Phylogenies are increasingly being used to investigate human history, diversification and cultural evolution. While using phylogenies in this way is not new, new modes of analysis are being applied to inferring history, reconstructing past states, and examining processes of change. Phylogenies have the advantage of providing a way of creating a continuous history of all current populations, and they make a large number of analyses and hypothesis tests possible even when other forms of historical information are patchy or nonexistent. (...) In common with approaches taken in other historical sciences, phylogenetics is a way of reconstructing past and processes using the traces left in the present day. Trees, based on DNA, language, cultural traits, or other evidence, are now sprouting all over the academic landscape. The increasing use of phylogenetic analysis to understand human cultural evolution has been embraced by some, and scorned by others. The purpose of this article is not to review methods and applications of phylogenetic analyses, nor to consider the growing field of cultural phylogenetics, but, more broadly, to explore how we interpret phylogenies as narratives about human diversification. The first half of the article deals with meaning: phylogenies are often interpreted as histories, but a bifurcating tree is at best an abstract representation of history, and its connections to past events and processes is dependent on the data used, the assumptions made in the analysis, and the degree to which nodes in the tree (where one lineage splits into two) can be connected to change and movement in real populations. The second half of the article explores the purpose of phylogenies: a tree does not have to be a literal history of human lineages in order to be useful for investigating processes of human diversification. Phylogenies should not be read as accurate records of history, but as a way of exploring plausible explanations for current patterns of diversity. Phylogenies provide important information that can be used to test ideas about human diversity, and can help to guard against errors of inference arising from statistical artifacts. (shrink)

In a critical review of late twentieth-century gene-culture co-evolutionary models labelled as ‘global phylogeny’, the authors present evidence for the long legacy of co-evolutionary theories in European-based thinking, highlighting that (1) ideas of social and cultural evolution preceded the idea of biological evolution, (2) linguistics played a dominant role in the formation of a unified theory of human co-evolution, and (3) that co-evolutionary thinking was only possible due to perpetuated and renewed transdisciplinary reticulations between scholars of different disciplines—especially (...) within the integrative framework of the ‘humanid’ and the ‘hominid’ branches of anthropology. (shrink)

In a critical review of late twentieth-century gene-culture co-evolutionary models labelled as ‘global phylogeny’, the authors present evidence for the long legacy of co-evolutionary theories in European-based thinking, highlighting that (1) ideas of social and cultural evolution preceded the idea of biological evolution, (2) linguistics played a dominant role in the formation of a unified theory of human co-evolution, and (3) that co-evolutionary thinking was only possible due to perpetuated and renewed transdisciplinary reticulations between scholars of different disciplines—especially (...) within the integrative framework of the ‘humanid’ and the ‘hominid’ branches of anthropology. (shrink)

Biology and the social sciences share an interest in phylogeny. Biologists know that living species are descended from past species, and use the pattern of similarities among living species to reconstruct the history of phylogenetic branching. Social scientists know that the beliefs, values, practices, and artifacts that characterize contemporary societies are descended from past societies, and some social science disciplines, linguistics and cross cultural anthropology for example, have made use of observed similarities to reconstruct cultural histories. Darwin appreciated that (...) his theory of descent with modification had many similarities of pattern and process to the already well developed field of historical linguistics. In many other areas of social science, however, phylogenetic reconstruction has not played a central role. (shrink)

If our knowledge of human cognition were based solely on research with participants younger than the age of 2 years, there would be no basis for the relational reinterpretation hypothesis, and Darwin's continuity theory would be safe as houses. Because many of the shortcomings cited apply to human infants, we propose how a consideration of cognitive development would inform the relational reinterpretation hypothesis.

