigueur a l'epoque, cede rapidement le pas a une integration au sein d'une philosophie de l'absolu comme processus, comme realisation de soi-meme: la figure grecque est alors pensee dans ses limites et dans son necessaire depassement. Mais doit-on s'en tenir la, a la necessite de ce depassement? Si la Grece fait office d'ideal esthetique et, dans une moindre mesure, ethique, elle est aussi a l'origine meme de la philosophie, elle est le foyer de procedures de pensee dont la philosophie semble etre, a jamais, tributaire. Des lors, le privilege grec semble en mesure de deborder la portee que le systeme avait su lui menager. Le destin de la Grece, c'est alors non seulement d'etre transcendee par le flux historique, mais aussi de representer ce principe dont le destin est accomplissement, et ceci a travers la philosophie hegelienne elle-meme. En croisant demarche genetique et approche systematique, cette etude nous propose plus qu'une mise en ordre interne au systeme, la mise en lumiere d'un veritable impense de la pensee hegelienne. (shrink)

The two opposing trends of dogmatism and relativism pervade the thought of the last few centuries. They are as irreconcilable in public opinion as in the different philosophical systems that embody these attitudes as two separate and conflicting elements.Frequently we find united in the same system of thought a tendency to doubt everything, to qualify and limit every statement, to penetrate by an insistent critique to the fundamentals, and at the same time an inclination towards naive faith in everything and (...) blind subjection to conceptions and ways of thought that have been made absolute. This phenomenon has its roots in the social conditions of the time : while the capabilities of the individual were being developed with the material wealth of society, the same process involved at the same time a growing instability und uncertainty.In the philosophical system of Kant which is given short consideration, this dual relationship to truth was given characteristic expression. Hegel with his dialectic attempted to overcome this opposition. He recognized that each single system of thought is historically conditioned, yet that it nevertheless is part and parcel of the all-embracing totality of knowledge. Hegel, however, declared the totality of a definite historical period, namely his own philosophy, to be the total and absolute truth, and thus fell back into a new type of dogmatism. At the same time, his teachings acquired a relativistic aspect, because his standpoint, which he declares transcends history, makes all particular ideas and purposes appear equally relative.The essay proceeds to analyze the consequences which result from freeing dialectics from the metaphysics of the absolute, and develops the conception of an ever progressing dialectical thought. Confirmation here becomes an all-important criterion of truth, and a distinction is drawn between this concept and the concept as it appears in modern pragmatism. Further, the difference between traditional and dialectical logic is explained. Finally the religious philosophy of Troeltsch is used to illustrate the dual relationship to truth that was characteristic of the last period, and, in this way, a further clarification of the principles of dialectical thought is attempted.L’opposition du dogmatisme et du relativisme traverse la pensée des siècles derniers. Ce n’est pas dans la conscience collective seulement, mais aussi à l’intérieur des systèmes philosophiques qu’on retrouve juxtaposées et non reconciliées ces deux conceptions, ces deux attitudes opposées. D’un côté le doute poussé à son point extrême, la tendance à limiter la validité de toute affirmation, la critique pénétrante, de l’autre l’adhésion à une foi naïve et la soumission aveugle à des concepts portés à l’absolu ou à d’autres instances : ces démarches contradictoires caractérisent souvent la doctrine du même penseur. Il convient de chercher les origines sociales de ce phénomène dans le fait que, pour l’individu, le développement de ses capacités était lié à une insécurité permanente. Après un rapide exposé du système Kantien dans lequel cette double relation à la vérité s’exprime d’une manière particulièrement nette, l’article montre dans la dialectique de Hegel la tentative la plus grandiose pour surmonter cette opposition. La méthode dialectique reconnaît que tous les points de vue sont conditionnés, mais, en même temps, elle conserve chacun d’eux en le mettant à sa place dans le tout de la connaissance. Mais comme Hegel donne cette totalité à une certaine phase historique, à savoir sa propre philosophie, comme la vérité absolue, il retombe dans un nouveau dogmatisme. Du même coup le relativisme s’attache aussi à sa doctrine, car son point de vue qu’il tient pour suprahistorique, rabaisse également toutes les idées, tous les buts déterminés au niveau du relatif. L’article étudie ensuite les conséquences qui se produisent si l’on détache la dialectique de cette métaphysique de l’absolu, puis développe l’idée d’une pensée dialectique ouverte. Dans une telle pensée, la notion de confirmation (Bewährung) en tant que critérium de la vérité, joue un rôle important. Dans une discussion avec la théorie pragmatiste moderne de la connaissance, H. tâche d’élucider ce concept. A partir de là, il expose la différence entre la logique traditionnelle et la logique dialectique. A la fin H. illustre l’attitude contradictoire à l’égard de la vérité qui caractérise la dernière période de l’histoire, par exemple la philosophie de la religion de Troeltsch, et il confronte cette dernière avec la manière dialectique de penser. (shrink)

