Casuistry is a traditional method of interpreting and resolving moral problems. It focuses on the circumstances of particular cases rather than on the application of ethical theories and principles. After a brief history of casuistry, the method is explained and its relation to theory and principles is discussed.

We examine, from a constructive perspective, the relation between the complements of S, T, and S ∩ T in X, where X is either a metric space or a normed linear space. The fundamental question addressed is: If x is distinct from each element of S ∩ T, if s ϵ S, and if t ϵ T, is x distinct from s or from t? Although the classical answer to this question is trivially affirmative, constructive answers involve Markov's principle (...) and the completeness of metric spaces. (shrink)

It is well known that in Bishop-style constructive mathematics, the closure of the union of two subsets of ℝ is ‘not’ the union of their closures. The dual situation, involving the complement of the closure of the union, is investigated constructively, using completeness of the ambient space in order to avoid any application of Markov's Principle.

We propose a principle of sustainability to complement established principles used for justifying healthcare resource allocation. We argue that the application of established principles of equal treatment, need, prognosis and cost-effectiveness gives rise to what we call negative dynamics: a gradual depletion of the value possible to generate through healthcare. These principles should therefore be complemented by a sustainability principle, making the prospect of negative dynamics a further factor to consider, and possibly outweigh considerations highlighted by the other (...) principles. We demonstrate how this principle may take different forms, and show that a commitment to sustainability is supported by considerations internal to the ethical principles already guiding healthcare resource allocation. We also consider two objections. The first of these, we argue, is either based on implausible assumptions or begs the question, whereas the second can be adequately accommodated by the principle we propose. (shrink)

The principle-based approach is a methodology to classify and analyse argumentation semantics. In this paper we classify seven of the main alternatives for argumentation semantics using a set of new robustness principles. These principles complement Baroni and Giacomin’s original classification and deal with the behaviour of a semantics when the argumentation framework changes due to the addition or removal of an attack between two arguments. We distinguish so-called persistence principles and monotonicity principles, where the former deal with the question (...) of whether a labelling or extension of an argumentation framework under a given semantics persists after a change, and the latter with the question of whether new labellings or extensions are created after a change. We furthermore show in which sense labelling-based and extension-based semantics lead to subtly different principles and results. Our results can be used for choosing a semantics for a particular application, or to guide the search for new argumentation semantics, but they have been used also in the design of algorithms. (shrink)

Explicit, quantitative procedures for identifying biodiversity priority areas are replacing the often ad hoc procedures used in the past to design networks of reserves to conserve biodiversity. This change facilitates more informed choices by policy makers, and thereby makes possible greater satisfaction of conservation goals with increased efficiency. A key feature of these procedures is the use of the principle of complementarity, which ensures that areas chosen for inclusion in a reserve network complement those already selected. This paper sketches (...) the historical development of the principle of complementarity and its applications in practical policy decisions. In the first section a brief account is given of the circumstances out of which concerns for more explicit systematic methods for the assessment of the conservation value of different areas arose. The second section details the emergence of the principle of complementarity in four independent contexts. The third section consists of case studies of the use of the principle of complementarity to make practical policy decisions in Australasia, Africa, and America. In the last section, an assessment is made of the extent to which the principle of complementarity transformed the practice of conservation biology by introducing new standards of rigor and explicitness. (shrink)

This article improves two existing theorems of interest to neologicist philosophers of mathematics. The first is a classification theorem due to Fine for equivalence relations between concepts definable in a well-behaved second-order logic. The improved theorem states that if an equivalence relation E is defined without nonlogical vocabulary, then the bicardinal slice of any equivalence class—those equinumerous elements of the equivalence class with equinumerous complements—can have one of only three profiles. The improvements to Fine’s theorem allow for an analysis of (...) the well-behaved models had by an abstraction principle, and this in turn leads to an improvement of Walsh and Ebels-Duggan’s relative categoricity theorem. (shrink)

This article presents the promising framework for educational decision makers developed by Brighouse, Ladd, Loeb, and Swift. The framework consists of an account of the educational goods, distributional principles and independent values at stake in education, and a method for making policy decisions on the basis of these and solid social science. I present three criticisms of this approach. The first says that the derivation of educational goods proceeds on the basis of a too narrow conception of values. I suggest (...) that this foundation should consist of an overlapping consensus, rather than flourishing. The second criticism has to do with the way that the distributive principles are characterized. I argue that BLLS’s characterization of distributive principles should be complemented with accounts of what domains of social life these principles regulate and a specification of whether the distributive principles should be understood as applying over time or at specific instances. The final criticism is that BLLS’s conception of independent values focuses solely on values that constrain the pursuit of educational goods. I claim that this part of the framework should be revised to include aspects of values that also support this pursuit. I conclude arguing that the BLLS frameworks should be further developed rather than rejected. (shrink)

