As a significant extension of our previous calculus of logical differentials and moving logic, we propose here a mathematical diagram for specifying the emergence of novelty, through the construction of some “differentials” related to cohomological computations. Later we intend to examine how to use these “differentials” in the analysis of anticipation or evolution schemes. This proposal is given as a consequence of our comments on the Ehresmann–Vanbremeersch’s work on memory evolutive systems, from the two points of view which are (...) characterization of life and use of categorical modeling. It would not be possible to conceive of the “differentials” outside the frame of a MES. Furthermore, we hope that this diagram will be useful to exhibit the “emergence of sense” in discourses, and this idea is supported here by a brief examination of how a discourse could be seen as a living system. (shrink)

This article explores the role of social factors in the emergence of self and other. It is suggested that the experience of causing actions contributes to a basic sense of self in which awareness of mental states and the experience of a mental self are grounded. According to the proposed evolutionary scenario, the experience of agency emerged as individuals acting in social context learned to differentiate between effects caused by their own actions and effects resulting from joint action. (...) Through joint action, individuals also developed an understanding of others' actions as goal-directed, paving the way for imitation. The ability to distinguish between action capabilities of self and other and the understanding that action-effect principles apply equally to self and other may have provided important advantages in circumstances where cooperative action and social learning were critical. The current proposal adds to previous evolutionary scenarios in that it identifies social conditions that may have shaped a basic sense of self. This, in turn, could have given rise to theory of mind and the cultural construction of mental selves. (shrink)

A vital step to successfully orienting Deleuze with biosemiotics (and theories of biological complexity overall) is to discover a coherent scientific throughline in his work that also accounts for the aesthetic/creative dimension of his philosophy. This requires the heterodox move (from a Deleuzean point of view) of giving priority to the organism. I argue that Deleuze’s treatment of the organism does more than signal a superficial relation to biological complexity theory that, as a result of his nuanced take on the (...) matter, undermines the value of the organic body to his system. Instead, we can recognize a working theory of autopoiesis in the early Deleuze that scaffolds as well as substantiates his later ethological and biosemiotic observations and reveals a definite, albeit minimal, notion of subjectivity in his work. Most importantly, reorienting his logic of sense as a logic of sense-making, or the context-dependent signification between system and environment (Thompson, 2007), allows us to begin the work of mining a scientific throughline in Deleuze’s work akin to biological complexity theory that is of value to both Deleuze studies and biosemiotics. (shrink)

The collection of Edmund Husserl's sketches on time-consciousness from the years 1893-1917, edited by Rudolf Boehm and published as Volume X in the Husserliana series, affords significant new material for the study of the evolution of Husserl's thought. Specifically, the sketches suggest that in the course of analyzing the consciousness of temporal objects Husserl became convinced that a distinction must be drawn between an ultimate or absolute flow of consciousness and the immanent temporal objects or contents -- sense-data, appearances (...) of external things, acts of wishing, judging, etc. -- constituted or known within that flow. Further, the texts indicate that the emergence of the absolute dimension was connected with the development during this period of two distinct interpretations of the constitution of time-consciousness. Husserl apparently worked out the first of these during the years 1901-1907, and only towards the end of this period did the notion of an absolute consciousness, absent in earlier texts, make its appearance. And no sooner did it emerge than Husserl undertook a critique of his first interpretation which ultimately culminated in its rejection. In the new position which then appeared, around 1909, the absolute flow of time-constituting consciousness, and its distinction from temporal objects both immanent and transcendent, was unequivocally affirmed. We propose now to discuss this evolution and the emergence and nature of the absolute flow of consciousness. -/- . (shrink)

The research addresses the effect of sense of control on perceived stress by controlling for the intervening effects of Religiosity and Materialism. A total of 609 emerging adults living in Dhaka city participated in the survey; surveyors used a 48-item structural closed-ended questionnaire to collect the responses. The elicited responses were quantified, and structural equation models were formulated to identify any associations among the variables of interest. The findings suggest that sense of control is a strong determinant of (...) perceived stress; neither religiosity nor materialism mediate the association. The study advances the transactional model of stress and coping. (shrink)

The paper argues that the emergence of the Western question of rationality only can be understood in its dynamic and evolution from the correlation between philosophical/theological/scientifical institution and the strong objectivity, in that such a strong objectivity only can be achieved by a scientifical institutional praxis, something that common sense and common people cannot do. The Platonic model of scientifical institution as centralizing and monopolizing the epistemological-political grounding, imposing it directly on common sense and common people, is (...) based on the idea that the strong epistemological-moral objectivity is the normative condition to the sense at all, to the framing, legitimation and guiding of common sense and common people. So this correlation between scientifical institution and strong objectivity leads to the strong institutionalism regarding the constitution, the legitimation and the social foment of the valid knowledge and of the valid culture, again from the contraposition to common sense and common people. Here, scientifical institution acquires a role of judge and of guide of the social evolution as a whole. The paper’s central argument is that such Platonic linking between scientifical institution and rationality must be deconstructed in favor of common sense and common people, i.e. in favor of the democracy as basis of the epistemological-moral grounding, which means as consequence the institutional weakening and abandonment of that Platonic self-understanding which links scientifical institution and objectivity. (shrink)

Why did science emerge in the West and how did scientific values come to be regarded as the yardstick for all other forms of knowledge? Stephen Gaukroger shows just how bitterly the cognitive and cultural standing of science was contested in its early development. Rejecting the traditional picture of secularization, he argues that science in the seventeenth century emerged not in opposition to religion but rather was in many respects driven by it. Moreover, science did not present a unified picture (...) of nature but was an unstable field of different, often locally successful but just as often incompatible, programmes. To complicate matters, much depended on attempts to reshape the persona of the natural philosopher, and distinctive new notions of objectivity and impartiality were imported into natural philosophy, changing its character radically by redefining the qualities of its practitioners.The West's sense of itself, its relation to its past, and its sense of its future, have been profoundly altered since the seventeenth century, as cognitive values generally have gradually come to be shaped around scientific ones. Science has not merely brought a new set of such values to the task of understanding the world and our place in it, but rather has completely transformed the task, redefining the goals of enquiry. This distinctive feature of the development of a scientific culture in the West marks it out from other scientifically productive cultures. In The Emergence of a Scientific Culture, Stephen Gaukroger offers a detailed and comprehensive account of the formative stages of this development---and one which challenges the received wisdom that science was seen to be self-evidently the correct path to knowledge and that the benefits of science were immediately obvious to the disinterested observer. (shrink)

