This paper examines the concept of God in traditional Igbo-African religious thought, prior to the advent of Western religion, with a view to showing that the idea of a God/Deity who is supreme in every area of life and sphere of influence and who “creates out of nothing,” like the God of the Christian or Western missionaries, is unrecognized in the Igbo-African traditional religious thought. Even though the Igbo conceive of strong and powerful deities that can only reign supreme (...) within their respective sphere of influence where they are in charge, none of these deities is identical to the supreme God promoted by the Christian missionaries. The Igbo traditional religious worldview maintains a polytheistic religious view, unlike the monotheistic outlook of the Christian religion. To achieve its goal, the paper adopts the method of historical hermeneutics and textual analysis. (shrink)

RESUMEN Se aborda en particular su relectura de Aristóteles y Tomás de Aquino, junto con su análisis de algunas discusiones relevantes en las ciencias sociales. Según Macintyre, el abandono del aristotelismo y su esquema teleológico de la investigación filosófica y de la razón práctica ha generado confusión e incoherencia en las articulaciones conceptuales de la filosofía moral moderna y contemporánea. En opinión de este autor, en el concepto de tradición el presente es considerado una reapropiación del pasado, lo que brinda (...) coherencia a las argumentaciones. A los fines de este trabajo se opta por una aproximación a medio camino entre una metodología analítica y una historia conceptual basada en el reconocimiento de distintas discusiones de las cuales se nutren los conceptos macinteryanos. Finalmente, se valoran las contribuciones de Macintyre a la vez que se indican algunas limitaciones de su tesis. ABSTRACT The article specifically addresses Macintyre's rereading of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas, as well as his analysis of certain relevant discussions in the social sciences. According to the author, abandoning Aristotelianism and its teleological scheme of philosophical research and practical reason has generated confusion and incoherence in the conceptual formulations of modern and contemporary moral philosophy. In Macintyre's view, the concept of tradition considers the present as a reappropriation of the past, thus bringing coherence to argumentation. For purposes of this paper, we have adopted an approach that is halfway between analytical methodology and conceptual history, based on the acknowledgment of different discussions that nurture Macintyre's concepts. Finally, the article assesses the philosopher's contributions, while also pointing out some of the limitations of his thesis. (shrink)

The theme of this dissertation is to trace a development of defining freedom in the western tradition. It projects to have Luther and Kierkegaard as the central figures to delineate an understanding of freedom, called the Platonic-Augustinean-Lutheran-Kierkegaadian concept of freedom. The author penetrates into these two fundamental elements in this tradition: man by nature pursues good and good must be attributed to God's grace . Logically, these two elements by appearance are not compatible. However, historically, in Augustine's (...) thought, they entered into and then are able to coexist in one system. Their incompatibility and coexistence created a dynamic underlying the development of defining freedom. Influenced by Augustine, Luther followed this dynamic and found that he must deny human freedom . He then resorted to God's grace in promise and claimed that faith endorses righteousness and that a Christian is possessed of freedom in grace. Propelled by this same dynamic, Kierkegaard challenged the modern concept of freedom as self-determination in rationality and provided a profound analysis of human existence in the light of redemption. Kierkegaard's analysis reveals an existential paradox in which man freely chooses unfreedom. Logically, his existential analysis starts with the concept of eternal possibility and infers that freedom is to hold fast to possibility through possibility's giving out itself . The dynamic constituted of the Platonic principle and the concept of redemption allows Kierkegaard to define a powerful concept of freedom and to deconstruct the modern concept of freedom. ;There are two tasks in this dissertation. The first one is to offer a historical and philosophical demonstration of the dynamic, in which the Platonic principle and the concept of redemption proceed from the confrontation, through the combination and the separation, and at last to the unification. The other task is to defend a position that freedom understood in terms of possibility requires possibility's giving out itself In this defense, the essay treats the concept of redemption as a philosophical meditation, rather than a theological reflection. (shrink)