Système nouveau de la philosophie et de son histoire passée, présente et à venir, La Vérité captive-De la philosophie est une oeuvre neuve, en son contenu comme en sa langue : La Vérité captive construit un édifice de Sens, et abolit, par voie de Pensée, toute distinction artificielle entre la foi et la raison, entre la littérature et la philosophie. L'ouvrage propose une relecture intégrale de l'histoire autour d'une ontologie trinitaire, tout en soulignant avec lucidité l'âge critique de l'" outre-modernité (...) " dans lequel l'humanité s'est enfoncée à force de donner créance à " l'immanentisme ". Maxence Caron remonte aux origines historiques conceptuelles qui ont pu ouvrir la crise de l'idéologie contemporaine croyant avoir accompli la vocation de la pensée en l'assignant au dogmatisme relativiste. Aspirant la totalité de la pensée en un fort mouvement apocalyptique et messianique, dans une langue littéraire renouvelée, d'une tonalité à la fois classique et paradoxale, Maxence Caron entend mettre en évidence les raisons profondes d'une conflagration historique dont l'originalité et l'ampleur n'ont pas été soulignées, et ne suscitent çà et là que plaintes réactionnaires alors qu'elle mérite d'être pensée en son fond et sa source. Prenant appui sur l'ère même qu'inaugure ce livre, la pensée est dite désormais indéfectiblement ouverte, depuis son intériorité même et par sa logique intrinsèque, à la Révélation du Principe. S'initiant d'un trait d'apocalypse et s'achevant sur un poème mystique, La Vérité captive expose le Système et le regarde simultanément jaillir de l'histoire de la philosophie. L'ensemble bouleverse tout repère stylistique et initie une nouvelle voie, finale. Ce livre souffle du fond des ères et, remontant à l'origine apodictiquement transcendante de tout acte de l'esprit, ouvre de mettre fin aux errances de la pensée. (shrink)

Cet article pointe certains rapprochements entre la pensée d’Emmanuel Levinas et celle de Svetlana Alexievitch, à qui fut décerné le prix Nobel de littérature en 2015, et tout particulièrement à mettre au jour leur hostilité à l’histoire entendue comme histoire officielle des vainqueurs et la « résistance éthique », au sens que Levinas donne à cette expression, c’est-à-dire à l’immense difficulté pour un être humain d’en tuer un autre, quelles que soient les conditions dans lesquelles s’effectue cet acte.