Research in quantum gravity strongly suggests that our world in not fundamentally spatiotemporal, but that spacetime may only emerge in some sense from a non-spatiotemporal structure, as this paper illustrates in the case of causal set theory and loop quantum gravity. This would raise philosophical concerns regarding the empirical coherence and general adequacy of theories in quantum gravity. If it can be established, however, that spacetime emerges in the appropriate circumstances and how all its relevant aspects are explained in (...) fundamental non-spatiotemporal terms, then the challenge is fully met. It is argued that a form of spacetime functionalism offers the most promising template for this project. (shrink)

This article traces the emergence of the term welfare state in British political discourse and describes competing efforts to define its meaning. It presents a genealogy of the concept's emergence and its subsequent integration into various political scripts, tracing the struggles that sought to name, define, and narrate what welfare state would be taken to mean. It shows that the concept emerged only after the core programmes to which it referred had already been enacted into law and that (...) the referents and meaning of the concept were never generally agreed upon – not even at the moment of its formation in the late 1940s. During the 1950s, the welfare state concept was being framed in three distinct senses: the welfare state as a set of social security programmes; the welfare state as a socio-economic system; and the welfare state as a new kind of state. Each of these usages was deployed by opposing political actors – though with different scope, meaning, value, and implication. The article argues that the welfare state concept did not operate as a representation reflecting a separate, already-constituted reality. Rather, the use of the concept in the political and economic arguments of the period – and in later disputes about the nature of the Labour government's post-war achievements – was always thoroughly rhetorical and constitutive, its users aiming to shape the transformations and outcomes that they claimed merely to describe. (shrink)

Special sciences (such as biology, psychology, economics) describe various regularities holding at some high macroscopic level. One of the central questions concerning these macroscopic regularities is how they are related to the laws of physics governing the underlying microscopic physical reality. In this paper we show how a macroscopic regularity may emerge from an underlying micro- scopic structure, and how the appearance of multiple realizability of the special sciences by physics comes about in a reductionist-physicalist framework. On this basis we (...) explain how complexity at the high level can arise due to a sort of harmony between the microscopic dynamics and observer-dependent macroscopic properties. We show that observer-dependent properties, which underlie the emergence of macroscopic properties and of macroscopic complexity, are objective physical facts. We argue that such physical properties remove the mystery from the multiple realizability of special sciences’ kinds, since the latter are grounded in shared physical properties. Finally we explain how and in what sense in our reductive physicalist approach the special sciences are still autonomous after all. (shrink)

In The Birth of Sense, Don Beith proposes a new concept of generative passivity, the idea that our organic, psychological, and social activities take time to develop into sense. More than being a limit, passivity marks out the way in which organisms, persons, and interbodily systems take time in order to manifest a coherent sense. Beith situates his argument within contemporary debates about evolution, developmental biology, scientific causal explanations, psychology, postmodernism, social constructivism, and critical race theory. Drawing (...) on empirical studies and phenomenological reflections, Beith argues that in nature, novel meaning emerges prior to any type of constituting activity or deterministic plan. The Birth of Sense is an original phenomenological investigation in the style of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and it demonstrates that the French philosopher's works cohere around the notion that life is radically expressive. While Merleau-Ponty's early works are widely interpreted as arguing for the primacy of human consciousness, Beith argues that a pivotal redefinition of passivity is already under way here, and extends throughout Merleau-Ponty's corpus. This work introduces new concepts in contemporary philosophy to interrogate how organic development involves spontaneous expression, how personhood emerges from this bodily growth, and how our interpersonal human life remains rooted in, and often thwarted by, domains of bodily expressivity. (shrink)

What drives much of the current philosophical interest in the idea of group cognition is its appeal to the manifestation of psychological properties—understood broadly to include states, processes, and dispositions—that are in some important yet elusive sense emergent with respect to the minds of individual group members. Our goal in this paper is to address a set of related, conditional questions: If human mentality is real yet emergent in a modest metaphysical sense only, then: (i) What would it (...) mean for a group to have emergent cognitive states? (ii) Is this even a metaphysically coherent view? (iii) Relative to which notion of emergence do we have reason to believe that certain groups in fact have emergent cognitive states? We shall argue that evidence from a wide variety of social science domains makes it plausible that there are group cognitive states and processes no less metaphysically emergent than human cognitive (and other special science) states and processes. (shrink)

In The Birth of Sense, Don Beith proposes a new concept of generative passivity, the idea that our organic, psychological, and social activities take time to develop into sense. More than being a limit, passivity marks out the way in which organisms, persons, and interbodily systems take time in order to manifest a coherent sense. Beith situates his argument within contemporary debates about evolution, developmental biology, scientific causal explanations, psychology, postmodernism, social constructivism, and critical race theory. Drawing (...) on empirical studies and phenomenological reflections, Beith argues that in nature, novel meaning emerges prior to any type of constituting activity or deterministic plan. The Birth of Sense is an original phenomenological investigation in the style of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and it demonstrates that the French philosopher’s works cohere around the notion that life is radically expressive. While Merleau-Ponty’s early works are widely interpreted as arguing for the primacy of human consciousness, Beith argues that a pivotal redefinition of passivity is already under way here, and extends throughout Merleau-Ponty’s corpus. This work introduces new concepts in contemporary philosophy to interrogate how organic development involves spontaneous expression, how personhood emerges from this bodily growth, and how our interpersonal human life remains rooted in, and often thwarted by, domains of bodily expressivity. (shrink)

