Comparative religion scholar Thomas Berry’s influential concept of “Earth jurisprudence” has been helpfully elaborated in three principal books. My first section identifies four of their common themes, deriving therefrom an implicit narrative: (1) the basis of ecology is autopoiesis, which (2) originally generated human communities and Indigenous vernacular laws, which were (3) later reasserted by forest defenders who fought to create the Magna Carta’s “Charter of the Forest,” which is (4) now championed globally by the Indian physicist and (...) eco-activist Vandana Shiva’s Earth Democracy movement. My next three sections identify mutually exclusive elements of the three books, deriving the following alternative narrative: self-conscious new dancing rituals (Cullinan) could empower an historically informed reconstruction of private property (Burdon) via commons-based vernacular law (Weston and Bollier). And my conclusion offers one template for such a strategy, namely a new environmental variation on my dancing-poetic conception of legal justice, christened “emerald star-law.”. (shrink)

This article allies the 1997 PlayStation video game Final Fantasy VII with Slavoj Žižek’s writings on ecology to critique the area of legal philosophy known as ‘earth jurisprudence’. Earth jurisprudents argue that law bears a large part of the responsibility for humanity’s exploitation of the environment, as law helps to bar nature from subjectivity. However, as Žižek warns—and as FFVII illustrates—the desire for meaning incites people to manufacture a harmonious vision of nature that obscures the chaotic forces (...) at work in the environment and ultimately absolves humanity of responsibility towards the world. Therefore, earth jurisprudence’s program of using legal rights to limit human intervention should be rejected in favour of an approach that enables people to take an active role in addressing the ecological crisis. (shrink)

This thesis aims to critique the Universal Declaration of the Rights of Mother Earth and its underlying moral justification in order to provide a stronger and improved version of both. In Chapter 1 I explore what sort of moral justification is necessary to establish the Universal Declaration on firm grounds and explore its relation to environmental ethics and rights discourse. I argue that a non-anthropocentric perspective is necessary to justify the Universal Declaration’s rights. In Chapter 2 I explore the (...) underlying justification of the Universal Declaration as discovered in the works of Cormac Cullinan and Father Thomas Berry. I argue that their ethical framework is indeterminate, has many ambiguities and uncertainties, and, among other problems, it does not provide a clear action-guiding framework. In Chapter 3 I develop an alternative justification for the Universal Declaration. I argue against many predominant moral theories, that in light of our best scientific and moral understanding we should expand the realm of moral concern to include all living beings, a moral theory I call Life’s Imperative. In Chapter 4 I illustrate that Life’s Imperative is a much stronger, more coherent justification for the Universal Declaration, one that coheres with both our best understanding of the natural world and our relation to it, and to an environmental ethic reflective of that relationship. Unfortunately many of the weaknesses in the current implicit justification of the Universal Declaration have also led to it enshrining rights that are themselves problematic. In order to address these issues, I revise its rights to accord with the stronger justification that I established in Chapter 3. The end result of doing so is a revised version of the Universal Declaration. (shrink)

In this visionary book, Cormac Cullinan explains how, if the community of life on Earth is to survive, a new understanding of nature and a new concept of legal systems are needed.Cullinan proposes a new approach or "Earth Jurisprudence" and gives practical guidance on how to begin moving towards it. He shows that this philosophy could help develop new legal systems that would foster human connections to nature. It would encourage personal and social practices that ensure our (...) planet remains liveable.Wild Law is an inspiring and stimulating book, which fuses politics, legal theory, ancient wisdom and personal experiences into a fascinating and eminently readable story."This important book shows not only why we need to revise our governance systems completely, but also how to begin doing so in a way that draws inspiration from nature and from our diverse human communities."Professor Wangari Mathai, Nobel Peace Prize 2004. (shrink)

Anthills and aardvarks -- The illusion of independence -- The myth of the master species -- Why law and jurisprudence matter -- The conceit of law -- Respecting the great law -- Remembering who we are -- The question of rights -- Elements of Earth governance -- Seeking Earth jurisprudence -- The rhythms of life -- The law of the land -- A communion of communities -- Transforming law and governance -- The mountain path.

