Many of our actions will affect the welfare of future people. For instance, continued emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) may lead to future environmental degradation, which will negatively affect people's lives. If we continue GHG-emissions, are we harming future people? In light of the non-identity problem, apparently, we are not. This article assesses three recent attempts (by Carter, Page and Kumar) at grounding concern for future generations in person-affecting moral theory. Although these attempts are promising, the conclusion is that none (...) is completely successful. It seems, then, that we have reason to incorporate a limited measure of consequentialism into person-affecting morality. More precisely, I suggest that we should adopt a version of telic sufficientarianism. (shrink)

According to impersonal moralities, welfare is good, period. Therefore, it is good that welfare is realised, whether by the benefiting of individuals who already exist or by the bringing of new...

Traditional ethical theories have paradoxical implications in regards to questions concerning procreation and our moral duties to future people. It has been suggested that the crux of the problem resides in an all too ‘impersonal’ axiology and that the problems of population axiology can be solved by adopting a ‘Person Affecting Restriction’ which in its slogan form states that an outcome can only be better than another if it is better for people. This move has been especially popular in the (...) context of medical ethics where many of the problems of population axiology are actualized. Examples are embryo or egg selection, pre-implantation genetic testing, assisted reproduction programmes, abortion, just to mention a few. I discuss a number of different interpretations of the Restriction and in particular one interpretation which I call Comparativism. According to this view, we should draw a distinction between uniquely and non-uniquely realizable people. The former people only exist in one out of two possible outcomes, whereas the latter exist in both of the compared outcomes. The idea is that we should give more weight to the well-being of non-uniquely realizable people or take it into account in a different way as compared to the well-being of uniquely realizable people. I argue that the different versions of the Person Affecting Restriction and Comparativism either have counterintuitive implications of their own or are compatible with traditional theories such as Utilitarianism. (shrink)

Physical activity, body composition and sedentary behavior may affect the health of children. Therefore, this study examined the effect of an educational hybrid physical education program on physical fitness, body composition and sedentary and PA times in adolescents. A 9-month group-randomized controlled trial was conducted in 150 participants allocated into the control group and experimental group. Cardiorespiratory fitness, speed, strength, agility, flexibility and body mass index were assessed through previously validated field tests. Sedentary time, PA at school and afterschool were (...) evaluated with the Youth Activity Profile-Spain questionnaire. Significant differences were observed concerning to the CG in APA-weekend, speed-agility and agility. Regarding the intervention, cardiorespiratory fitness, speed-agility, strength, flexibility, agility, PA in school, APA-weekday, APA-weekend, APA-week, and sedentary time increased significantly in the EG. The use of a hybrid program based on teaching personal and social responsibility and gamification strategies produced enhancements in cardiorespiratory fitness, agility, speed, APA-weekdays and APA-weekends, reducing the sedentary time. (shrink)

Risk taking is a component of the decision-making process in situations that involve uncertainty and in which the probability of each outcome – rewards and/or negative consequences – is already known. The influence of cognitive and emotional processes in decision making may affect how risky situations are addressed. First, inaccurate assessments of situations may constitute a perceptual bias in decision making, which might influence RT. Second, there seems to be consensus that a proneness bias exists, known as risk proneness, which (...) can be defined as the propensity to be attracted to potentially risky activities. In the present study, we take the approach that risk perception and risk proneness affect RT behaviours. The study hypothesises that locus of control, emotion regulation, and executive control act as perceptual biases in RT, and that personality, sensation seeking, and impulsivity traits act as proneness biases in RT. The results suggest that locus of control, emotion regulation and executive control influence certain domains of RT, while personality influences in all domains except the recreational, and sensation seeking and impulsivity are involved in all domains of RT. The results of the study constitute a foundation upon which to build in this research area and can contribute to the increased understanding of human behaviour in risky situations. (shrink)

In Reasons and Persons, Parfit (1984) posed a challenge: provide a satisfying normative account that solves the Non-Identity Problem, avoids the Repugnant and Absurd Conclusions, and solves the Mere-Addition Paradox. In response, some have suggested that we look toward person-affecting views of morality for a solution. But the person-affecting views that have been offered so far have been unable to satisfy Parfit's four requirements, and these views have been subject to a number of independent complaints. This paper describes a (...) person-affecting account which meets Parfit's challenge. The account satisfies Parfit's four requirements, and avoids many of the criticisms that have been raised against person-affecting views. (shrink)