Two essays relating Thomas and Whitehead have recently appeared. Coming To Be by James W. Felt, S.J., modifies Thomas by replacing his substantial form with Whitehead’s notion of subjective aim, the essencein-the-making introduced by God to guide the occasion’s act of coming into being. Felt also substitutes subjective aim for matter as the means of individuation. This is one of Whitehead’s individuating principles, although a case can be made that matter (the multiplicity of past actualities as proximate matter) is another. (...) “God and Creativity” by Stephen T. Franklin develops a reconciliation of these two ultimates by conceiving of God as the source of creativity, and seeing creativity in terms of the Thomistic esse. In my reflections on this project I explore four alternativeswith respect to the source of creativity: (a) creativity as derived from the past; (b) creativity as inherent in the present; (c) God as the source of transitional creativity (Franklin); (d) God as the source of concrescent creativity (Ford). The last two differ with respect to being’s relation to becoming. Does being undergird becoming, or does becoming bring about being, such that apart from it there would be no being? Our theory of creation depends upon this question. (shrink)

_Purpose._ The authors of this paper seek to comprehend, on the basis of ethics of discourse and communicative philosophy, the dimensions of human existence in times of war. This involves solving the following research tasks: to show the importance of moral and ethical norms in the structure of human existence and to emphasize the need for their observance by a person in the realities of war; to find out what the role of responsibility and co-responsibility is in preserving the space (...) of human existence in times of war; to explore the influence of discourse on the establishment of rational and social dimensions of human existence, formation of communicative space of understanding. _Theoretical basis._ The ideas of communicative philosophy and principles of discourse ethics, focused on the problems of substantiating ethical norms and values in their relationship with the human life world, and its activities are underlying the research. The analysis of human existence in times of war was carried out considering the theoretical and methodological foundations of philosophical anthropology. _Originality._ It is substantiated that the recognition of the universality of moral norms and values, and the productive power of communication contribute to deepening the understanding of the complexity and versatility of human existence in times of war. It has been determined that human existence’s rational and moral dimensions acquire particular significance in the context of russian aggression against Ukraine. The role of discourse was defined for affirming the humanistic foundations of human existence, in achieving cohesion, interaction, social solidarity, which is a condition for human development as a collective and unique being. It is noted that in war conditions the value of individual forms of human existence is complemented by the obligatory responsibility and co-responsibility for a person, awareness of the significance of coexistence in a situation where there is a threat to human life. _Conclusions._ The study of human existence involves the use of the methodological potential of discourse ethics, the significance of the ideas of which is increasing in the modern world because of the dangers caused by russian aggression against Ukraine. The recognition of the power of universal moral norms and the productive power of communication results in the affirmation of the humanistic foundations of human existence, the formation of the communicative space of understanding and consent necessary for a person. In times of war, the need for communicative rationalization of human existence, awareness of the value of morality and human humanity becomes obvious. (shrink)

What challenges must a principle of need for prioritisations in health care meet in order to be plausible and practically useful? Some progress in answering this question has recently been made by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. This article continue their work by suggesting that the characteristic feature of principles of needs is that they are sufficientarian, saying that we have a right to a minimally acceptable or good life or health, but nothing more. Accordingly, principles of needs must answer (...) two distributive questions: when do we have sufficient and how should we prioritise among those who do not yet have a sufficiency? Furthermore, it is argued that Roger Crisp’s theory of need, which combines sufficientarianism with prioritarianism below the threshold of need, is better equipped than alternatives to answer these questions as well as meeting the challenges formulated by Hope, Østerdal and Hasman. However, Crisp’s theory faces two major challenges. First, it has to say something about the currency of distribution: a principle of need must be complemented either with a theory on the human good or a theory about the proper goals of health care. Second, it has to say something about where the threshold should be set. However, any attempt to set a threshold seems morally arbitrary in the light of the sufficientarian idea that those just above the threshold never should be given priority over those just below the threshold. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The status and role of Popper’s ‘Rationality Principle’ (RP) is still the subject of disputes. The ‘prevailing view’ among Popper’s commentators seems to be that RP is better interpreted as a methodological principle. Yet, this view is challenged in a recent study where RP is interpreted as an‘idealization’. We critically review these two accounts of RP and propose a novel one according to which RP is, first and foremost, the scientific version of a heuristic that ordinary people (...) unconsciously use when they seek to explain and predict other people’s behavior. However, we recognize that, to the extent RP is part of a methodological strategy whereby, in the wake of adverse empirical results, social scientists place the ‘onus of proof’ on their situational model it is legitimate to claim that RP is adopted, at least partly, for methodological reasons. Further, to the extent that the adoption of RP implies suppressing those mental processes that may affect actors’ reasoning and willpower it is also legitimate to claim that RP is, at least partly, an ‘idealization’. We conclude that the status and role of RP is multi-faceted and that the three accounts of RP complement each other. (shrink)

