Pre-Socratic Philosophy

The language of early Greek epic, exemplified primarily by Homer, contains numerous descriptions of inner states and uses a specific vocabulary to do so. Scholars understand these descriptions in a general way; but the precision of the expressions remains a mystery. In this work, one of the most important of these words, thumos, is examined in each of its contexts. This synchronic formulaic analysis is carried out according to the contexts of thumos: the cognitive/intellectual, the emotional, and the physical. Two (...) additional contexts, deliberation and motivation, are discussed separately. Within the discussion of each context, the functional synonyms of thumos, particulary phren/phrenes, and other frequent associates of thumos, are examined. Thumos has associations with words relating to winds and storms, a fact which helps clarify its significance in all contexts. Because this work is a discussion of thumos in all contexts, and also contains an appendix of the relevant passages, it should be useful to scholars engaged in research on Homeric vocabulary. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Antik Yunan felsefesinde görünüş-gerçeklik problemi üzerine odaklanan ve bu bağlamda 'arkhe' kavramını değerlendiren bir analiz sunmaktadır. Arkhe, gerçekte değişenin ardında değişmeden kalan ancak durumları veya görünüşleri değişen bir ilke veya töz olarak kabul edilmekte ve bu bağlamda varlığın gerçekliği ile görünüşü arasındaki ilişkiyi açıklamak için kullanılmaktadır. Miletli filozoflar, arkheyi varlık için temel ilke olarak görürler ve bu ilkenin varlık üzerindeki değişimlerin arkasındaki sabit unsuru temsil ettiğini savunurlar. Bu unsur doğanın temelini oluşturur ve varlık ile onun görünüşü arasındaki ayrımı (...) açıklar. Thales, Anaksimandros ve Anaksimenes'in arkhenin ne olduğunu belirleme girişimleri varlığın gerçekliği ile görünen kısmı arasındaki ilişkiyi anlama çabalarını yansıtır. Bu kapsamda makalede öncelikle felsefenin doğuşunun gerekli koşulları belirlenerek Thales, Anaksimandros ve Anaksimenes'in arkhe kavramına yükledikleri farklı anlamlar ve arkheye yönelik yaklaşımları varlık anlayışları çerçevesinde değerlendirilmektedir. Böylece Arkhenin nasıl evrildiği ve bu kavramın görünüşün ötesindeki gerçekliği anlama çabalarına nasıl katkıda bulunduğu incelenmektedir. Ayrıca makalede Anaksimandros ve Anaksimenes'in arkhenin değişen durumlarını ayrılma-kopma veya yoğunlaşma-seyrekleşme işleyişi ile açıklamaları neticesinde görünüş-gerçeklik ayrımını temellendirme konusunda derinlemesine bir perspektif sundukları vurgulanmaktadır. Özellikle Anaksimandros'un 'apeiron' olarak adlandırdığı ilkenin, duyulardan ziyade akıl yoluyla kavranabilen bir gerçekliği temsil ettiği ve bu yönüyle görünüşün ötesinde bir anlam taşıdığı iddia edilmektedir. Nihai olarak apeironun belirli olmayan bir niteliğe sahip olduğu değerlendirilerek maddi bir yapıda olmasına rağmen duyularla algılanabilen olandan daha temel bir nitelikte olabileceği tespit edilmekte ve görünüş-gerçeklik meselesinin ele alınmasında apeironun diğerlerine kıyasla daha uygun bir yapıda olduğu öne sürülmektedir. (shrink)

Among the reconstructions of the quasi-legendary figure of Pherecydes, one point of the doxography concerning possible astronomical activities of the Wise of Syros is quickly dismissed by modern commentators. The story is based on two testimonies reported by Diogenes Laertius: one attributes to Pherecydes the invention of an instrument for observing the solstices (the “heliotrope”); the other recalls the opinion of Andron of Ephesus, who distinguished between two Pherecydes of Syros: the “Wise” and the “astronomer”. The first seems to stem (...) from a misunderstanding of Homeric poetry ; the second, if derived from the former, would have no greater value. However, the various understandings of the testimonies of Diogenes Laertius on Andron and, immediately after him, on Eratosthenes, leave open the possibility that the general issue of Pherecydes’ astronomy implied more than a simple misunderstanding of a few Homeric verses (without excluding it). It could rather depend on: (a) the confusion over the identity of Pherecyde(s) that seems to have prevailed as early as the 4th century B.C.; (b) the philosophical character that earlier doxographers were willing to attribute to his work. These neglected testimonies then became a remarkable source of information on the first reception of Pherecydes of Syros in the 4th century B.C., and on the ways in which this thinker was integrated in the history of philosophy. (shrink)