Is there a universal concept of God? Do all the great faiths of the world share a vision of the same supreme reality? In an attempt to answer these questions, Keith Ward considers the doctrine of an ultimate reality within five world religions - Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Judaism and Christianity. He studies closely the works of definitive, orthodox writers from each tradition - Sankara, Ramanuja, Asvaghosa, Maimonides, Al-Ghazzali and Aquinas - to build up a series of 'images' of (...) God, a common core of belief. Ward discovers that while the great religious traditions of the world retain their differences, there are convergences of thought at the deepest level, with a broad similarity of structure in concepts of God. He concludes that a recognition of these beliefs, as well as encouraging a clearer acceptance of the mystery of the divine, might also lead to an increase in understanding and tolerance of other faiths, to the enrichment of one's own. (shrink)

Although the question of relationship between basic concepts of traditional ontology and central concepts of fundamental ontology is not a topic which is systematically dealt with in Being and Time, it is obvious that some of the theses which are crucial not only for Heidegger's interpretation of philosophical tradition, but also for the whole project of fundamental ontology, concern this 'conceptual scheme'. In fact, the backbone of Heidegger's critical confrontation with dominant philosophical conceptions is the question of relationship between (...) the concept of 'substance' and the concept of 'Being', i.e. the discussion of philosophical doctrines in which 'Being' is reduced to 'substance'. Besides this context, which concerns the ontological problematics in the strict sense, it is possible to show that the refutation of the basic categories of traditional ontology is an issue which has a decisive role in more concrete phases of the realization of the project of fundamental ontology. This is especially confirmed in Heidegger's discussion of the concept of 'Being-There'. The interpretation of Heidegger's treatment of the relationship between the concepts of 'Being-there', 'existence' and 'existentials' on the one hand, and the concepts of 'substance', 'essence' and 'categories' on the other, shows that one of Heidegger's basic theses is that a transformation of concepts of traditional ontology is necessary for an appropriate understanding of human being. Iako pitanje odnosa izmedju temeljnih pojmova tradicionalne ontologije i centralnih pojmova fundamentalne ontologije nije tema koja je sistematicno obradjena u Bitku i vremenu, evidentno je da se neke od teza koje su kljucne ne samo za Hajdegerov odnos prema filozofskoj tradiciji, vec i za celokupan projekat fundamentalne ontologije, ticu suceljavanja pomenutih 'pojmovnih aparatura'. Naime, okosnicu u Hajdegerovom distanciranju od nasledjenih filozofskih koncepcija cini upravo propitivanje odnosa izmedju pojma 'supstancija' i pojma 'bitak', odnosno, osporavanje filozofskih ucenja u kojima se pojam 'bitak' svodi na pojam 'supstancija'. 'Destrukcija' tradicionalne ontologije, kao interpretativni model kojim Hajdeger pristupa filozofskoj povesnoj predaji, postavljena je kao problematizovanje nasledjenog poimanja bitka kao 'supstancije', nasuprot kojem se razvija fundamentalnoontolosko razmatranje 'problema bitka'. Pored naznacenog konteksta, u kome je rec o ontoloskoj problematici u uzem smislu, moguce je pokazati da je osporavanje temeljnih kategorija tradicionalne ontologije tema koja ima odlucujucu ulogu i u konkretnijim etapama realizacije projekta fundamentalne ontologije. Prethodno se posebno potvrdjuje u Hajdegerovoj tematizaciji pojma 'tubitak'. Sagledavanjem Hajdegerovih izvodjenja u kojima se razmatra veza izmedju pojmova 'tubitak', 'egzistencija' i 'egzistencijalije', sa jedne strane, i pojmova 'supstancija', 'sustina' i 'kategorije', sa druge, i procenjuje merodavnost navedenih pojmova tradicionalne ontologije u izlaganju ljudskog bitka, dolazi se do uvida da Hajdeger polazi od teze prema kojoj je u svrhu dosezanja izvornog razumevanja coveka nuzno izvrsiti prevrat u pojmovnosti tradicionalne ontologije. (shrink)

Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that traditions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood as ‘living’ entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the authentic continuation of a (...) tradition. It is argued that the ways of thinking and acting that constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition – stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making. (shrink)

