In this volume philosophers from throughout the Asia-Pacific region discuss a wide range of topics related to the development of democratic values and ways of life. The papers explore ideas, values and practices related to democracy from the different perspectives of the great religious and philosophical traditions of Asia, as well as considering both philosophical issues and the place of philosophy in a democratic society. While the contributors represent different philosophical traditions, they are connected through a common concern (...) with humanity, a belief in the value of philosophical inquiry and scholarship and by a commitment to the value of philosophy education in building and sustaining democracy. (shrink)

A models-based approach has been advocated as a means of overcoming the serious limitations of the traditional approach to physical education. One of the difficulties with this approach is that physical educators have sought to use it to achieve diverse and sometimes competing educational benefits, and these wide-ranging aspirations are rarely if ever achieved. Models-based practice offers a possible resolution to these problems by limiting the range of learning outcomes, subject matter and teaching strategies appropriate to each pedagogical model (...) and thus the arguments that can be used for educational value. In this article, two examples are provided to support a case for educational value. This case is built on an examination of one established pedagogical model, Sport Education, which is informed by a perspective on ethics. Next, I consider Physical Literacy which, I suggest, is an existentialist philosophical perspective that could form the basis of a new pedagogical model. It is argued, in conclusion, that a models-based approach along with a reconstructed notion of educational value may offer a possible future for physical education that is well grounded in various philosophical arguments and the means to facilitate a wide range of diverse individual and social educational ?goods? (shrink)

C. L. Stevenson, in “The Scientist’s Role and the Aims of Education,” has recently recommended that scientists join in the activity of making educational value statements, and that educationists have their value attitudes “straightened out under the guidance of beliefs that are well verified.” The argument underlying his recommendation is that since scientific knowledge is in some way relevant to questions of value in education, this knowledge must be utilized, otherwise some rather absurd educational judgments will be made, (...) perhaps with disastrous results. As he puts it, if the scientist “won’t risk making value judgments, then I’d like to ask who is going to make them. There’s always the possibility that those who aren’t reluctant to make them will turn out to be … complete asses.”. (shrink)

In this article, I outline three critiques of analytic philosophy; that it is irrelevant to individuals and society; unconstructive; and excessively technical. These critiques are linked to skepticism about the educational value of analytic philosophy. In response, I suggest that if analytic philosophy provides constructive guidance about prominent and pressing questions, then it holds potential educational value. I identify a body of prominent and pressing questions that are addressed by analytic philosophy as a discipline. Because analytic philosophy is (...) often concerned with the analysis of ordinary concepts, there is at least some potential educational value to analytic philosophy insofar as it provides guidance about the meaning of ordinary concepts that ground ordinary questions. Taking P. F. Strawson's paradigmatically analytic account of philosophy, I show that analytic philosophy can directly address ordinary questions in a constructive manner. Analytic philosophy is neither irrelevant, unconstructive, nor excessively technical. (shrink)

How can we theoretically and philosophically study the problem of values and authority in the context of education? The chapter uses the framework of action theoretical semiotics developed mainly on the conceptual structures of Greimassian semiotic theory. This detailed and elaborated theory of human discourse (utilized usually in terms of literary and “cultural” texts) will be expanded by biosemiotic and Peircean points of view to fit in the special problem area of education as transformation or extension from the biosemiotic (...) and zoosemiotic sphere to anthroposemiotic sphere: from nature to culture. The main theoretical starting point for action theoretical semiotics is the concept of meaning which is defined as relationship of an object to the action of the subject. The chapter will connect the action theoretical semiotics to the conception of Bildung and modern idea of the normativity of the rational inference by, e.g., contemporary philosopher of semantics Robert Brandom, to consider the educational implications of this semiotic view. (shrink)

