The gratiarum actio of the acting consuls can be seen as a key political ritual of the High Empire and as an important aspect of the communication between senatorial aristocracy and princeps. The only surviving speech of this type from this period, Pliny’s Panegyricus, has, however, been judged very differently due to a lack of comparison. In this context, it is often overlooked that although the gratiarum actio of M. Cornelius Fronto has not survived, the Corpus (...) Frontonianum contains both illuminating references to this speech delivered in 142 AD in the absence of the princeps and Antoninus Pius’ reaction to its published version. This article asks about the possible insights into the panegyric ritual that emerge from these fragments of information. (shrink)

Innovation in medieval studies is the creative ability to go back to sources. Digging, exploring, and connecting material pieces of evidence, facts, and individuals uncover new knowledge. One of the most significant sources for the medieval textual production is the university. Understanding the writings stemming from different faculties of medieval universities requires skills, curiosity, and tools. Among such instruments, the statutes of universities help researchers not only to decipher the organization of the academic institutions and interpret the rules that apply (...) to scholars and to their professors, but also to decode how and why texts were produced. The faculty of theology represents the highest level where education led during the Middle Ages and delivers the highest degree such as the master in theology. All over Europe, such faculties become the impetus that drives the intelligentsia to produce a textual heritage that today generates inspiration for magisterial carriers. Among them, Professor Maarten Hoenen is one to praise today. Taking as a point of departure a recent publication of Maarten Hoenen, 1 I will propose to investigate the relation between the statute of universities and of intellectual practices within medieval academia-more precisely, how a researcher should dig for complementary sources when the main documentation depicting an intellectual practice, such as the protestatio and gratiarum actio, is missing. I do not intend to be exhaustive, but simply to focus on how we should understand these two actions, protestatio and gratiarum actio, in connection with the Sentences commentaries. 2 The paradox is that we have traces of these two practices in the surviving manuscripts stemming from the university, but we do not always have a description of these actions in their statutes. Protestatio represents an oath that bachelors take at the beginning of an academic exercise, and the gratiarum actio is the final paragraph that closes the same exercise by thanks addressed to the public. The span of time I will focus on is between the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, since this is the period from which some testimonies survived that today help to better clarify how these actions were performed in medieval academia. It is also the period of naissance of the new faculties of theology all around Europe, as it is the case with Bologna, Vienna, Cracow, or Prague. They all embraced the model disseminated in Paris and Oxford on reading on the Sentences of Peter Lombard to obtain the degree of doctor in theology, and they contribute to building tradition, and therefore to produce sources for us today. (shrink)

For the occasion of his consulate in AD 379, Ausonius composed inter alia three hexameter Precationes and one Gratiarum actio addressed to the Emperor Gratian. Despite the shared context, in these three texts Ausonius presents entirely different ideas of the divine: on the one hand a polytheistic outlook with Phoebus, Tritonia and Victoria in prec. 1 and Ianus, Annus and Sol in prec. 2, but on the other hand in the Gratiarum actio a god who is (...) clearly characterised as monotheistic, an aeternus omnium genitor and opifex et causa mundi. Rather than pursue the scholarly debate about Ausonius’ own ambivalent religious outlook, this paper examines the decisive role which the context of speech, the conventions of literary genre and the rhetorical strategy play in the question of which model of god Ausonius presents in each case and how he addresses the god. (shrink)

The actio libera in causa doctrine, as originally formulated by various Enlightenment philosophers, concerns the imputation of responsibility to actors for actions unfree in themselves, but free in their causes. Like our Enlightenment counterparts, contemporary philosophers of criminal law, as well as most Western legal systems (both common law and civil), allow that persons can be responsible for acts that are not free when performed, provided they were free in their causes. The actio libera doctrine allows us to (...) impute unfree actions to persons, provided they were responsible for causing the conditions of unfreedom that characterizes those actions when performed. This doctrine seems to be instantiated in a great many actual legal practices. But I argue that we must distinguish between two importantly different understandings of the doctrine itself and its application in law. On the one hand, the actio libera doctrine allows us to waive the voluntariness requirement that is generally needed for criminal liability. On the other hand, it disallows defendants to appeal to defences they would otherwise be entitled to use to block liability, if they culpably created the conditions of their own defence. The first case involves rules of imputation, while the second concerns culpability, and justifying the actio libera doctrine therefore faces different challenges in the two cases. (shrink)

This article aims to interpret Leibniz’s dynamics project through a theory of the causation of corporeal motion. It presents an interpretation of the dynamics that characterizes physical causation as the structural organization of phenomena. The measure of living force by mv2 must then be understood as an organizational property of motion conceptually distinct from the geometrical or otherwise quantitative magnitudes exchanged in mechanical phenomena. To defend this view, we examine one of the most important theoretical discrepancies of Leibniz’s dynamics with (...) classical mechanics, the measure of vis viva as mv2 rather than ½ mv2. This “error”, resulting from the limits of Leibniz’s methodology, reveals the systematic role of this quantity mv2 in the dynamics. In examining the evolution of the quantity mv2 in the refinement of the force concept from potentia to actio, I argue that Leibniz’s systematic limitations help clarify dynamical causality as neither strictly metaphysical nor mechanical but a distinct level of reality to which Leibniz dedicates the “dynamica” as “nova scientia”. (shrink)

