Critical-set views avoid the Repugnant Conclusion by subtracting some constant from the welfare score of each life in a population. These views are thus sensitive to facts about biographical identity: identity between lives. In this paper, I argue that questions of biographical identity give us reason to reject critical-set views and embrace the total view. I end with a practical implication. If we shift our credences towards the total view, we should also shift our efforts towards (...) ensuring that humanity survives for the long term. (shrink)

Accommodating the diversity of learners in mainstream schooling and providing high quality education to all - what is usually described as inclusive education - is prioritised at international and European levels as a human rights issue and as a reform strategy which tackles inequalities and promotes social cohesion within both schools and wider society. This book advances critical realist ideas in empirical research in order to close the theory-practice gap and shift the emphasis from epistemology to ontology with regard (...) to teachers' empowerment to provide inclusive education. With a focus on the school context rather than the agency of the individual teacher, the authors use empirical data from case studies to demonstrate teachers' disempowerment as real, and rooted in features of reality. Offering a unified critical realist model, the book challenges taken-for-granted ideas and practices concerning the empowerment of teachers in inclusive education and seeks to set the ground for a more holistic and inclusive educational change. and inclusive educational change. (shrink)

In our papers on the rationality of magic, we distinghuished, for purposes of analysis, three levels of rationality. First and lowest (rationalitYl) the goal directed action of an agent with given aims and circumstances, where among his circumstances we included his knowledge and opinions. On this level the magician's treatment of illness by incantation is as rational as any traditional doctor's blood-letting or any modern one's use of anti-biotics. At the second level (rationalitY2) we add the element of rational thinking (...) or thinking which obeys some set of explicit rules, a level which is not found in magic in general, though it is sometimes given to specific details of magical thinking within the magical thought-system. It was the late Sir Edward E. Evans-Pritchard who observed that when considering magic in detail the magician may be as consistent or critical as anyone else; but when considering magic in general, or any system of thought in general, the magician could not be critical or even comprehend the criticism. Evans-Pritchard went even further: he was sceptical as to whether it could be done in a truly consistent manner: one cannot be critical of one's own system, he thought. On this level (rationalitY2) of discussion we have explained (earlier) why we prefer to wed Evans Pritchard's view of the magician's capacity for piece-meal rationality to Sir James Frazer's view that magic in general is pseudo-rational because it lacks standards of rational thinking. (shrink)

In the past ten years, work by K€olbel, MacFarlane, Richard and others has rekindled old debates on relativism. In this important contribution to those debates, the authors defend a ‘mainstream’ view about the contents of thought and talk that they call Simplicity against the assaults from such ‘analytic relativists’.

Knowing the factors that executives deem critical to governance change can improve our understanding of how such changes come about and can help us evaluate those changes. Interviews with business and finance executives at 11 colleges reveal the importance to governance change of chief executive and board member leadership and interactions, as well as executive communication style. Costs are clear constraints to action, particularly since benefits are not quantified and are difficult to describe. Efforts to discuss governance with internal (...) stakeholders require persistence to overcome narrow, individualized concerns. Communication about governance to external stakeholders is rare and represents a missed opportunity for stakeholder feedback and the development of trust. Executives appear willing to adopt governance forms without considering the idiosyncrasies of their institutional field, limiting the working definition of governance and its potential. For corporations and not‐for‐profit enterprises these findings hold implications for the context in which leadership is exercised and the shape of governance structures. They also pose a fundamental ethical dilemma for leaders to address. (shrink)

The aim of this pilot study was to develop a realistic clinical case for identifying Knobe's asymmetric effect, ie, the tendency to ascribe intentions to a larger extent when an act is considered wrong, as well as to compare medical students at the beginning and end of their curriculum. A vignette about a critically ill 72-year-old patient in need of an operation was used, with two different outcomes: the patient dies or the patient recovers. Approximately half of the students received (...) the ‘recovery case’ and half the ‘death case’. The questions asked were whether it was right to perform the risky operation and whether the head of the clinic brought about the patient's death/recovery intentionally. Among students in their first term an asymmetry in response pattern was identified. This asymmetry was not found among students in their final term. The difference between term 1 and term 11 students is believed to be due to the socialisation of medical students towards clinical reasoning regarding the moral role of intentions. Although no Knobe effect could be detected among term 11 students, a related adaptation effect was detected, indicating that students at the end of their medical school also tend to adapt their ascription of intentions to their moral evaluation of the act. By using clinically relevant cases a new effect has thus been identified that might be useful when investigating experienced clinicians and their views on intentions. The cases and effect merit further investigation. (shrink)

Different conceptions of scientific theories, such as the state spaces approach of Bas van Fraassen, the phase spaces approach of Frederick Suppe, the set-theoretical approach of Patrick Suppes, and the structuralist view of Joseph Sneed et al. are usually put together into one big family. In addition, the definite article is normally used, and thus we speak of the semantic conception of theories and of its different approaches . However, in The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism , (...) starting from certain remarks already made in “Theory Structure” , Current Research in Philosophy of Science, East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1979, pp. 317–338), Frederick Suppe excludes the structuralist view as well as other “European” versions from the semantic conception of theories. In this paper I will critically examine the reasons put forward by Suppe for this decision and, later, I will provide a general characterization of the semantic family and of the structuralist view of theories in such a way as to justify the inclusion of the structuralist view as a member of this family. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with the ways in which meaning is generically mediated in the novel. In particular it addresses the productive diversity of meanings generated by critical interpretation and asks how, given this diversity, comprehension and consensus might be possible. I argue that the construction of subject, object, space and time is achieved in the novel through different manifestations of four key metaphors: voice, view, setting and event. These metaphors supply meanings that rely on a common experience (...) of embodiment. Embodiment supplies the basis for an intersubjectively established consensus which identifies subjects and objects in terms that correspond to the semiotic, syntagmatic and semantic uses of metaphor. I begin by surveying and reviewing certain constructionist accounts of language and meaning in order to establish the importance of metaphor in conveying meaning in rhetorical, rather than linguistic, terms. I then discuss two examples of continental philosophy on speech: Derrida on voice and Foucault on discourse. I demonstrate how meaning is rhetorically constructed according to the use to which metaphors are put—whether they denote formal, semantic, or functional aspects of meaning—through an explication of Foucault’s theory, reserving Derrida’s grammatology for my analysis of the stabilisation of meaning in the theory of certain narratologists (Gérard Genette and Marie-Laure Ryan). Voice and view are key terms in literary theory, and I examine refinements to these metaphors in Genette and Ryan. The insistence of these narratologists on restricting the rhetorical dimension of meaning undermines the value of the literary work, prompting me to argue for a relaxing of such constraints. I read Peter Carey’s True History of the Kelly Gang for its uses of voice and point of view, many of which expose the limitations of the narratological approach. This is a theoretical thesis, which engages a wide range of perspectives—constructionist, deconstructionist, sociological and structuralist—together with their various accounts of language, metaphor, speech and meaning. In terms of sociological approaches to genre and discourse, I employ the chronotope as a critical tool, examining it in the context of the theme of the country house to demonstrate the role of two of my key metaphors, setting and event, which are important for the construction of space and time in abstract terms. Focusing on novels by Jane Austen, Virginia Woolf, and Kazuo Ishiguro, in which the country house defines the space and the temporality through which thematic and “material” elements are mediated, I reveal how the chronotope supplies an overarching coherence that unites thought and event in narrative. My readings of these novels describe a theory that is concerned with the rhetorical capacities of genre rather than with taxonomic constructions of form. To this end I argue that the metaphorical dimensions of narrative—voice, view, setting and event—be loosely drawn, according to the acknowledged mutability of genre. I also emphasise the constructive effect of metaphor whilst according it a rhetorical versatility consistent with the mutability and instability of genre as a semiotic tool, concluding that consensus is achieved in our readings of novels through the form’s reliance on these four key metaphors of embodiment. These metaphors have ordinary, everyday, widespread usage beyond narrative theory; in appreciating their rhetorical value, it must be noted nonetheless that any confusion that ensues is productive, for it results in the diversities of meaning and form celebrated in the literary work. (shrink)