C'est ce second volet qui est ici, pour la première fois, présentée dans son intégralité. F. Louzeau analyse les trois dialectiques fondamentales qui articulent les figures concrètes de la liberté dans la société et l'histoire : la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave, qui éclaire la faille du marxisme, définit les éléments du « social » et discerne les contradictions internes des mythes totalitaires son interférence avec la dialectique de l'homme et de la femme, d'où sont issues les trois relations (...) de paternité-maternité-fraternité, qui fondent la structure de toute société humaine et la dialectique paulinienne du païen et du juif, source et principe d'exacte interprétation des deux précédentes. Pages de début Remerciements Préface Introduction Première partie. De la dialectique maître-esclave Chapitre I. Un outil nécessaire et efficace pour comprendre la société et l'histoire Chapitre II. Qu'est-ce qu'une « conception du monde »? Chapitre III. L'origine commune du Communisme et du Nazisme Chapitre IV. La faille existentielle du marxisme Chapitre V. Qu'est-ce que le « social »? Chapitre VI. Contradictions internes du Communisme et du Nazisme Chapitre VII. Acquis et insuffisances de la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave Deuxième partie. De la dialectique homme-femme et de son interférence avec la précédente Chapitre VIII. Comment dépasser la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave? Chapitre IX. Épure de la dialectique de l'homme et de la femme Chapitre X. Objections Chapitre XI. Interférence et dialectique des relations familiales Chapitre XII. Paternité, Maternité, Fraternité Chapitre XIII. De la famille au peuple, du peuple à la Nation Chapitre XIV. Acquis et limites des dialectiques conjugale et familiale Troisième partie. Du bon usage des dialectiques maître-esclave et homme-femme à la lumière du rapport païen-juif Chapitre XV. Société et histoire Chapitre XVI. Fraternité universelle Chapitre XVII. Paradoxe et Mystère du peuple juif Chapitre XVIII. La dialectique du païen et du juif, source et mesure des dialectiques maître-esclave et homme-femme Chapitre XIX. Ontologie historique et dialectique Chapitre XX. Souplesse et exigence d'une perspective systématique Chapitre XXI. De son trésor tirer de l'ancien et du neuf Conclusion Annexe 1. Abréviation des principaux livres, articles et manuscrits de G. Fessard Annexe 2. Bibliographie de Gaston Fessard Annexe 3. Livres, articles et recensions concernant Gaston Fessard Annexe 4. Autres livres et articles Annexe 5. M. Sales, « Gaston Fessard. Un philosophe chrétien engagé dans l'histoire de son temps », in Hegel, le Christianisme et l'Histoire, Paris, puf, 1990, p. 17-21 Annexe 6. Index des noms propres de L'Anthropologie sociale du P. Gaston Fessard Gaston Fessard, Collaboration et Résistance au Pouvoir du Prince-Esclave Genèse et portée du manuscrit Avertissement « Argument » Avant-propos Chapitre I. Défaite Chapitre II. Révolution Chapitre III. Défaite et Révolution Chapitre IV. Devant la « Collaboration » Chapitre V. La politique de la nation vaincue Chapitre VI. Application des principes au concret Conclusion. De la direction de conscience dans la situation actuelle I. Quelques textes de Mein Kampf II. Le cardinal Mercier et les droits du pouvoir occupant III. Jeanne d'Arc et notre temps IV. Pourquoi la France est-elle entrée en guerre en 1939? V. Pourquoi le directeur de conscience doit protester contre mensonge et injustice VI. Les devoirs chrétiens du temps présent Index des noms propres de Collaboration et Résistance au Pouvoir du Prince-Esclave Pages de fin. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Literature 26.1 (2002) 24-42 [Access article in PDF] Emmanuel Levinas and Iris Murdoch: Ethics as Exit? C. Fred Alford THE LEVINAS EFFECT it has been called, the ability of Emmanuel Levinas's texts to say anything the reader wants to hear, so that Levinas becomes a deconstructionist, theologian, proto-feminist, or even the reconciler of postmodern ethics and rabbinic Judaism. Talmudic scholar and postmodern philosopher, Levinas has become everything (...) to everyone. Abstract and evocative, writing in what can only be described as the language of prophecy, we pretend we understand what he is talking about, writing in much the same style, so as to say whatever we wanted to say in the first place. Even those who disagree with Levinas generally criticize him from within the framework of his project, sharing his assumptions while trying to make Levinas more Levinassian. 1How might one disrupt the Levinas Effect? By disrupt, I mean criticize Levinas sympathetically, from a perspective outside his "system," but not outside his world. Levinas's world is one in which the self is the enemy not only of the other, but of authentic existence. Iris Murdoch shares this view with Levinas. Like Levinas, Murdoch sees the self as the enemy. "Unselfing," as she calls it, is the means; the end is to overcome totality, which means the subjection of the other to my categories and my experience. Levinas means much the same thing by totality. It is his philosophical idée maîtresse, the troubling tendency of Western thought from Plato to Hegel and beyond."What breaks the drive of consciousness to totality is not an appeal to an abstract social or linguistic whole, but an encounter with the concrete other person." Levinas did not say this, nor did Iris Murdoch. Maria Antonaccio says it in a book about Murdoch, in which she compares Murdoch's views to those of Levinas. What they share, says [End Page 24] Antonaccio, is this critique of totality, even if "Murdoch would reject the language of command, lordship and accusation that pervade Levinas's account." 2Certainly Levinas's language of persecution is one of the most striking aspects of his account, and I will not ignore it. But it is not the most important thing that distinguishes him from Murdoch. One might argue that it is the "concrete other person" that distinguishes Levinas from Murdoch, for in many respects the other is an abstraction for Levinas. "The best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes!" says Levinas. 3 Only at a distance is the other abstract enough to remind us of infinity.This distinction comes closer to capturing the difference between them. Even more important, Levinas shares Sartre's nausea at the thingyness of the world. Levinas calls it the il y a, the "there is." It is this that makes his account closer to Sartre's than one might imagine, and more distant from Murdoch. This does not, of course, make Levinas wrong. The comparison with Murdoch is a way of getting out from under the Levinas Effect.My goal is to better understand Levinas by comparing him with Murdoch. This requires that Murdoch's philosophy be seriously considered, but perhaps not as seriously as that of Levinas. Murdoch is the other, Levinas the subject. Possibly we will end up understanding the other better than the subject. I The outlines of Levinas's philosophy will be familiar to many readers. I will elaborate upon a story told by Levinas to recount it. 4 Imagine that someone rings your doorbell and disturbs your work. As you walk to the door you are distracted, still thinking about your latest project. It takes you a moment to recognize your neighbor at the door, the one who lives upstairs; as soon as you recognize his face you invite him in. You talk for a while. He tells you his problem, you tell him what you might do to help him. You share some pleasant conversation, and soon enough your neighbor leaves. What you originally experienced... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought of Lévinas and Ricœur by Michael SohnLevi CheckettsThe Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought of Lévinas and Ricœur Michael Sohn WACO, TX: BAYLOR UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2014. 172 PP. $69.95Michael Sohn's book The Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought of Lévinas and Ricœur explores the philosophical and religious writings of (...) two of twentieth-century France's most significant thinkers, Paul Ricœur and Emmanuel Lévinas, "to gain, by thinking with and through them, an insight into the phenomenon of recognition" (128). Recognition, to these authors, is not merely an act of re-cognition (identifying something one already knows), nor is it simple cognition (consciousness of something). For Lévinas, to whom Ricœur is indebted for his own work, recognition precedes ontological identification and is a "sensation of the infinite" in the Other (29). Recognition entails "a primordial ethical claim by the other" (57), up to and including self-sacrifice. For Ricœur, on the other hand, recognition of the other is situated in the "loving struggle for existence" between people seeking mutual recognition (72) and presents itself as "one among many sources of value and motivation" [End Page 207] for moral decision (81). In other words, while recognition of the other is a central concept in both authors' ethical writings, Sohn notes that "Lévinas' phenomenological description of recognition emerges out of a fundamental project to uncover the principle of all principles," while "Ricœur's attention to the locus of will integrates passivity and activity as it is taken up within the dialectic of the voluntary and the involuntary," making recognition one value among others (127).In highlighting the different positions of each of these authors, Sohn structures his writing in a highly systematized and clear way. He first divides the book broadly by author, then for each author devotes a chapter each to philosophical and religious approaches to recognition. Within each chapter, he outlines the intellectual influences for the given author, then articulates in turn the phenomenon, the ethics, and the politics of recognition. This tactic serves as a helpful reference for readers interested in Sohn's comparative project, though it sometimes leads to repetition insofar as there are overlaps in how different thinkers, philosophical schools, or principles function for each area. The overall project is framed by an introductory chapter that briefly outlines the main points of discussion throughout the book and a conclusion that summarizes, compares, and contextualizes the significance of the project. Sohn offers this text as a clarifying study of the phenomenon of recognition, a term the application of which "touches upon a broad spectrum of issues ranging from battles over multiculturalism to questions of national sovereignty and from matters of international human rights to social movements within feminism and human rights" (135). With such a broad range of applications, this relatively short examination of two pivotal thinkers' works on recognition is highly valuable.This work will be of interest to ethicists hoping to use the works of Ricœur or Lévinas, or to philosophers and historians interested in the development of recognitionbased ethics. Sohn provides thorough citations from the broad corpuses of both authors, giving students of either philosopher a helpful resource both for summarizing ideas and for carrying out research. Sohn also provides deep intellectual genealogies for each author, noting how thinkers such as Edmund Husserl, Karl Jaspers, Karl Barth, G.W.F. Hegel, Immanuel Kant, and their interpreters influenced Lévinas and Ricœur; he downplays the influence of thinkers like Martin Heidegger, Martin Buber, and Gabriel Marcel. This book does offer useful and clear summaries of the main ideas discussed, but it may be difficult for newer students unfamiliar with French language or philosophical concepts. Overall, this book is a valuable reference tool for Lévinas and Ricœur studies, especially those that focus on the phenomenology, religious thought, ethics, or politics of these two men. [End Page 208]Levi CheckettsGraduate Theological UnionCopyright © 2017 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