Actio immanens - as many other terms, coined by the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical tradition - is a biological concept par excellence. It was formed as a mental result of biological observation, on the strength of studies on living beings and so, refers to them first and foremost. During the last century, the term actio immanens gradually disappeared from philosophical encyclopedias and has totally vanished from the biological and philosophical language used to describe the dynamism of life. Moreover, if this (...) term does appear at all, its meaning is rather vague. However, actio immanens belongs to the group of key concepts, without which it would seem not possible to properly describe, nor to properly understand biological phenomena. (shrink)

Actio immanens - as many other terms, coined by the Aristotelian-Thomist philosophical tradition - is a biological concept par excellence. It was formed as a mental result of biological observation, on the strength of studies on living beings and so, refers to them first and foremost. During the last century, the term actio immanens gradually disappeared from philosophical encyclopedias and has totally vanished from the biological and philosophical language used to describe the dynamism of life. Moreover, if this (...) term does appear at all, its meaning is rather vague. However, actio immanens belongs to the group of key concepts, without which it would seem not possible to properly describe, nor to properly understand biological phenomena. (shrink)

(1997). Actio non est reactio: An extension of the concept of causality towards phenomena of information. World Futures: Vol. 49, The Quest for a Unified Theory of Information, pp. 409-427.

English translation of paper title: Action and Passion in the Renaissance. The Womanly and the Manly in Agrippa, Postel, and Bovelles. This paper uses the philosophy of Nicholas of Cusa and the Querelle des Femmes as historic backgrounds for how Agrippa of Nettesheim, Guillaum Postel, and Charles de Bovelles reconcile the notions of "male" and "female" in their respective philosophies.

This article revisits the debate between Leibniz and Clarke to explore conceptual shifts in the use of the term medium. A basic tenet of physics since antiquity says that every act of communication ‐ that is, every transmission of a force from the place of its cause to that of its effect ‐ requires a medium to ensure its interaction. In the context of the Early Modern Period, media were regarded as mediating instances that enabled communication. If these instances were (...) not immediately connected but rather spatially separated from one another ‐ as in the case of gravitation, magnetism or electricity ‐ then there had to be a medium to ensure both the transmission of the force and the causal connection. Although the mediation of the medium took place in an inexplicable way, it seemed to explain one process or another by its mere introduction. The epistemological foundations of communicability ‐ those with which Leibniz, Clarke and Newton were attempting to come to terms ‐ remain relevant to the descriptive language with which we depict our present and its technological condition. Without duration there is no mediation but rather immediacy and simultaneity. Immediacy means that the necessary separation between the two events, the abyss of communication, is negated. Immediacies, like instantaneous actions at a distance, presuppose the difference they are deemed to eradicate. (shrink)

Am Beispiel des Krugs und anderen, wandernden und tückischen Objekten der Literaturgeschichte soll die wechselseitige Voraussetzung von Offen- und Geschlossenheit in eine Konfiguration von Handlungstheorie, Figurationstheorie und Narratologie übersetzt werden. Die dabei verfolgte Frage lautet: Wie literarisch handeln offene Objekte? Nach Luhmann und Latour lässt sich das Handeln an Konzepte der Beschreibung koppeln: Sei es, dass sich Kommunikation zur Handlung simplifiziert und erst so einem Akteur zugerechnet werden kann, oder sei es, dass zeichenhafte Referenz, Zuschreibung und Protokollierung maßgebliche Stränge in (...) dem Aktionszusammenhang menschlicher und nichtmenschlicher Wesen ausmachen. Solche übersetzungen zwischen Erzählungen und Handlungen verfolgt dieser Beitrag anhand ausgewählter Beispiele aus der Literaturgeschichte. Working with the example of the jar and other, wandering and deceitful objects of literary history, this paper tries to translate the reciprocal presupposition of openness and closure to a configuration of theory of action, figuration and narration. It thus deals with the question, how literarily open objects act. According to Luhmann and Latour, action can be connected to concepts of description: Be it that communication is reduced to action and only thus attributable to an agent, or that symbolic reference, attribution and recording account for significant strands in human and non-human contexts of action. Drawing upon selected examples from literary history, the paper pursuits such translations of narration into action and vice versa. (shrink)