ArgumentThis paper examines the intertwined relations between eugenics and medical genetics from a Swedish perspective in the 1940s and 1950s. The Swedish case shows that a rudimentary form of genetic counseling emerged within eugenic practices in the applications of the Swedish Sterilization Act of 1941, here analyzed from the phenomenon of “heredophobia” (ärftlighetsskräck). At the same time genetic counseling also existed outside eugenic practices, within the discipline of medical genetics. The paper argues that a demand for genetic counseling increased in (...) the 1940s and 1950s in response to a sense of reproductive responsibility engendered by earlier eugenic discourse. The paper also questions the claim made by theoreticians of biopolitics that biological citizens have emerged only during the last decades, especially in neoliberal societies. From the Swedish case it is possible to argue that this had already happened earlier in relation to the proliferation of various aspects of eugenics to the public. (shrink)

On some accounts, early reflection on the nature of human cognition focused on its physical or physiological causes (as, for example, when in fragment 105 Empedocles identifies thought with blood). On other accounts, there was an identifiable process of semantic development in which a number of perception-oriented terms for knowing (e.g. gignôskô, oida, noeô, and suniêmi) took on a more intellectual orientation. Although some find evidence of this transition in the poems of Solon and Archilochus, appreciation for a distinction between (...) sensing and knowing is more plausibly credited to the Presocratic thinkers Heraclitus and Parmenides. It is unclear whether Heraclitus regarded sense perception as an essential first stage in acquiring knowledge (or an inherently inferior form of awareness), but the goddess in Parmenides’ poem unambiguously urges the youth to whom she speaks to set aside the testimony of eye and ear and instead ‘judge by reason’ the nature of what-is. (shrink)

Teaching competency in bioethics has been a concern of the field since its start. In 1976, The Hastings Center published the first report on the teaching of contemporary bioethics. Graduate programs culminating in an MA or PhD were not needed at the time, concluded the report. “In the future, however,” the report speculated, “the development and/or changing social priorities may at some point allow, or even require, the creation of new academic structures for graduate education in bioethics.” Although that future (...) might be upon us, the creation of a terminal degree in bioethics has its detractors. Scholars have debated whether bioethics is a discipline with its own methods and theoretical grounding, a multidisciplinary field bringing various professional perspectives to bear on particular types of problems, a set of problem-solving skills to resolve moral disagreements, or something else entirely. Whether or not efforts to develop the methods and theory of bioethics have matured to the point that it is now a discipline in the strictest sense, new bioethics training programs have appeared at all postsecondary levels. In this essay, we examine the number and types of U.S. programs and degrees in this growing field. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: I II III.

This article explores the role of social factors in the emergence of self and other. It is suggested that the experience of causing actions contributes to a basic sense of self in which awareness of mental states and the experience of a mental self are grounded. According to the proposed evolutionary scenario, the experience of agency emerged as individuals acting in social context learned to differentiate between effects caused by their own actions and effects resulting from joint action. (...) Through joint action, individuals also developed an understanding of others' actions as goal-directed, paving the way for imitation. The ability to distinguish between action capabilities of self and other and the understanding that action-effect principles apply equally to self and other may have provided important advantages in circumstances where cooperative action and social learning were critical. The current proposal adds to previous evolutionary scenarios in that it identifies social conditions that may have shaped a basic sense of self. This, in turn, could have given rise to theory of mind and the cultural construction of mental selves. (shrink)

How to understand Primordial Sociality and its emergence philosophically in relation to Fundamental Ontology and Existentialism. Primordial Sociality is based on Wild Being. This is distinguished from Existential Sociality based on the Emergent Meta-system. The various kinds of Being such as Pure, Process, and Hyper Being gives rise to different kinds of basic sociality which are Pure Sociality, Process Sociality, and Hyper Sociality prior to the arising of Wild Sociality that then appears on the surface of Ultra Sociality that (...) is completely transcendent (height) or is represented by the utterly unconscious (depth). Wild Being is a surface phenomena of the expression of Sense differentiated from Nonsense. Wild Sociality appears within the Transcendental field as the intrapenetration of what Merleau-Ponty calls Tacit Cogitos. (shrink)

The procedures of canonical quantization of the gravitational field apparently lead to entities for which any interpretation in terms of spatio-temporal localization or spatio-temporal extension seems difficult. This fact is the main ground for the suggestion that can often be found in the physics literature on canonical quantum gravity according to which spacetime may not be fundamental in some sense. This paper aims to investigate this radical suggestion from an ontologically serious point of view in the cases of two (...) standard forms of canonical quantum gravity, quantum geometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity. We start by discussing the physical features of the quantum wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics and of the spin networks of loop quantum gravity that motivate the view according to which spacetime is not fundamental. We then point out that, by contrast, for any known ontologically serious understanding of quantum entanglement, the commitment to spacetime seems indispensable. Against this background, we then critically discuss the idea that spacetime may emerge from more fundamental entities. As a consequence, we finally suggest that the emergence of classical spacetime in canonical quantum gravity faces a dilemma: either spacetime ontologically emerges from more fundamental non-spatio-temporal entities or it already belongs to the fundamental quantum gravitational level and the emergence of the classical picture is merely a matter of levels of description. On the first horn of the dilemma, it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence that is involved. The second horn runs into the difficulties raised by the physics of canonical quantum gravity. (shrink)

This study is meant to provide a means of understanding the change of philosophic perspective from the naive classical view that natures manifest themselves to mind to the modern view that they do so only as mediated by thought or speech. it does so by tracing the emergence of the early modern concept that philosophy must be presented as a system of propositions or laws in order to be scientific. it is argued that certain early moderns adopted the term (...) "system" from the stoic definition of art and that they clearly delineated the essential characteristics of systematicity but spoke only of systems of individual sciences. regis first applied the term to philosophy as a whole, but hobbes before him conceived of system in regis's sense. the conclusion is a more precise understanding of the origin of the modern use of the term and of the meaning of the early modern concept of philosophic system. (shrink)