Cancer is a chronic disease that causes the most deaths in the world, being a public health problem nowadays. Even though breast cancer affects the daily lives of patients, many women become resilient after the disease, decreasing the impact of the diagnosis. Based on a positive psychology approach, the concept of co-vitality arises understood as a set of socio-emotional competencies that enhance psychological adaptation. In this sense, emotional intelligence is one of the main protective factors associated with resilience. However, it (...) is not always as beneficial as it seems, and can lead to collateral effects on psychological adjustment. Given this controversy, this study aims to find the specific processes through which the dimensions of Perceived Emotional Intelligence can act as a risk or protective factor in the development of resilience. The total sample was 167 women, 46.7% were breast cancer survivors, and 53.3% were healthy controls. The selection of women with breast cancer carries out randomly, recruited through the Oncology Units. The sample completed measures of resilience and PEI, through Resilience Scale and TMMS-24. The results showed that breast cancer survivors showed higher age and greater levels of resilience and mood repair than healthy women. The mediation analysis revealed that breast cancer survival and PEI predicted 28% of the variance of resilience. The direct effects showed that emotional clarity and mood repair increased resilience levels. Although breast cancer did not predict resilience directly, it does through mood repair by an indirect process. Besides, the analysis showed that emotional attention played a role in vulnerability, decreasing mood repair, and resilience. These research support theories that point to a possible dark side of PEI, thus, a great level of emotional attention makes dark the positive effect of mood repair and personal growth if a clear perception of emotions does not complement it. These results provide empirical support concerning the need to work complementary each dimension of PEI to avoid unwanted effects on intrapersonal adjustment. (shrink)

A number of theorists have argued that Scanlon's contractualist theory both "gets around" and "solves" the non-identity problem. They argue that it gets around the problem because hypothetical deliberation on general moral principles excludes the considerations that lead to the problem. They argue that it solves the problem because violating a contractualist moral principle in one's treatment of another wrongs that particular other, grounding a person-affecting moral claim. In this paper, I agree with the first claim but note that all (...) it shows is that the act is impersonally wrong. I then dispute the second claim. On Scanlon's contractualist view, one wrongs a particular other if one treats the other in a way that is unjustifiable to that other on reasons she could not reasonably reject. We should think of person-affecting wronging in terms of the reasons had by the actual agent and the actual person affected by the agent's action. In non-identity cases, interpersonal justifiability is therefore shaped both by the reason to reject the treatment provided by the bad suffered and the reason to affirm the treatment provided by the goods had as a result of existing. I argue it would be reasonable for the actual person to find the treatment justifiable, and so I conclude that Scanlon's contractualist metaethics does not provide a narrow person-affecting solution to the non-identity problem on its own terms. I conclude that the two claims represent a tension within Scanlon's contractualist theory itself. (shrink)

A relevant problem in reproductive ethics is the moral evaluation of selection of the possible children that the parents can have. This article discusses one of the main attempts to solve this problem, the principle of Procreative Beneficence proposed by Julian Savulescu to define a strong pro-selection perspective. According to Savulescu, such a principle has an impersonal form and is balanced with a person-affecting principle of harm. The article proposes a new person-affecting interpretation of Procreative Beneficence, distinguishing it from other (...) pro-selection views and exploring its extension beyond selection to other problems of reproductive ethics. (shrink)

Derek Parfit has argued that (Teleological) Egalitarianism is objectionable by breaking a person-affecting claim to the effect that an outcome cannot be better in any respect - such as that of equality - if it is better for nobody. So, he presents the Priorty View, i.e., the policy of giving priority to benefiting the worse-off, which avoids this objection. But it is here argued, first, that there is another person-affecting claim that this view violates. Secondly, Egalitarianism can be construed as (...) person-affecting in a weaker sense. Thirdly, it is possible to construct a Relational version of the Priority View which incorporates the Egalitarian value of just equality in this sense. Two reasons are given for why this Relational View and Egalitarianism are superior to the Parfitian Absolute Priority View. However, no attempt is made to abjudicate between the first two views, the main point being that they both accept the value of just equality in the same sense. (shrink)

This paper deals with the proposal of a person‐affecting version of the principle of Procreative Beneficence. Such a principle has been stated by Savulescu & Kahane in an impersonal form and balanced with a person‐affecting principle of harm to address the moral problem of the selection of future children. The paper aims to show some differences between Person‐affecting Procreative Beneficence and Savulescu & Kahane’s hybrid position, and to distinguish the former from other pro‐selection perspectives. Moreover, it explores (...) the extension of such a principle beyond selection to other issues of reproductive ethics. (shrink)

In "Intrzmsitivity and thc Person-Affecting Principlc,"‘ (IPAP) Alastair Norcross attacks several key claims of my "Intransitivity and thc Merc Addition Paradox" (IMAP).2 This article suggests that N0rcross’s arguments despite: their appca1——lcavc IMAP’s claims mostly intact. Bcforc assessing N0rcross’s arguments, lct mc characterize two key notions distinguished in IMAP: an essentially comparative view of moral ideals and an intrinsic aspect view. On an essentially comparative view (ECU, different factors might bc relevant for comparing diffcrcnt alternatives regarding a given idcal. On such (...) a view, how bad a situation is regarding E1 given ideal is not an intrinsic feature of that situation. There is 110 fact of thc matter.. (shrink)