Working with the example of the jar and other, wandering and deceitful objects of literary history, this paper tries to translate the reciprocal presupposition of openness and closure to a configuration of theory of action, figuration and narration. It thus deals with the question, how literarily open objects act. According to Luhmann and Latour, action can be connected to concepts of description: Be it that communication is reduced to action and only thus attributable to an agent, or that symbolic reference, (...) attribution and recording account for significant strands in human and non-human contexts of action. Drawing upon selected examples from literary history, the paper pursuits such translations of narration into action and vice versa. (shrink)

Gestützt auf die bisher unveröffentlichten Teile des Briefwechsels von Leibniz mit Denis Papin aus der Zeit von 1692 bis 1700 wird in diesem Aufsatz versucht, einige Aspekte der Leibnizschen Dynamik darzulegen. Insbesondere wird der apriorische Beweis der Erhaltung der actio f ormalis im Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion zwischen Leibniz und Papin über die Messung der Kraft bei der horizontalen Bewegung behandelt. Es war Leibniz* Absicht, durch den apriorischen Beweis die Dynamik zu begründen und die Cartesianischen Gesetze der Bewegung zu (...) ersetzen. Papin seinerseits beschränkte sich auf die physikalische Ebene der Gesetze der Mechanik. Im Laufe der Debatte entwickelte Leibniz als Antwort auf Papins Kritik wichtige Argumente über die metaphysische Begründung der Dynamik. Die Begriffe actio f ormalis, inertia naturalis, entelecheia und Geschwindigkeit als quantitas intensiva werden in diesem Zusammenhang von Leibniz gegen Papins Einwände verteidigt. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 97 Heft: 1 Seiten: 350-353.

Desde los primeros años de su reflexión, Agustín entiende la "memoria" como una potencia operativa del alma. No la concibe simplemente como "almacén" de datos pasados, sino que, más bien, la presenta como centro "ordenador" y "coordinador" de los procesos psíquicos. En los escritos primeros, Agustín resalta la capacidad de la memoria para contraer y dilatar, tanto en relación con la "actio" con la que el alma mueve al cuerpo ("De immortalitate animae), cuanto en relación con la percepción como (...) actividad cognitiva ("De musica"). A partir de aquellos, la memoria viene presentada como una potencia implicada en actividades múltiples: en la formación de las imágenes de objetos percibidos ("phantasiai"), en su fijación, en la reevocación de objetos percibidos en el pasado (recordatio) y en la creación de imágenes de cosas jamás percibidas, sobre la base de recuerdos genéricos (phantasmata). En el curso de su reflexión, Agustín delinea progresivamente el carácter plurifuncional de la memoria, llegando a definirla en el "De Trinitate" como "cogitandi modus". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:diacritics 30.1 (2000) 78-88 [Access article in PDF] Kierkegaardian seduction, or the aesthetic actio(nes) in distans Begonya Saez Tajafuerce The one who cannot seduce people cannot save them either. --Søren Kierkegaard, Papirer IX A 383 Being an heir of Romanticism, Søren Kierkegaard appropriates the figure of seduction in his works and thought, yet he does so in a critical and unconventional manner. For Kierkegaard, seduction can no longer (...) be described or conceived of as an exclusively aesthetic undertaking, as the sheer fulfillment of pleasure and desire, as the factual consolidation of immediacy and sensuousness, but, on the contrary, seduction must be redescribed and reconceived within the realm of ethics or, to be more precise, within the confinium or border area between ethics and aesthetics. In this sui generis no-man's-land, which to a certain extent is formally inaugurated and categorially established by the notion of aesthetic action, as we will see--resides the ethical seduction.In effect, such a reconception of seduction presupposes an organic and dialectic recomprehension of the well-known Kierkegaardian theory of the stages, according to which any significant relation between the aesthetic and the ethical is not grounded on the evident divergences between both but, on the contrary, on their coadjuvancy. The point is that neither the aesthetic nor the ethical can or should be understood if disconnected, if incommensurably read, if seen only in the light of (an) Either/Or [E/O 1, 2].Forged within the aforementioned ambivalent frame, the Kierkegaardian figure of seduction becomes more than just a category, a sheer theoretic or analytic tool to reflect upon existence: it becomes a literary strategy as well, of philosophical and specifically ethical signification.Through an examination of some texts of E/O 1 (especially "The Seducer's Diary") and of Kierkegaard's journals and papers, I will pursue a typology of seduction with three modes: the musical seduction, or Don Juan's; the linguistic seduction, or Faust's; and the literary seduction, or Johannes's. The johannesque seduction will be stressed as the first janus frontis of the dilemma between the aesthetic and the ethical stages, to blur the conventional differences between both. Then I will bring Johannes, the seducer, and A, the aesthete, close to each other in order to illuminate what might be understood as [End Page 78] the aesthetic action. It will be argued that the aesthetic can no longer be deprived of all pragmatic connotations. Therewith, not only are the limits or chiasm between aesthetics and ethics blurred, but a common categorial space is established. The paradigmatic action in this context will be the johannesque actio(nes) in distans, that is, the second janus frontis of our dilemma. Finally, I will briefly consider Søren Kierkegaard's own aesthetic action or actio(nes) in distans, that is, his own literary practice. Seducers: Don Juan and Faust A typological consideration of the figure of seduction in E/O 1 quickly makes it clear that Kierkegaard's main source of inspiration, or rather of conceptual kleptomania, is to be found in Romanticism. 1 In this spirit, A, the aesthete, would let himself be brought from reflection to reflection, from insight to insight, and from glimpse to glimpse, by the experienced guiding hands of (his colleagues) Don Juan and Faust.In 1836, several years before the publication of E/O, where Don Juan and Faust are characterized as and related to the phenomenological realm of the demonic (det dœmoniske), Kierkegaard significantly writes in his journals that both cases, or figures, incarnate two "ideas," that is, two paradigmatic vital ideals or even two conceptions of life, which take shape "beyond the religious" [Pap I A 150]. 2 Consequently, seduction presupposes a nonreligious conception and/or way of life. It seems unclear, however, whether seduction presupposes, as Judge Wilhelm claims it does, a full rejection of the ethical. In E/O 2 Wilhelm states that all seducers share the virtue of holding the "ethical determinations" in check [SKS 3: 196], but he is by no means aware of what the game may... (shrink)