For this year’s Virtual Issue, our guest editor, Omar W. Nasim, has collected together papers from the Aristotelian Society archives that represent a substantial part of a dispute that contributed to the emergence of analytic philosophy in Britain at the turn of the 20th Century. The dispute was primarily concerned with the problem of the external world – the nature of the sensible objects of perception, and how they relate to physical things and the perceiving subject. The participants in (...) this controversy contested the nature of the appearance-reality distinction, whether it is it is possible for a thing to instantiate contrary sensible qualities at the same place and time, the distinction between presentation and representation, the nature of knowledge by acquaintance, and the nature of sense-data – e.g., whether sense-data are psychical or physical, whether they persist unperceived, and how they give rise to knowledge of the external world. G. E. Moore and Bertrand Russell were significant contributors to these debates, but so too were several philosophers whose names are now less well known: G. F. Stout, G. Dawes Hicks, Abraham Wolf, T. Percy Nunn, and S. Alexander. This Virtual Issue collects together, for the first time, the important contributions made to these debates by all of these figures. In doing so it provides a fascinating insight into the ways in which Russell’s earliest attempts to construct the external world from sense-data were influenced by the ideas and arguments of his immediate contemporaries. Omar W. Nasim’s specially commissioned introduction to the Virtual Issue sets out the historical context of these disputes about the external world, and details the prominent role played by the Aristotelian Society in making them possible. (shrink)

Available from UMI in association with The British Library. Requires signed TDF. ;This work pursues certain themes in the rise and development of analytic philosophy, focussing in particular on the relationship between Aristotelian and Fregean logic, and the emergence and evolution of interest in questions of meaning, with reference to Frege and Wittgenstein. ;In the introductory chapter I consider the general relationship between analytic philosophy and the history of philosophy, suggesting the need for a closer examination of the 'paradigm (...) shift' from syllogistic theory to modern logic. In Part One I undertake this examination, with a chapter outlining the development, nature and purpose of Aristotle's logical theory, followed by a chapter describing Frege's achievement in the Begriffsschrift. My central concern here is with the emergence of a conception of sense--as grounded in the notion of logical equivalence. Aristotle, I argue, had no such conception; and it only emerged as Frege was led to reflect on the differences between his own logical system and traditional logic. ;In Part Two I consider the tightening of the 'bonds of sense' which Frege created, looking first at Frege's logicist project and then at Wittgenstein's Tractatus . I describe the epistemological motivation of Frege's work and the way that this led him to distinguish between Sinn and Bedeutung, and I argue that there is a fundamental tension in his mature thought between a semantic and an epistemic conception of sense. This tension was ironed out, however, in the early work of Wittgenstein, who rigorously thought through the implications of the semantic conception. I trace the evolution of his early ideas, in the framework provided by Frege and Russell, and explain how his saying/showing distinction shaped both his account of logic and his picture theory of language. ;In Part Three I discuss Wittgenstein's later philosophy, showing how it developed in response to problems he later perceived in both his own earlier work and the writings of Frege. I describe the shift from simples to samples, and explain his conception of meaning as use and his remarks on rule-following . In the final chapter, I consider the implications of our discussion of sense for the issues as to the nature of logic and the role of philosophical analysis. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the extent to which the concept of emergence can be applied to questions about the nature and moral justification of territorial borders. Although the term is used with many different senses in philosophy, the concept of “weak emergence”—advocated by, for example, Sawyer (2002, 2005) and Bedau (1997)—is especially applicable, since it forces a distinction between prediction and explanation that connects with several issues in the dis-cussion of territory. In particular, we argue, weak emergentism (...) about borders allows us to distinguish between (a) using a theory of territory to say where a border should be drawn, and (b) looking at an existing border and saying whether or not it is justified (Miller, 2012; Nine, 2012; Stilz, 2011). Many authors conflate these two factors, or identify them by claiming that having one without the other is in some sense incoherent. But on our account—given the concept of emergence—one might unproblematically be able to have (b) without (a); at the very least, the distinction between these two issues is much more significant than has often been recognised, and more importantly gives us some reason to prefer “statist” as opposed to “cultural” theories of territorial borders. We conclude with some further reflections on related matters concerning, firstly, the apparent causal powers of borders, and secondly, the different ways in which borders are physically implemented (e.g., land vs. water). (shrink)

I focus on the stochastic gravity program, a program that conceptualizes spacetime as the hydrodynamic limit of the correlation hierarchy of an underlying quantum theory, that is, a theory of the microscopic theory of gravity. This approach is relatively obscure, and so I begin by outlining the stochastic gravity program in enough detail to make clear the basic sense in which, on this approach, spacetime emerges from more fundamental physical structures. The theory, insofar as it is a univocal theory, (...) is quite clear in its basic features, and so issues of philosophical interpretation can be readily isolated.The most obvious reason to investigate the theory as a model for the emergence of spacetime structure is how close it is to the stage at which the behavior that we recognize as spacetime actually emerges from the micro gravitational system. Approaches that begin with fully quantum gravity treat a system that is conceptually quite far removed from the stage at which emergence is relevant. The stochastic approach however begins by identifying the point at which spacetime emerges as a phenomena of interest.I begin with an analysis of the emergence question generally and ask how best we should understand it, especially from the point of view of thinking of spacetime as emergent. A nice feature of the stochastic program is how clear the question of emergence is on this approach. In part this is because of its similarity by design to the kinetic theory of gases and solid state physics. And so many of the analyses of the emergence of macroscopic variables in the thermodynamic limit can be repurposed to understand how an apparently continuous metrical space emerges from the behavior of a non-spatial system.A serious interpretive problem looms however. The problem is that there is no clear connection between features of the kinetic theory of gravity, as a quantum theory, and any final theory of gravity. In the third part of the paper I will argue that as far as questions of emergence are concerned, we need not begin with a final, underlying theory, and I attempt to identify general issues connected to the emergence of spacetime that can be addressed in isolation from our certainty about that final theory. I will argue that this is a common way in which we treat our other, after all, provisional theories. We begin with the theories we have and ask about their implications without assuming that they are final theories, and yet also without explicitly downplaying the significance of the results we derive. Moreover I will attempt to show that, whatever character a final theory of micro gravity has, spacetime as an emergent structure in that theory is likely to be similar in important respects to the way it manifests in the stochastic gravity program. Briefly this is precisely because of the metaphysical neutrality of the kinetic theory. I will expand, in this section, on the nature of the emergence of the spacetime structure in the context of the stochastic gravity program and explain how the emergence is tied not to the particular model of interactions appealed to, but rather to the generic features of quantum fields with correlated fluctuations at all orders. (shrink)