Parfit (2017) proposed a novel principle for outcome betterness in different people and different number choices. It is claimed to solve the Non-Identity Problem while avoiding the Repugnant Conclusion, and it shall do so in person-affecting rather than in impersonal terms. According to this Wide Dual Person-Affecting Principle, one of two outcomes would be (i) in one way better if this outcome would together benefit people more, and (ii) in another way better if this outcome would benefit each person more. (...) I argue that a plausible construal of this principle has two features that make it vulnerable to objections. First, the most plausible interpretation of the second part of the principle turns out to incorporate an average function. Although this helps to avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, it implausibly implies that it can be better to add further people with less bad but still miserable lives to populations consisting only of lives full of suffering. Second, the principle is not based on a comparative but on an intrinsic notion of benefit. This allows to solve the Non-Identity Problem, yet it accounts only for a weak sense of person-affecting rather than for the more substantive person-affecting intuition that it is morally significant that particular people are made better (or worse) off. Eventually, I highlight what we can, nevertheless, learn from Parfit’s idea of combining different ways in which outcomes might be better. (shrink)

Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin's argument in "Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox." Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of prticular significance to consequentialists. If 'all-things-considered better than' does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...) door to a consequentialist account of moral dilemmas. Temkin's argument crucially appeals to what he calls "the Person-Affecting Principle (PAP)", which he roughly characterizes as follows, "On PAP, one outcome is worse than another only if it affects people for the worse" This paper argues that PAP, although plausible, does not hold in precisely those situations in which it would have to hold in order for Temkin's argument against transitivity to work. (shrink)

Philosophy journals and conferences have recently seen several attempts to argue that ‘all-things-considered better than’ does not obey strict transitivity. This paper focuses on Larry Temkin’s argument in “Intransitivity and the Mere Addition Paradox.” Although his argument is not aimed just at utilitarians or even consequentialists in general, it is of particular significance to consequentialists. If ‘all-things-considered better than’ does not obey transitivity, there may be choice situations in which there is no optimal choice, which would seem to open the (...) door to a consequentialist account of moral dilemmas. Temkin’s argument crucially appeals to what he calls “the Person-Affecting Principle (PAP)”. which he roughly characterizes as follows, “On PAP, one outcome is worse than another only if it affects people for the worse” This paper argues that PAP, although plausible, does not hold in precisely those situations in which it would have to hold in order for Temkin’s argument against transitivity to work. (shrink)

This paper considers two objections based in axiological considerations against the position that whether a given outcome, or possible future or world, is morally worse than a second world may depend in part on what is going on at a third world. Such a wide-angled approach to determining worseness is critical to the solution I have previously proposed in connection with the nonidentity problem. I argue that both objections fail.

Recent advances in biomarkers may soon make it possible to identify persons at high risk for late-onset Alzheimer’s disease at a presymptomatic stage. Popular demand for testing is increasing despite the lack of cure and effective prevention options and despite uncertainties regarding the predictive value of biomarker tests. This underscores the relevance of the ethical, cultural and social implications of predictive testing and the need to advance the bioethical debate beyond considerations of clinical consequences. Our qualitative study included three groups (...) of affected persons: People with mild neurocognitive disorder, their relatives and family caregivers of people with dementia. We explored their moral motivations regarding predictive, biomarker-based testing and preclinical diagnostics. We interviewed affected individuals in Germany and Israel. Transcripts of 12 focus groups and 12 semistructured interviews were content analysed with a focus on the moral motivations of affected persons in their justification of why they accept or reject predictive testing and early diagnosis. We grouped the underlying aspects of moral motivation into four ethical categories: beneficence as a form of personal utility focusing on well-being, the ties of responsibility linking families and their individual members, the importance of self-determination by later life planning and notions of a good life. In general, cultural parallels among these motives were very obvious. Cultural variation occurred mainly in openness to suicide, scepticism about test validity and emphasis on personal autonomy. The study underscores the importance of counselling for life-planning issues and of informing test candidates about problems with test validity and about the ambiguity of test results. All data relevant to the study are included in the article or uploaded as supplementary information. (shrink)

Assisted reproductive technologies have greatly increased our control over reproductive choices, leading some bioethicists to argue that we face unprecedented moral obligations towards progeny. Several models attempting to balance the principle of procreative autonomy with these obligations have been proposed. The least demanding is the minimal threshold model (MTM), according to which every reproductive choice is permissible, except creating children whose lives will not be worth living. Hence, as long as the future child is likely to have a life worth (...) living, prospective parents may be allowed to use preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) to select embryos with genetic diseases or disabilities. Assuming a consequentialist person‐affecting view of morality, this paper investigates whether the MTM is an appropriate tool to guide procreative decisions given the continuous development of reproductive genetic technologies. In particular, I consider germline genome editing (GGE) and I argue that its application in human reproduction, unlike PGD, should be conceived as person‐affecting towards future progeny. I claim that even if we assume the plausibility of the MTM within PGD, we are committed to accepting that a greater moral obligation towards progeny should guide procreative decisions if GGE were available. In this case, the MTM should no longer be considered an appropriate instrument to guide procreative choices. Finally, I investigate when we face this greater moral obligation, concluding that it applies only when prospective parents have already engaged in the in vitro fertilization process. (shrink)