L'histoire répond à la volonté du matérialisme marxiste de se construire comme science en saisissant les principes constitutifs des sociétés humaines et de leur évolution. L'existence humaine est historique parce qu'elle évolue nécessairement en totalité en recouvrant toutes les dimensions de la vie sociale, matérielle et idéologique. Le marxisme rencontre donc l'histoire parce qu'il s'enracine dans une pensée dialectique du monde qui appréhende le réel en mouvement par les catégories de processus et de totalité. Dialectique et histoire sont ainsi essentiellement (...) liées dans la constitution du marxisme. Ce recueil souhaite renouer le fil, parfois occulté, mais jamais rompu, qui relie la dialectique au marxisme, et le marxisme à l'histoire. Il s'agit de souligner que l'adaptation de la pensée, et de l'historiographie marxiste, au mouvement de l'histoire, repose sur sa nature dialectique, et donc sur le rapport assumé à la philosophie idéaliste allemande (Hegel notamment). La position prise face à ce rapport détermine ici l'histoire de la dialectique, histoire de sa réception, dans le marxisme, ainsi que ries fractures structurant ce dernier, tant internes (Lukacs, et en un sens opposé, Althusser) qu'externe (Foucault). (shrink)

Die Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion bilden die letzte, die abschließende Disziplin des Hegelschen Systems. Die Konzeption der Vorlesungen in den Jahren 1821, 1824, 1827 und 1831 hat Hegel in großen Teilen immer wieder neu formuliert - Ausdruck seiner Reflexion der philosophisch-theologischen Auseinandersetzung in jenen Jahren. Die dreibändige Studienausgabe folgt dem Text der kritischen Ausgabe "G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte". Sie ermöglicht mit der getrennten Wiedergabe der vier selbständigen Kollegien eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Analyse.

Since Hegel, philosophy cannot stop thinking its end. The violent transformations which Hegel's philosophy has uncovered and caused in the structure of philosophical terms and in the terms under which philosophy is possible is Hamacher's topic. Starting from Hegel's commentaries on biblical scripture, Hamacher traces the genealogy and unfolding of Hegel's thought into his mature works--the Phenomenology of Spirit, the Encyclopedia, the Philosophy of History--focusing throughout on the limits and borders, the limitations and extremities of its conceptual and textual movements. (...) Because the concept for Hegel is the end of the thing--the point where it peaks--because it occurs by severance from its representational content, the trace of this splitting appears imprinted into its discursive articulation. The Hegelian text is punctuated by a series of terms and topics that operate according to the logic of the turning point: one function activating its opposite, they serve as pores between mutually exclusive experiences and establish their unity. This dialectical procedure falters, its unity dissolves, the pores turn into aporias, wherever conceptual exigencies surpass the reality they have instilled. Hamacher shows that dialectics, proceeding by way of aporias, remains unable to account for its own movement. Hegel's system must be read from the point where its rupture fails to converge with its end. Analyzing both the historical and the systematic aspects of Hegel's philosophy, addressing Kant and religious fetishism, Nietzsche and the impossible repetition of the same, Marx and the aroma of religion, Freud and the hysterical body, Hamacher's argument is directed toward what in Hegel's philosophy of spirit resists spiritualization and defeats philosophy. Aspiring to be the last philosophy, speculative idealism has to incorporate all previous systems and spiritualize its incorporation. Its logic of ingestion must, however, reject with repulsion and nausea everything that resists appropriation. Emphasizing Hegel's claim to present the political theology of modern society, Hamacher shows that the mechanism of nausea meant to keep the system intact is in fact itself a mechanism foreign to its body; it averts the promised incorporation, defeats idealization, leaves the body politic disintegrated, and voids the claim of the most powerful ontology of modern society to mark the end, the completion and plenitude--the pleroma--of philosophy and history. What remains--the indigestible, the unreadable, the nondiscursive--demands yet another kind of discourse and another practical gesture: toward a pleroma other than Hegel's. (shrink)

