When making consumption choices, people often fail to meet their own standards of both ethics and frugality. People also generally tend to demand more of others than they do of themselves. But little is known about how these different types of hypocrisy interact, particularly in relation to attitudes toward ethical consumption. In three experiments, we integrate research methods using anchoring and hypocrisy within the context of ethical consumption. Across three experiments, we find a default expectation that people should spend (...) less on consumer items than they actually do. This default position can be inverted by making the ethical context of consumption salient, whereby the expectation is then that people should spend more on consumer items than they actually do. Experiments 2 and 3 show that a moderate price anchor for ethical consumption is sufficient to shift expected standards for other people, but a higher price anchor is required to shift expected standards in personal behaviour. We discuss the countervailing roles of frugality and ethical consumption in understanding hypocrisy and ethical decision-making. (shrink)

Creationism is usually regarded as an irrational set of beliefs. In this paper I propose that the best way to understand why individual learners settle on any mature set of beliefs is to see that as the developmental outcome of a series of “fast and frugal” boundedly rational inferences rather than as a rejection of reason. This applies to those whose views are opposed to science in general. A bounded rationality model of belief choices both serves to explain the (...) fact that folk traditions tend to converge on “anti-modernity”, and to act as a default hypothesis, deviations from which we can use to identify other, arational, influences such as social psychological, economic and individual dispositions. I propose some educational and public policy strategies that might decrease the proportion of learners who find creationism and anti-science in general a rational choice. (shrink)

Much research on judgment and decision making has focussed on the adequacy of classical rationality as a description of human reasoning. But more recently it has been argued that classical rationality should also be rejected even as normative standards for human reasoning. For example, Gigerenzer and Goldstein and Gigerenzer and Todd argue that reasoning involves “fast and frugal” algorithms which are not justified by rational norms, but which succeed in the environment. They provide three lines of argument for this (...) view, based on: the importance of the environment; the existence of cognitive limitations; and the fact that an algorithm with no apparent rational basis, Take-the-Best, succeeds in an judgment task. We reconsider –, arguing that standard patterns of explanation in psychology and the social and biological sciences, use rational norms to explain why simple cognitive algorithms can succeed. We also present new computer simulations that compare Take-the-Best with other cognitive models. Although Take-the-Best still performs well, it does not perform noticeably better than the other models. We conclude that these results provide no strong reason to prefer Take-the-Best over alternative cognitive models. (shrink)

Thinking and acting in favor of sustainable development is internationally recognized; it is necessary but societies and individuals are slow to adopt an appropriate behavior. International organizations such as World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology recommend to opt for frugality, a principle emphasized to avoid over-consumption and consequently the depletion of natural resources. This article thus examines the principle of frugality by proving that it is not necessarily related to consumption as it is understood since the (...) Enlightenment: we have to take into account the Asian perspective that changes the relationship between humankind and nature, first taking into consideration the good of the whole community. I argue that frugality is not necessarily in conflict with economy but certainly challenging it as expressed by the Indian terms Jugaad or Gandhian: a way of thinking and creating new projects that lead to fruitful solutions for the majority. Therefore I intend to provide a positive definition of frugality as a way of creating new projects that lead to fruitful solutions for the majority. (shrink)

According to Agenda 21, the United Nation’s action plan for sustainable development, ‘Governments and private sector organisations should promote more positive attitudes towards sustainable consumption through education, public awareness programmes and other means’. But some could wonder whether the cultivation of frugal consumption habits in schools is compatible with basic liberal principles. This article argues that, in societies like ours, liberal egalitarian theories of justice should permit and even advocate teaching frugality in educational institutions. Liberal egalitarianism expects educational institutions (...) to equip children with the abilities and virtues needed to live well by their own judgment and in compliance with just institutions. The article examines how frugality could be one of these virtues. First, frugality is conducive to better compliance with our distributive obligations towards the current poor and future generations. Second, frugality enables prospective adults to live well with their fair share of scarce resources, and even with less. Third, frugality increases autonomy and facilitates its exercise. The article thus concludes that liberal egalitarian institutions should encourage schools to teach frugality. (shrink)

Relationship between default semantics and modularity of mind (in particular mind reading through the principle of Relevance).