When contemplating the origins of philosophical paideia one is tempted to think of Socrates, perhaps because we feel that Socrates has been a philosophical educator to us all. But it is Plato and his literary genius that we have to thank as his dialogues preserve not just Socratic philosophy, but also the Socratic educational experience. Educators would do well to better understand Plato's pedagogical objectives in the Socratic dialogues so that we may appreciate and utilize them in our own (...) educational endeavors, and so that we may adapt the Socratic experience to new interactive educational technologies. Plato designed his Socratic dialogues to arm students for real world challenges and temptations. First, in both form and function the dialogues attempt to replicate the Socratic experience for their audience. They demand from their readers what Socrates demanded from his students: active learning, self-examination, and an appreciation for the complexity and importance of wisdom. Second, the dialogues challenge the conflation of professional and personal excellence, best exemplified by sophists such as Hippias, and exhort their reader to pursue personal aretê separately from and alongside practical and professional skills or technai. Third, they aim not to transmit some prepackaged formula for success, but to teach students to learn for themselves; that is to love and pursue wisdom. The Socratic dialogues, and philosophic dialogue itself, are educationally important in that they teach us to be philosophers in the literal sense. (shrink)

Online education lacks the moral and ethical engagement as well as the empathic interactions that are essential and integral to true liberal education, including business. While the online venue can provide useful information and put libraries at the hands of the student or employee, there is an implicit lack of focus on the sacredness and centrality of the person, his or her values, attitudes, needs, and expectations. The focus of online education is on the delivery of data, not the (...) student’s engagement with the material or the process. Critically absent from online education is the ability to explore the transformation of data as it changes, first to information, then to knowledge, and finally to wisdom, within each person. Finally, absent is the ability to raise the level of abstraction. Since all needs to be measurable in concrete terms in online education, we are left with the language of metrics, such as deliverables, outcomes, inputs, and outputs. Where is the person in all of this? Where is the focus on the moral compass that is so necessary in any type of education? (shrink)

In the world where many of the traditional values are in crisis and where quite a few identities stagger, follows from the crucial importance of investigation of these processes in close relation with education, to the extent to which this allows to avoid the crises of values or favor the protection of the identities. Perhaps this would allow to establish certain directions and methodological norms that tend to favor the performance of these functions on the part of the (...) educational work. In this sense, more than definitive answers, this paper explores certain problems and stimulates the reflection on these vital issues. (shrink)

David E. Cooper Early in, while I was teaching in the United States, I received news of my appointment as a lecturer in the philosophy of education at the ...

There has been much impatience with what R. S. Peters calls “the endless talk about the aims of education,” but this talk continues to go on, and we are invited to add to it on this happy occasion. Indeed, those who deny that education has ends or that educators must have aims seem always to end up talking about much the same thing in a slightly different idiom. At any rate, I am quite ready, at least on this occasion, to (...) assume that there are values or goals which it is the business of education to promote, whether they are external, imposed, and far-off, or internal, autonomous, and nearby. I shall also assume that the values or goals which education is to promote consist of certain abilities, dispositions, habits, or traits. To have a single term for them I shall call them ‘dispositions’, taking this word, not in the narrower ordinary ‘sunny disposition’ sense, but in the wider one common among philosophers. So far as I am aware, there is really only one view that might reject the concept of dispositions in this sense, namely existentialism, and, as we shall see, even it seems to advocate our developing certain dispositions or, if you prefer, choosing certain postures. (shrink)

R. S. Peters has not only been the major philosopher of education in Britain during second half of the twentieth century, but by common consent, he has transformed the subject and brought it into the mainstream of contemporary philosophy. The ten essays in this book attest to his influence whether by critical examination of his ideas or by original treatment of topics in which has has inspired a new interest.

While human rights treaties provide a formidable set of principles on education and values, domestic Courts often tend to adjudicate claims in terms of local arguments for or against each particular educational practice. This article explores how international human rights law could inspire the interpretation of domestic law and educational practice, without neglecting specific cultural aspects. Firstly, the article reviews the sociological debate on values in education and shows its importance for the legal discussion. Secondly, some (...) critical contestations of international cultural human rights are outlined, as well as certain arguments to justify the importance of this model. The study of international law follows: the UN, the European Court of Human Rights, and three relevant African Charters, as well as every reference to education made by the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and by the African Court is examined. Lastly, a comparative section reveals a certain cultural commonality inspired by the UN treaties, but also reflects some cultural and institutional differences between the European and the African regional systems. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.