We examine the ontogeny and phylogeny of object and fantasy play from a functional perspective. Each form of play is described from an evolutionary perspective in terms of its place in the total time and energy budgets of human and nonhuman juveniles. As part of discussion of functions of play, we examine sex differences, particularly as they relate to life in the environment of evolutionary adaptedness and economic activities of human and nonhuman primates. Object play may relate (...) to foraging activities. Although fantasy play has been viewed as limited to humans, we speculate that certain types of fantasy play may be present in some nonhuman primates. Fantasy play may enable juveniles to see situations from different perspectives. We conclude that fantasy play may have immediate effects and object play may have deferred effects. (shrink)

Gentle handling of mammals , and lizards , but not of frogs and fish elevated the set-point for body temperature, i.e., produced an emotional fever, achieved only behaviourally in lizards. Heart rate, another detector of emotion in mammals, was also accelerated by gentle handling, from ca. 70 b/min to ca. 110 b/min in lizards. This tachycardia faded in about 10 min. The same handling did not significantly modify the frogs’ heart rates. The absence of emotional tachycardia in frogs and its (...) presence in lizards , together with the emotional fever exhibited by mammals and reptiles, but not by frogs or fish, would suggest that emotion emerged in the evolutionary lineage between amphibians and reptiles. Such a conclusion would imply that reptiles possess consciousness with its characteristic hedonic dimension, pleasure. The role of sensory pleasure in decision making was therefore verified in iguanas placed in a motivational conflict. To be able to reach a bait , the iguanas had to leave a warm refuge, provided with standard food, and had to venture into a cold environment. The results showed that lettuce was not necessary to the iguanas and that they traded off the palatability of the bait against the disadvantage of the cold. Thus, the behaviour of the iguanas was possibly produced, as it is in humans, through the maximization of sensory pleasure. Altogether, these results may indicate that the first elements of mental experience emerged between amphibians and reptiles. (shrink)

Historical language change (), like evolution itself, is a fact; and its implications for the biological evolution of the human capacity for language acquisition () have been ably explored by many contemporary theorists. However, Christiansen & Chater's (C&C's) revolutionary call for a replacement of phylogenetic models with glossogenetic cultural models is based on an inadequate understanding of either. The solution to their lies before their eyes, but they mistakenly reject it due to a supposed Gene/;culture co-evolution poses a series (...) of difficult theoretical and empirical problems that will be resolved by subtle thinking, adequate models, and careful cross-disciplinary research, not by oversimplified manifestos. (shrink)

One of the particular problems in the debate between science and theology regarding human origins seems to be an apparent controversy between the continuous character of evolutionary processes leading to the origin of Homo sapiens and the punctual understanding of the act of creation of man seen as taking place in a moment in time. The paper elaborates scientific arguments for continuity or discontinuity of evolution, and what follows, for the existence or nonexistence of a clear borderline between our (...) species and the rest of the living world. It is argued that, due to the conventional character of the notion of species, anthropology is unable to point to a moment in time or a place on Earth when or where Homo sapiens came into existence as a ‘really new’ species. The argument of the non˗specificity of humans is reinforced by considering emotional homologies between man and apes, “cultural” transmission of the patterns of behaviour in animals, or their mental and communicational abilities. All this is in line with a more general philosophical view of ontological continuity of the world. However, the argument is counterbalanced by pointing to such human characteristics as the ability to use abstract notions, or those forms of human behaviour which do not seem to have their animal analogues. In turn, various possibilities of theological interpretations of the act of creation of man are pointed out and a question is considered as to what extent theology is interested in a "momentary" account of this act. By pointing to theological accounts proposed as early as the 2nd century, it is argued that a vision of God – the craftsman who ‘builds’ its creation step by step, or even less restrictive forms of divine interventionism, are theologically inadequate. The original opposition between the continuity of evolutionary processes and ‘punctual’ character of creation is thus weakened and, from that perspective, a solution to the controversy in question is sought. One of such solutions, an “evolutionary model of creation”, a form of evolutionary creationism, proposed by a Polish philosopher Kazimierz Kloskowski, is presented. This model is based on two assumptions, stemming from process philosophy and evolutionary epistemology. The need to apply them in constructing a coherent view on evolution and creation is critically considered in the paper. (shrink)