What is the relation between some things and the set of these things? Mathematical practice does not provide a univocal answer. On the one hand, it relies on ordinary plural talk, which is implicitly committed to a traditional form of plural logic. On the other hand, mathematical practice favors a liberal view of definitions which entails that traditional plural logic must be restricted. We explore this predicament and develop a “critical” alternative to traditional plural logic.

This five volume collection brings together a carefully selected array of contributions from a variety of disciplines. Featuring essays from philosophers who have investigated the foundations of knowledge, and addressing different forms of knowledge in society such as common sense and practical knowledge, this collection also discusses the role of knowledge in economic process and gives attention to the role of expert knowledge in political decision making. Including a collection of articles from the sociology of knowledge and science, the set (...) also provides a new introduction and full index by the editors, making it a unique and invaluable research resource for both student and scholar. Coverage includes: 1. Foundations of Knowledge - Knowledge, Experience and Mind - Knowledge and Reality - Knowledge and Skepticism - Knowledge and Ignorance - Knowledge and Uncertainty 2: Knowledge and Society: Forms of Knowledge - Everyday Knowledge - Practical knowledge - Tacit knowledge - Secret Knowledge - Scientific Knowledge - Hermeneutics - Knowledge Construction - Indigenous (traditional) knowledge 3: Knowledge and the Economy - The Economics of Knowledge - Knowledge and Organisations - Knowledge Acquisition - Knowledge Based Systems (firms) - Knowledge Management - Knowledge and Information - Knowledge and Law 4: Politics and Knowledge - Science and Policy-Making - The Power of Ideas and Discourse - The Politics of Knowledge 5: Sociology of Knowledge and Science - Classical Perspectives - Modern Views - Science Studies. (shrink)

Contemporary analytic philosophy is dominated by metaphilosophical naturalism, the view that philosophy ought to be continuous with science. This naturalistic turn is for a significant part due to the work of W. V. Quine. Yet, the development and the reception of Quine’s naturalism have never been systematically studied. In this paper, I examine Quine’s evolving naturalism as well as the reception of his views. Scrutinizing a large set of unpublished notes, correspondence, drafts, papers, and lectures as well as published (...) responses to Quine’s work, I show how both internal tensions and external criticisms forced him to continuously develop, rebrand, and refine his metaphilosophy before he explicitly decided to label his view ‘naturalism’ in the late 1960s. (shrink)

There are two popular views regarding the origin of critical thinking: (1) The concept of critical thinking began with Socrates and his Socratic method of questioning. (2) The term ‘critical thinking’ was first introduced by John Dewey in 1910 in his book How We Think. This paper argues that both claims are incorrect. Firstly, critical reflection was a distinguishing characteristic of the Presocratic philosophers, setting them apart from earlier traditions. Therefore, they should be recognized as even (...) earlier pioneers of critical thinking. Secondly, John Dewey not only used the term ‘critical thinking’ before 1910, but there were also other authors who used it before him. The meaning of ‘critical thinking’ at the turn of the twentieth century was shaped by various traditions of linguistic usage, including literary criticism, science and medicine, and Kantian philosophy. (shrink)

Critical reflection helps professionals to learn directly from their practice experience, so that they can improve their own work in an ongoing and flexible way - something essential in today's complex and changing organisations. It allows change to be managed in a way which enables individuals to preserve a sense of what is fundamentally important to them as professionals. It is particularly important as it can also help make sense of some fundamental issues, and so also has implications for (...) how we live our lives. However, more systematic research on critical reflection is needed to help us understand what works best for professionals in different settings. This timely work explores how critical reflection is researched, evaluated and used as a research method itself, with the aim of improving how it is taught and practised in a rigorous and transferable way. Developing a more comprehensive and multi-disciplinary view of the current state of critical reflection and the research directions which need to be taken, the book is divided into four parts. It: - Provides an overview of different perspectives on critical reflection and stimulates dialogue between them - Establishes some common platforms from which to develop further research directions - Identifies the major issues in evaluating critical reflection teaching, and main methods for doing so - Contributes to social science methodological innovations by exploring how methods based on critical reflection can be used for researching professional practice - Contains contributions from academics who are internationally known and highly experienced in different aspects of critical reflection. Researching Critical Reflectionis an important reference for all students, practitioners, and researchers - including in the areas of education, management, health and social work - who engage with critical reflection to develop their practice. (shrink)

abstract Mou Zongsan used to say that in Western philosophy there exist three different traditions. The first is the tradition of Plato and Aristoteles, the second is the tradition of Kant and Hegel, and the last is the tradition of Leibniz and Russell. I am afraid, however, that this kind of interpretation is already outdated and incapable of encompassing the rich variegations of Western philosophy as a whole. In my view, the various options would have been exhausted by supplementing (...) the preceding list with the tradition founded by Husserl and Heidegger and the one set up by Whitehead. All of these traditions together encapsulate the most important domains of philosophy, such as ontology, epistemology, and axiology. In this article I closely investigate the epistemological thought of Bertrand Russell in order to find out whether it contains any aspects from which we can borrow and learn. (shrink)

Draft for Wolfe and Symons (ed.), History and Philosophy of Materialism. This chapter looks at the discussion of materialism in John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding, and then at parts of the Anglophone reaction to those discussions. It considers the early criticisms of Locke by Edward Stillingfleet and the anonymous author of three sets of Remarks on Locke’s Essay. It then looks at some other ways in which readers reacted to Locke’s discussions: the views of Anthony Collins and John Toland, (...) which one might be tempted to think of as Lockean materialism; William Carroll’s reading of Locke as a Spinozistic materialist; and the dualistic Lockeanism of William Duncan’s Lockean logic textbook. (shrink)