This article is an innovative piece and at the same time—a timely piece, in a world of global warming. A time in which fierce scientific debates are being fought over anthropogenic impact. Yet the general public would appear to ‘feel’ the change, without any need for measurement and contesting of findings. This ‘feeling’ is manifest in the Earth Hour. It is this collective act which I would argue is borne out of feelings for the earth. Feelings which tell (...) people instinctively a change in behaviour is needed. This article therefore examines the semiotics of a jurisprudence which is premised on feelings. Feelings towards the Djang—a primordial force expounded by the Australian Aboriginal Senior Law Man Bill Neidjie of the world heritage listed—Kakadu National Park, Australia. He foresaw the climatic shifts and wanted to assist European Australians—Balanda to help avert the possible consequence. (shrink)

To the Uttermost Parts of the Earth shows the vital role played by legal imagination in the formation of the international order during 1300–1870. It discusses how European statehood arose during early modernity as a locally specific combination of ideas about sovereign power and property rights, and how those ideas expanded to structure the formation of European empires and consolidate modern international relations. By connecting the development of legal thinking with the history of political thought and by showing the (...) gradual rise of economic analysis into predominance, the author argues that legal ideas from different European legal systems - Spanish, French, English and German - have played a prominent role in the history of global power. This history has emerged in imaginative ways to combine public and private power, sovereignty and property. The book will appeal to readers crossing conventional limits between international law, international relations, history of political thought, jurisprudence and legal history. (shrink)

A spectre is haunting legal positivists – and perhaps jurisprudes more generally – the spectre of the normativity of law. Whatever else law is, it is sometimes said, it is normative, and so whatever else a philosophical account of law accounts for, it should account for the normativity of law[1]. But law is at least partially a social matter, its content at least partially determined by social practices. And how can something social and descriptive in this down-to-earth kind of (...) way be normative?[2] This is presumably a problem for any theory of law, but it is especially acute for legal positivism, according to which (roughly speaking) all there is to facts about legality are such descriptive social facts. If this is so, the thought goes, the task of accommodating the law’s normativity immediately becomes both more daunting, and more urgent[3]. Unfortunately, though, it is entirely unclear what the problem of the normativity of law is supposed to be. Indeed, I suspect that there is no one problem here, as different people seem to have in mind different problems when they use this unhelpful phrase[4]. At least one family of issues people seem to have in mind when they talk about the normativity of law is a host of issues pertaining to the reason-giving force of the law. The law, it is sometimes said, gives reasons for action, and a theory of law should accommodate this obvious fact. But even when we focus just on questions regarding the reason-giving force of the law (and from now on I will restrict myself to just those, leaving other things people may have in mind when they talk about the normativity of law for another occasion), it is still not clear what the problem is. Indeed, my main purpose in this paper is to make some progress in understanding the relevant question here. And my conclusion is going to be somewhat skeptical: Once we are clear on what reason-giving in general consists in, and on what reason-giving powers the law actually has, there is not much by way of a problem here that needs to be solved, not a deep and interesting phenomenon here that theories of law need to accommodate, and that therefore places adequacy constraints on plausible theories of the nature of law.. (shrink)

Gendered Morality offers a textual-critical examination of gender in Islamic metaphysics and virtue ethics. Through a close reading of how masculinity and femininity are constructed, the book argues that the historically contingent nature of gender hierarchy, characterized as Islamic and ethical, is at odds with the overarching goal of Islamic ethics as earthly justice. Because the book moves beyond the typical Qur'anic and jurisprudence-based discourses about women's status, it makes a lasting contribution to our understanding of gender in the (...) ethical philosophy of Islam. (shrink)

In 2023, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights issued its ruling in the case of Sanchez v France. The case revolved around the conviction of the applicant, a politician, for inciting hatred or violence against people due to their religious affiliation. What makes this case unique among hate speech cases before the Strasbourg Court was that the applicant’s conviction did not stem from his own words but rather from his alleged failure to promptly remove commends made (...) by others under one of his (non-offensive) Facebook posts. This case has prompted a myriad of significant questions, the main one being, how an earth did we reach a point where imposing a criminal penalty on an internet user for someone else’s speech and how does such a penalty align with the principles of necessity and proportionality outlined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (freedom of expression)? This paper aims to address this question by examining the Court’s approach to hate speech, particularly in the realm of politics, how to the Court situates politicians within the scope of Article 10 and how the gradual expansion of ‘duties and responsibilities’ incorporated in Article 10 to engulf those who are not the actual speakers (namely internet intermediaries and, with Sanchez individual politicians). It concludes that Sanchez constitutes a worrying term for the very worst of hate speech and free speech jurisprudence as individuals (at the moment just politicians) have a duty to be vigilant of what others say on the former’s social media pages. If they are not, criminal penalties are deemed to be justified and legitimate by Strasbourg. (shrink)

