Abstract
In this paper we criticize the “Ashbyan interpretation” (Froese & Stewart, 2010) of autopoietic
theory by showing that Ashby’s framework and the autopoietic one are based on distinct, often
incompatible, assumptions and that they aim at addressing different issues. We also suggest that in
order to better understand autopoiesis and its implications, a different and wider set of theoretical
contributions, developed previously or at the time autopoiesis was formulated, needs to be taken into consideration: among the others, the works of Rosen, Weiss and Piaget. By analyzing the concepts of organization and closure, the idea of components, and the role of materiality in the theory proposed by Maturana and Varela, we advocate the view that autopoiesis necessarily entails self-production and intrinsic instability and can be realized only in domains characterized by the same transformative and processual properties exhibited by the molecular domain. From this theoretical standpoint it can be demonstrated that autopoietic theory neither commits to a sharp dualism between organization and structure nor to a reflexive view of downward causation, thus avoiding the respective strong criticisms.