According to the Internal Aspects View, the value of different outcomesdepends solely on the internal features possessed by each outcome and theinternal relations between them. This paper defends the Internal AspectsView against Larry Temkin’s defence of the Essentially Comparative View,according to which the value of different outcomes depends on what isthe alternative outcome they are compared with. The paper discusses bothperson-affecting arguments and Spectrum Arguments. The paper doesnot defend a person-affecting view over an impersonal one, but it arguesthat although there (...) are intuitive person-affecting principles that entail anEssentially Comparative View, the intuitions that support these principlescan also be acommodated by other principles that are compatible with theInternal Aspects View. The paper also argues that the rejection of transitivityand the Internal Aspects View does not help us to solve the challengespresented by Spectrum Arguments. Despite this, the arguments presentedby Temkin do succeed in showing that, unfortunately, our intuitions arechaotic and inconsistent. The paper argues that this has metaethicalconsequences that will be unwelcome by a moral realist such as Temkin,since they challenge the idea that our intuitions may track a moral realityexisting independently of our preferences. (shrink)

Lockean accounts of personhood propose that an individual is a person just in case that individual is characterized by some advanced cognitive capacity. On these accounts, human beings with severe cognitive impairment are not persons. Some accept this result—I do not. In this paper, I therefore advance and defend an account of personhood that secures personhood for human beings who are cognitively impaired. On the account for which I argue, an individual is a person just in case that individual belongs (...) to a natural kind that is normally characterized by advanced cognitive capacities. Since “human being” is just such a natural kind, individual human beings can be persons even when they do not themselves have advanced cognitive capacities. I argue, furthermore, that we have good reason to accept this account of personhood over rival accounts since it is uniquely able to accommodate the intuitive concept of an impaired person. (shrink)

ABSTRACTModern technological means allow for meaningful interaction across arbitrary distances, while human morality evolved in environments in which individuals needed to be spatially close in order to interact. We investigate how people integrate knowledge about modern technology with their ancestral moral dispositions to help relieve nearby suffering. Our first study establishes that spatial proximity between an agent's means of helping and the victims increases people's judgement of helping obligations, even if the agent is constantly far personally. We then report (...) and meta-analyse 20 experiments elucidating the cognitive mechanisms behind this effect, which include inferences of increased efficaciousness and personal involvement. Implications of our findings for the scientific understanding of ancestral moral dispositions in modern environments are discussed, as well as suggestions for how these insights might be exploited to increase charitable giving. Our meta-analysis provides a practical example.. (shrink)

This article aims to identify new moral dilemmas generated by technological progress and its consequence - the phenomenon of technological alienation in modern society. It examines the relationship between the phenomenon of alienation, technological progress and moral dilemmas they cause in modern society. In addition to the emergence of new moral and existential issues that arises as the consequence of the direct “collision” of a person and technologies as a result of their widespread introduction into our lives, we consider moral (...) dilemmas arising from technological progress in such areas of life as politics, economics and education. Each of them poses a deeper problem for the person - an alienation from other people, from the species essence and from oneself, which allows us to designate this question not only as social problem, but also affecting existential questions. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to explore the relationship between affectivity and moral experience from a phenomenological perspective. I will start by showing how in a phenomenologically oriented account emotions can be conceived as intentional evaluative feelings which play a role in both moral epistemology and the motivation of moral behaviour. I will then move to discuss a particular kind of affect, "existential feelings" (Ratcliffe in Journal of Consciousness Studies 12(8–10), 43–60, 2005, 2008), which has not been considered so (...) far in the discourse on moral and affective experience. Relying on the notion of pre-intentionality through which Ratcliffe characterizes existential feelings (Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53(6), 602–626, 2010) and on some insights into the relationship between affectivity and ethics developed by De Monticelli (2003, 2006), I suggest that key to the role played by existential feelings in moral experience is that they determine the kinds of evaluations that it is possible for us to make and the range of our possibilities of action. I then illustrate and further develop this idea through a phenomenological analysis of some forms of psychopathological experience. More specifically, by considering some experiential features of depression and borderline personality disorder, I claim that, by acquiring an existential character, emotions such as guilt, feelings of isolation, anger and shame can radically alter the structure of the individual evaluative perspective, having a deep impact on both moral judgements and behaviours. (shrink)