Humans and other species depend on the planet’s well-being to survive and flourish. The health of the planet and its ecosystems is under threat from anthropogenic climate change, pollution and biodiversity loss. The promotion of planetary health against entrenched degradation of nature urgently requires ethical guidance. Using an ecocentric virtue jurisprudence approach, this article argues that the highest end of safeguarding planetary health is to secure the flourishing of the Earth community, of which the flourishing of humanity is (...) but one component. The article demonstrates how law, despite its historic role in facilitating our present planetary crisis, has an untapped potential to redeem itself by promoting planetary flourishing through the creation of conditions conducive to the practice of moral virtues, which can help meet the challenges of the Anthropocene. Once given an ecocentric interpretation, the cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage and moderation, as well as their subvirtues, can justify or produce legal structures that address everything from the human right to a healthy environment to the rights of nature. (shrink)

The rapid change in the world after the Enlightenment not only brought about revolutionary scientific and technological innovations, but also opened the door to important transformations in the context of thought. Especially with the wind created by the French Revolution, some concepts such as equality, fraternity, and justice, which were already in circulation before, came to the fore even more. One of the concepts that was magnified in this process was freedom. The concept manifested itself in philosophy as an understanding (...) of free will against the idea of determinism, and in politics as independence against oppressive governments. Since the day it was addressed as an independent topic, it has attracted attention with its different types and aspects, including freedom of the press, freedom of thought, freedom of expression, freedom of religion and conscience. We see that the intellectual adventure of the Western world in the last two centuries has been shaped around these concepts. The libertarian attitude, which at first manifested itself as a rebellion against religious and secular authorities, was later driven to extremes that saw itself as independent from all moral and social norms. These debates were inevitably reflected in the field of theology, and topics such as the position of the will of man against God’s will, fate and the problem of evil were reconsidered according to contemporary claims and objections. The atheistic tendencies that emerged in the Western world claimed that all religions deprive man of the possibility of being an active subject on earth and that a person who believes that all his/her actions are known and determined cannot be truly free. This point is actually one of several important issues that contemporary atheism raises against theism. These debates have also reached the Islamic world and the issue continued to be addressed with similar arguments. At its core, each of these claims rests on the assumption that Islam's conception of the human being leaves no room for individual freedom. Although the problem has different aspects such as fate and theodicy, one of the most striking aspects of the problem is the question of whether man has the right to reject Islam as well as the right to enter Islam by one’s own free will. It is important to answer this question. Because some practices from the early period of Islamic history and the assumptions that apostates should be killed according to certain conditions, which are accepted as an established jurisprudence in Islamic law, have provided important opportunities for anti-Islamic ideas and ideologies. This article shows how the issue has been dealt with in the classical literature, while at the same time suggesting solutions on how to approach the phenomenon of conversion today. In addition, the study will show that the issue is dealt with in the context of public security in the fiqh literature, and therefore, the current cases of conversion or apostasy do not fully correspond to the discussions in the classical period. (shrink)

Virtually all liberal egalitarian advocates of redistributive taxation support an income tax, believing that consumption taxes fail to reach capital and its yield. But this is not true under progressive rates. There are two forms of consumption tax, prepaid and postpaid. A consistent progressive postpaid consumption tax reaches the yield to capital in just those cases in which ordinary moral intuitions want it to be reached: when savings are used to finance a "better," more expensive, lifestyle. Such a tax stands (...) between an income tax, which double taxes all savings, come what may, and a prepaid consumption tax, which never taxes savings. It is the last, best hope for some semblance of redistribution via tax on earth. (shrink)

This volume will acquaint novice philosophers with one of the most important debates in twentieth-century philosophy, and will provide seasoned readers with a ...

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 107 Heft: 1 Seiten: 160-178.

This volume presents four of his key writings on the irrational in mass culture : From Astrology to Fascism ; from anti-Semitism to to the Occult.

_Explores the ancient and perennial notion of the four elements as environmental ideas._.