Bernard Lonergan argued that a Thomist theory of intellect must begin with advertence to the act of understanding. He distinguished his cognitional theory from a conceptualism that neglects the experience of insight and reflection on it. Early in his career, he explained how the conceptualist approach misinterprets Aquinas and creates problems for the metaphysics of rational psychology. This article explains Lonergan’s position and illustrates the conceptualist alternative by analysing Joseph Owens’s view of cognition. By explaining the metaphysical differences between Lonergan’s (...) and Owens’s opposing views of human knowing in relation to their distinctive readings of Aquinas, this article contributes to a more accurate reading of Aquinas on the act of understanding. (shrink)

The entrapment defense is a puzzle of long standing. One the one hand, we are offended by the government’s subjecting someone vulnerable to extreme temptation. It seems like something anyone might fall prey to. On the other hand, it is hard to explain why someone who actually commits, or attempts a crime, and who would be liable if anyone other than the government had tempted him, should escape punishment. His blameworthiness seems the same. This essay seeks to illuminate this puzzle (...) by showing how it parallels the long-standing debate surrounding the criminal law problem of the actio libera in causa—situations in which someone seeks to escape liability by contriving to put a certain defense in place, such as provoking his victim into attacking him, so that he can then kill him in self-defense. The parallels between the two problems do not serve to resolve either, but make them appear in a rather different light. (shrink)

El artículo pretende demostrar que el pensamiento de san Agustín sobre el tema "acción y contemplación" se ve a la luz de un modelo antropológico que se remonta a Antíoco de Ascalón, y que Agustín conoce a través de las obras de Varrón y de Cicerón. Según tal modelo, el hombre está compuesto de alma y cuerpo y no sólo de alma racional; el alma es impulsada a la acción por un "appetitus" natural, como naturalmente es llevada también a vivir, (...) a conocer con los sentidos y el intelecto, en la vida humana, estos "appetitus" se satisfacen de manera diversa, según el progreso de la edad, de modo que en cada edad se alcanza o se debe alcanzar un acuerdo, una especie de "coniugium" entre los "appetitus" y el alma, y entre el conocimiento y la acción. (shrink)

When a provocateur intentionally provokes a deadly affray, the law of self-defense holds that the provocateur may not use deadly force to defend himself. Why is this so? Provocateurs are often seen as just one example of the problem of actio libera in causa, the causing of the conditions of one’s defense. This article rejects theories that maintain a one-size-fits-all approach to actio libera in causa, and argues that provocateurs need specific rules about why they forfeit their defensive (...) rights. This article further claims that provocateurs need to be distinguished from their cousins, initial aggressors, as initial aggressors engage in conduct that grounds the permissibility of the defender’s behavior whereas the provocateur’s behavior does not justify the respondent’s use of force against him. In addition, this article rejects that the basis of this forfeiture can be found in the doctrines surrounding when and why mitigation for provocation is appropriate for the respondent. Provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights for the very simple reason that they start the fight. This forfeiture occurs when they behave culpably, meaning that they subjectively appreciate that they are running the risk of causing force to be used against them and they engage in this behavior without justification or excuse. The question of when the provocateur’s behavior is justified is incredibly complex. It requires analysis of when it is that one is justified in increasing the risk of another’s wrongdoing. Any analysis of this justification must take seriously the liberty rights of the potential provocateur to engage in otherwise permissible behavior. Moreover, the determination of whether the provocateur is justified will turn on whether the later acts that he puts into motion are themselves justified. Thus, when Charles Bronson in the movie Death Wish presents himself as a victim so that muggers will attack him, the justifiability of his conduct in appearing as a vulnerable victim will turn on whether he is entitled to engage in this conduct, intending to later defend himself. This article argues that in Death Wish-type cases, the reason that the provocateur is not justified is because he becomes a vigilante, thereby usurping the role of the state and undermining rule of law values. (shrink)