What we envisaged as a dossier to explore the connection between style and philosophy in this unique transitional period of Presocratic philosophy has turned out to be a volume that breaks with several conventional views of the Presocratics and has the potential to take the interpretation of style and Presocratic philosophy in a whole new and more fruitful direction.

In the lead article, Vardoulakis argues that Heidegger elides and occludes animportant difference between two senses of what it means for something to becalculable. On the one hand, there is‘that which can be calculated with somecertainty’, which Vardoulakis dubs the‘calculated’. On the other, there is‘calculating’, the process of proceeding‘even though we know that such acalculation can never be certain or secure as it lacks a determinate measurement’.Iwant to suggest, however, that such a distinction does play a significant role inHeidegger’s work, (...) albeit in an unexpected place: his analyses of time. I will traceout what I consider to be two likely manifestations of the different senses of thecalculable. Turningfirst toBeing and Time, I will propose that we can read therelationship between world-time and now-time through this lens. For Heidegger,the pernicious factor that gives rise to the ordinary conception of time is not time’scalculability as such, but rather the dominance of what Vardoulakis calls thecalculated. Secondly, I want to draw out the role that the dynamic betweencalculating and calculated can be seen to play in Heidegger’s analyses of theAnaximander fragment, especially the way he distinguishes time’s‘allocationcharacter’(Zuweisungscharakter) from mere‘numerability’. (shrink)

Heraclitus uses paradoxical language to present the relationship between opposites in his worldview. This mode of expression has generated much controversy. Some take the paradoxes as evidence of a contradictory identity of opposites (Barnes), while others propose a dynamic union through transformation without identity that avoids the contradiction (Graham). By examining B88 and B62, I seek to identify the stronger and weaker points of such readings. The contradictory identity reading thwarts the transformation between opposites. The dynamic reading offers a plausible (...) alternative. However, it skips a characterization of how Heraclitus conceives of the transformation between opposites in physical terms. To fill this gap, I consider Heraclitus’ use of what I call the anti-cognate internal object in B62. I argue that ‘living the death and dying the life’ is a case of change as mixture, a popular conception among the early Presocratics. Upon closer examination, the anti-cognate internal object suggests that real contradictions belong to Heraclitus conception of change. The details reveal a philosophically compelling view. (shrink)

Dada la necesidad de formalizar un espacio de reflexión y discusión sobre los problemas y autores correspondientes al período de la antigüedad grecorromana, desde la Universidad Tecnológica de Pereira ingeniaron y materializaron el desarrollo de un foro académico. Con miras a la difusión y acrecentamiento de los estudios sobre el pensamiento grecolatino, se piensa para la región cafetera colombiana un avance importante en cuanto a la propuesta de proyectos y de actividades de talante dialógico a ejemplo de los países latinoamericanos (...) y europeos en que esos estudios poseen mayor alcance. De aquí que, para efectos del fortalecimiento de lo clásico en la academia colombiana, se convoca bianualmente al nominado Foro Internacional de Filosofía Antigua en la ciudad de Pereira. (shrink)

The question of Who am I?” is the end of philosophy. The famous ancient Greek philosopher Socrates raised three ultimate questions in philosophy when he looked up at the starry sky: “Who am I?” “Where do I come from?” “Where am I going？”. For thousands of years, humans have explored and answered questions about them, including various disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, biology, and neurology etc., but none of them have been recognized. This article starts with the cosmology and worldview (...) of “Who am I?” and elaborates on the origin of “Who am I?” and the concept of “center”. (shrink)