ABSTRACT. The following is an email interchange that took place between Dan Dennett and myself in the period 14th to 28th June, 2001. The discussion tries to clarify some essential features of the "heterophenomenology" developed in his book Consciousness Explained (1996), and how this differs from a form of "critical phenomenology" implicit in my own book Understanding Consciousness (2000), and developed in my edited Investigating Phenomenal Consciousness: new methodologies and maps (2000). The departure point for the discussion is a (...) paper posted on Dan's website that summarises a related debate between Dan, David Chalmers and Alvin Goldman (Dennett, 2001). To make the discussion easier to follow, the multiple embeddings have been removed (restoring the sequence in which the comments were written). I have also corrected a few typos and grammatical errors. However, the text of the emails remains exactly the same. In Round 1, I suggest that scientific investigations of consciousness are better described as a form of "critical phenomenology" that accepts conscious experiences to be real rather than as a "heterophenomenology" which remains neutral about or denies their existence. Dan replies that I have misunderstood his position - he doesn't deny that conscious experiences exist. Conscious experiences just don't have the first-person phenomenal properties that they are commonly thought to have and, in his view, science remains neutral about the nature of such properties. In Round 2, I agree with Dan that science initially remains neutral about how to understand the nature of conscious experiences. Nevertheless, the phenomenology of consciousness provides the data that scientists are trying to understand. A better understanding of data does not, in general, make the data disappear. I also ask, "if you remove the phenomena from phenomenal consciousness, in what sense is whatever remains "consciousness"? And, if one removes all the phenomenal content from what one takes consciousness to be, doesn't this amount to a denial of the existence of "consciousness" in any ordinary sense of this term? Dan's reply likens beliefs in phenomenal properties to the belief in evil spirits causing disease. He has no doubts that diseases such as whooping cough and tuberculosis are real, but this doesn't require him to believe in evil spirits. And, what's left, once one removes phenomenal properties, is what a zombie and a so-called conscious person have in common: a given set of functional properties that enable them to carry out the tasks we normally think of as conscious. In Round 3, I summarise our similarities and differences. We agree that first-person reports are not incorrigible and that third-person information may throw light on how to interpret them. We also agree that first-person reports are reports of "something", although we disagree about the nature of that something. I suggest that Dan is sceptical about first-person reports rather than heterophenomenologically "neutral" (e.g. when he likens belief in phenomenal properties to belief in evil spirits). While we agree that science is likely to deepen our understanding of consciousness, I repeat that, unlike the replacement of old theories by better theories, a deeper understanding of phenomena does not in general replace the phenomena themselves. Rather than third-person data replacing first-person reports, the former are required to make sense of the latter, making their relationship complementary and mutually irreducible. In fact, there are many cases where science takes the reality of first-person phenomenology seriously, for example in the extensive literature on pain and its alleviation. If this can't be squeezed into an exclusively third-person view of science, then we will just have to adjust our view of science - something that a "critical phenomenology" achieves at little cost. At the time of this editing, Dan has not replied. . Reference. Dennett, D. (2001) The fantasy of first-person science. http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/pubpage.htm. (shrink)

The last decades have witnessed the emergence of a burgeoning literature on freedom that has set out to reconfigure this idea in response to the critique of the autonomous subject. The paper has three main objectives. It engages critically with this new field of theory by exploring two divergent strands of thought: a recast form of liberal autonomy and agonistic freedom as envisioned by M. Foucault, C. Castoriadis and certain other authors. Second, it seeks to bring out the merits of (...) the agonistic view by situating it in the problematic of freedom that developed after the critique. Agonistic freedom attends more fully to social inhibitions and unconscious determinations; it grapples more effectively with internalized limits; and it gives more play to the creative powers of action, which carry liberating effects. The argument offers, finally, a reply to the much-iterated polemic against agonistic self-invention, which charges it with amoral and antidemocratic implications. In effect, this ethos of freedom displays virtues that can facilitate democratic interaction and reinforce commitment to democratic egalitarianism. The entire discussion ties in with debates around agonistic democracy and helps to construe democratic freedom in a way that enables social contestation, pluralization, and solidarity. (shrink)

Critical theory is construed in very broad terms in Leone, Potter, and Shackel's discussion. It is not restricted to the "critical theory" associated with the Frankfurt school or, latterly, with Habermas. It encom-passes any research program that adopts a critically self-conscious attitude toward its constituent presuppositions: as they describe it, "critical theory asks of any set of conclusions from what point of view they are constructed." To press for such reflexiveness is crucially important, but a number (...) of important things drop out or are left unspecified when "critical theory" is construed this broadly. For example, what is the standpoint of the critical theorist, and to what criteria of acceptability is the exercise of unmasking answerable? What sort of commentary does the unmasking provide on contemporary contexts, and how is one to determine when it is accurate in what it reveals about the conditions and interests informing practice? Leone et al. stop at the point where the most interesting and difficult questions arise. This is not to fault their analysis or their recommendations but to suggest what seem some important avenues for development of their critical initiative that remain to be explored. (shrink)

This chapter is adapted from Siegel, in which I argue that the critical thinker is best thought of as one who is appropriately moved by reasons. In this view, critical thinking involves a variety of reasoning and other cognitive skills; knowledge of various sorts; a set of tendencies or dispositions to exercise those skills and utilize that knowledge; the valuing of reasons and an appreciation of their epistemological force; and a certain sort of character. I am grateful (...) to David Moshman and Carol Crowley for helpful comments on an earlier draft. (shrink)

In a fictional conversation designed to appeal to both working teachers and social philosophers, three educators take up the question of whether critical thinking itself can, or should, be taught independently of an explicit consideration of issues related to social justice. One, a thoughtful but somewhat traditional Enlightenment rationalist, sees critical thinking as a neutral set of skills and dispositions, essentially unrelated to the conclusions of morality, problems of social organization, or the content of any particular academic discipline. (...) A second interlocutor, steeped in “critical” pedagogy of Paulo Freire, insists that the problem is the pose of neutrality itself. On this view, all honest and effective approaches to teaching must confront the hegemony of unjust relationships, institutions, and conceptual schemes. The third character attempts to resolve the tension between these two opposed camps. (shrink)

In a fictional conversation designed to appeal to both working teachers and social philosophers, three educators take up the question of whether critical thinking itself can, or should, be taught independently of an explicit consideration of issues related to social justice. One, a thoughtful but somewhat traditional Enlightenment rationalist, sees critical thinking as a neutral set of skills and dispositions, essentially unrelated to the conclusions of morality, problems of social organization, or the content of any particular academic discipline. (...) A second interlocutor, steeped in “critical” pedagogy of Paulo Freire, insists that the problem is the pose of neutrality itself. On this view, all honest and effective approaches to teaching must confront the hegemony of unjust relationships, institutions, and conceptual schemes. The third character attempts to resolve the tension between these two opposed camps. (shrink)