The procedures of canonical quantization of the gravitational field apparently lead to entities for which any interpretation in terms of spatio-temporal localization or spatio-temporal extension seems difficult. This fact is the main ground for the suggestion that can often be found in the physics literature on canonical quantum gravity according to which spacetime may not be fundamental in some sense. This paper aims to investigate this radical suggestion from an ontologically serious point of view in the cases of two (...) standard forms of canonical quantum gravity, quantum geometrodynamics and loop quantum gravity. We start by discussing the physical features of the quantum wave functional of quantum geometrodynamics and of the spin networks of loop quantum gravity that motivate the view according to which spacetime is not fundamental. We then point out that, by contrast, for any known ontologically serious understanding of quantum entanglement, the commitment to spacetime seems indispensable. Against this background, we then critically discuss the idea that spacetime may emerge from more fundamental entities. As a consequence, we finally suggest that the emergence of classical spacetime in canonical quantum gravity faces a dilemma: either spacetime ontologically emerges from more fundamental non-spatio-temporal entities or it already belongs to the fundamental quantum gravitational level and the emergence of the classical picture is merely a matter of levels of description. On the first horn of the dilemma, it is unclear how to make sense of concrete physical entities that are not in spacetime and of the notion of ontological emergence that is involved. The second horn runs into the difficulties raised by the physics of canonical quantum gravity. (shrink)

The integration of technology in care is core business in nursing and this role requires that we must understand and use technology informed by evidence that goes much deeper and broader than actions and behaviours. We need to delve more deeply into its complexity because there is nothing minor or insignificant about technology as a major influence in healthcare outcomes and experiences. Evidence is needed that addresses technology and nursing from perspectives that examine the effects of technology, especially related to (...) increasing demands for efficiency, the relationship of technology to nursing and caring, and a range of philosophical questions associated with empowering people in their healthcare choices. Specifically, there is a need to confront in practice the ways technique influences care. Technique is the creation of a kind of thinking that is necessary for contemporary healthcare technology to develop and be applied in an efficient and rational manner. Technique is not an entity or specific thing, but rather a way of thinking that seeks to shape and organize nursing activity, and manage efficiently individual difference(s) in care. It emphasizes predetermined causal relationships, conformity, and sameness of product, process, and thought. In response is needed a radical vision of nursing that attempts in a real sense to ensure we meet the needs of individuals and their community. Activism and advocacy are needed, and a willingness to create a certain detachment from the imperatives that technique demands. It is argued that our responsibility as nurses is to respond in practice to the errors, advantages, difficulties, and temptations of technology for the benefit of those who most need our assistance and care. (shrink)

This chapter challenges the view that psychology emerged from philosophy about 1900, when each found its own proper sphere with little relation to the other. It begins by considering the notion of a discipline, defined as a distinct branch of learning. Psychology has been a discipline from the time of Aristotle, though with a wider ambit, to include phenomena of both life and mind. Empirical psychology in a narrower sense arose in the eighteenth century, through the application (in Britain (...) and elsewhere) of the observational attitudes of the physical and life sciences to mental phenomena. The experimental psychology of the latter nineteenth century was a transformation of this empirical psychology, although the British version was characterized by new theoretical conceptions (including evolutionary ideas) as well as new empirical techniques. After surveying psychology in and out of universities in this period, the chapter reviews a taxonomy of “schools” of psychology from 1923. Notice of anti-psychological attitudes in British philosophy before and after 1900 is balanced by considering positive conceptions of psychology’s role in connection with epistemology and the problem of the external world. (shrink)

The Hamiltonian structure of General Relativity (GR), for both metric and tetrad gravity in a definite continuous family of space-times, is fully exploited in order to show that: i) the "Hole Argument" can be bypassed by means of a specific "physical individuation" of point-events of the space-time manifold M^4 in terms of the "autonomous degrees of freedom" of the vacuum gravitational field (Dirac observables), while the "Leibniz equivalence" is reduced to differences in the "non-inertial appearances" (connected to gauge variables) of (...) the same phenomena. ii) the chrono-geometric structure of a solution of Einstein equations for given, gauge-fixed, initial data (a "3-geometry" satisfying the relevant constraints on the Cauchy surface), can be interpreted as an "unfolding" in mathematical global time of a sequence of "achronal 3-spaces" characterized by "dynamically determined conventions" about distant simultaneity. This result stands out as an important conceptual difference with respect to the standard chrono-geometrical view of Special Relativity (SR) and allows, in a specific sense, for an "endurantist" interpretations of ordinary physical objects in GR. (shrink)

According to formalism, a mathematician is not concerned with mysterious metaphysical entities but with mathematical symbols. As a result, mathematical entities become simply sensible signs. However, the price that has to be paid for this move seems to be too high, for mathematics, at present considered to be the queen of sciences, turns out to be a to a contentless game. That is why it seems absurd to regard numbers and all mathematical entities as mere symbols. The aim of our (...) paper is to show the reasons that have led some philosophers and mathematicians to adopt the view that mathematical terms in the proper sense refer to nothing and mathematical propositions have no real content. At the same time we want to explain how formalism helped to overcome the traditional concept of science. (shrink)