In this article, Anniina Leiviskä argues that the educational relevance of Hans-Georg Gadamer's concept of tradition has remained unacknowledged because of the conservatism that has been associated with Gadamer's hermeneutics, particularly his notion of tradition. Therefore, Leiviskä seeks to reveal the reflective, nonconservative nature of Gadamer's concept of tradition in order to illuminate its significance with respect to the philosophy of education. Utilizing Gadamer's reinterpretation of the Aristotelian notion of phronesis, she outlines a concept (...) of situated rationality that rests upon the idea of the historicity of human existence, and she suggests that this concept may be used to define a central aim of education. Leiviskä argues that instead of disengaged objectivity, rationality as phronesis stands for the reflective reappropriation of one's tradition, which is enabled by one's situatedness in history and requires encountering other horizons — including the horizons of the past — through which one may be addressed and challenged. (shrink)

Starting with Popper, social theorists across the board have acknowledged that traditions serve socially valuable functions. However, while traditions are usually understood as ‘living’ entities that come in overlapping varieties and evolve over time, the socially valuable functions attributed to tradition tend to presuppose invariability in ways of thinking and acting. Addressing this tension, this article provides a detailed analysis of the concept of tradition, and directs special attention to conceivable criteria for the authentic continuation of a (...) tradition. It is argued that the ways of thinking and acting that constitute the material of a tradition must – among faithful members of that tradition – stand in a relation of equivalence – not identity or similarity. The implications of this account concern our ability to decide (normatively) conflicts over authenticity among rival tradition branches as well as the role that traditions play in policy-making. (shrink)

In this book, Eric Havelock presents a challenging account of the development of the idea of justice in early Greece, and particularly of the way justice changed as Greek oral tradition gradually gave way to the written word in a literate society. He begins by examining the educational functions of poets in preliterate Greece, showing how they conserved and transmitted the traditions of society, a thesis adumbrated in his earlier book Preface to Plato. Homer, he demonstrates, has much to (...) say about justice, but since that idea is nowhere in the epics directly stated or expressed, it must be deduced from the speech and actions of the characters. Havelock's careful reading of the Iliad and the Odyssey is original and revealing; it sheds light both on Homeric notions of justice and on the Archaic Greek society depicted in the poems. As Havelock continues his inquiry from Hesiod to Aeschylus, his findings become more complex. The oral Greek world shades into a literate one. Words lose some kinds of meanings, gain others, and steadily become more suited to the conceptualization that Plato strove for and achieved. This evolution of language itself, Havelock shows, was one of the principal accomplishments of the Greek world. Lucidly written and forcefully argued, this book is a major contribution to our knowledge of ancient Greece--its politics, philosophy, and literature, from Homer to Plato. (shrink)

Using this bit of dialogue from Oscar Wilde as introduction, we propose to demonstrate the pertinence of the hostess’ remark and to show that the “Fin de siècle” really did mark a certain “Fin du globe”, connoting as it does the decline of art, the end of an era and of the eras in which artistic experience, and even experience of the world, was realized in a specific style. It was indeed the end of what we will here call “globe (...) style”.For a long time the notion of style had a very general significance. The origin of the word can no doubt be traced back to the term stilus, designating the punch that monks used for writing, and also probably an Egyptian etymon signifying a pillar. Through metonymic extensions the name of the instrument (an instrument, nevertheless, used in a highly intellectual activity) and the name of the individual work (but a work of cultural and artistic nature) have been subject to generalization and ultimately designate the specific quality of a phenomenon. Obviously it was necessary that this phenomenon be confirmed and made official through imitation and tradition. As for generalization of the phenomenon of style, its scope has become almost unlimited, taking in all forms of creative activity whether artistic or not, and ultimately almost all beings as long as they have assumed a form hallowed by tradition. (shrink)

In §481 of the 1830 Encyclopaedia, Hegel states explicitly that "actual free will is the unity of theoretical and practical spirit." In so far as human beings, in Hegel's view, are not just animals, but are self-conscious, thinking beings, their practical activity--or willing-must involve knowledge and understanding of what they want to achieve through such activity; and knowledge and understanding, for Hegel, are precisely what is meant by theoretical intelligence.