There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...) bribe, and so only one takes a bribe. Luck is the salient difference between the agents in each case. After all, the spatial location of the pedestrian is outside of each driver’s control, and being offered a bribe is outside of each judge’s control. But we blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, and we blame the bribe-taker more than the mere would-be bribe-taker. This is because we believe that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. Nevertheless, the idea that luck affects moral responsibility contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person’s blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. This moral principle yields the verdict that the drivers are equally blameworthy and that the judges are equally blameworthy. So, to put the contradiction in concrete terms, our thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy, and the same is true for the judges. -/- I argue that only the first strand of our thinking is correct. Certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and character can partially determine a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. In terms of the examples, I argue that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. But if I am to make genuine progress in the moral luck debate, my arguments cannot appeal to case intuitions such as ‘the killer driver is more blameworthy,’ because the problem of moral luck is fundamentally a clash of intuitions. So, I offer arguments from diverse areas in philosophy in order to ensure that they do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions. (shrink)

This research examines how the fit between employees moral development and the ethical work climate of their organization affects employee attitudes. Person-organization fit was assessed by matching individuals' level of cognitive moral development with the ethical climate of their organization. The influence of P-O fit on employee attitudes was assessed using a sample of 304 individuals from 73 organizations. In general, the findings support our predictions that fit between personal and organizational ethics is related to higher levels of commitment and (...) job satisfaction and lower levels of turnover intent. Ethical P-O fit was related to higher levels of affective commitment across all three ethical climate types. Job satisfaction was only associated with ethical P-O fit for one of the three P-O fit variables and turnover intentions were significantly associated with two of the ethical P-O fit variables. The most consistent effect was found for the Conventional - Caring fit variable, which was significantly related to all three attitudes assessed. The weakest effect was found for the Preconventional - Instrumental fit variable, which was only predictive of affective commitment. The pattern of findings and implications for practice and future research are discussed. (shrink)

This research examines how the fit between employees moral development and the ethical work climate of their organization affects employee attitudes. Person-organization fit was assessed by matching individuals' level of cognitive moral development with the ethical climate of their organization. The influence of P-O fit on employee attitudes was assessed using a sample of 304 individuals from 73 organizations. In general, the findings support our predictions that fit between personal and organizational ethics is related to higher levels of commitment and (...) job satisfaction and lower levels of turnover intent. Ethical P-O fit was related to higher levels of affective commitment across all three ethical climate types. Job satisfaction was only associated with ethical P-O fit for one of the three P-O fit variables and turnover intentions were significantly associated with two of the ethical P-O fit variables. The most consistent effect was found for the Conventional - Caring fit variable, which was significantly related to all three attitudes assessed. The weakest effect was found for the Preconventional - Instrumental fit variable, which was only predictive of affective commitment. The pattern of findings and implications for practice and future research are discussed. (shrink)

In the first part of this article, I argue that even those entities that in their own right and for their own sake give us reason not to destroy them and to help them are sometimes substitutable for the good of other entities. In so arguing, I consider the idea of being valuable as an end in virtue of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. I also conclude that entities that have claims to things and against others are especially nonsubstitutable. In the (...) second part, I argue that cloning poses no threat to the nonsubstitutability of these entities (and in this sense, to the dignity of persons). I also consider the relation between cloning and (what I called) holistic identity, and between the latter and genetic identity. In the concluding part of the article, I try to distinguish cases where identity over time and so-called person-affecting acts have and do not have greater moral significance than nonidentity over time and nonperson-affecting acts. I try to apply my results to cases involving embryos, future generations, and to the so-called Non-Identity Problem. (shrink)