Recent approaches to causal modelling rely upon the causal Markov condition, which specifies which probability distributions are compatible with a directed acyclic graph. Further principles are required in order to choose among the large number of DAGs compatible with a given probability distribution. Here we present a principle that we call frugality. This principle tells one to choose the DAG with the fewest causal arrows. We argue that frugality has several desirable properties compared to the other principles that have been (...) suggested, including the well-known causal faithfulness condition. _1_ Introduction _2_ The Causal Markov Condition _3_ Faithfulness _4_ Frugality _4.1_ Basic independences and frugality _4.2_ General properties of directed acyclic graphs satisfying frugality _4.3_ Connection to minimality assumptions _5_ Frugality as a Parsimony Principle _6_ Conclusion Appendix. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is twofold: (i) to introduce the framework of update semantics and to explain what kind of semantic phenomena may successfully be analysed in it: (ii) to give a detailed analysis of one such phenomenon: default reasoning.

This article provides an overview of recent results on lexicographic, linear, and Bayesian models for paired comparison from a cognitive psychology perspective. Within each class, we distinguish subclasses according to the computational complexity required for parameter setting. We identify the optimal model in each class, where optimality is defined with respect to performance when fitting known data. Although not optimal when fitting data, simple models can be astonishingly accurate when generalizing to new data. A simple heuristic belonging to the class (...) of lexicographic models is Take The Best (Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) Psychol. Rev. 102: 684). It is more robust than other lexicographic strategies which use complex procedures to establish a cue hierarchy. In fact, it is robust due to its simplicity, not despite it. Similarly, Take The Best looks up only a fraction of the information that linear and Bayesian models require; yet it achieves performance comparable to that of models which integrate information. Due to its simplicity, frugality, and accuracy, Take The Best is a plausible candidate for a psychological model in the tradition of bounded rationality. We review empirical evidence showing the descriptive validity of fast and frugal heuristics. (shrink)

Reasoning by default is a relevant aspect of everyday life that has traditionally attracted the attention of many fields of research, from psychology to the philosophy of logic, from economics to artificial intelligence. Also in the field of law, default reasoning is widely used by lawyers, judges and other legal decision-makers. In this paper, a philosopher of language (Carlo Penco) and a philosopher of law (Damiano Canale) attempt to explore some uses of default reasoning that are scarcely (...) considered by legal theory. In particular, the dialogue dwells on the notion of literal meaning, witness testimony, and the problem of disagreement among experts in legal proceedings. The paper is intended as a sort of brain storming useful to identify new lines of research straddling philosophy of law, cognitive psychology and philosophy of language. (shrink)

This paper spells out the attention schema theory of consciousness in terms of the predictive processing framework. As it stands, the attention schema theory lacks a plausible computational formalization that could be used for developing possible mechanistic models of how it is realized in the brain. The predictive processing framework, on the other hand, fails to provide a plausible explanation of the subjective quality or the phenomenal aspect of conscious experience. The aim of this work is to apply the formal (...) tools of predictive processing to outline a possible model of cognition that details a plausible way in which organisms may acquire or construct the kinds of schemas postulated by the attention schema theory. This is done in terms of Bayesian control models, which tend to favour representing information in a frugal or 'sparse' manner that strips away detail in precisely the way that the attention schema requires. Once integrated, these two accounts can offer a plausible explanation of the supposedly irreducible and mysterious 'feel' of conscious experience, in terms of the frugal manner in which perceptual mechanisms are represented by the attention schema. (shrink)

A research program is announced, and initial, exciting progress described. Many inference problems, poorly modeled by some traditional approaches, are surprisingly well handled by kinds of simple-minded Bayesian approximations. Fuller Bayesian approaches are typically more accurate but rarely are they either fast or frugal. Open issues include codifying when to use which heuristic and to give detailed evolutionary explanations.