It is common to assume of an “objectivist” stage of Zubiri, prior to his meeting with Heidegger in Freiburg. However, if we analyze Zubiri’s philosophy before his stay in Freiburg, we already find a “metaphysical” orientation, and not merely an objectivist one. This orientation is intrinsically related to the early appearance of the notion of “reality” in his courses. The appearance of his concept of reality is at least partially motivated by Zubiri’s early reading of Heidegger’s habilitation thesis on Duns (...) Scotus. Zubiri discovered in Heidegger the possibility of trying to carry out a phenomenological characterization of reality, which took him beyond the conception, basically idealistic, of being as a “position” or as a “belief.” With Heidegger, Zubiri was able to sustain that reality is not something extra animam. However, Zubiri could not follow Heidegger in his conceptualization of reality based on human existence, and with this he began his own path in philosophy. A path that, in a certain sense, breaks with all phenomenology, because reality is located at a moment prior to the meaning of things for a subject or for a human existent. And yet, a path that continues the phenomenological claim of a descriptive fidelity to the things themselves. (shrink)

Aquinas held that the metaphysical consideration of beings as being consists in the consideration of being as created, i.e., the consideration of things in their complete reality, and the reduction of this complete reality to its complete cause. When existence displaces form as the primary sense of being, the thing’s act of existing is conceived of as ‘formal’ with respect to its essence. Consequently, the primary object of metaphysical consideration becomes the complete entity, a composite of essence and existence, (...) and the primary sense of being becomes the subsistence of the complete entity. In Aquinas’s creationist discourse, the term supposit denotes the concept of the entitative whole or complete entity. What this concept of the supposit adds to the Aristotelian conception of the concrete individual derives from the contingency of existence in every being beyond the first being. The subject of a nature and of categorical accidents is now also conceived of as the subject of a received act of existing. Aquinas reduces the distinctions of finite entities to their possession of acts of existing that are diverse absolutely, in virtue of a ‘privation’ of the fullness of existence, just as Aristotle reduces formal contrariety to the possession or ‘privation’ of differences that are diverse absolutely. And as Plato traced the negations constitutive of formal contrariety to a correlative participation between being and otherness, Aquinas analogously traced the distinctions of finite entities to a transcendental duality between participated existence and receiving essence. The necessary participation of each of these principles of finite being in divine and infinite existence constitutes the ultimate metaphysical reduction and horizon of a creationist metaphysics. (shrink)

A number of theologians engaged in the theology and science dialogue—particularly Pentecostal theologian Amos Yong—employ emergence as a framework to discuss special divine action as well as causation initiated by other spiritual realities, such as angels and demons. Mikael and Joanna Leidenhag, however, have issued concerns about its application. They argue that Yong employs supernaturalistic themes with implications that render the concept of emergence obsolete. Further, they claim that Yong's use of emergence theory is inconsistent because he (...) highlights the ontological independence of various spirits in the world concurrently with his advocation of supervenience theory. In view of these concerns, Leidenhag and Leidenhag urge Yong to depart from his application of emergence theory. In what follows, we plan to address each of these criticisms and demonstrate that they are tenuous, if not unwarranted, especially in light of a kenotic-relational pneumatology. (shrink)

Quantum gravity is understood as a theory that, in some sense, unifies general relativity (GR) and quantum theory, and is supposed to replace GR at extremely small distances (high-energies). It may be that quantum gravity represents the breakdown of spacetime geometry described by GR. The relationship between quantum gravity and spacetime has been deemed ``emergence'', and the aim of this thesis is to investigate and explicate this relation. After finding traditional philosophical accounts of emergence to be inappropriate, (...) I develop a new conception of emergence by considering physical case studies including condensed matter physics, hydrodynamics, critical phenomena and quantum field theory understood as effective field theory. This new conception of emergence is unconcerned with the ideas of reduction and derivation (i.e. it holds that we may have emergence with reduction or without it). Instead, a low-energy theory (or model) is understood as emergent from a high-energy theory if it is novel and autonomous compared to the high-energy theory, and the low-energy physics is dependent in a particular, minimal sense on the high-energy physics (this dependence is revealed by the techniques of effective field theory and the renormalisation group). While novelty is construed in a broad sense, the autonomy comes essentially from the underdetermination of the high-energy theory by the low-energy theory, which reflects the minimal way in which the emergent, low-energy theory depends on the high-energy one. It results from the scaling behaviour of the theories and the limiting relations between them, and is demonstrated by the renormalisation group and effective field theory techniques, the idea of universality, and the phenomenon of symmetry-breaking. These ideas are important in exploring the relationship between quantum gravity and GR, where GR is understood as an effective, low-energy theory of quantum gravity. Without experimental data or a theory of quantum gravity, we rely on principles and techniques from other areas of physics to guide the way. As well as considering the idea of emergence appropriate to treating GR as an effective field theory, I investigate the emergence of spacetime (and other aspects of GR) in several concrete approaches to quantum gravity, including examples of the condensed matter approaches, the ``discrete approaches'' (causal set theory, causal dynamical triangulations, quantum causal histories and quantum graphity) and loop quantum gravity. (shrink)

Embryogenesis involves biochemical patterning as well as mechanical morphogenetic movements, both regulated by the expression of the regulatory genes of development. The reciprocal interplay of morphogenetic movements with developmental gene expression is becoming an increasingly intense subject of investigation. The molecular processes through which differentiation patterning closely regulates the development of morphogenetic movements are today becoming well understood. Conversely, experimental evidence recently revealed the involvement of mechanical cues due to morphogenetic movements in activating mechano-transduction pathways that control both the differentiation (...) and the active morphogenesis of fundamental events in embryonic tissue development. Here I will first focus on the central role the shape of biological structures of the molecular and mesoscopic cell scales plays in mechano-transduction. Then, after a short description of the genetic regulation of the Drosophila embryo mesoderm invagination at gastrulation—one of the best-understood morphogenetic movement of embryogenesis—I will detail the processes of differentiation and of active morphogenesis of Drosophila embryo gastrulation, which require mechano-transduction. Finally, I will explore the putative consequences in evolution of these mechano-transduction events. I speculate that the first ancient multicellular organisms might have emerged from primary morphological and differentiation patterns induced by primitive mechano-sensation effects allowed by mechano-transduction in response to their physical environment, such as touch by gravity or water flows, which might have acted as primitive motor–sensorial systems, thus conditioning the emergence of our primary animal ancestors. (shrink)