The study reveals the feature of determining the limitations of human existence, which affects moral and ethical beliefs and views. It is noted that the philosopher N. Abbagnano saw the need to adjust the philosophy of existentialism, reducing pessimistic tones that could interfere with the development of existential thinking. The aim of the article was to determine the moral capabilities of man in the situations of measuring existence in the positive context of philosophy N. Abbagnano. Accordingly, the study makes an (...) understanding of the role of existentialism as a philosophical current of the twentieth century; the role of death and freedom in human existence is determined; the problem of moral capabilities of a person in situations of limitation is highlighted.Attention is drawn to the key differences between the philosophy of existentialism and romanticism according to the views of the philosopher, from which follows the problem of the specificity of freedom and finiteness of man, as well as the importance of a sense of human life, taking into account his considerations about his finiteness. It is noted that the analysis of the views of existentialist philosophers prompted the philosopher to the idea of determining the positivity of human existence in situations of limitation. The moral responsibility of man is bound, according to N. Abbagnano, with the adoption of responsibility to themselves and society on its own mission, the definition of the limitation of freedom not only the moral principles of the environment, but also their own purpose of life.A special emphasis in the problem of human limitation is given to the theme of death in the philosophy of N. Abbagnano. Death is defined not simply as the fact of a person’s limb or death, but as the possibility of possibility. Death is a situation that no one can get around, and even predict. Therefore, death can interrupt the mission of human life at any time, and a person has no access to the secret of his own death, at least until its occurrence. It is the possibility of death that leads to the moral horizons of man and is prescribed in the moral and ethical environment of co-existence. It is indicated that the possibility has a similar nature to death, because its mystery is revealed when the possibility ceases to be only an opportunity, and therefore it is always beyond human understanding.Nature has a possible total definition of good and evil, which in the philosophy of N. Abbagnano not separated and are not opposed. Freedom Kok rent on both options simultaneously, and multiplied under the influence of freedom in a situation koeksisters. Attention is drawn to the definition of permanent affiliation to cocsistent of existence that begins with birth and does not end until death. And it is through co-existence that the possibility is possible. The moral horizons of koekzistentsii are limited not only by death, as a break in the ties of existence, violations of bindings, but also by the constant existence of good and evil, as inseparable parts of life. Through the creation of morality, man seeks being, seeks that enchanting state of rightness and truth, the finding of which should bring peace of certainty in situations of possibility. The conclusion is made that the limitation of a person to the possibility of the possible, his own finiteness is the positivity of human existence. (shrink)

Nicholas Agar argues that it is possible, and even likely, that radically enhanced human beings will turn out to be ‘post-persons’, that is, beings with a moral status higher than that of mere persons such as us.1 This would mean that they will be morally justified in sacrificing our lives and well-being not merely in cases of emergency, but also in cases of ‘supreme opportunities’ , that is, whenever such a sacrifice leads to ‘significant benefits for post-persons’. For this reason, (...) Agar believes, it would be morally wrong to allow any cognitive enhancement of people that might entail the risk of moral status enhancement.However, neither are there sufficient grounds to expect radically enhanced human beings to have a higher moral status than unenhanced human beings, nor would it, even if they did, be morally wrong to bring about their existence. We use moral status ascriptions mostly as a convenient shorthand to indicate a difference in capacities that strikes us as morally relevant. Rocks have zero moral status because they cannot feel or think, so we cannot hurt or kill them. Whatever we do to them, it does not affect them. Animals, on the other hand, …. (shrink)

Individuals diagnosed with conduct disorder (CD) in childhood and adolescence are at risk for increasingly maladaptive and dangerous behaviors, which unchecked, can lead to antisocial personality disorder (ASPD) in adulthood. Children with CD, especially those with the callous unemotional subgroup qualifier (“limited prosocial emotions”/dsm‐5), present with a more severe pattern of delinquency, aggression, and antisocial behavior, all markings of prodrome ASPD. Given this recognized diagnostic trajectory, with a pathological course playing out tragically at the individual, familial, and societal level, and (...) lack of effective remediation via current standards of care, we posit an alternate treatment approach; case‐specific compulsory moral habilitation aimed at rectifying the undeveloped affective domain of adolescents and young adults suffering from these disorders. We begin with a brief historical overview of response to mental illness, review CD and ASPD diagnostic criteria and treatment limitations, and posit a unique neurohabilitative approach that focuses on the absent affective moral development of these populations. Next, we invoke a public health safety argument to justify case‐specific compulsory moral habilitation, discuss neurotechnologies to be considered in treatment, and conclude with ethical considerations and suggestions for further research. (shrink)

After describing the disorder of psychopathy, I examine the theories and the evidence concerning the psychopaths’ deficient moral capacities. I first examine whether or not psychopaths can pass tests of moral knowledge. Most of the evidence suggests that they can. If there is a lack of moral understanding, then it has to be due to an incapacity that affects not their declarative knowledge of moral norms, but their deeper understanding of them. I then examine two suggestions: it is their deficient (...) practical reason or their stunted emotions that are at fault. The evidence supports both explanations. I conclude with an overview of the debate concerning whether they are morally or legally responsible for their actions. (shrink)

This study investigates the impact of fraud/lawsuit revelation on U.S. top executive turnover and compensation. It also examines potential explanatory variables affecting the executive turnover and compensation among U.S. fraud/lawsuit firms. Four important findings are documented. First, there was significantly higher executive turnover among U.S. firms with fraud/lawsuit revelation in the Wall Street Journal than matched firms without such revelation. Second, although on average, U.S. top executives received an increase in cash compensation after fraud/lawsuit revelation, this increase is smaller than (...) that of matched non-fraud/lawsuit firms. Third, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to change top executive when chief executive officer (CEO) was not the board chairman and CEO had been on the board for a short time. Fourth, fraud/lawsuit firms were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation when profitability was low, firms were involved in fraud, the compensation committee size was small, and the board met more often. These findings indicate that although, in general, U.S. fraud/lawsuits firms did not reduce their executive cash compensation, those involved in fraud were more likely to reduce their executive cash compensation than to change their top executives. The finding, that ethical standards is not a significant factor for U.S. executive turnover nor compensation reduction, suggests that ethics appears to play no part in the board’s decisions, and that U.S. firms may have ethical standards in writing but they do not implement nor enforce the standards. (shrink)