The default theory of aesthetic value combines hedonism about aesthetic value with strict perceptual formalism about aesthetic value, holding the aesthetic value of an object to be the value it has in virtue of the pleasure it gives strictly in virtue of its perceptual properties. A standard theory of aesthetic value is any theory of aesthetic value that takes the default theory as its theoretical point of departure. This paper argues that standard theories fail because they theorize from (...) the default theory. (shrink)

Gerd Gigerenzer and Thomas Sturm have recently proposed a modest form of what they describe as a normative, ecological and limited naturalism. The basic move in their argument is to infer that certain heuristics we tend to use should be used in the right ecological setting. To address this argument, we first consider the case of a concrete heuristic called Take the Best (TTB). There are at least two variants of the heuristic which we study by making explicit the choice (...) functions they induce, extending these variants of TTB beyond binary choice. We argue that the naturalistic argument can be applied to only one of the two variants of the heuristic; we also argue that the argument for the extension requires paying attention to other “rational” virtues of heuristics aside from efficacy, speed, and frugality. This notwithstanding, we show that there is a way of extending the right variant of TTB to obtain a very well behaved heuristic that could be used to offer a stronger case for the naturalistic argument (in the sense that if this heuristic is used, it is also a heuristic that we should use). The second part of the article considers attempts to extending the naturalistic argument from algorithms dealing with inference to heuristics dealing with choice. Our focus is the so-called Priority Heuristic, which we extend from risk to uncertainty. In this setting, the naturalist argument seems more difficult to formulate, if it remains feasible at all. Normativity seems in this case extrinsic to the heuristic, whose main virtue seems to be its ability to describe actual patterns of choice. But it seems that a new version of the naturalistic argument used with partial success in the case of inference is unavailable to solve the normative problem of whether we should exhibit the patterns of choice that we actually display. (shrink)

Default positions, predetermined starting points that aid in complex decision-making, are common in clinical medicine. In this article, we identify and critically examine common default positions in clinical ethics practice. Whether default positions ought to be held is an important normative question, but here we are primarily interested in the descriptive, rather than normative, properties of default positions. We argue that default positions in clinical ethics function to protect and promote important values in medicine—respect for (...) persons, utility, and justice. Further, default positions in clinical ethics may also guard against harm. Where default positions exist, there are epistemic burdens to overturn them. The person wishing to reject the default position, rather than the person endorsing it, bears this burden. The person who bears the burden of meeting the epistemic requirements must provide evidence proportional to the degree of harm the default position protects against. Default positions that protect against significant harm impose significant epistemic requirements to overturn. This asymmetry not only makes medical decision-making more economical but also serves to promote and protect certain values. The identification and analysis of common and recognizable default positions can help to identify other default positions and the conditions under which their associated epistemic requirements are met. The article concludes with considerations of potential problems with the use of default positions in clinical ethics. (shrink)

In this paper we investigate how different discourses on frugal innovation are articulated, and how the dynamics between these different discourses have led to a certain dominant understanding of frugal innovation today. We analyse the dynamic interactions between three discourses on frugal innovation: innovations for the poor, grassroots innovations by the poor, and more recently co-creating frugal innovations with the poor. We argue that this latter discourse is articulated as a hegemonic project as it is designed (...) to accommodate demands from both business and poor communities. We draw on Laclau and Mouffe’s concepts of ‘chain of difference’, ‘empty signifier’ and ‘floating signifier’ to explain the advent of the hegemonic discourse on co-creating innovations with the poor. We show how a floating signifier with radical potential, frugal innovation, has been hijacked and co-opted in a hegemonic project that has leveraged powerful ambiguous signifiers, with co-creation acting as an empty signifier. To clarify what is problematic in this hegemonic intervention, we expose how contemporary frugal innovation discourse contributes to a project of governing and exploiting rather than helping the poor, in ways that benefit formal economic actors while further worsening global inequalities. (shrink)

The notions of inference and default are used in pragmatics with different meanings, resulting in theoretical disputes that emphasize the differences between the various pragmatic approaches. This paper is aimed at showing how the terminological and theoretical differences concerning the two aforementioned terms result from taking into account inference and default from different points of view and levels of analysis. Such differences risk making a dialogue between the theories extremely difficult. However, at a functional level of analysis the (...) different theories, definitions, and approaches to interpretation can be compared and integrated. At this level, the standardization of pragmatic inferences can be regarded as the development of a specific type of presumptions, used to draw prima-facie interpretations. (shrink)

A heuristic is a rule of thumb. In psychology, heuristics are relatively simple rules for making judgments. A fast heuristic is easy to use and allows one to make judgments quickly. A frugal heuristic relies on a small fraction of the available evidence in making judgments. Typically, fast and frugal heuristics (FFHs) have, or are claimed to have, a further property: They are very reliable, yielding judgments that are about as accurate in the long run as ideal non-fast, (...) non-frugal rules. This paper introduces some well-known examples of FFHs, raises some objections to the FFH program, and looks at the implications of those parts of the FFH program about which we can have some reasonable degree of confidence. (shrink)

In this article, the author formulates five hypotheses why frugality makes sense: as facilitating happiness; as a condition for realizing justice; as a personal asset; as a Pareto improvement; as a requirement for distributive justice.