Imagine someone who deliberately provokes someone else into attacking him so that he can harm that person in defending himself against her attack and then claim “self-defense” when brought to court to defend himself for what he has done to her. Should he be allowed to use this defense, even though it’s clear that he has deliberately manipulated his attacker into attacking him precisely in order to be able to harm her with impunity (assuming he were allowed to use the (...) defense and thus escape legal penalties)? This question is the focal point in the paper that follows. I argue first that the case described above is indeed an instance of an “actio libera in causa,” albeit arguably one at the margins of this controversial class of cases. Then, using a view about the justification of self-defense that I have defended elsewhere, I show why I believe that, while the manipulator should not be deprived of the legal right to defend his self-defensive actions in such cases by claiming they were a legitimate matter of self-defense, there is good reason to enact laws that will allow him to be prosecuted, independently of his “self-defense” defense, for manipulating his attacker as he did, thus allowing him to harm her in self-defense and then defend his actions as purely a matter of “self-defense.”. (shrink)

The article first gives an exegesis of the famous passage in the "Republic", 505d11-506a2. Attention is drawn to the fact that the principle that every soul does everything for the Good can be translated in two ways: Every soul does everything for the sake of the Good, or goes to all lengths for the sake of the Good. Depending on the different translations, we have a different picture of the platonic Socrates in the Republic, an intellectualistic Socrates for whom irrational (...) desires do not exist, or a Socrates who also accepts irrational desires. The article favours the first one. Then it attempts to show that we can elucidate some dark points in the Socratic thesis that the Good is what every soul pursues and for which every soul does everything, with the help of Aquinas’s distinction between it actio hominis and actio humana. Finally, the article outlines three substantive answers to the question “What is the Good?” – the henological, the perfectionist and the structuralist. Instead of advancing a new answer, the article suggests an uncontroversial formal starting point for an answer to this question. (shrink)

I tackle the difficult problem of specifying how voluntary intoxication affects criminal culpability generally and recklessness in particular. I contend that the problem need not be conceptualized as an instance of actio libera in causa, namely the situation in which persons do something at t1 to culpably create the conditions of their own defense at t2. Instead, I argue that we need only consider intoxicated defendants at t2 in order to justify their punishment. In the course of defending my (...) view, I challenge conventional wisdom about both the nature of recklessness and the effects of intoxicants. I conclude by discussing a possible ground on which involuntary intoxication might be treated differently. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la desconexión de sí como caracterización fenomenológica de una enfermedad destructora como el Alzheimer. Queremos mostrar que, en los casos más extremos de su desarrollo, el paciente se hunde en una desvinculación emocional producto de la plasticidad destructiva que lo afecta. Este aislamiento implica un desafío emocional para los familiares que observan que su ser querido se desconecta y que ellos no pueden hacer nada para evitarlo. No obstante, los familiares buscan asistir al ser querido en su (...) marginación. El alcance de este acompañamiento revela la experiencia humana del consuelo como respuesta intersubjetiva frente a esta desconexión. El análisis de esta desconexión muestra, de manera paradójica, la necesidad humana de poner distancia ante un sufrimiento extremo y con ello señala, a la vez, su límite. El análisis antropológico de los dispositivos de la actio per distans puede ofrecer un soporte trascendental a las éticas de la ternura frente a la vivencia de esta enfermedad. (shrink)

La acción a distancia se ha considerado muy a menudo como un medio de explicación inaceptable en la física. Debido a que daba la impresión de resistirse a los intentos de asignarle causas propias a los efectos, la acción a distancia se ha proscrito como sinsentido ocultista. El rechazo de la acción a distancia fue el principal precepto del aristotelismo que fue tan dominante en la filosofía natural europea, y hasta hoy permanece como un prejuicio principal de la física moderna. (...) No obstante, hubo un período de interregno; un período durante el cual las acciones a distancia eran fácilmente aceptadas por un número ignificativo de filósofos naturales. La principal influencia sobre este nuevo enfoque radical hacia la naturaleza de la causalidad física fue, por supuesto, Isaac Newton. El principio de gravitación universal de Newton a muchos les pareció dar no sólo un ejemplo innegable de una fuerza cuya naturaleza no se podía producir por ningún tipo de contacto mecánico entre los cuerpos, sino también un modelo para otras supuestas fuerzas que podían suponerse que dan cuenta de los fenómenos químicos, biológicos y otros fenómenos físicos. Por tanto, durante el siglo XVIII, como lo han demostrado un gran número de importantes estudios históricos, los filósofos naturales buscaron hacer fructífero el deseo de Newton, expresado en el Prefacio a los Principia, de que todos los fenómenos de la naturaleza fueran explicados en términos de fuerzas atractivas y repulsivas que operan a distancia entre las partículas diminutas de los cuerpos. Sin embargo, en la actualidad el rechazo a la legitimidad de las acciones a distancia es tan grande que una serie de notables especialistas de Newton han insistido en que Newton nunca creyó en la actio in distans y que fue completamente malentendido por la generación que le sucedió. Este artículo reitera que Newton sí creía en la acción a distancia y refuta los argumentos de especialistas recientes que sostienen lo contrario. (shrink)