A satisfactory theory of “strong evaluation” should manage to do two things: first of all, make sense of the distinction between impersonal ethical issues and personal orientation. Secondly, the deontic layer of reasons and norms should be taken into account, among other things because the central indicators of strong evaluation, namely praise and blame, presuppose norms and reasons as standards of praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. These two desiderata seem to pull in different directions. The suggested analysis of the deontic layer in (...) terms of external, value-based reasons for action may make it seem even more difficult to allow for reasons of one’s own. I argue that there can be reasons of one’s own, depending on one’s orientations, commitments and the actual shape of one’s affective-conative responses. First I discuss the general reasons that decisions and commitments create, and general (stance-insensitive) reasons for making a commitment to X. These suffice as a reply to MacIntyre’s worry (9.2). Yet the picture can be developed further. Drawing on the idea of exclusionary reasons (introduced in 9.1), I discuss the general reasons for having an orientation of one’s own and the difference between an orientation to the good and a commitment to a good. The difference is the role they have as reasons for action. Commitments play a stronger role in practical reasoning because they are exclusionary reasons (9.3). Then I turn to non-uniformity and stance-sensitivity of reasons, and ask whether different people have stance-sensitive reasons to make different commitments (9.4). In the last section I analyze more closely the nature of personal resonance and the difference it may make (9.5). (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Problems in Medicine and Psychiatry. By Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. Psychiatric Ethics. Edited by Sidney Block and Paul Chodoff. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavior Control. By Ruth Macklin.

Recently it has been argued that some instances of germ‐line gene therapy will change the identity of the person who receives the benefit of therapy, and that in these instances there is no good moral reason to conduct germ‐line gene therapy. Against this we argue that even if gene therapy should have an effect on the identity of the resulting person, this would not diminish the urgency of the therapy. Not only would impersonal moral reasons speak in favour of such (...) radical gene therapy, there would also be person‐affecting reasons to perform it. (shrink)

Heidegger's neglect of value : Schelerian prospects -- The lived-experience of humanism in Husserl and James -- Participatory realism in Scheler's ethics -- Interpreting Scheler's Aktsein through Heidegger's Sein-in-der-Welt -- Phenomenological personalism -- Persons realizing values : how participatory realism works -- Embodying values : making values more concrete -- Finding hierarchy and phenomenological realism in James's affective intentionality -- Ethical non-naturalism and Schelerian participatory realism.

The theory of evolution: The rise and impact of evolutionary ideas, by R. Scoon. Evolution in its relation to the philosophy of nature and the philosophy of culture, by F.S.C. Northrop. The genetic nature of differences among men, by T. Dobzhansky. Evolutionary thought in America: Evolution and American sociology by R.E.L. Faris. The impact of the idea of evolution on the American political and constitutional tradition, by E.S. Corwin. Evolutionism in American economics, 1800-1946, by J.J. Spengler. The influence of evolutionary (...) theory upon American psychological thought, by E.G. Boring. Naturalism in American literature, by M. Cowley. The idea of organic expression and American architecture, by D.D. Egbert. Evolution and moral theory in America, W.F. Quillian, Jr. Evolution and theology in America, by S. Persons. (shrink)

Describes the rescue efforts involved in saving the lives of animals affected by a tornado.

Book reviewed in this article: Philosophy in Medicine: Conceptual and Ethical Problems in Medicine and Psychiatry. By Charles M. Culver and Bernard Gert. Psychiatric Ethics. Edited by Sidney Block and Paul Chodoff. Man, Mind, and Morality: The Ethics of Behavior Control. By Ruth Macklin.

Prior research has shown the relationship between objective economic inequality and searching for positional goods. It also investigated the relationship between social class and low income with conspicuous consumption. However, the causal relationship between economic inequality has been less explored. Furthermore, there are also few studies looking for the psychological mechanisms that underlie these effects. The current research’s main goal is to analyze the consequences of perceived economic inequality on conspicuous and status consumption and the possible psychological mechanisms that could (...) explain its effects. Furthermore, the current research aims to examine whether there is a causal relationship between PEI and materialism preferences and attitudes toward indebtedness. This work includes two preregister experimental studies. In the Study 1, we manipulated PEI and its legitimacy through a 2 × 2 between-participants experiment. Results showed a main effect of PEI on status consumption, status seeking, status anxiety, materialism, and attitude toward indebtedness. No interaction effect between legitimacy and inequality was found. In the Study 2, we manipulated the PEI through the Bimboola Paradigm. We replicated the effect of PEI on status consumption, status seeking, and materialism and found that status seeking mediated the relationship between PEI and status and conspicuous consumption. Economic inequality affects consumer behavior and favors consumption preferences for products that provide desirable symbolic values associated with status. These results could have important implications in the interpersonal and intergroup processes, including those related to consumption and purchase. (shrink)