The economic analysis of law has gone through a remarkable change in the past decade and a half. The founding articles of the discipline – such classic pieces as Ronald Coase's “The problem of social cost”, Richard Posner's “A theory of negligence” and Guido Calabresi and Douglas Malamed's “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” – offered economic analyses of familiar aspects of the common law, seeking to explain, in particular, fundamental features of the law (...) of tort in terms of such economic ideas as transaction costs, Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, or minimizing the sum of the accident costs and avoidance costs. In each case, they argued that the law of torts should be understood as a set of liability rules selected for their incentive effects, rather than as a set of substantive rights and remedies for their violation. These authors claimed to be able to explain most of the features of tort law and, where features were found that did not fit with their preferred explanations, recommended modification. Although they disagreed on important questions, each of the pieces seems to work a manageable structure into what strikes first-year law students as an otherwise random morass of common-law judgments. Generations of legal academics were introduced to these works, and drawn into their way of looking at things. As a student studying first-year torts with Calabresi at Yale, I had the sense that I was in the presence of greatness. (shrink)

Faculty of Law and Department of Philosophy, University of Toronto 1. INTRODUCTION The economic analysis of law has gone through a remarkable change in the past decade and a half. The founding articles of the discipline – such classic pieces as Ronald Coase’s “The problem of social cost” (1960), Richard Posner’s “A theory of negligence” (1972) and Guido Calabresi and Douglas Malamed’s “Property rules, liability rules, and inalienability: One view of the cathedral” (1972) – offered economic analyses of familiar (...) aspects of the common law, seeking to explain, in particular, fundamental features of the law of tort in terms of such economic ideas as transaction costs (Coase), Kaldor-Hicks efficiency (Posner), or minimizing the sum of the accident costs and avoidance costs (Calabresi and Malamed). In each case, they argued that the law of torts should be understood as a set of liability rules selected for their incentive effects, rather than as a set of substantive rights and remedies for their violation. These authors claimed to be able to explain most of the features of tort law and, where features were found that did not fit with their preferred explanations, recommended modification. Although they disagreed on important questions,1 each of the pieces seems to work a manageable structure into what strikes first-year law students as an otherwise random morass of common-law judgments. Generations of legal academics were introduced to these works, and drawn into their way of looking at things. As a student studying first-year torts with Calabresi at Yale, I had the sense that I was in the presence of greatness. (shrink)

The authors use social science methodology to determine whether a doctrinal shift—from an objectivist view of criminality in the common law to a subjectivist view in modem criminal codes—is consistent with lay intuitions of the principles of justice. Commentators have suggested that lay perceptions of criminality have shifted in a way reflected in the doctrinal change, but the study results suggest a more nuanced conclusion: that the modern lay view agrees with the subjectivist view of modern (...) codes in defining the minimum requirements of criminality, but prefers the common law's objectivist view of grading the punishment deserved. The authors argue that there is practical value in having criminal law track shared community intuitions of the proper rules for assigning liability and punishment. For that reason, the study results support the often criticized subjectivist view of modern codes in setting the minimum requirements of liability, but disapprove of the modern codes' shift away from the common law's objectivist view of grading. (shrink)

The Received View on quantum non-individuality is, roughly speaking, the view according to which quantum objects are not individuals. It seems clear that the RV finds its standard expression nowadays through the use of the formal apparatuses of non-reflexive logics, mainly quasi-set theory. In such logics, the relation of identity is restricted, so that it does not apply for terms denoting quantum particles; this “lack of identity” formally characterizes their non-individuality. We face then a dilemma: on the one (...) hand, identity seems too important to be given up, on the other hand the RV seems to require that identity be given up. In this paper we shall discuss how the specific characterization of the RV through non-reflexive logics came to be framed. We examine some of the main objections to this version of the RV and argue that they are misguided under this specific “non-reflexive” understanding of the RV. Finally, we shall also argue that this non-reflexive view is not the only option for a metaphysical articulation of the RV: less radical approaches to identity and logic are open. In particular, some of these alternative approaches to the RV we present may be immune to most of the criticisms presented against the non-reflexive approach. (shrink)

I explore the critical significance of the phenomenological notion of intuition. I argue that there is no meaning that is originally formal-conceptual. The meanings of concepts function as symbolic approximations to original nonconceptual, intuitive givens. However, the meaning content originally intuitively given in lived experience has a tendency to be lost in pursuit of universalizability and communicability of conceptual content. Over time, conceptual approximations lose their reference to the experience that had given them their meaning in the first place. (...) The loss of an experiential reference makes for a vacuous set of concepts, giving way to ideologies, by which I mean the conscious prejudicial support for a set of ideas without the experiential, intuitive context that is necessary to see the value of those ideas. A critical phenomenology is a critique of ideological views by descriptively recovering the intuitive content whereby concepts can be adequately reevaluated. -/- This main aim of this work is to establish the methodological features of critical phenomenology by responding to the objections made against phenomenology and intuition by Frankfurt School critical theorists. Scheler’s phenomenology is used as a way forward due to his far-reaching critique of reason and emphasis on the phenomenological intuition of value. -/- Chapter 1 considers three Frankfurt School objections of Husserlian phenomenology, as (1) immanentist (Adorno), (2) idealist (Adorno), and (3) normatively empty (Habermas). Each fail to discern the subtle features of nonidentity with respect to Husserl’s notions of apperception and adumbrated phenomena. -/- Chapter 2 shows how Scheler’s original view of the phenomenological attitude makes more explicit Husserl’s subtle dialectical elements. Adequate and inadequate givenness is interpreted with respect to one’s intentional orientation and the moral attitudes carried within the world, influencing the content of the given. -/- Chapter 3 confronts the popular charge of idealism. Reality is a problem for phenomenology only to conscious modes of givenness. But through ecstatic modes of givenness (in resistances) Scheler’s phenomenology achieves an existential ground that is crucial for phenomenology to engage actually existing social structures and factors. -/- Chapter 4 concerns the charge that phenomenology is normatively empty. That Scheler had developed a theory of value is not enough to rebut the charge but his view of value-givenness as an attitude informed by the act of loving, opens an awareness of the values disclosed by that attitude. -/- Chapter 5 shows that Scheler’s sociology of knowledge, in contrast to Karl Mannheim’s interpretation, provides a unified picture of the interdependency of spirit and life needed for the realization of values in the world and society. -/- Chapter 6 suggests a way of framing a phenomenological critique of ideology. Scheler points to the attitudinal factors of loving and hating to disclose systemic devaluation and overvaluation. This awareness arises (1) from noticing how individual valuation reflects social valuation, and (2) by being attuned to how one’s own intuitions contradict prevailing social valuation and thought, thereby opening a space for a critique of those patterns. (shrink)