During the first two years of human life a common neural substrate underlies the hierarchical organization of elements in the development of speech as well as the capacity to combine objects manually, including tool use. Subsequent cortical differentiation, beginning at age two, creates distinct, relatively modularized capacities for linguistic grammar and more complex combination of objects. An evolutionary homologue of the neural substrate for language production and manual action is hypothesized to have provided a foundation for the evolution of (...) language before the divergence of the hominids and the great apes. Support comes from the discovery of a Broca's area homologue and related neural circuits in contemporary primates. In addition, chimpanzees have an identical constraint on hierarchical complexity in both tool use and symbol combination. Their performance matches that of the two-year-old child who has not yet developed the neural circuits for complex grammar and complex manual combination of objects. (shrink)

We approach the issue of holophrasis versus compositionality in the emergence of protolanguage by analyzing the earliest combinatorial constructions in child, bonobo, and chimpanzee: messages consisting of one symbol combined with one gesture. Based on evidence from apes learning an interspecies visual communication system and children acquiring a first language, we conclude that the potential to combine two different kinds of semiotic element — deictic and representational — was fundamental to the protolanguage forming the foundation for the earliest human (...) language. This is a form of compositionality, in that each communicative element stands for a single semantic element. The conclusion that human protolanguage was exclusively holophrastic — containing a proposition in a single word — emerges only if one considers the symbol alone, without taking into account the gesture as a second element comprising the total message. (shrink)

Humans are normative beings through and through. This capacity for normativity lies at the core of uniquely human forms of understanding and regulating socio-cultural group life. Plausibly, therefore, the hominin lineage evolved specialized social-cognitive, motivational, and affective abilities that helped create, transmit, preserve, and amend shared social practices. In turn, these shared normative attitudes and practices shaped subsequent human phylogeny, constituted new forms of group life, and hence structured human ontogeny, too. An essential aspect of (...) class='Hi'>human ontogeny is therefore its reciprocal nature regarding normativity. This chapter reviews recent evidence from developmental psychology suggesting that, from early on, human children take a normative attitude toward others’ conduct in social interactions, and thus a collectivistic and impersonal perspective on norms. We discuss to what extent our closest living primate relatives lack normative attitudes and therefore live in a non-normative socio-causal world structured by individual preferences, power relationships, and regularities. (shrink)

Research in anthropology has shown that kin terminologies have a complex combinatorial structure and vary systematically across cultures. This article argues that universals and variation in kin terminology result from the interaction of (1) an innate conceptual structure of kinship, homologous with conceptual structure in other domains, and (2) principles of optimal, “grammatical” communication active in language in general. Kin terms from two languages, English and Seneca, show how terminologies that look very different on the surface may result from variation (...) in the rankings of a universal set of constraints. Constraints on kin terms form a system: some are concerned with absolute features of kin (sex), others with the position (distance and direction) of kin in “kinship space,” others with groups and group boundaries (matrilines, patrilines, generations, etc.). Also, kin terms sometimes extend indefinitely via recursion, and recursion in kin terminology has parallels with recursion in other areas of language. Thus the study of kinship sheds light on two areas of cognition, and their phylogeny. The conceptual structure of kinship seems to borrow its organization from the conceptual structure of space, while being specialized for representing genealogy. And the grammar of kinship looks like the product of an evolved grammar faculty, opportunistically active across traditional domains of semantics, syntax, and phonology. Grammar is best understood as an offshoot of a uniquely human capacity for playing coordination games. (shrink)

Evolution of the human capacity for beliefs is considered in relation to the emergence in human phylogeny of the ability to formulate propositions, evaluate their worth as bases for action, and make emotional attachments to them. Most of the relevant capabilities had appeared in primate evolution before the emergence of the Hominidae. The combination of capabilities peculiar to evolving hominines was that involved in the development of language, which ontogenetic evidence suggests began as a tool for implementing (...) intentionality in social interaction and whose subsequent elaboration was associated with later reportorial and narrative uses. (shrink)