Building on the discussion between Stephen Darwall and Michael Tomassello, we propose an alternative evolutionary account of moral motivation in its two-pronged dimension. We argue that an evolutionary account of moral motivation must account for the two forms of moral motivation that we distinguish: motivation to be partial, which is triggered by the affective relationships we develop with others; and motivation to be impartial, which is triggered by those norms to which we give impartial validity. To that aim, we present (...) the second-person standpoint of morality, first as Darwall conceives of it, and then as we reinterpret it from a naturalistic approach. Then we synthesize Tomasello’s evolutionary account of morality, and Darwall’s objections to it. To reply to those objections, building on Tomasello’s proposal, we argue that the motivation to be impartial, and the feeling of obligation to comply with normative requirements, appeared when humans anticipated and, critically, internalized others’ sanctions to the violation of social norms. Consequently, we posit that social norms and sanctions appeared first at the community level, and only after that were they internalized in the form of self-directed reactive attitudes. Finally, we derive some corollaries that follow from our proposal. (shrink)

In this paper, the moral person is understood through the lens of identity theory in sociological social psychology. Identity theory helps identify the internal dynamics of individuals as moral persons by apprehending their self-views’, behavior, and emotions within and across situations. When the identity process is activated, the cognitive, behavioral, and affective dimensions of individuals inter-relate through a self-regulated control system. When this control system is laced with moral meanings, we see how moral persons emerge and are maintained or challenged (...) in situations. I review studies that I carried out over 2 years that sampled over 3,000 individuals using survey and laboratory research. A series of hypothesis consistent with identity theory were tested to examine individuals’ moral identity, moral behavior, and moral emotions. The findings confirm the predictive power of identity theory in explaining the moral person. Future avenues for research are briefly discussed. (shrink)

Many academics and world leaders have declared that there is a moral imperative to address climate change. But such claims often fall on deaf ears because the nature of the threat posed by global warming lacks many of the features of a paradigmatic moral transgression [Jamieson, Dale. 2007. The moral and political challenges of climate change. Working Paper, New York University, New York]. This paper explores these psychological obstacles to moral engagement about climate change. I argue that the temporal and (...) psychosocial distance of the threat of global warming undermines the kind of affective response that motivates moral concern. I conclude by suggesting that images focusing more on the personal and short-term consequences of global warming will generate stronger moral reactions. (shrink)

In this paper, we explore and discuss the use of the concept of being affected in biomedical decision making processes in Germany. The corresponding German term ‘Betroffenheit’ characterizes on the one hand a relation between a state of affairs and a person and on the other an emotional reaction that involves feelings like concern and empathy with the suffering of others. An example for the increasing relevance of being affected is the postulation of the participation of people with disabilities and (...) chronic or acute diseases in the discourse, as partly realized in the German National Ethics Council or the Federal Joint Committee. Nevertheless, not only on the political level, the resistance against the participation of affected people is still strong; the academic debate seems to be cross-grained, too. Against this background, we explore the meaning and argumentative role of the concept of being affected as it is used by affected and lay people themselves. Our analysis is based on four focus group discussions in which lay people, patients and relatives of patients discuss their attitudes towards biomedical interventions such as organ transplantation and genetic testing. This setting allows for a comparison of how affected and non-affected people are concerned and deliberate about medical opportunities, but also of how they position themselves as being affected or non-affected with respect to (scientific) knowledge and morality. On this basis, we discuss the normative relevance of being affected for the justification of political participation. (shrink)

In this book, the authors provide a detailed discussion of some problematic of some critical issues of the philosophical research field known as “moral psychology”. The common thread that ideally combines the eight essays concerns the definition and demarcation of the “moral mind”, as a set of cognitive and affective capabilities, attitudes, psychological mechanisms that have practical relevance when we wonder how to act or we evaluate the of action of others. The subtitle (persons, reasons, virtues) means to focus on (...) the vertexes that draw an ideal triangulation within which lies the practical space characterizing and nourishing the moral life of human beings. (shrink)

There is a way of doing moral philosophy which goes something like this: If it can be shown that it is rational for perfectly selfish people to accept the constraints of morality, then it will follow, a fortiori, that it is rational for people capable of affective bonds, and thus less selfish, to do so. On this way of proceeding the real argument – that is, the argument for the actual constraints to be adopted – proceeds with only fully (...) rational individuals who have no other concern than to maximize their nontuistic preferences. Then it is noted that the affective capacities of human beings actually make quite palatable the constraints that the fully rational persons with wholly nontuistic preferences have agreed upon. (shrink)