The theoretical work of European and American structuralism has produced a number of important elements which have resulted in (especially with respect to certain new, fundamental approaches in semantics, philosophy and methodology) essential shifts in the modes of thinking in the humanities, and in the cultural and social sciences. Despite these shifts, Western discourses have still not produced any integral, coherent structural model of epistemology. The present article intends to show that such a model can be found in the pan-structural (...) epistemology of the modern Chinese philosopher Zhang Dongsun (1886?1973), and that the crucial, theoretical underpinnings of such models were developed much earlier in the history of Chinese thought, given that the bases of a structural approach to comprehension had already been established in ancient Chinese philosophy. This paradigmatic foundation (the concept li) was further developed and elaborated by various Chinese philosophers in later centuries as a crucial feature of the classical Chinese logic of binary analogies. The article also points out that the central binary concept of the Neo-Confucian tradition (i.e. the concept of structure and creativity; li and qi) has generally been interpreted as a dualism of idea and matter by Euro-American sinologists. However, such interpretations have overlooked an important feature of traditional, structurally determined Chinese onto-epistemology. (shrink)

For many centuries, heroic virtue has been for the Congregation of the Causes of the Saints the golden rule to assess sanctity. It was Prospero Lambertini who developed the criteria, setting an extremely high standard that at the same time fitted the various types and stages of human life. With the shift from admiration to imitation of the saints, new methods of studying their life became necessary. From the 20th century onwards, heroicity of virtue was defined by the Congregation in (...) terms not of unusual and extraordinary actions, but the constant and exact fulfilment of the duties of one’s state of life. Sanctity in the canonical sense, according to the Second Vatican Council, differs in degree and does not constitute a different species in the genus “good Catholic”. The new laws for beatification employ no longer the courtroom model, investigating separate virtues, but the academic model of researching and writing a doctoral dissertation, with the accent on a person’s spiritual growth. What makes the saints different from other Christians is their particularly focused passion; the real significance of their life, however, only becomes clear when it is over. It is then, too, that we can understand their specific mission and their meaning for the life of the Church, as tradition at its most living and models of holiness for their particular age. The study of the live of the saints , necessary to assess sanctity, needs its own method. Belonging as they do to a tradition that is essentially religious, the true image of the saints is best perceived by the light of faith. Hagiology cannot, however, ignore modern science. Not only does it depend on the material gathered by historians, it also needs history and psychology for its interpretation. The final judgment pertains to the Pope, or to be more precise, to the Spirit. (shrink)

In the late 1960s, Georges Canguilhem introduced the concept of ‘scientific ideology’. This concept had not played any role in his previous work, so why introduce it at all? This is the central question of my paper. Although it may seem a rather modest question, its answer in fact uncovers hidden tensions in the tradition of historical epistemology, in particular between its normative and descriptive aspects. The term ideology suggests the influence of Althusser’s and Foucault’s philosophies. However, (...) I show the differences between Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology and Althusser’s and Foucault’s respective concepts of ideology. I argue that Canguilhem was in fact attempting to solve long-standing problems in the tradition of historical epistemology, rather than following the lead of his younger colleagues. I argue that Canguilhem’s ‘refurbishment without rejection’ of Bachelard’s epistemology, which the concept of scientific ideology was aimed to implement, was necessary to justify the historical narratives that Canguilhem had constructed in his own work as a historian of concepts. A strict acceptance of Bachelard’s epistemology would have made it impossible to justify them. Canguilhem’s concept of scientific ideology therefore served as a theoretical justification of his practice as a historian. I maintain that the concept of scientific ideology was needed to reconcile Bachelard’s normative epistemology with Canguilhem’s view of the history of science and its aims, which differed from Bachelard’s more than it is generally acknowledged. (shrink)