The real reason for the apparent discontinuity between human and nonhuman minds is that all closely related hominids have become extinct. Nonetheless, I agree with Penn et al. that comparative psychology should aim to establish what cognitive traits humans share with other animals and what traits they do not share, because this could make profound contributions to genetics and neuroscience. There is, however, no consensus yet, and Penn et al.'s conclusion that it all comes down to one trait is (...) premature. (shrink)

Se describen varios elementos que le permiten a la fenomenología elaborar una descripción del ser humano sin renunciar a lo que tiene de ontología universal o antropologización, lo que implica que en todo análisis de la conciencia general deben caer la razón humana, la paradoja de la subjetividad o, lo que es lo mismo, la paradoja de la conciencia en su estado humano. De aquí se desprende que ella pueda ser observada en un sujeto que posee un cuerpo con el (...) cual y desde el cual la experiencia y la percepción pueden tener lugar. Esto valida el ejercicio de interrogar a la razón por su genética antropológica en un proceso de filogenias. This article describes the various elements which allow phenomenology to develop a description of the human being without giving up its status of universal ontology or anthropologization, which implies that any analysis of general awareness refers to human reason, the paradox of subjectivity, or, in other words, the paradox of con-sciousness in its human state. From this it follows that it can be observed in a subject that has a body with which and from which experience and perception can take place. This validates the action of interrogating reason for its anthropological genetics in a process of phylogenies. (shrink)

Since the nineteenth century, hominid palaeontology has offered critical information about prehistoric humans and evidence for human evolution. Human fossils discovered at a time when there was growing agreement that humans existed during the Ice Age became especially significant but also controversial. This paper argues that the techniques used to study human fossils from the 1850s to the 1870s and the way that these specimens were interpreted owed much to the anthropological examination of Stone, Bronze, and Iron (...) Age skeletons retrieved by archaeologists from prehistoric tombs throughout Europe. What emerged was the idea that a succession of distinct human races, which were identified using techniques such as craniometry, had occupied and migrated into Europe beginning in the Ice Age and continuing into the historic period. This marks a phase in the history of human palaeontology that gradually gave way to a science of palaeoanthropology that viewed hominid fossils more from the perspective of evolutionary theory and hominid phylogeny. (shrink)

The papers in this volume present varying approaches to human aggression, each from an evolutionary perspective. The evolutionary studies of aggression collected here all pursue aspects of patterns of response to environmental circumstances and consider explicitly how those circumstances shape the costs and benefits of behaving aggressively. All the authors understand various aspects of aggression as evolved adaptations but none believe that this implies we are doomed to continued violence, but rather that variation in aggression has evolutionary roots. These (...) papers reveal several similarities between human and nonhuman aggression, including our response to physical strength as an indicator of fighting ability, testosterone response to competition, a sensitivity to paternity, and baseline features of intergroup aggression in foragers and chimps. There is also one paper tackling the phylogeny of these traits. The many differences between human and nonhuman aggression are also pursued here. Topics here include the impact of modern weapons and extremes of wealth and power on both the costs and benefits of fighting, and the scale to which coercion can promote aggression that acts against a fighter’s own interests. Also the implications of large-scale human sociality are discussed. (shrink)

This paper outlines three broad conceptual schemes currently in play in the sciences concerned with explaining cognitive abilities. One is the anthropocentric scheme – human cognition – that dominated our thinking about cognition until very recently. Another is the cybernetic-computational scheme – cybernetic cognition – rooted in cognitive science and flourishing in such fields as artificial intelligence, computational neuroscience, and biocybernetics. The third is an evolutionary biological scheme – phylogenetic cognition – that conceptualizes cognition in terms of the (...) class='Hi'>phylogeny-based approach we take to all other traits of evolved organisms. It shows how these conceptions ground different research questions and methods, and how their relationship is still in flux. (shrink)