ABSTRACT While interest in philosophy and medicine has burgeoned in the past two decades, there remains a need for an analysis of the intellectual activity embodied in good medical practice. In this setting, ethical and scientific decision‐making are complexly interrelated. The following paper, collaboratively written by physicians and philosophers, presents a view of applied (clinical) science and applied ethics. Making extensive use of illustrations drawn from routine case material, we seek to indicate a variety of philosophic issues to be (...) found in daily practice, elucidate various levels of critical reasoning within the medical setting, and demonstrate a remarkable similarity between medical and ethical decision‐making. (shrink)

This paper describes a flaw in the teaching of issues related to market economics and social justice at American institutions of higher learning. The flaw we speak of is really a gap, or an educational disconnect, which exists between those faculty who support market-based economies and those who believe capitalism promotes economic injustice. The thesis of this paper is that the gap is so wide and the ideas that are promoted are so disconnected that students are trapped into choosing one (...) or the other position (or neither) and are left unable to link the two sides of the discussion. Such an educational process is not one that produces free and reasoned discernment. In this paper, we briefly relate how we came to be aware of the disconnect and its harms. We present evidence that a pedagogical gulf exists within the teaching of markets and capitalism at American universities - faculty interviews, course syllabi, portions of the corpus of material generally referred to as Catholic Social Thought, as well as references to traditional, mainstream economic theory. Further, we give evidence of the confusion and frustration among students this gulf causes. We suggest possible reasons for the gulf-primarily through an investigation of the differences in underlying assumptions and misperceptions that exist between two divisions within universities. We conclude by suggesting a set of curricular changes designed to improve teaching. The authors' aim is not to change people's minds. It is to change their teaching. The authors believe that these curricular changes will leave students less frustrated and better prepared for a life of significant service - with improved critical thinking skills. (shrink)

Spinoza's Ethics, published in 1677, is considered his greatest work and one of history's most influential philosophical treatises. This volume brings established scholars together with new voices to engage with the complex system of philosophy proposed by Spinoza in his masterpiece. Topics including identity, thought, free will, metaphysics, and reason are all addressed, as individual chapters investigate the key themes of the Ethics and combine to offer readers a fresh and thought-provoking view of the work as a whole. Written (...) in a clear and accessible style, the volume sets out cutting-edge research that reflects, challenges, and promotes the most recent scholarly advances in the field of Spinoza studies, tackling old issues and bringing to light new subjects for debate. (shrink)

The dissertation critically examines Husserl's transcendental idealism as a response to epistemological skepticism. Contrary to prevailing interpretations, I argue that Husserl intended to formulate a non-reductive, idealist justification of empirical knowledge. I take the standard phenomenalistic interpretation of Husserl's idealism to be right in discerning his basic concern with the refutation of skepticism, but wrong in construing the transcendental reduction as an ontological reduction of the natural world to "ideal" sets of transcendental experiences. On the other hand, recent "neutrality views" (...) which hold that phenomenological epoche requires the permanent suspension of ontological commitments seem to confuse Husserl's quasi-verificationist critique of traditional metaphysics with the positivistic critique of all metaphysics. I suggest instead that Husserl's epistemological program be understood as an attempt to ground transcendentally, i.e. on the basis of apodictic and presuppositionless evidences, our ordinary beliefs about the world. In this light, Husserl's Weltvernichtung argument for the presuppositionlessness of consciousness can be seen as a necessary precondition of the transcendental justification of empirical knowledge. ;To clarify Husserl's genetic phenomenology, I adopt Dagfinn Follesdal's interpretation of the noema as a Fregean Sinn. I distinguish two levels of 'constitution' to show how Husserl traces back the sense and being of the objective world to the synthetic activity of the transcendental subject. The resolution of transcendental analogues of skeptical doubts by means of Husserl's analysis of 'retroactive cancellation' completes, in general outline, the grounding of the "verificationism" of the natural attitude. However, I argue that the anti-skeptical force of 'retroactive cancellation' depends on conceiving the relationship between the conscious subject and the world in a way that renders Weltvernichtung unintelligible. Husserl's transcendental idealist response to the skeptic accordingly leads to a dilemma: either one maintains the presuppositionlessness of consciousness but abandons the critique of skepticism for a descriptive study of the transcendental structures of experience; or one attempts to reformulate Husserl's phenomenological verificationism while abandoning the goal of absolute grounding. (shrink)

The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of Diametros devoted to Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism, the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, (...) besides general moral theories, some local principles of justice might be valid. Quinn Hiroshi Gibson states that Tännsjö should have considered the Rawlsian view on justice in its contractualist reading. Jay A. Zameska argues that his “revised lexical sufficientarianism” constitutes a more reliable moral view than prioritarianism. Finally, Lasse Nielsen points out that there is more to say about distributive justice than consequentialist theories can grasp. Moreover, he puts forward an argument in defense of prioritarianism. The final article in this issue constitutes Tännsjö’s replies to his critics. (shrink)

Despite the spectacular contributions to knowledge made by molecular biology during the last half century, cancer research has not delivered an agreed explanation of how malignant tumours originate. The models assiduously investigated in molecular terms largely reflect waves of fashion, and time has revealed their inadequacy: cancer is (1) not caused by the direct action of oncogenes, (2) not fully explained by the impairment of tumour suppressor genes, (3) not set in motion by mutations controlling the cell cycle, (4) not (...) governed by the dependence of malignant tumours on an adequate blood supply and (5) not triggered by a failure of programmed cell death. But there is now strong evidence that cancers may have their origin in mutations that block the execution of critical steps in the process of normal differentiation. Cancer, thus seen, is not initially a disease of cell multiplication, but a disease of differentiation. The evidence for this point of view should now be explored. BioEssays 27:833–838, 2005. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Dewey's critical conception of work deserves consideration because it combines two types of models of social critique that are usually considered separately in contemporary Dewey scholarship. In the syllabus Social Institutions and the Study of Morals, Dewey contends that the valuation of social settings should be grounded on criteria immanent to social experience, and he applies his model of immanent critique to work-related issues. In his philosophy of education, he highlights that institutional settings should be valued from the (...) point of view of their formative effects, and in Democracy and Education, the formative effects of work are put to the fore. The case of work illustrates the fact that specific institutional settings require that immanent critique be complemented by critique of the formative effects. The psychological and social centrality of work implies that the problems met in the social experience of work produce effects that concern not only the social experience of work but also life outside of work. Therefore, these effects cannot be accurately tackled by an immanent critique of work. (shrink)