In February 2000, the EuropeanCommission adopted a Communication on theprecautionary principle. This states how theCommission intends to apply the principle andestablishes guidelines for its application. Thedocument is intended to inform discussions oninternational agreements. In particular, itprovides a defense of European Union (EU)precautionary policies in case of tradedisputes, for example, in case the EU isaccused of imposing unfair trade barriers onexports of genetically-modified (GM) productsfrom the United States under the rules of theWorld Trade Organisation. In the communication,the Commission emphasizes (...) the scientificaspects of the precautionary principle, perhapspartly to counter claims from US officials thatthe EU's reluctance to accept GM imports is notbased on science but is politically-motivated.However, a principle is by definition a moralguide to behavior. In other words, it is anethic. The precautionary principle should beviewed as a complement to science, to beinvoked when a lack of scientific evidencemeans that outcomes are uncertain. Anyinterpretation of this principle needs to placeat least as much emphasis on its ethical andvalue-based aspects as on its scientificjustification. The Commission's interpretationrisks undermining the painstaking progress madeamong European Union member states inresponding to public concern about GM crops andfood by adopting increased precaution. Thispaper explores the balance between thescientific and ethical/value-based aspects ofthe precautionary principle as set out in theCommission's communication, to make the casethat it is the ethical and value-based aspectsrather than the scientific aspects of theguidelines that need strengthening. (shrink)

The debate about the ethical implications of Artificial Intelligence dates from the 1960s :741–742, 1960; Wiener in Cybernetics: or control and communication in the animal and the machine, MIT Press, New York, 1961). However, in recent years symbolic AI has been complemented and sometimes replaced by Neural Networks and Machine Learning techniques. This has vastly increased its potential utility and impact on society, with the consequence that the ethical debate has gone mainstream. Such a debate has primarily focused on principles—the (...) ‘what’ of AI ethics —rather than on practices, the ‘how.’ Awareness of the potential issues is increasing at a fast rate, but the AI community’s ability to take action to mitigate the associated risks is still at its infancy. Our intention in presenting this research is to contribute to closing the gap between principles and practices by constructing a typology that may help practically-minded developers apply ethics at each stage of the Machine Learning development pipeline, and to signal to researchers where further work is needed. The focus is exclusively on Machine Learning, but it is hoped that the results of this research may be easily applicable to other branches of AI. The article outlines the research method for creating this typology, the initial findings, and provides a summary of future research needs. (shrink)

One of the goals of medicine is to improve well-being, in line with the principle of beneficence. Likewise, scientists claim that the goal of human embryonic stem cell research is to find treatments for diseases. In hESC research, stem cells are harvested from a 5-day-old embryo. Surplus embryos from infertility treatments or embryos created for the sole purpose of harvesting stem cells are used in the research, and in the process the embryos get destroyed. The use of human embryos (...) for research purpose raises ethical concern. In this context, the religious leaders play the role to be the moral compass and “reality check” to engage with the public. In Malaysia, the Ministry of Health has outlined the Guidelines for Stem Cell Research and Therapy, reflecting on Islamic principles. Since there has not been much focus on the viewpoints of other faiths in Malaysia, this study attempts to explore the ethical guiding principles deliberated by religious leaders from the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions and identify if there is a common ground between the mainstream religious views and principles of medical ethics, in relation to hESC research. Eleven religious leaders representing the Buddhist, Hindu and Catholic traditions were interviewed. Interestingly, though reasoning of religious leaders came from different angles, their underlying concerns revolve around the values of “do no harm” and “intention to save lives”. These values are also the key principles in medical ethics. The findings are applied to answer the question as to whether religious and medical guiding principles can co-exist and complement in ethical decision-making, without compromising the values. (shrink)