My argument is that Chalmers' zombie fiction and his rigid-designator-argument going back on Kripke comes down to a petitio principii. Rather, at the core it appears to be more related to the essential 'privacy' of the phenomenal internal perspective. In return for Chalmers I argue that the 'principle self-preservation' of living organisms necessarily implies subjectivity and the emergence of sense. The comparison with a robot proves instructive. The mode of 'mere physical' being is transcended if, in the form (...) of phenomenal perception, sense appears on the stage of higher animals – a transition explained here as an emergence phenomenon based on the systemic co-operation of perception, valuation and action ('perc-val-act system'). Some fundamental considerations are added: Those consequences implied by the principle self-preservation reveal the natural-biological origin of the organism – primarily seeming a more insignificant circumstance – as a momentous fundamental difference (end-in-itself-character, subjectivity, constitution of sense) compared to technical artefacts (robot). And the emergentist approach indicates the – maybe paradoxical – possibility of a dualism of physical and psychical phenomena in an overall physical system, that is not dualistic at the same time. (shrink)

In the late eighteenth century Newton's Principia was studied in the Scottish universities under the influence of the local school of ‘Common Sense’ philosophy. John Robison, holding the key chair of natural philosophy at Edinburgh from 1774 to 1805, provided a new conception of ‘mechanical philosophy’ which proved crucial to the emergence of physics in nineteenth century Britain. At Cambridge the emphasis on ‘mixed mathematics’ was taken to a new level of refinement and application by the introduction of (...) analytical methods in the 1820s. The fusion of these two schools, with emphasis on conceptual unity on the one hand, and mathematisation on the other, came about from the 1830s onwards, and reached full expression in the new framework of a unified mathematical physics based on the energy principle. (shrink)

This paper examines the anti-psychologism of Paul Natorp, a Marburg School Neo-Kantian. It identifies both Natorp’s principle argument against psychologism and the views underlying the argument that give it its force. Natorp’s argument depends for its success on his view that certain scientific laws constitute the intersubjective content of knowledge. That view in turn depends on Natorp’s conception of subjectivity, so it is only against the background of his conception of subjectivity that his reasons for rejecting psychologism make sense. (...) This interpretation of Natorp suggests that attention paid to late nineteenth century theories of subjectivity and philosophy of psychology could improve our understanding of the emergence of anti-psychologism in that period.Keywords: Paul Natorp; Marburg School; Neo-Kantianism; Psychologism; Subjectivity. (shrink)

Explaining the emergence of individuality in the process of evolution remains a challenge; it faces the difficulty of characterizing adequately what ‘emergence’ amounts to. Here, I present a pragmatic account of individuality in which I take up this challenge. Following this account, individuals that emerge from an evolutionary transition in individuality are coarse-grained entities: entities that are summaries of lower-level evolutionary processes. Although this account may _prima facie_ appear to ultimately rely on epistemic considerations, I show that it (...) can be used to vindicate the emergence of individuals in a quasi-ontological sense. To this end, I discuss a recent account of evolutionary transitions in individuality proposed by Godfrey-Smith and Kerr (Brit J Philos Sci 64(1):205–222, 2013) where a transition occurs through several stages, each with an accompanying model. I focus on the final stage where higher-level entities are ascribed a separate fitness parameter, while they were not in the previous stages. In light of my account, I provide some justification for why such a change in parameters is necessary and cannot be dismissed as merely epistemic. (shrink)

Roux begins by exploring the texts in which the origins of the scientific notion of thought experiments are usually said to be found. Her general claim is simple: the emergence of the notion of thought experiments relies on a succession of misunderstandings and omissions. She then examines, in a more systematic perspective, the three characteristics of the broad category of thought experiments nowadays in circulation: thought experiments are counterfactual, they involve a concrete scenario and they have a well-delimited cognitive (...) intention. Her aim in exploring these characteristics is twofold. Firstly, it is to show that each of these characteristics, considered individually, may be taken in a more or less strict sense, and consequently to explain the proliferation of thought experiments. Secondly, it is to suggest that the recent debates on thought experiments might have arisen because these three characteristics are not easily conciliated when they are considered together. Finally, in a third and last section, the nine essays of the introduced book are presented. (shrink)