This article advances a critical phenomenology of the meaning of aging embodiment. Its broad aim is to profoundly challenge an idealized view of aging as foremost and fundamentally a natural or normative procession of “ready-made” stages pre-set “in” time (i.e., infancy, childhood, adolescence, adulthood, and “old age”) or pre-given units of time that unfurl along a timeline (i.e., chronological age), from past to present to future. Combining, defending, and adapting resources from Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception with a reading (...) of the concept of institution (Stiftung) via the phenomenon of puberty in Institution and Passivity: Course Notes from the Collège de France (1954-1955) as well as insights from critical gerontology, I argue that the phenomenon of aging embodiment demands to be understood in terms of transitions, that is, as an intensive reorientation in relationality, sociality, and the style in which one has a past rather than as changes along a timeline. (shrink)

These documents, published here for the first time, present the Treasury's counter-arguments during the period when Keynes was developing the ideas that led to the Keynesian revolution in economic policy. Keynes spent much effort trying to persuade the Treasury to adopt policies designed to raise employment and stabilise prices, and to create an international monetary system that would favour these objectives. His arguments are set out fully in the Royal Economic Society's 30-volume set of The Collected Writings of John Maynard (...) Keynes. In contrast, the views of his Treasury critics have hitherto been much less accessible.Economists and historians have tended to assume that Keynes was right and the Treasury was wrong; this volume shows that the Treasury anticipated the political problems that would be encountered in putting Keynes's ideas into practice. Much of what Keynes published was deliberately polemical: he believed that words should be 'a little wild', for they were 'the assault of thought on the unthinking'. Treasury officials were by no means as unthinking as Keynes tended to portray them, and they had a coherent and intellectually respectable understanding of public finance. Ministers in the inter-war period and early in the Second World War were sensitive to the use that political opponents might make of Keynes's arguments; officials had to provide counter-arguments, and in doing so they revealed much about their views on economics and public finance. Once Keynes became an adviser to the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1940, the debate became internal to the Treasury, but officials continued to subject Keynes's ideas to critical analysis.The documents in this volume show Treasury responses to Keynes on a range of issues crucial to understanding the period and the context of the Keynesian revolution in public policy. The topics covered include: the return to the gold standard; the use of public expenditure to cure unemployment in the inter-war period; how to avoid inflation in the war; planning for the post-war international economy; and the 1944 white paper on employment policy. This edition is an essential tool for the study of a formative period of British history and a great intellectual debate. (shrink)

This paper explores Confucius’ views on warfare according to the Gongyang Commentary. Though often overlooked as a source for understanding Confucius’ position on warfare, the Gongyang Commentary is replete with comments and anecdotes on the topic. It articulates a complex set of ethico‐ritual principles pertaining to warfare in which certain kinds of warfare are clearly condoned and praised while others are clearly condemned and criticized. What according to the Gongyang Commentary was the Gentleman's position on warfare? The paper explores this (...) central question through a close reading of anecdotal narratives and selected passages from the Gongyang Commentary and related texts on the subject of warfare. (shrink)

What is citizenship? This question goes back to the political philosophy of Aristotle, and how one answers it will be decisive in determining one's vision of political life. In the last ten to fifteen years, the question of citizenship has aroused a renewed set of extremely lively debates within political philosophy, and Iris Marion Young has certainly occupied an important place within these theoretical debates. In particular, Young—especially in her seminal article, Polity and Group Difference: A critique of the ideal (...) of universal citizenship—has presented a sharp challenge to all political theorists who are in some broad sense intellectually nourished by the tradition of civic republicanism and who think about the theme of citizenship under the influence of civic‐republican conceptions. In essence, Young's argument is that the practices of contemporary liberal society show that the implicit normative promise contained in the idea of a universal citizen identity has not been fulfilled, and therefore we must rethink this notion from the ground up. The purpose of my essay is to review the arguments that constitute Young's challenge to the civic‐republican tradition, with a view to clarifying the following questions: Is Young's political theory aimed at a reconstruction of the idea of citizenship on a normatively more sound basis? Or does her project imply a rejection of the idea of citizenship, and its displacement by an alternative understanding of political membership? (shrink)

The project begins by drawing two basic distinctions. The first distinction is between forms of ideological discourse in general, which may not be critical in their orientation, and those forms of critical discourse which are historically self-conscious in their method. The formal antitype of all critical discourse is, in this view, the discourse of interpretation. The second distinction separates forms of critical thought from forms of critical discourse. Unlike the latter, forms of thought do (...) not require for their existence the operation of an explicit set of signs or system of objective articulation.One further introductory point is in order. I believe that the elementary forms of critical discourse should be divided into two large categories: the narrative forms, on the one hand, and the nonnarrative forms, on the other. Furthermore, I suggest that the nonnarrative forms—which are my chief concern in this paper—comprise four elementary types: the hypothetical ; the practical or injunctive ; the array; and the dialectic. I shall concentrate on the nonnarrative forms, and in particular on the array and the dialectic, for two reasons: first, one of these, the array, is not normally recognized as a form of critical discourse; and, second, both the array and the dialectic offer especially clear contrasts with narrative forms of discourse, both critical and noncritical.1 1. Some brief comments on the other two nonnarrative forms may be useful. Perhaps the best examples of a practical or injunctive form are furnished in a book like Euclid’s Elements, or any cookbook. The hypothetical form may be illustrated out of any number of classic works such as Sir Humphry Davy’s “On Some New Phenomena of Chemical Changes Produced by Electricity” and Michael Faraday’s “Electricity from Magnetism” . Jerome J. McGann is the Doris and Henry Dreyfuss Professor of Humanities at the California Institute of Technology. A new book, The Beauty of Inflections: Literary Investigations in Historical Method and Theory , continues the critical projects of his recent books The Romantic Ideology: A Critical Investigation and A Critique of Modern Textual Criticism . His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “The Religious Poetry of Christina Rossetti”. (shrink)

The evolution of altruism in human societies has been intensively investigated in social and natural sciences. A widely acknowledged recent idea is the “parochial altruism model,” which suggests that inter- group hostility and intragroup altruism can coevolve through lethal intergroup conflicts. The current article critically examines this idea by reviewing research relevant to intergroup conflicts in human evolutionary history from evolutionary biology, psychology, cultural anthropology, and archaeology. After a brief intro- duction, section 2 illustrates the mathematical model of parochial altruism (...) and some critiques of the model and its interpretation, primarily from an evolutionary biology point of view. Section 3 delves into the archaeological evidence of prehistoric intergroup conflicts in the Japanese archipelago’s Jomon and Yayoi periods, Europe’s Mesolithic period, and North America’s Pacific period as counter examples of the paro- chial altruism model. In section 4, the ethnographies of intergroup relationships and conflicts reveal that intergroup relationships in many ethnic groups are not as simple as the assumption in the mathematical model of parochial altruism. In section 5, we outline psychological research on intergroup conflicts which suggest that intergroup hostility and ingroup altruism are not necessarily correlated. In conclusion, we argue that the assumption and parameter settings of the parochial altruism model are inconsistent with empirical data. (shrink)