The core principles of 7th century Korean Buddhist thinker and practitioner Wŏnhyo’s harmonization in non-obstruction thought and Wilberian Integral Theory may help us to understand ourselves and the world better and thus act and live well together accordingly in this contemporary world facing global crises. Whatare particularly noteworthy in Wŏnhyo’s thought and life is that as much as reality is unobstructed (無礙) in its profound calm so can our mode of being and relationships be awakened to its natural harmony free (...) of conflicts (和諍會通). This ideal can be optimally pursued by coming back to the source of One Mind (一心) while extensively benefiting sentient beings. Wŏnhyo consistently pursued and realized this soteriological project through his practice, works, and expediently dedicated life. The most recent version of Wilber’ Integral Theory consists of Integral Approach, Integral Methodological Pluralism, and Integral Post-Metaphysics. Their core principles consist of the AQAL (all quadrants, all levels, all lines, all states, and all types) and holons with their twenty tenets (holonic laws). Extensively utilizing scientific achievements Wilber attempted to map the whole developmental territory of occasions ranging from matter to Spirit or Emptiness and to formulate the Theory of Everything and then apply it to various fields including business, spirituality, and ecology. Within this framework, however, MarkEdwards tried to add an integral epistemology with its interpretive part and to complement Wilber’s more evolutionary ranking ascent with involutionary egalitarian descent. By also critiquing representational—and thus somewhat reifying—tendency of the AQAL framework and proposing to read it as an interpretive lens hesaves Integral Theory from internal conflicts and rendered it more consistent. Being based on experience and vast scholarship both Wŏnhyo’s and Wilberian visions have an integral nature. Whereas Wŏnhyo’s Enlightenment-anchored high vision-logic enabled him to actualize harmonization unobstructedly, backed by scientific achievements as well as his practice Wilber pioneered the AQAL Integral Theory, and then by adding an interpretive dimension Wilber has made it more balanced and consistent system. Now facing the human-caused threats of various global crises as well as the usual complexities of our ordinary life, we need to draw on mankind’s cultural resources including these two spectacular achievements. We may then further develop these soteriological visions in such a way as to satisfy hopefully all justifiable needs of men as well as the world in a futuristic perspective. (shrink)

In times of digitalization and globalization, social expectations change at an increasing pace. In order to provide orientation in times of frequent change, this article argues to reinforce the meaning of moral principles, norms, or values as focal points, which build the basis of mutually aligned behavioral expectations. Accordingly, the paper explains the abstract meaning of focal points – having reciprocal expectations as foundation for social cooperation – as well as the particular relevance of the focal point ‘do no harm’.

A necessary part of David Armstrong's account of truthmakers for modal truths is his Possibility principle: any truthmaker for a contingent truth is also a truthmaker for the possibility of the complement of that contingent truth (if T makes _p_ true and _p_ is contingent, then T makes ⋄∼_p_ true). I criticize Armstrong's Possibility principle for two reasons. First, his argument for the Possibility principle both relies on an unwarranted generalization and vitiates his desire for relevant truthmakers. (...) His argument undercuts relevant truthmakers by entailing that each contingent being is a truthmaker for all modal truths. Second, even if the argument seems successful, the Possibility principle is subject to counterexamples. Armstrong's being composed of more than fifty atoms makes it true _that something composed of more than fifty atoms exists_ and that truth is contingent, but his being composed of more than fifty atoms does not make it true _that it is possible that it is not the case that something composed of more than fifty atoms exists_. (shrink)

In search of general generative principles I start from the postulate of a reality which comprises both materialistic and psychic aspects. This overall reality, described by others as the world of archetypes, is not directly accessible to sensory perception. Yet, by studying archetypical manifestations, it is possible to distinguish different structures or generative principles in it. Comparison of three models, which depict developmental processes in different disciplines, shows that they have the same basic structure. The effects of the archetypes involved (...) can be described as four general generative principles: 1st the principle of wholeness (connection and integration of conflicting opposites), 2nd the principle of complementation and compensation (periodic change of opposite influences); 3rd the enstructuring principle (relative stability or spatial aspect of a manifest structure), and 4th the principle of gesture (change or temporal aspect of that structure). (shrink)

This paper contends that principles of virtue ethics have the potential to both supplement and complement academic integrity policy in the adjudication of undergraduate student academic integrity breaches. The paper uses elements of grounded theory to explore responses from 15 Academic Integrity Breach Decision Makers at an Australian university, and in particular, the process they use to determine outcomes for student breaches of academic integrity. The findings indicate that AIBDMs often use principles of virtue ethics to help provide nuanced judgement (...) on sometimes complicated breaches of ethical behaviour. The findings demonstrate that many AIBDMs supplemented their knowledge of institutional academic integrity policy with a deep commitment to their own virtuous behaviour. (shrink)