This commentary questions the claim that Take-The-Best provides a cognitively more plausible account of cue utilisation in decision making because it is faster and more frugal than alternative algorithms. It is also argued that the experimental evidence for Take-The-Best, or non-integrative algorithms, is weak and appears consistent with people normally adopting an integrative approach to cue utilisation.

Extant literature romanticizes frugality as a lifestyle trait that helps in the spiritual evolution of consumers, which in turn enables them in overcoming the negative consequences of materialism and over-consumption. Extant studies have not paid attention to cultural contexts, such as caste and gender, which could outline the non-volitional enactment of frugality in societies such as India. We draw from the work of the political philosopher Alain Badiou to argue that frugality embodies non-volitional subjectivities and is linked to processes of (...) responsibilization and de-politicization. We engage with layered narratives from three story-sites and conceptualize frugality as a socio-political subjectivity that disenfranchises consumers and normalizes inequality. Our study provides evidence of how consumers are made to adopt frugality to conform to political conservatism and unequal orders of caste and gender. (shrink)

Extant literature romanticizes frugality as a lifestyle trait that helps in the spiritual evolution of consumers, which in turn enables them in overcoming the negative consequences of materialism and over-consumption. Extant studies have not paid attention to cultural contexts, such as caste and gender, which could outline the non-volitional enactment of frugality in societies such as India. We draw from the work of the political philosopher Alain Badiou to argue that frugality embodies non-volitional subjectivities and is linked to processes of (...) responsibilization and de-politicization. We engage with layered narratives from three story-sites and conceptualize frugality as a socio-political subjectivity that disenfranchises consumers and normalizes inequality. Our study provides evidence of how consumers are made to adopt frugality to conform to political conservatism and unequal orders of caste and gender. (shrink)

Look before you leap. - Proverb. He who hesitates is lost. - Another proverb.

Some theorists have recently raised doubts about much of the experimental evidence purporting to demonstrate the existence of unconscious perception. In our (2019) in this journal, we argued some of these considerations are not decisive. Phillips (forthcoming a) replies thoughtfully to our paper, concluding that he is unconvinced by our arguments. Phillips maintains that the view that perception is invariably conscious remains, as he puts it, the “default” hypothesis both within the folk understanding and experimental study of perception. There (...) is much to agree with in Phillips’ piece, but there remain some substantive points of disagreement, which we outline here. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue that (principled) attempts to ground a priori knowledge in default reasonable beliefs cannot capture certain common intuitions about what is required for a priori knowledge. I will describe hypothetical creatures who derive complex mathematical truths like Fermat’s last theorem via short and intuitively unconvincing arguments. Many philosophers with foundationalist inclinations will feel that these creatures must lack knowledge because they are unable to justify their mathematical assumptions in terms of the kind of basic (...) facts which can be known without further argument. Yet, I will argue that nothing in the current literature lets us draw a principled distinction between what these creatures are doing and paradigmatic cases of good a priori reasoning (assuming that the latter are to be grounded in default reasonable beliefs). I will consider, in turn, appeals to reliability, coherence, conceptual truth and indispensability and argue that none of these can do the job. (shrink)

Humans and animals make inferences about the world under limited time and knowledge. In contrast, many models of rational inference treat the mind as a Laplacean Demon, equipped with unlimited time, knowledge, and computational might. Following H. Simon's notion of satisficing, the authors have proposed a family of algorithms based on a simple psychological mechanism: one-reason decision making. These fast and frugal algorithms violate fundamental tenets of classical rationality: They neither look up nor integrate all information. By computer simulation, (...) the authors held a competition between the satisficing "Take The Best" algorithm and various "rational" inference procedures. The Take The Best algorithm matched or outperformed all competitors in inferential speed and accuracy. This result is an existence proof that cognitive mechanisms capable of successful performance in the real world do not need to satisfy the classical norms of rational inference. (shrink)