Die Mehrheit der Kant-Forscher meint, dass Kant Handlungen bloss als Verhaltnis von Ursache und Wirkung aufgefasst und die Unterschiede zwischen dem Handlungsbegriff und dem Begriff der actio als Bewirken einer Wirkung aufgehoben habe. Luis Placencia zeigt, dass Kants Philosophie, auch wenn sie keine vollstandige Handlungstheorie formuliert hat, im Hinblick auf grundlegende Fragen fruchtbar gemacht werden kann: Was ist das Spezifikum des menschlichen Handelns? Was ist wollen, was ein Wille? Sind Absichten nur Grunde oder zugleich Ursachen des Handelns? Gibt es (...) einen Widerspruch zwischen der Freiheit des Handelns und einer Determination der Natur? (shrink)

In Brutus § 274 Cicero writes: The style of M. Calidius was pure and limpid; he used no word that was ‘ durum aut insolens aut humile aut longius ductum. Erant autem et uerborum et sententiarum ilia lumina quae uocant Graeci S0009838800019418_inline1… “ Qua de re agitur” autem illud quod multis locis in iuris consultorum includitur formulis et ubi esset uidebat.’ In the last phrase, which I give in the MSS reading, editors have adopted for et ubi the suggestion of (...) Corradus id ubi. There seem to be two objections to it: poor sense, doubtful syntax. Impelled by these objections but pressing overmuch the relevancy of a somewhat similar phrase one editor proposed ‘ acutissime uidebat.’ But the context shows that Cicero is describing the language of Calidius, not his mental powers; so a reference to keenness in perceiving the subject of dispute is not relevant. In § 276 the passage proceeds to enumerate the formal qualities of his style:. ‘ accedebat ordo rerum plenus artis, actio liberalis, totumque dicendi placidum et sanum genus.’. (shrink)

; tibi M. Bibulus quaerenti se de caelo seruasse respondit idemque in contione dixit, ab Appio tuo fratre productus, te omnino, quod contra auspicia adoptatus esses, tribunum non fuisse. tua denique omnis actio posterioribus mensibus fuit, omnia quae C. Caesar egisset, quod contra auspicia essent acta, per senatum rescindi oportere; quod si fieret, dicebas te tuis umeris me custodem urbis in urbem relaturum.’.

Die Studie behandelt George Campbells 1776 erschienene »Philosophy of Rhetoric«. Es handelt sich um eine historische und textimmanente Interpretation, deren leitende These lautet, daß Campbell eine Begründung rhetorischer Wirkungskraft aus dem Geist des englischen Empirismus unternimmt. Dabei wird der von David Hume stammende Begriff der vivacity im Rückgriff auf die antike Rhetoriktheorie als evidentia interpretiert. Die Studie zeigt, daß evidentia nicht nur die Grundkategorie für Ethos, Logos und Pathos darstellt, sondern auch für den Redeschmuck und die Actio.

In order to clarify the objectives of bankruptcy, to reveal the true essence of bankruptcy procedure and the origin of legal terms, it is necessary to ascertain the nature of this institute of law, as well as the reasons for its creation and development. This article provides historic analysis of the development of the institute of bankruptcy procedure. For this purpose, a historic comparative research is undertaken in the article, in order to find certain parallels of bankruptcy procedure under Roman (...) law and the modern bankruptcy procedure. Roman law has been chosen as the most phenomenal ancient law for the purposes of undertaking a historic analysis of the development of bankruptcy procedure. In the authors’ opinion, it it the best example that reveals the origin of bankruptcy procedure, and the reasons for its formation. Analysis of certain private law institutes of Roman law enables the authors to conclude that the main features (principles) of the bankruptcy procedure formed precisely under Roman law: replacement of personal liability by pecuniary; public auction as a form of realization of debtor’s property; transition from selling of debtor’s property as a whole to disposal of property in divided property units; creation of subject, who administers auctions of debtor’s property under oath not to act in selfish purposes; setting of a term of 30 days, during which a debtor has to cover the debts (claims’ dispute resolution); establishment of the institute of informing creditors about initiated procedures of debt retrieval and encouragement to join these procedures; establishment of the ban to recover debts from household items; laying of the foundations of the institute of peace agreement between the debtor and his creditors; establishment of actio Pauliana - a remedy for the protection of creditors rights. The mentioned rules in one way or another eventually have been transferred to legal acts on legal relations in case of bankruptcy of many foreign countries. (shrink)