In Law, Pragmatism and Democracy, Richard Posner wrestles with the ghost of John Dewey for the mantle of pragmatist jurisprudence. Most commentators have seen this work as pitting Posner against Dewey in a contest of pragmatisms, the stakes for which are no less than their respective legacies for legal and democratic theory. Some have sided with Posner and others with Dewey. I contend that the commentators have misidentified the target of Posner’s critique. Posner had another legal theorist in mind (...) and he was disingenuous in naming Dewey. A careful reconstruction of Posner’s argument shows that Dewey’s pragmatism provides a genuine middle way between Posner’s position and that of his intended rival. (shrink)

“Experimental jurisprudence” draws on empirical data to inform questions typically associated with jurisprudence or legal theory. Scholars in this flourishing movement conduct empirical studies about a variety of legal language and concepts. Despite the movement’s growth, its justification is still opaque. Jurisprudence is the study of deep and longstanding theoretical questions about law’s nature, but “experimental jurisprudence,” it might seem, simply surveys laypeople. This Article elaborates and defends experimental jurisprudence. Experimental jurisprudence, appropriately understood, is (...) not only consistent with traditional jurisprudence; it is an essential branch of it. (shrink)

Conceptual analysis is an integral part of legal theory, but the nature and purpose of such inquiries are often not clearly stated. In this article, I attempt to elaborate upon some of the differing reasons for conceptual analysis and what consequences may follow from choosing one objective rather than another. By showing that divergent purposes are often present in competing analyses of the same concept, I also hope to indicate why some “debates” in the jurisprudential literature are best understood as (...) theorists talking past one another. (shrink)

Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons have recently presented a series of papers in which they argue against what has come to be called the ‘new wave’ moral realism and moral semantics of David Brink, Richard Boyd, Peter Railton, and a number of other philosophers. The central idea behind Horgan and Timmons’s criticism of these ‘new wave’ theories has been extended by Sean Holland to include the sort of realism that drops out of response-dependent accounts that make use of an analogy (...) between moral properties and secondary qualities. This paper argues that Holland’s extension depends crucially on the fact that his target is a direct response-dependent account of moral value. His argument does not work against such accounts of more basic normative notions such as ‘harm’ or ‘benefit’. And these more basic notions may then serve as the basic normative building blocks for an indirectly response-dependent moral theory. (shrink)

Although the words “nature” and “ecology” have to be qualified in discussing either Daoism or Heidegger, the author argues that a different and potentially helpful approach to questions of nature, ecology, and environmental ethics can be articulated from the works of Martin Heidegger and the early Daoist philosophers Laozi (Lao-Tzu) and Zhuangzi (Chuang-Tzu). Despite very different cultural contexts and philosophical strategies, they bring into play the spontaneity and event-character of nature while unfolding a sense of how to be responsive to (...) the world through a practice of “non-coercive-activity” (wuwei) and “letting be” (Gelassenheit). Significant ecological implications can be drawn from the recognition of nature reinterpreted as dao (way) and as Sein (being). The openness and receptiveness of experiencing the world as being-under-way suggests what might be called a “pluralistic holism,” involving the recognition of both the interconnectedness and the unique singularity of things, and the possibility of being responsive to the phenomena themselves in their mutuality as wellas in their particular givenness. (shrink)

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first one I distinguish between weak and strong Anti-Archimedeanisms, the latter being the view that metaethics, just as any other discipline attempting to work out a second-order conceptual, metaphysical non-committed discourse about the first-order discourse composing normative practices, is conceptually impossible or otherwise incoherent. I deal in particular with Ronald Dworkin’s famous exposition of the view. I argue that strong Anti-Archimedeanism constitutes an untenable philosophical stance, therefore making logical space for the (...) practice of a discipline such as metaethics—conceived as ethically neutral. This makes space, concurrently, for neutral conceptual jurisprudence. In the second part of the article, I attempt to show two things. On the one hand, that Dworkin’s widely discussed ‘challenge of disagreements’ to legal positivism is founded upon strong Anti-Archimedeanism. On the other hand, that having rejected strong Anti-Archimedeanism we should consequently reject the challenge as a serious challenge to positivism. This move, of course, does not thereby imply that accounting for legal disagreements is not an important jurisprudential task. But it marks—contra Dworkin—that there is no principled or a priori impossibility of doing so within a positivist framework. (shrink)

This paper adds to the critical work on the relationship between Hans Jonas and Emmanuel Levinas by arguing that the experience of the face of the other can be made compatible with Jonas’s understanding of metabolism thus allowing for an extension of who counts as an other to include all organic life forms. Although this extension will allow for a broadening of ethical patients on one side, we will see that a corresponding broadening of ethical agents on the other side (...) will prove to be more difficult owing to the exceptionality of the human being that they both maintain and believe is expressed through the experience of responsibility. (shrink)