This paper describes a pair of dietary practices I label default vegetarianism and default veganism. The basic idea is that one adopts a default of adhering to vegetarian and vegan diets, with periodic exceptions. While I do not exhaustively defend either of these dietary practices as morally required, I do suggest that they are more promising than other dietary practices that are normally discussed like strict veganism and vegetarianism. For they may do a better job of striking (...) a balance between normative concerns about contemporary farming practices and competing considerations of life. Additionally, I argue that framing discussions in terms of defaults is useful for various reasons: it helps organize agreements and disagreements, it more accurately reflects the way people conceptualize their dietary practices, and it presents a more dialectically effective view. (shrink)

We reject the concept of a default option of withdrawal as proposed by Syltern and colleagues, and will outline here potential consequences on parental trust, particularly in historically marginali...

Inclusion of children in medical decision making, to the extent of their ability and interest in doing so, should be the default position, ensuring that children are routinely given a voice. However, optimizing the involvement of children in their health care decisions remains challenging for clinicians. Missing from the literature is a stepwise approach to assessing when and how a child should be included in medical decision making. We propose a systematic approach for doing so, and we apply this (...) approach in a discussion of two challenging clinical cases. The approach is informed by a literature review, and is anchored by case studies of teenagers' refusal of clinical care, regulatory requirements for research assent, and the accepted approach to involving cognitively impaired adults in medical decisions. (shrink)

Since the earliest formalisation of default logic by Reiter many contributions to this appealing approach to nonmonotonic reasoning have been given. The different formalisations are here presented in a general framework that gathers the basic notions, concepts and constructions underlying default logic. Our view is to interpret defaults as special rules that impose a restriction on the juxtaposition of monotonic Hubert-style proofs of a given logicL. We propose to describe default logic as a logic where the juxtaposition (...) of default proofs is subordinate to a restriction condition . Hence a default logic is a pair (L, ) where properties of the logic , like compactness, can be interpreted through the restriction condition . Different default systems are then given a common characterization through a specific condition on the logicL. We also prove cumulativity for any default logic (L, ) by slightly modifying the notion of default proof. We extend, in fact, the language ofL in a way close to that followed by Brewka in the formulation of his cumulative default system. Finally we show the existence of infinitely many intermediary default logics, depending on and called linear logics, which lie between Reiter's and ukaszewicz' versions of default logic. (shrink)

This is a note from an AMC session on Jeff Horty's (2012) book *Reasons as Defaults*.

In this pioneering book Kasia Jaszczolt lays down the foundations of an original theory of meaning in discourse, reveals the cognitive foundations of discourse interpretation, and puts forward a new basis for the analysis of discourse processing. She provides a step-by-step introduction to the theory and its application, and explains new terms and formalisms as required. Dr Jaszczolt unites the precision of truth-conditional, dynamic approaches with insights from neo-Gricean pragmatics into the role of speaker's intentions in communication. She shows that (...) the compositionality of meaning may be understood as merger representations combining information from various sources including word meaning and sentence structure, various kinds of default interpretations, and conscious pragmatic inference. Among the applications the author discusses are constructions that pose problems in semantic analysis such as referring expressions, propositional attitude constructions, presupposition, modality, numerals, and sentential connectives. She proposes solutions to cutting edge problems in the semantics/pragmatics interface - for example, how many levels of meaning should be distinguished; the status of underspecification; how much contextual information should be placed in the representation of the speaker's meaning; whether there are default interpretations; the stage of utterance interpretation at which pragmatic inference begins; and whether compositionality is a necessary feature of the theory of meaning and if so how it is to be defined.The book is for students and researchers in semantics, pragmatics, computational linguistics, and philosophy of language at advanced undergraduate level and above. (shrink)

Small and medium size business enterprises (SMEs) are the linchpin in systems of food provisioning in sub-Saharan Africa. These businesses occupy the middle of the agri-food chain and face a food security conundrum: they must ensure that smallholder producers of limited means can operate under fair terms while low-income consumers are supplied with affordable and nutritious food. This task becomes even more challenging when resources are scarce. This paper explores how resource-constrained SMEs arrange the terms on which both farmers and (...) consumers are included in agri-food chains. To this end, it combines the concept of inclusion with that of frugality. We use the case of a Kenyan SME to demonstrate how a focus on frugality can advance our understanding of how business practices create thriving business relationships with smallholders while simultaneously ensuring access to affordable food for consumers. We additionally identify what conditions for inclusion emerge from this type of dynamic business practices. Our perspective departs from assessing induced organisational interventions, such as contract farming or cooperatives, which deliberately shorten the agri-food chain, thereby overlooking the skilful practices being employed by business actors in the middle of the chain. (shrink)