Die Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion bilden die letzte, die abschließende Disziplin des Hegelschen Systems. Die Konzeption der Vorlesungen in den Jahren 1821, 1824, 1827 und 1831 hat Hegel in großen Teilen immer wieder neu formuliert – Ausdruck seiner Reflexion der philosophisch-theologischen Auseinandersetzung in jenen Jahren. Die dreibändige Studienausgabe folgt dem Text der kritischen Ausgabe »G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte«. Sie ermöglicht mit der getrennten Wiedergabe der vier selbständigen Kollegien eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Analyse.

The capacity to classify social groups legally is a central characteristic of modern states. Social groups, however, often resist the classificatory schemas of the state. This raises the following question: how do modern states exercise symbolic power in social fields beset by acute classification struggles? While existing scholarship has demonstrated that states exercise symbolic power, there has not been a concomitant effort to systematize and theorize the various strategies through which they do so. This article addresses this lacuna through examining (...) classification struggles centered on a number of “heterodox” religious groups that have historically been perceived as deviant from mainstream religions. Specifically, it looks at Falun Gong in China, Mormons in the United States, and Baha’is in Egypt. The analysis draws attention to three strategies through which states exercise symbolic power: coercive classification, wherein the deviant group is forcibly fixed as such in law; juridical normalization, whereby the deviant group is allowed to enter the mainstream by shedding “problematic” ritual practices; and legal erasure, whereby the deviant group is kept out of the official classificatory system so that it becomes a legal non-entity. In summary, this article both identifies the religious field as a critical domain in which states of various ideological orientations exercise symbolic power and deploys this analysis to identify distinct strategies through which they do so. (shrink)

Dans la pensee du jeune Hegel, essentiellement theologico-politique, le moment francfortois est le moment critique conduisant a l'achevement de cette pensee qui, a Iena, reconciliera l'histoire, verite de la politique, et la philosophie, verite de la religion. La proposition finale d'un tel salut a l'homme moderne va clore positivement la negation severe que Hegel opere des solutions qu'il veut lire dans les abstractions opposees du judaisme et du christianisme. Le premier est condamne parce qu'il absolutise dans l'existence la difference (des (...) commandements) en rejetant l'identite; le second n'est pas absous parce que, inversement, il privilegie l'identite (de l'amour) en meprisant les differences. Hegel leur opposera l'identification, constitutive de la raison, de la difference et de l'identite, dont la future philosophie speculative construira le developpement dialectique. (shrink)

De 1805 a 1830, Hegel donne neuf series de cours sur l'histoire de la philosophie. Explorant et meditant les theses de ses predecesseurs, il en nourrit sa pensee et les eclaire en retour de la sienne. A ce titre, K.L. Michelet, a qui l'on doit la restitution de ces lecons a partir des notes de Hegel et de celles de ses auditeurs, voit dans ce texte la meilleure cle pour la comprehension de son oeuvre. C'est par le berceau de la (...) philosophie, la Grece, que Hegel commence son exploration de l'histoire de la philosophie. Divisant la pensee grecque en trois periodes (la premiere s'etend de Thales a Anaxagore; la seconde englobe epicurisme, stoicisme et scepticisme; la troisieme, Platon et Aristote), il s'agit pour lui de partir du commencement de la pensee philosophique pour aboutir au stade ou l'idee prend la forme de la totalite. Dans ce premier tome sont reproduites les lecons dediees aux penseurs dits presocratiques Ioniens (Thales, Anaximandre, Anaximene), Pythagoriciens, Eleates (Xenophane, Parmenide, Melissus, Zenon), Heraclite, Empedocle, Leucippe, Democrite et Anaxagore. (shrink)

De 1805 à 1830, Hegel professe neuf séries de cours sur l’histoire de la philosophie. Explorant et méditant les pensées de ses prédecesseurs, il en nourrit sa pensée et les éclaire en retour de la sienne. A ce titre, K.L. Michelet, à qui l’on doit la restitution de ces leçons à partir des notes de Hegel et de celles de ses auditeurs, voit dans ce texte « la meileure clé pour la compréhension de son œuvre ».C’est par le berceau de (...) la philosophie, la Grèce, que Hegel commence son exploration de l’histoire de la philosophie. Divisant la pensée grecque en trois périodes , il s’agit pour lui de partir du « commencement de la pensée philosophante » pour aboutir au stade où « l’idée prend la forme de la totalité ».Achevant la présentation de cette première période, le troisième tome des Leçons traite des pensées de Platon et d’Aristote. (shrink)