Should philosophy be a compulsory subject in schools? I take it as read that philosophy has general educational value: like other academic disciplines, it cultivates a range of intellectual virtues in those who study it. But that may not be a good enough reason to add it to the roster of established school subjects. The claim I defend in this article is that philosophy also has distinctive educational value: there are philosophical problems that feature prominently and pressingly in (...) ordinary human lives and that all children should be equipped by their education to tackle. Among these are the problems of justifying subscription to moral, political and religious standards. The significance of these problems for everyone is sufficient to warrant the inclusion of philosophy in the school curriculum. (shrink)

Helen Freeman; Interests and Educational Value, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 9, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 119–136, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.146.

RESUMEN Se fundamenta la concepción teórica general de la educación axiológica en el contexto del sistema de enseñanza de postgrado para la formación de educadores ambientales. Se aplicaron los métodos del nivel teórico analítico-sintético, inductivo-deductivo, histórico-lógico y ascensión de lo abstracto a lo concreto, con la intención de sistematizar información proveniente de la bibliografía consultada y de la experiencia profesional de los autores. Se defiende la idea de considerar la existencia de una dimensión ambiental de valores universales, en lugar de (...) hacer referencia a valores estrictamente ambientales. Se enfatiza en la importancia que, para la educación, adquiere la estimulación de la actividad valorativa del sujeto, a partir de una noción precisa del sistema de virtudes y fortalezas del carácter. Se identifican cinco valores básicos a desarrollar en el educador ambiental, para asegurar, desde el punto de vista axiológico, su desempeño en la preparación de diferentes sectores sociales y consolidar la necesaria contribución de los mismos a la sostenibilidad ecológica. ABSTRACT In this paper a general theoretical conception of axiological education is systematized in the context of the postgraduate educational system in the training of environmental educators. Methods of the theoretic level to systematize information obtained from the bibliography and from the vocational experience of the author. The category value is analyzed aimed at using it unilaterally from the environmental perspective and it is concluded that it is much more objective, from the theoretical point of view, to assume the existence of an environmental dimension of universal values ​​rather than of strictly environmental values. It emphasizes on the importance of the stimulation of the person’s valuating activity for education, from a precise notion of the system of virtues and character strengths. Five basic values are identified ​​ to be developed in an environmental educator to ensure, from the axiological point of view, his performance in the preparation of different social sectors to strengthen their necessary contribution to ecological sustainability. (shrink)

This essay argues that there are educational situations in which interlocutionary misbehaviour in the form of withholding ‘good will’ can have educational value. It describes an exchange between a teacher and a student in which the teacher withheld good will, and analyzes this exchange through conceptual frameworks of performative contradiction and differend, provided by Derrida and Lyotard, respectively. It further analyzes how context, power, and ethical considerations affect the evaluation of instances of interlocutionary misbehaviour. The essay ends with (...) the ironic observation that even in cases in which refusing to extend good will to one's interlocutor is educationally pertinent, good will is not absent from the exchange altogether. (shrink)

The Black Lives Matter campaign has forced a reassessment of monuments that commemorate historical figures in public spaces. One of these, a statue of General Lord Roberts, stands in Glasgow, once the Second City of the Empire. A critical reading of this monument as a memorial text in a landscape of power contrasts the intended heroic depiction of Roberts with the excluded histories of those who were on the receiving end of his actions. I consider possible courses of action in (...) determining what should be done with this memorial, recommending against its removal. Keeping the monument in its privileged public space without further action will not do. Arguing that the Roberts memorial is educationally valuable, despite and because of its celebration of Roberts as a hero of Empire, I defend its potential role in postcolonial and postimperial education. (shrink)

I address the problems of diminished moral responsibility and of moral relativism, typically associated with education in late modern society, by developing, beyond the problematic contemporary formulations of postmodern ethics, an ethics of integrity as a moral resource for education. This ethics is constituted by the principles of respect for the dignity of persons, and the acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of our moral choices. I show how it offers more than the scant resources of postmodern ethics to educators (...) who seek to enable their students to develop a deeply-founded sense of moral comportment and an authentic identity in the face of the moral complexity of late modernity's globalised and plural society. (shrink)