Since its inception, situation theory has been concerned with the situated nature of meaning and cognition, a theme which has also recently gained some prominence in Artificial Intelligence. Channel theory is a recently developed framework which builds on concepts introduced in situation theory, in an attempt to provide a general theory of information flow. In particular, the channel theoretic framework offers an account of fallible regularities, regularities which provide enough structure to an agent's environment to support efficient cognitive processing but (...) which are limited in their reliability to specific circumstances. This paper describes how this framework can lead to a different perspective on defeasible reasoning: rather than being seen as reasoning with incomplete information, an agent makes use of a situated regularity, choosing to use the regularity that seems best suited (trading off reliability and simplicity) to the circumstances it happens to find itself in. We present a formal model for this task, based on the channel theoretic framework, and sketch how the model may be used as the basis for a methodology of defeasible situated reasoning, whereby agents reason with simple monotonic regularities but may revise their choice of regularity on learning more about their circumstances. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Defense of Frugality:Insights from “Green Contemplatives” across TraditionsWioleta PolinskaIn 1995, James Nash, a Christian ethicist, wrote a seminal article discussing the decline of the virtue of frugality. Not only is frugality demoted by our society, but it is also met with ridicule and depicted as “unfashionable, unpalatable, and even unpatriotic.”1 In contrast, argued Nash, frugality needs to be defined as an “earth affirming and enriching norm that delights (...) in the non- and less-consumptive joys of the mind and flesh, especially the enhanced lives for human communities and other creatures that only constrained consumption and production can make possible on a finite planet.”2 Seen as such, frugality becomes a subversive norm revolting against the norms prevalent in our consumerist society. Today, frugality continues to be a radical virtue, yet a virtue that receives a growing attention from the religious and secular alike. This is due to the spreading ecological deterioration, the increasing gap between the poor and the wealthy, and the mounting dissatisfaction with life among the well-to-do. Psychologists, sociologists, economists, and environmentalists call for a life that rejects overconsumption, a life that is satisfied with what is enough.3 Scholarly voices from diverse disciplines point out that restraint in our lifestyle choices is necessary to ensure sustainability for all life forms and the planet itself. This is so because the health of the environment is endangered largely due to human consumption aimed at increasing one’s well-being. Furthermore, the research on happiness suggests that the prosperous in our society might be happier when practicing some restraint in consumer spending.4 Thus, it appears that frugality can bring health to the planet and its various inhabitants and make human beings happy.Based on an interdisciplinary assessment of the consumerist lifestyle, I will argue that contemplative Christian and Buddhist traditions offer one way of restoring the subversive virtue of frugality. By examining contemplative resources present in their respective theologies, practices of meditation, and environmentally friendly lifestyles, I will suggest the relevancy of these for secular as well as religious communities and the well-being of the planet. Given our growing social, environmental, and psychological costs driven by consumerism, it is important to revisit strategies present in living frugally.5 [End Page 147]Zygmunt Bauman, a sociologist and philosopher, defines consumerist society in the following manner:Consumer society manages to render non-satisfaction permanent. One way of achieving such an effect is to denigrate and devalue consumer products shortly after they have been hyped into the universe of the consumer’s desires. But another way, yet more effective, hides from the limelight: the method of satisfying every need/desire/want in such a fashion that it cannot but give birth to new needs/desires/wants. What starts as a need must end up as a compulsion or an addiction.6Of course, there is nothing wrong with consumption as such. Our very survival depends on it. What is problematic is the kind of consumption that turns into an end in itself so that other concerns, be they social, economic, or psychological, are dismissed. In a society that often measures personal achievement by economic success, the nonsatisfaction with one’s current status is rendered permanent. This is particularly noticeable whenever the updated versions of popular products appear on the market, whether iPods, iPhones, or computers. Purchases of such products are rarely motivated by “needs,” since the older versions of the products are still functional, but by hyped-up desire created by a multibillion-dollar advertising industry. We want what we are told we should want because we are caught in a cycle of compulsion that aims at satisfying every desire. In such a cycle, wants become identified as needs. More than 70 percent of the electronic products end up in our landfills, and they contribute 70 percent of the heavy metals found in US landfills.7Wendell Berry, a Catholic contemplative, characterizes this consumerist approach to life as consistent with the culture of the one night stand. We are after pleasure rather than lasting commitments; we do not probe into the practices of various businesses; we choose not to know true names of our... (shrink)