Excerpt from The Wisdom and Religion of a German Philosopher: Being Selections From the Writings of G. W. F. Hegel Some passages which are valued by Hegel's students will be found to be omitted, and others may be inserted which they think should be excluded. This it is difficult to avoid. I have merely taken these passages which seemed to me most likely to be useful, omitting many as repetitions, or as not comprehensible without a fuller context. Where a translation (...) exists I have given a reference to it in brackets; but in all cases I have referred to the original, and in some cases, mainly for consistency's sake, made some slight alterations in the translator's wording. The German references are quoted from the second amended edition of Hegel's works. I am indebted for considerable assistance in my work to the kindness of Miss Frances H. Simson, m.a., Warden of the Masson Hall, in Edinburgh. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

C'est ce second volet qui est ici, pour la première fois, présentée dans son intégralité. F. Louzeau analyse les trois dialectiques fondamentales qui articulent les figures concrètes de la liberté dans la société et l'histoire : la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave, qui éclaire la faille du marxisme, définit les éléments du « social » et discerne les contradictions internes des mythes totalitaires son interférence avec la dialectique de l'homme et de la femme, d'où sont issues les trois relations (...) de paternité-maternité-fraternité, qui fondent la structure de toute société humaine et la dialectique paulinienne du païen et du juif, source et principe d'exacte interprétation des deux précédentes. Pages de début Remerciements Préface Introduction Première partie. De la dialectique maître-esclave Chapitre I. Un outil nécessaire et efficace pour comprendre la société et l'histoire Chapitre II. Qu'est-ce qu'une « conception du monde »? Chapitre III. L'origine commune du Communisme et du Nazisme Chapitre IV. La faille existentielle du marxisme Chapitre V. Qu'est-ce que le « social »? Chapitre VI. Contradictions internes du Communisme et du Nazisme Chapitre VII. Acquis et insuffisances de la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave Deuxième partie. De la dialectique homme-femme et de son interférence avec la précédente Chapitre VIII. Comment dépasser la dialectique du maître et de l'esclave? Chapitre IX. Épure de la dialectique de l'homme et de la femme Chapitre X. Objections Chapitre XI. Interférence et dialectique des relations familiales Chapitre XII. Paternité, Maternité, Fraternité Chapitre XIII. De la famille au peuple, du peuple à la Nation Chapitre XIV. Acquis et limites des dialectiques conjugale et familiale Troisième partie. Du bon usage des dialectiques maître-esclave et homme-femme à la lumière du rapport païen-juif Chapitre XV. Société et histoire Chapitre XVI. Fraternité universelle Chapitre XVII. Paradoxe et Mystère du peuple juif Chapitre XVIII. La dialectique du païen et du juif, source et mesure des dialectiques maître-esclave et homme-femme Chapitre XIX. Ontologie historique et dialectique Chapitre XX. Souplesse et exigence d'une perspective systématique Chapitre XXI. De son trésor tirer de l'ancien et du neuf Conclusion Annexe 1. Abréviation des principaux livres, articles et manuscrits de G. Fessard Annexe 2. Bibliographie de Gaston Fessard Annexe 3. Livres, articles et recensions concernant Gaston Fessard Annexe 4. Autres livres et articles Annexe 5. M. Sales, « Gaston Fessard. Un philosophe chrétien engagé dans l'histoire de son temps », in Hegel, le Christianisme et l'Histoire, Paris, puf, 1990, p. 17-21 Annexe 6. Index des noms propres de L'Anthropologie sociale du P. Gaston Fessard Gaston Fessard, Collaboration et Résistance au Pouvoir du Prince-Esclave Genèse et portée du manuscrit Avertissement « Argument » Avant-propos Chapitre I. Défaite Chapitre II. Révolution Chapitre III. Défaite et Révolution Chapitre IV. Devant la « Collaboration » Chapitre V. La politique de la nation vaincue Chapitre VI. Application des principes au concret Conclusion. De la direction de conscience dans la situation actuelle I. Quelques textes de Mein Kampf II. Le cardinal Mercier et les droits du pouvoir occupant III. Jeanne d'Arc et notre temps IV. Pourquoi la France est-elle entrée en guerre en 1939? V. Pourquoi le directeur de conscience doit protester contre mensonge et injustice VI. Les devoirs chrétiens du temps présent Index des noms propres de Collaboration et Résistance au Pouvoir du Prince-Esclave Pages de fin. (shrink)

Introduction to the Difference Essay. FICHTE, SCHELLING, AND HEGEL The essay on the Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy was ...