I address the problems of diminished moral responsibility and of moral relativism, typically associated with education in late modern society, by developing, beyond the problematic contemporary formulations of postmodern ethics, an ethics of integrity as a moral resource for education. This ethics is constituted by the principles of respect for the dignity of persons, and the acceptance of responsibility for the consequences of our moral choices. I show how it offers more than the scant resources of postmodern ethics to educators (...) who seek to enable their students to develop a deeply-founded sense of moral comportment and an authentic identity in the face of the moral complexity of late modernity's globalised and plural society. (shrink)

P S Wilson; Interests and Educational Values, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 181–199, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

P S Wilson; Interests and Educational Values, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages 181–199, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-.

Existentialism and postmodernism have both abandoned the idea of a human nature. Also, the idea of naturalness as a value for education has been targeted as a blind for conservative ideology. There are, however, good reasons to re-establish a sound concept of human naturalness. First of all, the concept does not seem to have disappeared from common usage, despite all criticism. Secondly, the idea of naturalness seems essential to our sense of ourselves and for the formation of our identities. And (...) finally, the idea is the inevitable basis for the possibility of a radical criticism of society and culture. This paper presents two suggestions for a rehabilitation of the concept of naturalness: Gernot Böhme's phenomenology of body and nature, and Christoph Menke's ‘genealogical reflexion’. (shrink)

The question of whether art is a source of knowledge is a question of epistemic as well as of aesthetic interest which has significant pedagogical implications as well. This issue, both in its epistemic and aesthetic dimensions, is addressed here under the general perspective of the contemporary cognitivist - anti-cognitivist debate. Consequently, it is asked: a) can art be a means of knowledge and if it does, is knowledge obtained through art of the same kind with scientific knowledge? and b) (...) if we accept that art actually offers some kind of knowledge, is this knowledge relevant to its aesthetic value, does it constitute an essential part of its functioning as art? The paper discusses the plausibility and consistency of the answers given to these questions either from the cognitivist or the anti-cognitivist point of view and argues that the importance and role attributed to art within the educational praxis, as well as its educational value per se, significantly depends on the kind of approach we adopt in regard to these questions. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile Spinoza stipulates an ideal moral person in the propositions on the ‘free man’ in Ethics IV, this account does not seem to be intended to function as a pedagogical tool of political relevance. Hence, it does not seem to correspond to the purpose of moral exemplarism. If we look for that kind of practical guidance, Spinoza’s political works seem more relevant. Interestingly, when we approach Spinoza’s political theory with moral exemplarism in mind, we find that instead of constructing his (...) exemplar on the idea of a supremely moral person, he emphasizes the concept of ingenium to chisel out an imperfect model of human behavior. We argue that the purpose of this is to avoid a utopian and inefficient political theory and to work out a moral practice that is capable of assisting people and communities in ethical self-transformation. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Journal of Aesthetic Education 40.4 (2006) 51-64 MuseSearchJournalsThis JournalContents[Access article in PDF]Art as Symbolic Form: Cassirer on the Educational Value of ArtThora Ilin BayerIntroductionAmong the papers that Ernst Cassirer left at his death in 1945 is a fully written out lecture labeled "Seminar of Education, March 10th, 1943," which also bears the title "The Educational Value of Art." It may have been prepared for a session (...) of Cassirer's seminar at Yale for that spring on Aesthetics: Symbolic Forms, the second half of a yearlong course. 1 The text begins with discussion of the Platonic quarrel with the poets and moves through views of various thinkers, especially Croce and Collingwood. Cassirer had planned to have a volume on art included in The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, in addition to those on Language,Mythical Thought, and The Phenomenology of Knowledge. 2 In these three volumes he often mentions the triad of language, myth, and art, but he says little of art as such.In May 1942 in a letter to Paul Schilpp, the American philosopher and editor of the volume of critical essays on Cassirer's work in the Library of Living Philosophers series, Cassirer wrote that he had intended to produce a volume on art but the disfavor (Ungunst) of the times caused him to put it off again and again. 3 The principal sources of Cassirer's aesthetics are his chapter on art in An Essay on Man 4 and two lectures on the educational value of art called "Language and Art I & II," 5 which parallel his earlier small study, Language and Myth. 6 Cassirer's conception of art as a symbolic form is derived from his conception of human culture as a systematic structure of symbolic forms that has as its main components myth and religion, language, art, history, and science (the chapter titles of the second part of An Essay on Man). In addition to these forms of culture there is a "metaphysics of symbolic forms," the subject of a fourth volume of The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, left in manuscript at his death. 7 [End Page 51]I wish to raise two questions: (1) How does Cassirer conceive of art as a symbolic form? and (2) What are the implications of his conception for a conception of the ideals of aesthetic education? My aim in pursuing these questions is not to argue for the correctness of Cassirer's views but to attempt to establish what his views in fact are. Little has been written directly on Cassirer's conception of art relative to the frequency with which his name is mentioned in general discussions of aesthetics. 8 Cassirer's conception of education is a nearly unexamined subject. 9The Platonic Quarrel: MimesisCassirer says: "Of all the problems that we have to study in a philosophy of education, the problem of the educational value of art is one of the most difficult ones." 10 He claims that this problem goes back to the beginning of philosophy itself and that at present we are still very far from a generally accepted solution. Plato's famous quarrel with the poets in the tenth book of the Republic is important not simply for an understanding of ancient aesthetics but also for philosophy's conception of itself.The basic tenets of this quarrel are well known. I wish to review them here toward the goal of suggesting an original view of it that is derivable from Cassirer's approach. The issue is whether poetry or philosophy is the means to truth. The works of Homer had scriptural status for the Greeks and were thought to contain all that was necessary for civil wisdom. Poiein is to make and compose poetry. The ancient poet is a maker of truth claims through language. The quarrel rests on the fact that the philosopher is also a maker of truth claims formulated in words. Is the relatively new figure in Plato's time of the philosophos, the friend or lover... (shrink)