Although ontogeny cannot recapitulate phylogeny, a two-level model of the acquisition of language will be here proposed and its implication for the evolution of the faculty of language will be discussed. It is here proposed that the identification of the cognitive requirements of language during ontogeny could help us in the task of identifying the phylogenetic achievements that concurred, at some point, to the acquisition of language during phylogeny. In this model speaking will be considered as a complex (...) ability that arises in two different steps. The first step of competence widely relies on a bodily-based format of knowledge. The second step relies on more abstract meta-representations and implies high-level socio-cognitive skills. It is hypothesized that in order to reach the second level of language competence, symbolic communication and interaction with a cultural community are needed. Hence, the origins of species-specific human complex language and cognition are in both the brain and culture. Moreover, in this model, data from the embodied language research will be discussed in the light of a usage-based account of language. (shrink)

This book examines the historical development of studies of the brain and behavior from the early work of Aristotle and Galen up to the late twentieth century. Modern neuroscience, a multidisciplinary endeavor, emerged only recently as a unified field . This book does not treat the disciplinary history of neuroscience per se but, rather, the history of attempts to understand the nervous system and its relationship to behavior from a constellation of disciplines all related to what we now call “neuroscience”: (...) anatomy, physiology, psychology, psychiatry, evolutionary theory, and anthropology.Louise H. Marshall is a neuroscientist and director of the UCLA Brain Research Institute's Neuroscience History Archives. Her coauthor, the late neuroscientist Horace W. Magoun, founded the Department of Anatomy at UCLA's Medical School in 1953. Their book grew out of a series of poster presentations put together by Magoun for several national and international neuroscience meetings during the early 1980s. Magoun wrote a twenty‐seven‐page brochure after receiving much enthusiasm from neuroscientists at these meetings—both students and those more established in the field—and many wanted a publication.Not surprisingly, given its early beginnings in poster presentations, the book is richly illustrated. The chapters are arranged only loosely chronologically; their sequence is directed more explicitly by investigative themes. The first chapter outlines three basic “postulates” that direct the organization of the rest of the book and act as conceptual threads: phylogeny , the idea of a structural and functional hierarchy in the nervous system, and the notion that function determines structure. The last chapter, by way of discussion, moves into twentieth‐century developments in the understanding of certain “integrative” systems in the brain and the recognition by neuroscientists of the need for multidisciplinary approaches that integrate anatomical, physiological, and behavioral perspectives.The third postulate, the idea that “form follows function,” receives the most emphasis in the book, and most chapters touch on the oscillating relationship between studies of form and studies of function . The book also illustrates certain historical trends: the anatomical studies of the ancient and Renaissance periods, the more physiological and clinical studies of the nineteenth century, and the instrument‐centered approaches of early twentieth‐century neurophysiology.The book has certain strengths and weaknesses related to the authors' perspective as neuroscientists. As one might expect, elements of presentism arise, as the work of some investigators is described as “anticipating” that of later scientists, and other research—for example, J. L. W. Thudichum's work on brain chemistry—is deemed “surprisingly modern” . However, the book gives wonderfully detailed, precise accounts of scientific developments related to brain and behavior. The authors demonstrate a critical mastery of both primary and secondary sources, with thorough citations, and the book comes with a comprehensive bibliography.Discoveries in the Human Brain does not place neuroscientific developments within a wider cultural or social context, but the authors had no ambitions to do so. They even point to drawbacks of such historical approaches, arguing that they “create issues where none exist and … couch ideas in such convoluted language that the events and concepts become unfamiliar and difficult to fathom” . This position reflects their intended audience: neuroscientists interested in the history of their field. While there is certainly room for professional historians of science to tackle the history of neuroscience, this book will be valuable for historians because literature in the history of neuroscience is sparse. However, it is likely to be of greater value to neuroscientists—in the authors' words, “those workers at the bench who are curious to learn how it all happened.”. (shrink)