This article considers the principles that ought to be used to determine the scope and content of contract law's «default rules», the rules that will, in the absence of express exclusion, govern parties» contractual relationships. It examines three, ostensibly competing, approaches discussed in the literature: that defaults be grounded in the subjective consent of contracting parties, in the customs and norms immanent within the parties» community, and in the value of economic efficiency. It argues that each has something of (...) value to tell us about default rules, but that none can, in isolation, offer a wholly compelling prescription for their design. Rather, the best such prescription must be an eclectic one, drawing something from all three accounts, but varying to reflect the institution promulgating the default. Where defaults are promulgated legislatively, the case for choosing rules that will promote efficiency is a strong one, and the main criticism of efficiency analysis is shown, in this particular context, to be misguided. Where, however, defaults are promulgated adjudicatively—in the context of settling individual cases—the normative appeal of efficiency is much reduced. The article, then, criticizes efficient adjudicative defaults against their defenders, whilst defending efficient legislative defaults against their critics. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that Polleit and Mariano (2011) are right in concluding that Credit Default Swaps (CDS) are per se unobjectionable from Rothbard’s libertarian perspective on property rights and contract theory, but that they fail to derive this conclusion properly. I therefore outline the proper explanation. In addition, though Polleit and Mariano are correct in pointing out that speculation with CDS can conceivably hurt the borrowers’ interests, they fail to grasp that this can be the case only (...) in some peculiar circumstances that I identify. In other words, they miss the bigger picture, the one outside special circumstances, in which CDS trading has the opposite effect. That is, CDS facilitate debt accumulation, including government debt accumulation. Finally, I point out how this can precipitate the collapse of fiat money regimes. An incidental goal of the analysis is to provide a better account than Polleit and Mariano of recent government interventions in and around CDS markets. (shrink)

Findings from two experiments argue in favor of the superiority of default, preferred interpretations over non-default less favored counterparts, outshining degree of non-salience, non-literalness, contextual strength, and negation. They show that, outside of a specific context, the default interpretation of specific negative constructions is a non-salient interpretation 1; their non-default interpretation is a salience-based alternative. In contrast, the default interpretation of the affirmative counterparts is a salience-based interpretation ; their non-default interpretation is a non-salient (...) alternative. When in equally strongly supportive contexts, default yet non-salient negative sarcasm is processed faster than non-default, non-salient yet affirmative sarcasm and faster than non-default yet salience-based negativ.. (shrink)

Objective To determine whether presenting delivery room management options as defaults influences decisions to resuscitate extremely premature infants. Materials and methods Adult volunteers recruited from the world wide web were randomised to receive either resuscitation or comfort care as the delivery room management default option for a hypothetical delivery of a 23-week gestation infant. Participants were required to check a box to opt out of the default. The primary outcome measure was the proportion of respondents electing resuscitation. Data (...) were analysed using χ2 tests and multivariate logistic regression. Results Participants who were told the delivery room management default option was resuscitation were more likely to opt for resuscitation (OR 6.54 95% CI 3.85 to 11.11, p<0.001). This effect persisted on multivariate regression analysis (OR 7.00, 95% CI 3.97 to 12.36, p<0.001). Female gender, being married or in a committed relationship, being highly religious, experiences with prematurity, and favouring sanctity of life were significantly associated with decisions to resuscitate. Discussion Presenting delivery room options for extremely premature infants as defaults exert a significant effect on decision makers. The information structure of the choice task may act as a subtle form of manipulation. Further, this effect may operate in ways that a decision maker is not aware of and this raises questions of patient autonomy. Conclusion Presenting delivery room options for extremely premature infants as defaults may compromise autonomous decision-making. (shrink)