In his debut book, The Birth of Tragedy, Nietzsche presents what he understands as a metaphysics of art or metaphysics of the artist. As it becomes clear throughout the argument developed in the work, his aim is to favor a justification of the world and of existence as an aesthetic phenomenon. The path to his metaphysics passes through the interaction with Kantian and, mostly, Schopenhauerian formulations, and through a deep dialogue with Greek culture in general and, indirectly, with Pre-Socratic thought. (...) The objective of this article is to delimit the retentions and displacements of the critical tradition in his book from 1872, and highlight the importance of the interlocution with the Greek cultural repertoire in the conformation of his metaphysics of the artist. In particular, the working hypothesis is that Nietzsche, in these approaches and appropriations of critical and archaic philosophical tradition, finds the possibility of an immanent metaphysics in the post-Kantian context, conceived as a physiology (in the antique sense) of aesthetic bias. (shrink)

Special volume of "Thaumàzein - Rivista di Filosofia" dedicated to the theme of Socratic Eudaimonia and care for others. It is a multilingual volume comprising twenty papers divided into six sections with an introduction by Linda Napolitano. Edited by Santiago Chame, Donald Morrison, and Linda Napolitano. -/- Despite the appearances given by certain texts, the moral psychology of Socrates needs not imply selfishness. On the contrary, a close look at passages in Plato and Xenophon (see Plato, Meno 77-78; Protagoras 358; (...) Gorgias 466-468; Euthydemus 278; Lysis 219; Xenophon, Memorabilia III 9, 4-5) suggests that the “egoist”’s welfare depends upon the welfare of others (i.e. family, friends or the whole city). Since the welfare of his family, friends and city is part of his own eudaimonìa, the “egoist” (phìlautos) has a direct and intrinsic motive to promote the welfare of these others. -/- This multilingual issue explores the role that other peoples’ welfare plays in Socratic ethics. Special attention is paid to test-cases in which the principle that moral action is always good only for the agent seems to have no validity. I.e., under which circumstances is the self-sacrifice for the sake of others (such as the soldier’s self-sacrifice on the battlefield) good for the agent (as in Alcibiades I 115a-116d)? Essays deal with contradictions or tensions of this sort, and relate them to more general views on eudaimonìa held within Socratic literature. Comparison between different Socratic authors is used as a means to identify the distinctive features of Socratic eudaimonìa if compared to other Greek theories of happiness, such as the Aristotelian theory of philautìa (NE IX, 1166a-1166b; 1168a-1169b). (shrink)

Until recently, Melissus of Samos has been undeservedly neglected by scholars, largely because of Aristotle's harsh criticism and because, as a result, Melissus has been perceived as a second-rate philosopher clinging to the coattail of Parmenides. In the last half-century, however, several scholars have been re-examining Melissus' arguments and his role in the development of ancient philosophy. They have discovered that Melissus' influence upon later thinkers such as Plato has been far greater than Aristotle's assessment would lead us to believe (...) and that Melissus is a significant philosopher in his own right. Scholars have relied upon the extant fragments, all preserved by Simplicius, in their re-examination, but relatively little attention has been paid to the context of the fragments and of the testimonies. This dissertation is intended to help remedy this neglect by compiling all of the relevant sources and providing some preliminary commentary. I have included all of the sources in the original and in translation, including any passages in Simplicius that may aid in assessing him as an interpreter of and a source for Melissus. Of the comments, the most important are on Plato and Aristotle, the MXG, and Simplicius. Regarding Plato and Aristotle, I argue that the Eleaticism they inherit from Parmenides has been largely filtered through Melissus, whose version of Eleaticism won out over the competing versions of the pluralists Anaxagoras and Empedocles. The MXG, I argue, is a relatively reliable source for the general structure of Melissus' arguments and may also provide clues about the content of parts of Melissus' deduction that have not been preserved in the fragments. Simplicius, I contend, is a reliable reporter of Melissus' doctrine, and he is careful to distinguish Melissus' actual arguments from his own highly tendentious interpretation. His paraphrase, however, is of little value for a reconstruction of Melissus' deduction, with the important exception of the opening sentence, which is either a close paraphrase or an actual quotation of Melissus' opening argument. I conclude the dissertation with a tentative commentary on Melissus' arguments themselves. (shrink)