The ArgumentPain has important biomedical socioanthropological, semiotic, and other facets. In this contribution pain and the experssion of pain are looked at from the perspective of evolutionary biology, utilizing, among others, cross-cultural data from field work in Melanesia.No other being cares for sick and suffering conspecifics in the way humans do. Notwithstanding aggression and neglect, common in all cultures, human societies can be characterized as empathic, comforting, and promoting the health and well-being of their members. One important stimulus triggering (...) this caring response in others is the expression of pain. The nonverbal channel of communication, particularly certain universal — i.e., culture-independent facial expressions, gestures, and body postures, convey much of the message from the painstricken person to the group.These behaviors signal the person's physical and psychical pain, sadness, grief, and despair in ways very similar to the signs given by infants and small children: the body loses tonus and sinks or drops to the ground, the gestures are those of helplessness. Pain and grief may be so strong that control is lost not only over the body's posture but also over the mind's awareness. In such cases the afflicted person may carry out actions endangering himself or others. In general, these behavior patterns resemble those of infants in situations of distress and danger, and it is not surprising that the response of the members of the group is basically parental: taking care, assisting and consoling.Perceptive and behavioral patterns which developed in the course of avian and mammalian phylogeny to serve the well-being of the young have proven, as was shown by Eibl-Eibesfeldt, to be powerful building blocks for actions in other spheres of human interaction. Love is one such field, the reactions to a conspecific suffering pain is another. (shrink)