Die Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Religion bilden die letzte, die abschließende Disziplin des Hegelschen Systems. Die Konzeption der Vorlesungen in den Jahren 1821, 1824, 1827 und 1831 hat Hegel in großen Teilen immer wieder neu formuliert – Ausdruck seiner Reflexion der philosophisch-theologischen Auseinandersetzung in jenen Jahren. Die dreibändige Studienausgabe folgt dem Text der kritischen Ausgabe »G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen. Ausgewählte Nachschriften und Manuskripte«. Sie ermöglicht mit der getrennten Wiedergabe der vier selbständigen Kollegien eine entwicklungsgeschichtliche Analyse. Die Studienausgabe erscheint (...) in drei Teilbänden: Teilband 1: Einleitung. Der Begriff der Religion (PhB 459) Teilband 2: Die bestimmte Religion (PhB 460) Teilband 3: Die vollendete Religion (PhB 461) Unveränderter Print-on-Demand-Nachdruck der Ausgabe von 1994. (shrink)

Les Lecons sur la logique, donnees par Hegel dans l'ete 1831, quelques mois avant sa mort, livrent son ultime pensee dans le domaine de cette science qui constitue l' ame du systeme. Le texte de l'abrege encyclopedique n'est, comme il l'ecrit a Cousin, qu'une suite de theses, dont le developpement et l'eclaircissement est reserve aux cours. On trouve donc, dans les rares manuscrits et cahiers de ses etudiants, le veritable echo de l'enseignement et des explications du maitre, permettant de comprendre (...) de nombreux paragraphes commentes par Hegel de maniere nouvelle selon les annees. Les notes de cours prises par Karl Hegel, son propre fils et son etudiant alors, fiables, completes et homogenes, sont l'un des deux seuls temoignages des lecons faites sur la base de la derniere edition du manuel encyclopedique (1830). Leur interet est d'autant plus grand que ces lecons sont professees durant la periode d'elaboration de la seconde edition de la Doctrine de l'Etre de la Science de la Logique qui paraitra en 1832. Elles beneficient donc de cette proximite qui leur confere une clarte singuliere due a la maturation profonde de la pensee hegelienne. Retrouvees et publiees recemment par des membres du Hegel-Archiv de Bochum, ces pages, traduites par les chercheurs du Centre Alpin de Philosophie Allemande (Universite de Grenoble2 - ENS-LSH), constituent donc un outil indispensable a la comprehension de la Logique que Hegel a enseignee tous les ans, de 1818 a sa mort. (shrink)

Hegel et l'Orient vise a combler une lacune : dans les cours de Berlin consacres a la Philosophie de l'Histoire et a la Philosophie de la Religion, l'Orient occupe une place considerable, mais cette enorme masse de textes n'a guere jusqu'ici retenu l'attention des historiens de la philosophie. L'auteur s'efforce tout d'abord de reperer les motifs qui ont conduit Hegel a elever a la dignite de categorie philosophique le tres ancien mythe de l'Orient et de replacer cette reconstruction historico-speculative dans (...) le cadre general de sa doctrine. Pour ce faire, l'auteur examine, a travers les textes classiques (Phenomenologie de l'Esprit, Logique et Encyclopedie), mais aussi a travers les Ecrits de jeunesse, comment Hegel est conduit a accorder a l'Orient une place importante dans les premiers cours d'Esthetique et dans les Principes de la philosophie du droit, ainsi que la maniere dont le theme est repris et developpe dans La raison dans l'histoire et dans la Philosophie de la Religion. Il examine parallelement le contexte immediat de l'histoire des idees (redecouverte de l'Orient par l'Aufklarung et le Romantisme allemand) et les raisons de l'attitude, generalement polemique, de Hegel vis-a-vis de ces courants. Il s'interroge enfin sur la valeur et les limites de l'interpretation hegelienne. En annexe est presentee la Recension que Hegel fait de la Dissertation de W. von Humboldt sur la Bhagavad-Gita - publiee en 1827 dans les Jahrbucher fur wissenschaftliche Kritik, et jusqu'alors inedite en francais - qui fournit une illustration vivante de ces themes. (shrink)

La critique kierkegaardienne de Hegel est‑elle si facile à désamorcer? Si l’on accepte de répondre aux véritables questions posées par l’auteur, sans les faire passer au préalable par la machine conceptuelle hégélienne, ce qui se dessine est un nouvel ordre problématique où il devient difficile de réduire Kierkegaard à un moment du système hégélien : moment nécessaire, certes, mais aussi dépassable. Nous avons choisi d’éclaircir ce nouvel ordre problématique et de le faire rétroagir sur la philosophie hégélienne. La fonction d’autorialité (...) du texte philosophique, l’histoire, le temps : voici les champs qui se retrouveront bouleversés par la pensée kierkegaardienne du fait absolu de la foi. C’est l’amour du paradoxe qui s’opposera en définitive à Hegel, tel le moteur qui pousse la pensée philosophique à prendre véritablement en compte la singularité. (shrink)

La philosophie hégélienne culmine avec l'analyse du rapport entre le moment infini, absolu, divin, et le moment fini, objectif, humain, de l'esprit. Le premier donne son sens - religieux et philosophique - au second qui, en retour, le fait exister - politiquement. Chacun d'eux joue ainsi un rôle spécifique au sein de leur unité cependant fondamentalement divine. A l'encontre de toutes les interprétations anthropologiques du hégélianisme, le texte de Hegel vérifie l'actualisation d'une telle relation dialectique, mais hiérarchisée, entre l'humanité et (...) la divinité de l'esprit, au sein de l'histoire politique comme au sein de l'histoire de la religion et de la philosophie, et, plus généralement, dans le rapport même de celles-ci. La présente étude propose donc une thèse sur l'articulation hégélienne de la politique, de la religion et de la philosophie dans le développement de l'esprit. (shrink)