The subject of the dissertation is the futurological problem of the containment and structure of uncertainty by means of systems analysis and related techniques in a book written by the nuclear strategist Herman Kahn entitled On Thermonuclear War published in 1960. The dissertation closely examines how Kahn articulated specific contents for fighting and and surviving a hypothetical and uncertain future war. Kahn considered his mode of systems analyses, scenarios, war-games, and analogies to comprise a scientific method which was both more (...) comprehensive and more precise than the work produced by his national security counterparts. To a large degree, he attributed the greater definition and refinement of his method to the central importance it gives to the otherwise undervalued status of hypothetical possibility. ;His unbounded field of historical possibility suggests the primary epistemological question of the dissertation. In a situation of general uncertainty, how did Kahn draw forth the specific features of any individual condition? I will examine his employment of an abstract quantitative idiom in calculating risks, and his characteristic methods for circumscribing and plotting the scenario-sets which I designate as the dialectic of faith and insight. By tracing the articulation of the originating field, I shall identify the points at which Kahn set limits to hypotheticals. ;How did Kahn make the future an object of study? How did he block or limit the disruptions of variable uncertainty in his scenarios and calculations? How did he manifest his claim for the scientific integrity of his method? In consequence of my attention to Kahn's rhetorical and scientific performances, my review of his ideas focuses on the formal means of the futurological domain: its idiom, elements, themes, and combinatorial patterns. Only this close and serious scrutiny of Kahn's practices of composing the speculative object will yield an understanding of the specific form of planning which shaped, and one might even say, determined, the American nuclear arsenal. (shrink)

This dissertation analyzes the language of clarity and obscurity in Plato and Aristotle. For each of them Heraclitus serves as a paradigm of obscurity. Against this foil, a strictly philosophical notion of clarity comes to be defined. ;Chapter One frames the topic by examining Lucretius' critique of Heraclitus in the first book of De Rerum Natura. In it I take Lucretius' condemnation of Heraclitus' obscura lingua as exemplifying the dominant conception of what philosophical language must be after Plato and Aristotle. (...) ;Chapter Two contains a reading of the metaphors of light which dominate the central books of the Republic. Here Plato sets out for the first time in anything like a systematic way his conception of what philosophy is. I examine how, early in the discussion of philosophical education, Plato introduces Heraclitus' metaphorical use of sunlight as antithetical to his own, and uses the contrast to formulate his own sun-metaphors in the analogy, the divided line and the cave mythos. ;In Chapter Three I turn to the Cratylus. The problem presented to Platonic philosophy by Heraclitus is here defined not only around a specific set of doctrines which need to be countered, but also around the issues of clarity and obscurity in language. ;In Chapter Four, I analyze two distinct conceptions of metaphorical obscurity in the writings of Aristotle. In theoretical philosophical discourse, Aristotle analyzes metaphor as necessarily generating obscurity. Such obscurity is almost universally condemned as establishing an impassible barrier to the truth. In the Rhetoric and the Poetics, on the other hand, while the connection between metaphora and asapheia remains strong, Aristotle gives a certain guarded approval to the alienating effect of metaphorical obscurity in that it can be shown to generate a unique form of insight. Heraclitus plays a prominent role in the framing of each conception. ;An appendix examines the notion of narrative obscurity as formulated by Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Longinus. (shrink)

David Gallop provides a Greek text and a new facing-page translation of the extant fragments of Parmenides' philosophical poem. He also includes the first complete translation into English of the contexts in which the fragments have been transmitted to us, and of the ancient testimonia regarding Parmenides' life and thought. All of the fragments have been translated in full and are arranged in the order that has become canonical since the publication of the fifth edition of Diels-Rranz's Die Fragmente der (...) Vorsokratiker. Alternative renderings are provided for passages whose meaning is disputed or where major questions of interpretation hinge upon the text or translation adopted. In an extended introductory essay, Gallop offers guidance on the background of the poem, and a continuous exposition of it, together with a critical discussion of its basic argument. The volume also includes an extensive bibliography, a glossary of key terms in the poem, and a section on sources and authorities. (shrink)

Sous l'influence d'Anaximandre, Parménide radicalise la pensée d'Héraclite : comme tout ce qui est au monde, le monde lui-même est à la merci de la puissance universelle et annihilante du temps. Reste pourtant ce sur sur quoi le temps n'a aucune prise : non ce qu'il y a, mais le fait même qu'il y ait.