The orthogenetic development of some characteristic features during the evolution of the Hominidae has been pointed out. Especially brain- and skull development have been dwelt on . A parallel has been drawn with the orthogenetic development of some characteristic features during the evolution of the Equidae. It appears that during human evolution early-ontogenetic features come more and more to the front whereas during the evolution of Horses these characters are more and more pushed back in ontogeny. By this, (...) class='Hi'>human evolution, at least as concerns the orthogenetically developing features which happen to be very characteristic of the organisation of Man, shows a generalising developmental tendency whereas that of Horses shows on the whole a specialising tendency.Some modes in which early-ontogenetic characters can be present in the adult stages are dealt with such asBolk's theory of retardation andSchindewolf's theory of proterogenesis which are considered not to differ very much in essentials. Also the principle of development along a roundabout way is mentioned in this connection and some examples are given.A better understanding of orthogenetic evolution and of the differences existing between that of the Hominidae and that of the Equidae is found in the principle of heterochronic development, the change of developmental intensity and the rate of growth of features in the ontogenies of allied forms. This is illustrated by the two diagrams of Fig. 2. Here we also established connection with the science of genetics which can explain experimentally the heterochronous shifting of features in compared ontogenies by difference in rate of action and quantitative action value of genes or sets of genes.Il est démontré que le développement phylogénétique de certains caractères morphologiques chez les Hominides est orthogénétique. Principalement le développement du cerveau et du crâne est discuté dans cette connection. Comparativement le développement orthogénétique de certains caractères pendant la phylogénie des Equides est traité. Il résulte que pendant l'évolution humaine des caractères fetaux se misent progressivement en premier plan dans les ontogénèses pendant que ceux dans la phylogénie des Equides se misent de plus en plus en arrière-plan ontogénétiquement. Dans cette manière l'évolution humaine montre, aux moins relative aux caractères orthogénétiques, qui sont exactement très caractéristiques pour l'organisation de l'Homme, une tendence généralisante de développement, celle des Equides au contraire une tendence spécialisante.Quelques possibilités avec lesquelles des caractères fetaux peuvent paraître dans la phase adulte sont discutées comme la théorie de retardation deBolk et la théorie de développement proterogénétique deSchindewolf. Celles-ci sont regardées comme principalement pas différentes. Aussi le principe de développement selon un détour est nommé dans cette connection et quelques exemples en sont donnés.Le principe du développement hétérochronique, le changement de l'intensité et de la vitesse du développement chez des caractères des formes alliés, nous donne un meilleur notion de l'évolution orthogénétique et de la différence, cité ci-dessus, entre la phylogénie humaine et celle des Equides. Ceci est démontré détaillé avec des exemples à l'aide des deux diagrammes de Fig. 2. Dans, cette façon une connection est mise avec la science génétique, qui peut expliquer expérimentalement le développement hétérochronique des caractères morphologiques dans des ontogénèses comparables par des différences dans la vitesse d'action et dans la réalisation quantitative des gènes.Es wird gezeigt wie die phylogenetische Entwicklung einiger charakteristischen Merkmale bei den Hominiden orthogenetisch verläuft. Vor allem werden Gehirn- und Schädelentwicklung in dieser Weise betrachtet. Vergleichenderweise wird die orthogenetische Entwicklung von einigen charakteristischen Merkmalen während der Phylogenie der Equidae besprochen. Es ergibt sich, dass während der menschlichen Evolution früh-ontogenetische Merkmale immer mehr in den Vordergrund treten während solche in der Phylogenie der Equiden immer mehr zurück treten in der Ontogenie. In dieser Weise zeigt sich die menschliche Evolution, wenigstens was den sich orthogenetisch entwickelnden Merkmalen anbelangt, welche gerade sehr charakteristisch für die Organisation des Menschen sind, eine verallgemeinerende Entwicklungstendenz, die der Equidae dagegen eine spezialisierende.Einige Möglichkeiten durch welche früh-ontogenetische Merkmale im erwachsenen Zustand auftreten können werden besprochen, so die Retardationstheorie vonBolk und die Proterogenesistheorie vonSchindewolf. Diese werden als nicht grundverschieden betrachtet. Auch das Prinzip der umwegigen Entwicklung vonNauck wird in diesem Zusammenhang genannt und einige Beispiele gegeben.Das Prinzip der heterochronischen Entwicklung, die Abänderung der Entwicklungsintensität und der Wachstumsgeschwindigkeit bei Merkmalen von verwandten Formen bietet uns einen besseren Begriff von der orthogenetischen Evolution und von dem oben angeführten Unterschied zwischen der menschlichen Phylogenie und der der Equidae. Dies wird näher ausgeführt und mit Beispielen belegt mit Hilfe der beiden Diagramme von Fig. 2. In dieser Weise wird auch eine Verbindung hergestellt mit der genetischen Wissenschaft, die in experimenteller Weise im Stande ist die heterochrone Verschiebung von Merkmalseigenschaften in vergleichbaren Ontogenesen durch Unterschiede in der Geschwindigkeit der Wirkung und in dem quantitativen Verwirklichungswert der Gene zu erklären. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 14.1 (2004) 47-54 [Access article in PDF] Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research*(A Recommended Manuscript) Adopted on 16 October 2001Revised on 20 August 2002 Ethics Committee of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai, Shanghai 201203 Human embryonic stem cell (ES) research is a great project in the frontier of biomedical science for the twenty-first century. Be- cause (...) the research involves the use of human embryos, it triggers serious debate on ethical issues. Opponents consider the embryo to be an early form of human life that should be respected and not destroyed. However, the majority of scientists support embryonic stem cell research, believing that it offers good prospects for the treatment of diseases that have remained incurable until now and so will benefit humankind. The Ethics Committee of the Department of Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications of the Chinese National Human Genome Center at Shanghai seriously discussed the ethical debate initiated by embryonic stem cell research. We concluded that we should support the scientists of our country in actively carrying out human embryonic stem cell research for the noble cause of "medicine being a beneficent art." For the healthy and orderly development of human embryonic stem cell research in our country, we put forward the following recommended Ethical Guidelines for Human Embryonic Stem Cell Research as a reference for leaders, administrative departments, and related scientists. Preface Article 1. Human embryonic stem cells are the primitive cells that play the main role in the growth and development of a human body. These [End Page 47] primitive cells have the potential for infinite proliferation, self-renewal, and multi-directional differentiation. If scientists can discover the mechanism of differentiation of human embryonic stem cells, it will be possible to induce differentiation of human embryonic stem cells to form various types of human cells for clinical cell therapy. If human embryonic stem cell research can be integrated with modern biomedical engineering techniques, it also will be possible to make repair and replacement of human tissues and organs a reality. Article 2. There are two ways to classify human embryonic stem cells. One way is to classify them according to their potential for differentiation. There could be three kinds of stem cells: totipotent stem cells, pluripotent stem cells, and unipotent stem cells.A totipotent stem cell has the potential to develop into a whole individual. It can differentiate into the more than 200 cell types in the whole body, construct any tissue or organ of the body, and finally develop into a whole individual. The fertilized egg and the cleavage cells at the very early stage of embryonic development are totipotent stem cells.A pluripotent stem cell has the potential to differentiate into many cell types derived from the three embryonic layers. However, it has lost the capacity to develop into a complete organism.A unipotent stem cell is derived from the further differentiation of the pluripotent stem cell. It can differentiate only into one cell type such as a hematopoietic stem cell, neural stem cell, and others.The other way is to classify human stem cells according to their source. There could be two kinds of human stem cells: embryonic stem cells and tissue stem cells (also called adult stem cells). The former involves experimentation with embryos, which has serious ethical implications. Ethical issues associated with the latter are mainly expressed in the various opinions regarding the allocation of health resources. Article 3. Human embryonic stem cells are the group of cells called the blastocyst inner cell mass during the early stage of embryonic development. They are the main source of totipotent stem cells, and hence the focal and hot point in stem cell research. Studies on the clinical application of embryonic stem cells probably will involve use of the somatic cell nucleus transfer (SCNT) technique, which destroys the early human embryo. At present, the ethical and moral debate is very serious in human embryonic stem cell research regarding whether the research will develop... (shrink)