L'éternité n'est pour Hegel ni une sempiternité, ni un « maintenant » ponctuel figé, encore moins une atemporalité abstraite. Quelle en est dès lors la signification positive ? L'éternité doit se comprendre plutôt comme un présent absolu, un présent total qui dépasse la négativité destructrice du temps naturel et se déploie dans deux domaines : la logique, où l'éternité est la coprésence des moments de l'Idée, et la sphère de l'esprit absolu, en laquelle l'éternité de l'esprit acquiert la dimension de (...) l'historicité, comme l'illustrent notamment l'histoire de la religion et l'histoire de la philosophie. Par cette double compréhension — logique et historique — de l'éternité, Hegel parvient à résoudre le paradoxe de l'historicité de l'esprit absolu et à saisir la possibilité de sa manifestation temporelle. Hegel's conception of eternity should be differenciated from never-ending progress, from the punctual « now » , or even more from an abstract timelessness. Hence what could be the positive meaning of such a notion ? Eternity should rather be understood in terms of an absolute présent, i. e. a total présent superseding the destructive negativity of natural time and spreading out into two fields : the eternity of logics is the co-existence of différent stages in the realm of Idea, and the eternity of the absolute spirit encompasses the dimension of historicity, as may be illustrated in the history of religion and the history of philosophy. Through such a twofold interprétation — i. e.both logical and historical — of eternity, Hegel suceeds in solving the paradox of the historicity of the absolute spirit and in grasping an understanding ofits temporal manifestations. (shrink)

La 4e de couverture indique : « Pour Hegel, l'absolu est esprit. L'esprit est donc principe de tout ce qui a sens (d'abord le logique) et être (d'abord la nature). Mais c'est seulement une fois qu'il est, en tant qu'esprit au début purement subjectif (en gestation dans l'existence naturelle du sens logique), devenu pour lui-même, objet de lui-même, comme esprit, que, dans une telle présence à soi de son faire, il agit véritablement. Se reconnaissant alors, et par là se satisfaisant, (...) dans la nature spiritualisée qu'est l'" esprit objectif " et dans l'" esprit absolu " où il triomphe de sa propre naturalisation ou incarnation, il se fixe, en les fixant elles-mêmes, dans leurs figures respectives : droit, morale, vie sociale-politique ; art, religion, philosophie. Certes, l'esprit ne s'enferme dans aucun des actes qui le configurent de la sorte en le différenciant de sa présence totale à lui-même, mais, vérifiant celle-ci dans leur totalisation, il jouit réellement de lui-même dans leur remémoration pratique réitérée, qui fait bien d'eux les Actes de sa constitution. Les grandes figures de l'esprit sont évoquées dans ce recueil comme une telle auto-différenciation de son identité à soi absolue, par là en leur relation différentielle intime les unes aux autres, donc en leur problématicité. L'esprit, qui n'est qu'à se reconstruire en ses Actes, se révèle ainsi toujours vivant au cœur même de leur système. ». (shrink)

The Hegel Lectures SeriesSeries Editor: Peter C. Hodgson Hegel's lectures have had as great a historical impact as the works he himself published. Important elements of his system are elaborated only in the lectures, especially those given in Berlin during the last decade of his life. The original editors conflated materials from different sources and dates, obscuring the development and logic of Hegel's thought. The Hegel Lectures series is based on a selection of extant and recently discovered transcripts and manuscripts. (...) The original lecture series are reconstructed so that the structure of Hegel's argument can be followed. Each volume presents an accurate new translation accompanied by an editorial introduction and annotations on the text, which make possible the identification of Hegel's many allusions and sources. Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of GodHegel lectured on the proofs of the existence of God as a separate topic in 1829. He also discussed the proofs in the context of his lectures on the philosophy of religion, where the different types of proofs were considered mostly in relation to specific religions. The text that he prepared for his lectures in 1829 was a fully formulated manuscript and appears to have been the first draft of a work that he intended to publish and for which he signed a contract shortly before his death in 1831. The 16 lectures include an introduction to the problem of the proofs and a detailed discussion of the cosmological proof. Philipp Marheineke published these lectures in 1832 as an appendix to the lectures on the philosophy of religion, together with an earlier manuscript fragment on the cosmological proof and the treatment of the teleological and ontological proofs as found in the 1831 philosophy of religion lectures. Hegel's 1829 lectures on the proofs are of particular importance because they represent what he actually wrote as distinct from auditors' transcriptions of oral lectures. Moreover, they come late in his career and offer his final and most seasoned thinking on a topic of obvious significance to him, that of the reality status of God and ways of knowing God. These materials show how Hegel conceived the connection between the cosmological, teleological, and ontological proofs. All of this material has been newly translated by Peter C. Hodgson from the German critical editions by Walter Jaeschke. This edition includes an editorial introduction, annotations on the text, and a glossary and bibliography. (shrink)