This essay introduces a cluster of articles titled “Devalued Currency: An Elegiac Symposium on Paradigm Shifts.” Eagleton's piece addresses, from a perspective indebted to Walter Benjamin, the notion of Thomas Kuhn that “shifts” in the controlling paradigms of disciplines and practices are entirely transformative not only of their futures but also of their pasts. Benjamin argued that a work of art is a set of potentials that may or may not be realized in the vicissitudes of its afterlife. The true (...) significance of works might be said, therefore, to emerge only after some as-yet-unexpected event or upheaval makes their significance apparent. In this sense, we might argue that historical events make full sense only in the light of “judgment day”; until then, history remains an incoherent chronicle. But the totality that will one day be revealed cannot be anticipated. The past is open-ended because the present is, and meanwhile, the meaning of history is in our hands to change. Since we have that power, Eagleton suggests that we recycle figures of the past as characters in a comedy rather than tragedy. Still, it is never possible to say which figures of the past and which works are ultimately important and which are not, because we cannot say which mutations will result in major developments to come. No work or person is important or peripheral in itself or himself; it is the critic and historian who render them so. (shrink)

The present essay is a critical study of Barwise and Perry’s book, emphasizing the logical and model-theoretical aspects of their work. I begin by presenting the authors’ criticism of the classical view of logic and semantics within the tradition of Frege, Russell and Tarski. In this connection, I discuss the so-called Frege argument (“the slingshot”). I try to show that the argument appears inconclusive, not only from a situation-theoretic perspective, but also from such alternative perspectives as orthodox Fregean (...) semantics or Russellian semantics. I then discuss the ontology of situation semantics and the way it is modeled within set theory. In particular, I compare the notion of an abstract situation with that of a possible world. The last two sections concern the model-theoretic aspects of the authors’ theory. In Section 7, I discuss how the “partial” perspective of situation semantics differs from that of classical model theory. Finally, in Section 8, different model-theoretic accounts of attitude reports within situation semantics are discussed, in particular the “relations to situations”-approach presented by the authors in Chapter 9 of S & A. The usual problems of “logical omniscience” that appear in standard Hintikka-style epistemic logic are avoided in situation semantics. I argue, however, that situation semantics is faced with analogous counter-intuitive results, unless the expressive power of the language under study is suitably restricted. (shrink)

McCarthy begins this first systematic review of the development of Habermas's thought with general accounts of the relation of theory and practice and of the reduction of praxis to techne in positivist conceptions of reason. We learn how the communication structures presupposed by the community of natural scientists cannot be grasped within the framework of empirical-analytic science and the technological cognitive interests on which it is based. He then goes on to explain clearly the practical interest supposedly underlying the historical-hermeneutic (...) sciences and the emancipatory interests said to be the basis of critical theory. McCarthy shows how the perceived weaknesses in the initial attempt to elucidate this view by incorporating some of Freud's insights into a revised historical materialism set the program for most of Habermas's subsequent work. He examines in some detail the central points at issue between hermeneutics and critical theory and shows how the existence of systematically distorted communication structures and the tendency of the hermeneutical sciences to reduce inquiry to the interpretation of transmitted meanings force Habermas to a critique of ideology. Having shown the importance of psychoanalysis to this critique and to social theory as conceived by the Frankfurt School, McCarthy proceeds to outline Habermas's project for the general theory of communicative competence presupposed by a consistent theoretical development of psychoanalysis. Since critical theory regards the reflexive application of science to social structures as a process of enlightenment, Habermas must also take seriously the challenge laid down by functional analysis, which understands life processes of the human species not a quest for liberation, but as a drive for the self-maintenance of social systems. In concretizing the critique of systems theory, McCarthy shows how Habermas is driven to project a theory of social evolution, a reconstructed historical materialism which goes beyond explaining historical development through changes in the forces of production to include the learning processes that take place in the dimension of moral insight, practical knowledge, communicative action and the consensual regulation of conflicts. This brings us to Habermas's most recent work on communication theory, and one of the considerable merits of McCarthy's book is that it brings together the widely scattered publications which bear on this matter. He shows how Habermas's universal pragmatics, his theory of communicative competence, is an attempt to rework the normative-theoretical foundations of critical theory. Since speech is seen as the distinctive medium of human life, a theory of communication becomes the foundation for the human sciences by disclosing the universal infrastructure of socio-cultural life. Since Habermas is particularly concerned with a theory of social action, his work in universal pragmatics focuses on speech acts and the interpersonal relations which underlie them. McCarthy argues that the theory of communicative competence can be seen as an attempt to make good the claim Habermas made some thirteen years ago in his inaugural lecture at Frankfurt: that the human interest in autonomy and responsibility can be apprehended a priori since it lies at the root of language. Habermas attempts to reconstruct the normative basis of speech as a system of universal and necessary validity claims, and McCarthy provides a clear account of the "logics" of truth and morality, as well as Habermas's argument for their inseparability. McCarthy concludes by examining the crisis tendencies Habermas perceives in advanced capitalism and the correlative question of legitimizing the private appropriation of public wealth. No such legitimization can withstand discursive examination or rational consensus since it must suppress generalizable interests by treating them as particular. Thus, a repoliticization of the public sphere becomes the "new conflict zone" in organized capitalism.--G.E. (shrink)