The efforts to prove God's existence in the history of thought have been one of the fundamental problems of philosophy and theology, and even the most important one. The evidences put furword to prove the existence of God constitute the center of philosophy of religion’s problems not only philosophy of religion, but also the disciplines such as theology-kalam and Islamic philosophy are also seriously concerned. When we look at the history of philosophy, it is clear that almost all philosophers are (...) interested in the evidence in favour of and against the existence of God. Especially in recent times, religious experience has often been regarded as evidence of the existence of God. Studies in the field of religious and mystical experience have put forward many arguments concerning the use of religious experience as evidence. However, this study has been limited to experience of sense and pure consciousness claims rather than examining all of these arguments. In this study firstly, the analogy between experience of sense and religious experience will be deal with, and then claims that conciousness can be emptied by a number of methods which are defended by mystics. In addition, it will be tried to defend the opinion that the mystical experiences which are the common point of the two approaches are valid. The main emphasis of the article will be that these arguments can be used as evidence for the existence of God.Summary: Religious experience - which has not been considered as one of the classical evidences regarding the existence of God before being popular by recent studies – is started to be called one of the arguments. The most important reason for not arguing religious experience among the evidences of God’s existence is that it is a personal experience and therefore contains subjective perspectives. However, many researchers, who refuse to accept the criticism raised against religious experience with restricting to subjectivity, emphasized the importance of religious experience by highlighting the objective aspects of such experiences. This emphasis was not only on its significance, but also on the fact that it had a cognitive feature and thus it could provide evidence for the existence of God. The argument of religious experience is generally defined as an effort for demonstrating to existence of God with reference to several feelings such as spiritual experiences of human in face of creator and sacred Being, encounter with God, uniting, and annihilating selfness in Him. The emergence of such efforts, especially after the XVIIIth century, indicates that the history of the evidence does not go back much earlier. However, even if notas evidence, it is possible to extend the traces of religious and mystical experience to the history of religions such as Buddhism and Hinduism. Considering a great amount of the previous literature focused on religious experience in the West, It is easily seen that such research is still new. The main purpose in addressing such a controversial issue is to make the argument on the religious experience more current and to show whether the religious experience would be able to use as evidence for the existence of God.First title of this study comprises many different claims such as Walter T. Stace’s The Argument from Unanimity Richard Swinburne’s The Principle of Credulity, William P. Alston’s Perceiving God, John Hick’s Experience-as. However, instead of briefly giving out very different claims, the study chooses to focus on two arguments which are less discussed and can be given in more detail. The first is the argument based on the analogy between the religious experience and the sense experience. The fundamental point of this argument is sense experience. With reference to the similarities between the sense experience and the religious experience, it can be argued that religious experience is also cognitive and may function as an evidence for the existence of God. In other words, being perceptual and noetic, namely cognitive, of sense experience is addressed as a similar side of religious experience. Whether it is imaginary or real, eventually, it is necessary for an experience to have an object and being experience of something. Therefore, the religious experience includes the perception of a Transcendent Being that is beyond and in excess of the individual who experiences. Perception of the sense experience will definitely be different from the perception of religious experience. Researchers who think that the five sense organs do not run the perception of Sacred Beings, identified broader and various meanings for the perception. Thereby, in this approach, where the semantic field of perception is expanded, it was contended that human beings were able to perceive the transcendent, eternal, and unlimited God, and this can be explained in the epistemological sense. In order to use religious experiences as an evidence for the existence of God, it is necessary to determine whether such experiences are caused by God rather than something else. This raises the issue of the validity of religious experience. The researchers in this area have propounded various criteria to identify whether religious experience is existed or not. Experiences, which do not meet the criteria, are not considered existed even if they claim to be religious experience.The second is the argument that discusses whether it is possible to suggest an evidence for the existence of God by utilizing pure consciousness events. In general, this argument claims that the consciousness gets clear, and thus, mystic or Sufi experiences the Divine One with pure consciousness by discharging consciousness from all sensual contents and removing it from secular desire and wishes. The argument, which claims the experience of Divine One is direct, therefore uninterpretable, and experienced by pure consciousness, believes clearing the consciousness of mystics from sensual qualities such as seeing, hearing, and tasting. It is stated that it is possible for mystics to empty their sensory images and get rid of them, and thus, their desires and wishes could be lost. Especially, the thinkers who are connected with the philosophy of perennialism and defend this approach, thought that people, who have distinct religion, culture, and beliefs in different parts of the world and in various time periods, had the same experience and considered such experiences were universal by suggesting that this similarity could be called as common essence.Even though the claim which offers that the events of pure consciousness are the same everywhere have been criticized in many respects, the advocates of this approach have argued that the experience has the common essence, but the interpretation is different. This relationship, which was tried to be established between experience and commentary, caused a lot of work for both the thinkers who put forward the claims of pure consciousness and the researchers who opposed it. However, examining the relationship between experience and interpretation requires serious studies in socio-psychological, cultural and religious fields. Therefore, in order not to exceed the limits of the article, the relationship between experience and interpretation is briefly mentioned.While discussing two arguments, the main claims of the arguments were addressed, and the criticisms directed to this argument were not discussed as much as possible. However, some fundamental criticisms have been mentioned shortly for a better understanding of the discussion. Since such western-oriented claims mostly were deployed in a western context, the study excluded the comparison of the claims across different cultures. (shrink)

In this article, I seek to make sense of the oft-invoked idea of 'public emergency' and of some of its (supposedly) radical moral implications. I challenge controversial claims by Tom Sorell, Michael Walzer, and Giorgio Agamben, and argue for a more discriminating understanding of the category and its moral force.

Can there be a philosophy of taste? This paper opens by raising some metaphilosophical questions about the study of taste – what it consists of and what method we should adopt in pursuing it. It is suggested that the best starting point for philosophising about taste is against the background of 18th-century epistemology and philosophy of mind, and the conceptual tools this new philosophical paradigm entails. The notion of aesthetic taste in particular, which emerges from a growing sense of (...) dissatisfaction with an undifferentiated category of taste, comes to be set apart from gustatory taste on account of its normativity and aspirations to objectivity. The paradox of taste, as found in Hume and Kant, is examined, and shown to be highly relevant to contemporary metaphysical debate within aesthetics. Specifically, this paper argues that both Realists and Anti-Realists rely more heavily than assumed on the idea of taste. (shrink)

Any description of the emergence and evolution of different types of meaning processes (semiosis, sensu C.S.Peirce) in living systems must be supported by a theoretical framework which makes it possible to understand the nature and dynamics of such processes. Here we propose that the emergence of semiosis of different kinds can be understood as resulting from fundamental interactions in a triadically-organized hierarchical process. To grasp these interactions, we develop a model grounded on Stanley Salthe's hierarchical structuralism. This model (...) can be applied to establish, in a general sense, a set of theoretical constraints for explaining the instantiation of different kinds of meaning processes (iconic, indexical, symbolic) in semiotic systems. We use it to model a semiotic process in the immune system, namely, B-cell activation, in order to offer insights into the heuristic role it can play in the development of explanations for specific semiotic processes. (shrink)

Molecular imprints of organisms serving as both the agents and the products of the underlying sign activities are quantum mechanical in their origins. In particular, molecules in any reaction networks constituting a biological organism are semiotic or context-dependent in the sense that their activities reside within the proper coordination of the entire networks. The origin of life could have been related to a specific aspect of molecular semiotics, especially in the transition from molecules as the physical symbols of material (...) units to molecules as the semiotic signs having the capacity of pointing to something else other than the molecules themselves. Quantum mechanical underpinning of the molecular imprints leading to the emergence of life is in the appraisal of the material capacities of both coherent assimilation and decoherent dissociation already latent in the imprints. One empirical evidence suggesting the likelihood of both coherent assimilation and decoherent dissociation in prebiotic settings could have been found in synthetic chemical reactions running in hydrothermal circulation of seawater through hot vents in the Haedean ocean on the primitive Earth. (shrink)