The reality of spirits? A historiography of the Akan concept of 'mind' (La réalité des esprits: Vers une historiographie de la conception akan de l'esprit). In this article the following thesis is considered: the classifications used to define African Indigenous Religions are 'inventions' of Western scholars of religion who employ categories that are entirely "non-indigenous". The author investigates the presumptions of this statement and discusses the work of scholars of religion studying the Akan and in particular the Akan (...) class='Hi'>concept of mind. In the analytic philosophical tradition the precise meaning of Akan concepts of mind such as okra and sunsum, described by various scholars of religion in different eras, are reviewed. The pre-colonial, colonial and the postcolonial era all have had specific influence on the conceptualisation of the mind. On the basis of an historiography of the Akan mind the author concludes that, contrary to the originally thesis under review, 'cultural background' and 'academic discipline' are relatively unimportant in the classification of 'indigenous religions'. The 'paradigm' prevailing within a discipline , 'personal belief' and the spatio-temporal context in which conceptualisations are created, turn out to be far more significant. (shrink)

The subject of this research is the philosophy of the Tyumen philosopher Yuri Mikhailovich Fyodorov – a representative of the Tyumen philosophical tradition, who focused on the problems of ethics, namely practical implementation of the ethical in the context of development of the North and establishment of a new society from fundamentally different individuals. Tyumen philosophers were concerned with the question of how to form a single moral essence out of the agonistic society. For solving this problem, Yuri Mikhailovich (...) Fyodorov turned to Neo-Platonism, cosmism, and Russian religious philosophy, as well as paid particular attention to the question of elevation of human to a moral entity. The ways for such subjectification proposed by Fedorov are examined in this article. The scientific novelty consists in the fact that the philosopher is not widely known, as well as in the emphasis on the process of subjectification, epimeleia heautou in interpretation of M. Foucault, or the self-nurturing practices. It is illustrated that creativity, freedom, kindness and love are the key practices of self-nurturing which Y. M. Fyodorov indicated as the procedures of subjectification. From his perspective, these four concepts are the goal and practice for an individual, who seeks to surpass his own foundations. The philosophy of Y. M. Fyodorov aims to substantiate the unity of man with man, man with being; as well as attach meaning, value and vector to human life; contra pose something genuine, profound and eternal to the concepts that deprive an individual of the right to power over himself and the right to the long-term existence. (shrink)

The author emphasizes the leading role of Kant's philosophy and neo-Kantianism in spreading the theory of natural law on Ukrainian territory. The article emphasizes that the idea of natural law was considered in the circles of the Ukrainian intelligentsia as a component of the general system of idealistic views. The intelligentsia was critical of positive law and called for the correction of its defects with the help of moral goals. The author compares rationalist and religious-ethical approaches to issues of ethical (...) origin and natural human rights. (shrink)

Traditionally, the proponents of empiricism sought for the starting point of knowledge in sensations that happen to us when we open our sense organs to the world. They analyzed the functioning of human faculties of sensation and cognition and the way these faculties are activated so as to discover the origin of ideas. Thus, they insisted on the priority of particulars to universals in the body of synthetic knowledge, and granted empirical facts the authority of truth. For that reason, they (...) are opposed to the rationalists, who maintained that the most important part of synthetic knowledge is derived solely from first principles or ideas, and that these principles or ideas are “innate”—that reason can ascertain their truth intuitively without the use of the senses.Logical positivism belongs to the empiricist tradition. However, it distinguishes itself from its empiricist predecessors in a very important way, so that its proponents thought they could overcome the difficulties raised against the older empiricists. (shrink)

Images of Eternity. Concepts of God in Five Religious Traditions. Keith Ward. Oneworld Publications Ltd., Oxford and New York 1993. viii, 197 pp. £8.95.

In this paper, we explore the traditional conception of a prioricity as epistemic independence of evidence from sense experience. We investigate the fortunes of the traditional conception in the light of recent challenges by Timothy Williamson. We contend that Williamson’s arguments can be resisted in various ways. En route, we argue that Williamson’s views are not as distant from tradition as they might seem at first glance.

In this essay Kelvin Beckett argues that Richard Peters's major work on education, Ethics and Education, belongs on a short list of important texts we can all share. He argues this not because of the place it has in the history of philosophy of education, as important as that is, but because of the contribution it can still make to the future of the discipline. The limitations of Peters's analysis of the concept of education in his chapter on “Criteria (...) of Education” are well known. In the chapter on “Education as Initiation,” however, Peters offered a synthetic sketch of education that, Beckett argues, points us toward a more comprehensive definition of education, one which, he maintains, can be accepted by all philosophers, regardless of the tradition they work in. (shrink)

The Higher Self is a concept introduced by Roberto Assagioli, the founder of psychosynthesis, into transpersonal psychology. This notion is explained and linked up with the Western mystical tradition. Here, coming from antiquity and specifically from the neo-Platonic tradition, a similiar concept has been developed which became known as the spark of the soul, or summit of the mind. This history is sketched and the meaning of the term illustrated. During the middle ages it was developed (...) into a psychology of mysticism by Thomas Gallus, popularized by Bonaventure, and radicalized by the Carthusian writer Hugh of Balma. Spark of the soul signifies an "organ of the mystical experience." It is argued that the split introduced into history between outer and inner experience has lain dormant ever since the 13th century, with inner experience relegated to the private and mystical realm. By introducing this concept, transpersonal psychology reconnects with this tradition and has to be aware of the legacy: to achieve the theoretical, and if possible scientific, integration of both types of experience by drawing on the experiential nature of this concept and fostering good research. (shrink)

This work is a study of the implicit physical commitments of certain aspects of C.G. Jung's analytical psychology. The critique is carried out according to the hermeneutic approach taken by Martin Heidegger to the metaphysical problem in the Western philosophical tradition.

The intent of the article is to define merleau-ponty's place in the phenomenological tradition and, at the same time, to defend his standpoint, especially on those issues where his thought represents a departure from the tradition. although merleau-ponty espouses a form of the husserlian doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness, his understanding of intentionality differs in several fundamental respects from husserl's. the article attempts to show specifically where merleau-ponty's gestalt- theoretical orientation leads him to modify such basic aspects (...) of husserl's concept of intentionality as the noesis-noema distinction and the claim for atemporality of meaning. a critical comparison is drawn between merleau- ponty's concept of intentionality and that of aron gurwitsch. in a more positive vein, the article provides an extended exegesis of merleau-ponty's position on this central concept in phenomenology, and it also tries to relate the exposition of intentionality to merleau-ponty's thesis of the primacy of perception. finally, an attempt is made to reveal the ontological ramifications implicit in merleau-ponty's revisions to the doctrine of intentionality. (edited). (shrink)

Classical phenomenology is locked inside a form of transcendentalism and so it is the entire tradition which made it possible. This is the reason (some think) why it must become object of a systematic criticism meant to convince us that phenomenology abandoned the world of facts and construed a nonrealistic account of consciousness. This argument must be understood as part of a much broader form of criticism philosophical naturalism erected not only against phenomenology but against all pre-phenomenological theories which (...) employ themselves to defend non-naturalistic accounts of consciousness. It was first Hume and the logical positivists to address these theories in a critical manner in order for later contemporary naturalists to reinvigorate the same kind of argument. But similar replies have been also put forward by those usually considered defenders of classical phenomenology (the so-called “post-phenomenologists”). There is however a third category of philosophers, the so-called “transcendentalists”, who defended Husserl and continue to do so. I think some of the transcendentalists were onto something but they ultimately failed to do justice to classical phenomenology for the same two particular reasons I believe the post-phenomenologists have failed to convince. (shrink)

The concept of “enhypostaton” was introduced into theological discourse during the sixth-century Christological debates with the aim of justifying the unitary subjectivity of Christ by reclassifying Christ’s human nature as ontically non-independent. The coinage of the term is commonly ascribed to Leontius of Byzantium. Its conceptual content has been recognized by contemporary scholarship as relevant to the core issues of Christology, as well as possessing significance for such philosophical questions as individuation and the nature of individual entityhood. Even so, (...) despite its role in the formation of classical Christological thought, the notion of “enhypostaton” is often regarded as obscure and not clearly defined. This paper aims to shed some light on the meaning of Leontius’ conception of it, in respect of its specifically philosophical import. (shrink)