In the advertising discourse of human genetic database projects, of genetic ancestry tracing companies, and in popular books on anthropological genetics, what I refer to as the anthropological gene and genome appear as documents of human history, by far surpassing the written record and oral history in scope and accuracy as archives of our past. How did macromolecules become "documents of human evolutionary history"? Historically, molecular anthropology, a term introduced by Emile Zuckerkandl in 1962 to characterize the (...) study of primate phylogeny and human evolution on the molecular level, asserted its claim to the privilege of interpretation regarding hominoid, hominid, and human phylogeny and evolution vis-à-vis other historical sciences such as evolutionary biology, physical anthropology, and paleoanthropology. This process will be discussed on the basis of three key conferences on primate classification and evolution that brought together exponents of the respective fields and that were held in approximately ten-years intervals between the early 1960s and the 1980s. I show how the anthropological gene and genome gained their status as the most fundamental, clean, and direct records of historical information, and how the prioritizing of these epistemic objects was part of a complex involving the objectivity of numbers, logic, and mathematics, the objectivity of machines and instruments, and the objectivity seen to reside in the epistemic objects themselves. (shrink)

Many prescriptions offered in the literature for enhancing creativity and innovation in organizations raise ethical concerns, yet creativity researchers rarely discuss ethics. We identify four categories of behavior proffered as a means for fostering creativity that raise serious ethical issues: breaking rules and standard operating procedures; challenging authority and avoiding tradition; creating conflict, competition and stress; and taking risks. We discuss each category, briefly identifying research supporting these prescriptions for fostering creativity and then we delve into ethical issues associated with (...) engaging in the prescribed behavior. These four rubrics illustrate ethical issues that need to be incorporated into the creativity and innovation literature. Recommendations for how organizations can respond to the ethical issues are offered based on practices of exemplary organizations and theories of organizational ethics. A research agenda for empirically investigating the ethical impact these four categories of behavior have on organizations concludes the article. (shrink)

In this article we explore the possibility of viewing complex systems, as well as the models we create of such systems, as operating within a particular type of economy. The type of economy we aim to establish here is inspired by Jacques Derrida’s reading of George Bataille’s notion of a general economy. We restrict our discussion to the philosophical use of the word ‘economy’. This reading tries to overcome the idea of an economy as restricted to a single logos or (...) master narrative. At the same time, however, Derrida illustrates that we always operate from a restricted framework and as such something will always escape and interrupt our understanding of the world. In this paper we will propose that one could use Derrida’s reading of Bataille, along with notions such as différance, in order to move towards an understanding of complex systems as existing within certain sets of possibilities and constraints. We argue that this view of an economy agrees with the work of Edgar Morin on complexity and his conceptualization of general complexity. (shrink)