The early modern period was the natural historical habitat of the Principle of Sufficient Reason, i.e., the demand that everything must have a cause, or reason. It is in this period that the principle was explicitly articulated and named, and throughout the period we find numerous formulations and variants of the PSR and its closely related ‘ex nihilo nihil fit’ principle, which the early moderns inherited from medieval philosophy. Contemporary discussions of these principles were not restricted to (...) philosophy. “Nothing will come of nothing; speak again” old King Lear tells his daughter Cordelia at the beginning of Shakespeare’s celebrated tragedy, and in early modern science, conservation principles were the order of the day. Within philosophy, Malebranche stipulates that there cannot be an effect without a cause, and Berkeley motivates his idealism by an appeal to ‘ex nihilo nihil fit.’ Were we to try to provide an exhaustive survey the various formulations of the PSR in this period – including the weaker ones – we would be writing an encyclopedia. In fact, one wonders whether any early modern thinker was willing to accept a wholesale rejection of the PSR, i.e., a view which states that no fact requires an explanation. Moreover, the view that many – perhaps most – facts require an explanation seems to be tacitly assumed even by us today, in both our theoretical and colloquial discourse. For these reasons, this chapter will focus on two early modern philosophers who advocated very strong (i.e., virtually exceptionless) versions of the PSR: Benedict de Spinoza and G.W. Leibniz. Following a brief overview of Descartes’s restricted endorsement of the PSR, I will turn to discuss the central features of the PSR in the writings of Spinoza (§2) and those of Leibniz (§3). In the cases of each of these philosophers, we will examine carefully: (i) their main statements of the PSR, (ii) the scope they assign to the principle (i.e., what requires an explanation and what counts as an explanation), (iii) the modal strength they assign to the principle, (iv) the main implications they draw from the principle, (v) exceptions to the principle, and, finally, (vi) the justification of the principle. In §4, we will study a principle, complementing the PSR, namely, the assertion that everything and every fact must have an effect (or as Leibniz would put it: “nothing is sterile”). (shrink)

In this paper, the independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto principle are simultaneously weakened in the Arrovian framework of social choice. Moreover, we also relax transitivity of social preferences. We show that impossibility remains under weaker versions of Arrow’s original conditions. Our results complement the recent work by Coban and Sanver (Soc Choice Welf 43(4):953–961, 2014).

The principle of maximal entropy (further abbreviated as “MaxEnt”) can be founded on the formal mechanism, in which future transforms into past by the mediation of present. This allows of MaxEnt to be investigated by the theory of quantum information. MaxEnt can be considered as an inductive analog or generalization of “Occam’s razor”. It depends crucially on choice and thus on information just as all inductive methods of reasoning. The essence shared by Occam’s razor and MaxEnt is for the (...) relevant data known till now to be postulated as an enough fundament of conclusion. That axiom is the kind of choice grounding both principles. Popper’s falsifiability (1935) can be discussed as a complement to them: That axiom (or axiom scheme) is always sufficient but never necessary condition of conclusion therefore postulating the choice in the base of MaxEnt. Furthermore, the abstraction axiom (or axiom scheme) relevant to set theory (e.g. the axiom scheme of specification in ZFC) involves choice analogically. (shrink)

This is the first textbook on osteopathic medicine to complement the dominant 'medical' model of education.

This chapter discusses the limitations of approaches to modelling and handling evidential issues using hierarchical network representations. Such models of evidential inference rest on the compound proposition that real-world evidential inference usually or always consists of propositional ‘atoms’ that are linked together by nomological entities of some kind, entities that are often — but not always — called ‘generalisations’. These sorts of models or representations of evidential inference are referred to as ‘network-and-generalisation’ models of evidential inference. It is argued that (...) for certain important problems, especially where these concern meaning and human understanding, these need to be complemented by other methods. (shrink)

The infinite pigeonhole principle for 2-partitions asserts the existence, for every set A, of an infinite subset of A or of its complement. In this paper, we study the infinite pigeonhole pr...

The article “Prevention of corruption in public procurement: importance of general legal principles” examines the importance of general legal principles in the sphere of public purchases. The purpose of the work is to analyse the information on possible methods of prevention of and fight against corruption. The main result of the work is the conclusion that strict adherence to the general legal principles is one of the corruption-reducing factors. While combating corruption in the field of public procurement, general legal principles (...) should not be divided into primary and secondary principles, because they are all equally important and complement each other. Audit of the normative acts regulating public procurement shall be performed in the Member States of the European Union; positivisation of the following principles will effectively prevent manifestations of corruption in the area of public procurement: the principle of responsibility; principle of permanent composition of the procurement commission; the principle of in dubio pro reo; the principle of compensation; the principle of control; the principle of objectivity; the principle of completing the procurement procedure within a reasonable time period. (shrink)

In this article, I suggest that the recently emerged perspective of environmental pragmatism encompasses self-contradicting principles. For many years, it was deemed impossible for environmental ethics to formulate justified environmental policy. