In this paper I continue to explore some of the problems I believe one encounters when attempting to unravel the ontology of person. I maintain my interest for classical philosophical theories which were equally concerned with this matter. I draw upon Hume’s philosophy and Husserl’s phenomenology by indicating their conceptual differences relevant to my current topic, but I adopt a thought-expe-rimental approach. That because, on the one hand, my purpose is not to reconstruct the logic of these philosophers in details, (...) but to select some of the features of their theories in order to later integrate them in what I hope it will become an improved philosophical analysis. On the other hand, I have reasons to believe, that any philosophical discussion about the ontology of person begins with implications which preclude the possibility of objective descriptions, if such descriptions are even possible, that being another way to argue that we cannot claim to have a science of person without clarifying the limits of philosophical conceivability. (shrink)

When describing the person, the general tendency is to rely upon the assumption that the quality of “person” is always constituted from “outside” to “inside” either by being determined to re-project the content of emotional experiences, or by simply transferring existent theoretical constructions. I have explored this way of thinking in a previous occasion and made more or less clear why it ultimately leads to the rejection of the inner dimension of person in the absence of which no serious discussion (...) of this matter is possible. In the first part of the paper I follow the premise that “reasoning”, in Husserl’s sense, is the characteristic of person, and discuss some of the obstacles one encounters when attempting to describe the person as “reasoning” entity. In the second part, I will lay the path for a future eidetic analysis of cognitive descriptions. The overall purpose remains the same, namely the search for ways to objectively describe the person via classical phenomenology. (shrink)

Objectivity is one of the oldest of problems in philosophy. Plato, Aristotle and others strived to provide a definitive solution. One of Husserl’s strategies was to introduce a distinction between “sciences of matters of fact” and “eidetic sciences” where the transition from the first science to the second science is possible via intentional sifting which is not to say that something becomes objective because one intends it. For Husserl intentional sifting is cognitive, hence phenomenology should begin by describing “the essence (...) of thinking” in order to later become a genuine science of consciousness. But inside the phenomenological movement there are profound disagreements with respect to the ontology of cognition and intentionality. Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty opted for emotional descriptions of thinking. With few exceptions, contemporary phenomenology has become the praise of emotional experience. In this paper I take the opposite path and make the case for cognitive-intentional character of consciousness I consider one of the most important problems of contemporary philosophy and psychology. I follow the assumption that the only way to generate objective propositions is to assume, against current views, that Husserl was not an idealist and that we can speak about cognition without reducing to emotion and yet without committing to dualism. (shrink)

La phénoménologie se trouve dans une impasse et cela est la conséquence du refus de dialoguer avec les sciences empiriques. On s'interroge ici sur la possibilité de dépasser l'intreprétation transcendantale du sujet pour l'inscrire définitivement dans la réalité naturelle. En prenant l'idée de la reconstruction cognitive-intentionnelle comme hypothèse de travail, on élabore un concept du sujet naturel. Ainsi, l'analyse des expressions phénoménologiques montre que la structuration ontologique du sujet se réalise dans et à travers la réalité.

Classical phenomenology is locked inside a form of transcendentalism and so it is the entire tradition which made it possible. This is the reason (some think) why it must become object of a systematic criticism meant to convince us that phenomenology abandoned the world of facts and construed a nonrealistic account of consciousness. This argument must be understood as part of a much broader form of criticism philosophical naturalism erected not only against phenomenology but against all pre-phenomenological theories which employ (...) themselves to defend non-naturalistic accounts of consciousness. It was first Hume and the logical positivists to address these theories in a critical manner in order for later contemporary naturalists to reinvigorate the same kind of argument. But similar replies have been also put forward by those usually considered defenders of classical phenomenology (the so-called “post-phenomenologists”). There is however a third category of philosophers, the so-called “transcendentalists”, who defended Husserl and continue to do so. I think some of the transcendentalists were onto something but they ultimately failed to do justice to classical phenomenology for the same two particular reasons I believe the post-phenomenologists have failed to convince. (shrink)

Defining the "person" is not an easy task and not even a direct possibility. One cannot generate a definition with tremendous implications without properly understanding the ontological makeup of "person". From this point of view philosophy and science have more or less proven that they aren’t able to share the same conclusions regarding the ontological features of “person”. In part because philosophy and science do not share the same general concept of reality. As long as there is a debate regarding (...) the nature of reality and, inevitably, of what can be incorporated within such reality it is almost impossible to find a common ground. But disagreements with respect to the ultimate nature of reality occur within the field of philosophy for here too, there isn’t one, but multiple accounts of reality. On their turn philosophical accounts of reality differ dramatically and in some cases are fundamentally opposed. To some extent, the same can be claimed about science. Psychology is certainly under different epistemological constraints than cosmology. Therefore, when one speaks about “persons” he has first to account that the divide between fields and within the fields is already a serious obstacle in defining the ‘person”. Ideally, a definition of “person” should emerge from a unified conceptual paradigm but that is an epistemological ambition almost impossible to fulfill in the current context. In the absence of a common epistemological ground the task of identifying and describing the features of “person” is almost impossible to accomplish. If however we put aside the debate regarding the ultimate nature of reality while adopting at the same a phenomenological realistic attitude, we could at least begin to formulate some of the epistemological qualifiers which may be beneficial for our task. It is certainly the absence of such qualifiers that blocks a coherent philosophical investigation into the ontological makeup of “person”. I believe that in order to overcome such conceptual crisis we should first identify its philosophical origins and sketch some of the premises which will later lead not only to the conception of proper qualifiers, but also to a proper epistemological approach on “person”. (shrink)

This is the first in a series of attempts to unveil the implications of the ontological difference between meaning and perception. I begin with general consideration regarding the tension between dualism and physicalism and move on some phenomenologically driven set of implications which will be later detailed and expanded in order to lay the grounds for the architecture of meaning. The main assumption at work is that meaning and perception are ontologically different but not disconnected in a sense that in (...) order for an act of meaning to be fulfilled, a “lifting above perceptual contents” must necessarily occur. The lifting above perceptual content is what confers the act of meaning a special ontological status but it also the reason for ongoing explanatory difficulties. (shrink)

From a classical phenomenological point of view, to reason is to have a conscious intentional experience. A conscious experience can be described as a predicative reconstruction of whatever reason might be concerned with while the intentional aspect can be deduced from the effort of disclosing specialized propositional insights into whatever reasoning is concerned with. Husserl argued that the task of phenomenology is to pave the way toward a science of consciousness in which reason as key feature of conscious life will (...) be properly treated. However, contemporary phenomenology adopted an entirely different perspective on this matter. Conscious experiences are now described from a perspective reminiscent to traditional empiricism while the search for universal objectivity is abandoned in favor of contextual truths. The current situation raises several questions how did we get here, does making sense entail emotions, does the emotivist reconsideration of consciousness solve the problem of objectivity, should a future science of consciousness stress the role of emotions as a solution to subjectivism and yet to be considered a phenomenological science of consciousness. In this paper, I only begin to tackle these problems. (shrink)

Concerns regarding the possibility of a phenomenological science of consciousness emerged almost from its inception. Naturalism was quick to attack phenomenology. Philosophers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others have too argued that a phenomenological science of consciousness can succeed if repositioning classical phenomenology from an existentialist perspective. One way to close this debate is to revisit several key classical phenomenological concepts. In this paper I depart from the premise that it is possible to have a phenomenological science of consciousness (...) but in order to do that we must distinguish between the problem of objectivity and the problem of consciousness keeping in mind that the two are intimately related. I will be discussing some of the differences between universally valid and experimental statements and make some remarks with respect to the phenomenological origins of consciousness without getting in too many details. The present purpose is to tackle some of these epistemological and ontological aspects pertaining to science and consciousness without making strong claims. (shrink)

Philosophy has been dominated by the view that emotions do a perfect job in producing knowledge about the inner and the outer world. Until recently this was the mark of standard naturalism but with the early Sartre and Merleau-Ponty it became central to contemporary phenomenology. In part because there is a persistent difficulty in understanding the relation between reasoning and feeling. In part because there is no scientific evidence for the ability to reason. There are many accounts of emotion but (...) few attempts to understand reasoning. My assumption is that emotions assist only with collecting data while reasoning is responsible for generating meaning about the inner and outer world. In order to understand that, we must approach reasoning without mixing ontology with metaphysics. Second, we must provide a compelling realistic model of reasoning. In this paper I sketch out a version of it. Overall, I argue that that we must find a way to re-integrate reasoning within the contemporary philosophical and scientific vocabulary if we wish to understand the conscious mind. (shrink)