In regard to its source there are three possibilities. A person may be subjected to a demand from some other person or social group, from some factor within himself such as his "long-run" or "most inclusive" interests, or some "higher" part of the self, or the self's need of integration or wholeness, from some superhuman cosmic power, a deity or an impersonal cosmic moral principle. Naturalistic philosophers tend to interpret the demand as proceeding from either the social group or from (...) the long-run or inclusive interests of the self. These explanations, however, soon run into difficulties. If moral obligation is the demand of a social group then which group is it whose demands should be recognized as obligatory --the family, local community, nation, or humanity? Does humanity constitute a group that makes recognizable demands? Or if our moral obligation is to seek fulfillment of our own most inclusive or long-run interests then do such private interests never clash with the public interest? If they do then is it our moral obligation in such cases to seek our private interests above the weightier interests of society? Or if private and public interests never clash then what guarantees this wonderful harmony? (shrink)

What is logical relevance? Anderson and Belnap say that the “modern classical tradition [,] stemming from Frege and Whitehead-Russell, gave no consideration whatsoever to the classical notion of relevance.” But just what is this classical notion? I argue that the relevance tradition is implicitly most deeply concerned with the containment of truth-grounds, less deeply with the containment of classes, and least of all with variable sharing in the Anderson–Belnap manner. Thus modern classical logicians such as Peirce, Frege, Russell, (...) Wittgenstein, and Quine are implicit relevantists on the deepest level. In showing this, I reunite two fields of logic which, strangely from the traditional point of view, have become basically separated from each other: relevance logic and diagram logic. I argue that there are two main concepts of relevance, intensional and extensional. The first is that of the relevantists, who overlook the presence of the second in modern classical logic. The second is the concept of truth-ground containment as following from in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. I show that this second concept belongs to the diagram tradition of showing that the premisses contain the conclusion by the fact that the conclusion is diagrammed in the very act of diagramming the premisses. I argue that the extensional concept is primary, with at least five usable modern classical filters or constraints and indefinitely many secondary intensional filters or constraints. For the extensional concept is the genus of deductive relevance, and the filters define species. Also following the Tractatus, deductive relevance, or full truth-ground containment, is the limit of inductive relevance, or partial truth-ground containment. Purely extensional inductive or partial relevance has its filters or species too. Thus extensional relevance is more properly a universal concept of relevance or summum genus with modern classical deductive logic, relevantist deductive logic, and inductive logic as its three main domains. (shrink)

This article analyses and evaluates the uses of the concept of causal power in the critical realist tradition, which is based on Roy Bhaskar's philosophy of science. The concept of causal power that appears in the early works of Rom Harré and his associates is compared to Bhaskar's account of this concept and its uses in the critical realist social ontology. It is argued that the concept of emergence should be incorporated to any adequate notion (...) of causal power. The concept of emergence used in Bhaskar and other critical realists’ works is shown to be ambiguous. It is also pointed out that the concept of causal power should be analysed in an anti-essentialist way. Ontological and methodological problems that vitiate Bhaskar's transcendental account of the concept of causal power are examined. Moreover, it is argued that the applications of the concept of causal power to mental powers, reasons, and social structures in the critical realist social ontology are problematic. The paper shows how these problems might be avoided without giving up the concept of causal power and the notion of structural social causation. (shrink)

The ‘traditional’ conception of toleration, understood as the putting up with beliefs and practices by those who disapprove of them, has come under increasing attack in recent years for being negative, condescending and judgemental. Instead, its critics argue for a more positive, affirmative conception, perhaps best captured by Anna Elisabetta Galeotti’s idea of ‘toleration as recognition’. In this article, without denying that it is not always the most appropriate form of response to differences, I defend the traditional conception of toleration (...) against its critics. Two principal arguments are advanced in defence of it: the first articulates its role as part of a viable and realistic political theory of modus vivendi, while the second argues that it is only the traditional conception of toleration that makes possible the mutual accommodation of some values that are genuinely antithetical and hostlie to each other. Thus, there remains an important place for the traditional conception of toleration in both political theory and practice. (shrink)