This paper examines the theories of the soul proposed by Girolamo Cardano in his De immortalitate animorum (1545) and his De subtilitate (1550-4), Julius Caesar Scaliger's comprehensive critique of these views in the Exercitationes exotericae de subtilitate of 1557, and Cardano's reply to this critique in his Actio in calumniatorem of 1559. Cardano argues that the passive intellect is individuated and mortal, and that the agent intellect is immortal but subject to constant reincarnation in different human beings. His theory (...) of cognition leads him to claim that at its highest level, the intellect is converted into the object of its perception. In his refutation of the various elements of Cardano's theories, Scaliger uses his knowledge of the Greek text of Aristotle to stress the reflexive faculty of the soul, its ability to conceive of objects greater than itself, and its status as the individuating principle of the hylemorphic human being. In spite of Cardano's pretention to novelty and Scaliger's humanist credentials, both thinkers are shown to conduct their discussions in an inherited scholastic matrix of thought. (shrink)

One Seit Platon (mit dem Spott von Diogenes) über Kant ist die Fundamentalfrage "Was ist der Mensch?" bis heute nicht nur von der Philosophie (als regina scientiarum), sondern von der Wissenschaft überhaupt nicht beantwortet. Phänomenologisch hat der Mensch a posteriori physische (somatische), psychische(perceptio, emotio, cognitio), mentale (logische), spirituelle (conscientia, volitio, actio) "Sphären". Ontologisch in Kontext von to ti en einai (Aristoteles) sollte der Mensch a priori ein "Programm" (Information) vor der Kosmogonie haben. Der (Neo‐) Positivismus (z.B. Hume bis Carnap, (...) Russel*; * Nobel Laureate) verwirft Fragen der Metaphysik als Scheinprobleme. Damit bleibt das Menschen‐Wesen in Kontext von Postulaten, wie res cogitans (Descartes), Monaden(Leibniz), "Gott, Freiheit, Unsterblichkeit", Seligkeit und (moralischer) Vollkommenheit (Kant), absoluter Geist (Hegel) in der theologischen Dimension. Antwort könnte eine zukünftige (holistisch‐multidimensionale) philosophische theoretische und Experimentaltheologie (kontrollierbare Beobachtung) durch weitere Forschung geben, in Kontext (bzw. Existenz) von A. Physikotheologie bzw. (a) höhere (als drei) geometrische/physikalische Dimensionen (Hilbert, Riemann /Friedmann, Minkowski, Schmutzer), (b) Paralleluniversen (z.B. L. Randall), (c) Quantentheorie/‐philosophie (Planck*, u.a.), (d) Gravitations‐/Relativitätstheorie (Newton/Einstein*), (e) Vakuumenergie (Sato), etc. B. ChemoBiotheologie bzw. "psychischen" (Fechner) und "spezifischen" (Joh. Müller) Energien,"biologischem Feld" (Gurwitsch), künstlicher Biogenese (Oparin, Fox, Urey*, u.a.; 32 Fragen von John Bernal). C. Psychotheologie bzw. parapsychische Phänomene (Carrel*, Richet*/France, Rhinne/USA, Vassilev, Bechterew/Russia, etc.). D. Religionstheologie: (über‐) Bewußtsein, übersinnliche, immaterielle, supraphysikalische Phänomene (Sri Aurobindo, Dalai Lama*, Konfuzius/Laotse, Gopi Krishna, Papst Benedikt, Paramahansa Yogananda, Sri Yogendra, etc.)und ihre physiologische Begründung (Anand/Chinna, Kasamatsu/Hirai, Ornstein, Pauli*, von Weizsäcker, etc.). Damit hängt die ontologische Frage nach dem MenschenWesen mit der Lösung des Problemkomplexes "Gott Geist/Seele Mensch Natur" zusammen. (shrink)

Bento Prado Júnior (1937-2007) foi um dos mais importantes nomes da filosofia feita no Brasil. AUtor de poucos livros mas de vasta produção ensaística, desenvolveu uma ampla reflexão sobre a figura contemporânea do sujeito, e sua originalidade sempre foi reconhecida por seus pares. EM seus últimos anos, o filósofo se dedicava à elaboração de uma trilogia da qual este livro seria o primeiro volume. ELa versaria sobre as relações entre teoria do sujeito (Ipseitas), teoria da ação (Actio) e teoria (...) estética (Contemplatio). INfelizmente, apenas o primeiro volume foi deixado em estado de manuscrito, não havendo indicações sobre os demais. O Leitor verá neste livro incompleto, editado e organizado por Vladimir Safatle, o movimento vivo de uma experiência de pensamento em plena operação. TOda sua escrita é marcada pela emergência de articulações surpreendentes e problemas transversais que indicam uma capacidade incomum de reconstruir questões e tensionar nossos conceitos hegemônicos de razão. PRova maior da maturidade da filosofia feita entre nós. (shrink)

This paper discusses a recent book of Maximiliane Kriechbaum, ‘Actio, ius, und dominium in den Rechtslehre des 13-14 Jahrhunderts.’ Kriechbaum maintains, contrary to the generally accepted opinion, that William of Ockham did not present any doctrine of individual subjective rights when he defined the word ius as potestas .She maintains that Ockham was rather arguing in terms of Aristotelian act and potency. The review-article criticizes this view and argues that Ockham often did use the word ius to mean a (...) rightful power, as the term is commonly used in discourse on rights. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Abailard and Non-Things MARTIN M. TWEEDALE On SEVERAL OCCASIONSin his logical writings Abailard extracts himself from embarrassing ontological implications of his analyses of language by resorting to the notion of a something that is not a thing. I shall note here two such occasions and then discuss Abailard's explanations of this procedure based on the grammatical distinction of personal and impersonal constructions. Since the texts on this latter topic (...) are especially confusing, a considerable portion of my effort will be spent on making sense of them as preparation for drawing some conclusions about Abailard's overall approach. My purpose here is to show how Abailard's grammatical analyses are fundamental to his defence of a number of metaphysical positions. I also want to suggest that Abailard's grammatical approach, especially on the question of dicta, contains insights of continuing interest. Not all of Abailard's non-things are particularly associated with analyses of language. For instance, there are the likenesses the mind supposedly constructs for itself in order to think of things that are not being perceived. These Abailard calls fictive things (res ficta), and he refuses to give them the status of real psychological entities. ~ The likenesses are compared to mirror images which Abailard is also willing to treat as non-things. However, I wish to restrict my discussion here to cases which arise from Abailard's analysis of the reference of certain words. One such instance occurs in his discussion of universals. The peculiar nonthing here is the "state" (status), which, Abailard maintains, is "the common cause by which the universal word is imposed"7 Abailard is very careful to dis1Glossae super Porphyrium, in Peter Abelards philosophische,.gchriIten, edited by Geyer (henceforth referred ~o as Geyer), Miinster i. W., 1919 (BGPM, vol. 21), pp. 20-21, ll. 23-32: Intellectus autem sicut nec corporeo indigens instrumento est, ita /nec/ necesse est eum subiectum corpus habere in quod mittatur, sed rei ~dmilitudine contentus est, quam sibi ipse animus conficit, in quam suae intelligentiae actionem dirigit. Unde turr,~ destructa vel remota sensus qui in earn agebat, perit, inteUectus autem permanet rei similitudine auimo retenta. Sigut autem sensus non est res sentita, in quam dirigitur, sic nec intellectus forma est rei quam concipit, sed intellectus actio quaedam est animae, unde intelligens dicitur, forma vero in quam dirigitur, res imaginaria quaedam est et ficta, quam sibi, quando vult et qualm vult, animus conficit.... 11.9-17: Quaero enim, utrum flla quadratura et ilia altitudo vera forma sit intellectus, qui ad similitudinem quantitatis turris ducatur et compositionis eius. Sed profecto vera quadratura et vera altitudo non nisi corporibus insunt, ficta etiam qualitate nec intellectus nec ulla vera essentia forrnari potest. Restat igitur, ut sicut ficta eat qualitas, ficta substantia sit ei subiecta. Fortasae autem et ea speculi imago, quae visui subiecta apparere videtur, nihil esse vere dici potest, quoniam scilicetin alba speguli superficie contrarii coloris qualitas saepe apparet. Ibid., pp. 19-20,II. 14-16- ~ad nunc ea quae breviter tetigimus, diligenter perquiramus, scilicet quae sit iIla communis causa, secundum quam universale nomen impositum est.... 11. 21-29. Singuli homines discreti ab invicem, gum in propriis differant tam essentiis quam formis, ut supra meminimus rei physicam inquirentes, in eo tamen conveniunt, quod homines aunt. Non dico in homine, gum res nulla sit homo uisi discreta, sed in esse hominem. Esse autem hominem non est homo nec res aliqua, si diligentius consideremus, [329] 330 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY tinguish three different questions frequently confused in discussions on universals. The first is "What is 'universal' predicated of?", and the answer is simply words --words not in the sense of mere marks or sounds, but of meaningful marks or sounds. Another is "How do we have an idea associated with universals?" Here the aforementioned likenesses enter as that by which the mind can have an idea applicable to many individuals. But there is also the question of what makes a certain word correctly applicable to many things. Abailard does not make the error of thinking that an idea in the mind or some operation of the mind could possibly be the cause, as some conceptualists seem to think. This would lead to the conclusion that... (shrink)