Philosophy with children (P4C) 1 presents significant positive challenges for educators. Its 'community of enquiry' pedagogy assumes not only an epistemological shift in the role of the educator, but also a different ontology of 'child' and balance of power between educator and learner. After a brief historical sketch and an outline of the diversity among P4C practitioners, epistemological uncertainty in teaching P4C is crystallised in a succinct overview of theoretical and practical tensions that are a direct result of the implementation (...) of P4C in mainstream education. These recurring pedagogical tensions in my practice as P4C teacher, teacher educator and mentor of teacher educators cause disequilibrium that opens up rich opportunities for philosophy of education in supporting novice P4Cers. Disequilibrium is a positive force that opens up a space in which educators need to reflect upon their values, their beliefs about learning and teaching, and ultimately encourages educators to rethink their own role. Plato's metaphor of the stingray highlights the role of the P4C teacher educator as model of the P4C teacher in any setting: 'to numb and to be numbed'. The P4C community and its institutions need to address the questions arising from these pedagogical tensions; and this needs to be done with integrity, that is, in communities of enquiry that include children. If not, in the long term, a more instrumental version of P4C may prevail. (shrink)

In this article I try to conceive a new approach towards laughter in the context of formal schooling. I focus on laughter in so far as it is a bodily response during which we are entirely delivered to uncontrollable, spasmodic reactions. To see the educational relevance of this particular kind of laughter, as well as to understand why laughter is often dealt with in a very negative way in pedagogical contexts, this phenomenon should be carefully distinguished from humor or (...) amusement. I build my argument for a smaller part on the basis of conceptual analysis, and to a greater extent on Bakhtin’s work on the transition from Medieval folk culture to Modern civilized culture, in which he claims that a reduction from laughing as a strongly physical experience to mere forms of amusement or humor actually implies that laughter no longer possesses its inherent equalizing and communizing potential. In a sense, laughter forms a threat to any organization of social existence according to similarities and differences in identity and position, and this explains why we usually try to suppress it, or why we try to render it functional in view of the continuation of a societal regime or pedagogical order. More positively formulated, laughter may be said to have an intrinsic educational meaning, because it allows a significant transformation of individual and collective existence. (shrink)