The following is an assessment of critical realism, a philosophy of science advanced in the mid-1970s to mid-1980s by Roy Bhaskar. My contention is that critical realism points toward a way out of the post-positivist intellectual morass in which we currently find ourselves. ;I identify two challenges posed by proponents of what I refer to as post-positivist perspectivism: epistemic relativism and the anti-realism that relativism presupposes. I take these challenges to have political implications, in that both undermine our (...) capacity to talk seriously about falsehood. I argue that critical realism is most valuable as a non-Humean account of causality. As such it provides for a direct counter to anti-realism and an indirect counter to epistemic relativism. ;I attempt to determine the significance of critical realism by engaging with a set of representative interlocutors: Kant, Hilary Putnam, Charles Varela and Rom Harre, Brian Ellis and, to a limited extent, Charles Taylor. Following an introductory chapter, in which I set out Bhaskar's position, I devote a chapter to Kant's transcendental idealism, a chapter to Hilary Putnam's internal realism, a chapter to Bhaskar's theory of truth and a chapter to Bhaskar's extension of his views to the social and psychological sciences. In the chapter on Bhaskar's philosophy of social and psychological science I respond to objections raised by Charles Varela and Rom Harre in relation to the causal efficacy of social structures, and to objections raised to the general position, articulated by Brian Ellis. I also raise certain concerns of my own regarding Bhaskar's conceptualization of the efficacy of reasons and his treatment of actions. I conclude by reflecting, in a final chapter, on the significance of Bhaskar's work in relation to the challenges of relativism and anti-realism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Replies to CriticismsJames R. HamiltonI am grateful to Noël Carroll, David Davies, Sherri Irvin, Aaron Meskin, and Paul Thom for stimulating discussions of The Art of Theater over the past year, culminating in these carefully crafted critical comments on various aspects of the book.1 I especially appreciate the efforts of Sherri Irvin, who edited this special issue and without whose encouragement, enthusiasm, and careful editing this would not (...) have happened.Whenever the central proposals made in The Art of Theater were made by theater people during the past hundred years, they were greeted with a kind of baffled outrage by many traditionalist literature scholars who had taken it as an obvious fact that theatrical performances are nothing more than illustrations or interpretations of works of dramatic literature, at best requiring artistry for performance but not issuing in independent works of art. Quite a few contemporary literature and theater scholars have seen errors in the traditionalist view and proposed that theatrical performances are capable of even great artistry and, perhaps, of being works of art in their own right. It must be said, however, that they will not find my defense of that position congenial. Indeed, it will seem worse still from their point of view because my defense of the position does not require semiotic analysis, let alone any sort of poststructuralist thinking about theatrical performances that depends on seeing performance as a novel kind of text—a “theater text.” This will disappoint because, unlike many contemporary literary theorists (and even some theater theorists), I do not think of theatrical performances as something to be read and, further, as something that falls within the purview of literary scholarship after all. Performances are actions and are to be understood in the ways we understand all other actions.I knew the central proposals in The Art of Theater would seem a little strange to philosophers. Some of the strangeness that they have felt about the view—if not the baffled outrage felt by literary theorists—can be mitigated, I believe, by considering three facts that served as motivations for making the proposal. I encountered these facts while teaching experimental theater techniques in a workshop format. Only gradually did I come to realize they are facts about any theatrical performance—its presentation, its [End Page 80] preparation, and its reception. It was only after I realized how general these facts are that I began to wonder why the view they seem to suggest is not more widely held, or even discussed, among philosophers working on the performing arts. My book was designed to get that discussion going. And, to judge by the quality of the discussion in this volume, it has succeeded admirably in meeting that goal. I think the book is also largely correct, however, so it is worth beginning at the beginning, with the basic facts I encountered in teaching experimental theater.First, it is undeniable that what typical spectators for any theatrical performance grasp is delivered to them entirely during the time of the performance itself. The typical spectator—which excludes academics and professional critics—is usually unfamiliar with what she is about to see and hear, in content if not in kind. Nevertheless, most spectators are successful in tracking most theatrical performances, even some in wildly unfamiliar styles and traditions. This is an important fact. Its importance lies in the implication that spectators do not need to recognize anything beyond what they see in the performance to regard the event as something they can assess aesthetically and artistically.Second, rehearsal processes for theatrical performances involve a lot of experimentation that focuses on how to make features of actors’ bodies and voices render clearly what the audience is supposed to see and hear and on how to make the sights and sounds generated by the ensemble, the set, the lighting, and so on focus audience attention in the places that will best enable them to understand what the company is presenting. This too is an important fact, for it highlights what any spectator has to know something about in order to make cogent artistic assessments of the event she has witnessed.Finally, consider the following case... (shrink)

An interpretation of John Rawls’ ‘justice as fairness’ as a deliberative critical argumentative strategy for evaluating existing institutions is offered and its plausibility is discussed. I argue that ‘justice as fairness’ aims at synthesizing the moral values claimed by existing social institutions into a coherent model of a well-ordered society in order to demand that these institutions stand up to the values that they promise. Understood in such a way, ‘justice as fairness’ provides a set of idealizing ‘mirrors’ through (...) which power dynamics in society can be viewed but does not function as a model for an ideal society. Key Words: distributive justice • immanent criticism • justice as fairness • political liberalism • public reason • John Rawls • reflective equilibrium. (shrink)

I clarify Kant's classification of duties and criticize the apocryphal tradition that, according to Kant, perfect duties trump imperfect duties. I then use Kant's view to argue that judges who believe that an action is immoral and should be illegal need not set aside their beliefs in order to comply with binding precedents that permit the action. The same view of morality that causes some people to oppose certain actions, including abortion, requires lower–court judges to comply with binding (...) precedents. Therefore, someone's opposition to legal abortion, by itself, does not justify opposing that person's nomination to a lower court. (shrink)

In this paper we criticize the “Ashbyan interpretation” (Froese & Stewart, 2010) of autopoietic theory by showing that Ashby’s framework and the autopoietic one are based on distinct, often incompatible, assumptions and that they aim at addressing different issues. We also suggest that in order to better understand autopoiesis and its implications, a different and wider set of theoretical contributions, developed previously or at the time autopoiesis was formulated, needs to be taken into consideration: among the others, the works of (...) Rosen, Weiss and Piaget. By analyzing the concepts of organization and closure, the idea of components, and the role of materiality in the theory proposed by Maturana and Varela, we advocate the view that autopoiesis necessarily entails self-production and intrinsic instability and can be realized only in domains characterized by the same transformative and processual properties exhibited by the molecular domain. From this theoretical standpoint it can be demonstrated that autopoietic theory neither commits to a sharp dualism between organization and structure nor to a reflexive view of downward causation, thus avoiding the respective strong criticisms. (shrink)

While many books have been written about Bertrand Russell's philosophy and some on his logic, I. Grattan-Guinness has written the first comprehensive history of the mathematical background, content, and impact of the mathematical logic and philosophy of mathematics that Russell developed with A. N. Whitehead in their Principia mathematica (1910-1913).? This definitive history of a critical period in mathematics includes detailed accounts of the two principal influences upon Russell around 1900: the set theory of Cantor and the mathematical logic (...) of Peano and his followers. Substantial surveys are provided of many related topics and figures of the late nineteenth century: the foundations of mathematical analysis under Weierstrass; the creation of algebraic logic by De Morgan, Boole, Peirce, Schröder, and Jevons; the contributions of Dedekind and Frege; the phenomenology of Husserl; and the proof theory of Hilbert. The many-sided story of the reception is recorded up to 1940, including the rise of logic in Poland and the impact on Vienna Circle philosophers Carnap and Gödel. A strong American theme runs though the story, beginning with the mathematician E. H. Moore and the philosopher Josiah Royce, and stretching through the emergence of Church and Quine, and the 1930s immigration of Carnap and GödeI. Grattan-Guinness draws on around fifty manuscript collections, including the Russell Archives, as well as many original reviews. The bibliography comprises around 1,900 items, bringing to light a wealth of primary materials. Written for mathematicians, logicians, historians, and philosophers--especially those interested in the historical interaction between these disciplines--this authoritative account tells an important story from its most neglected point of view. Whitehead and Russell hoped to show that (much of) mathematics was expressible within their logic; they failed in various ways, but no definitive alternative position emerged then or since. (shrink)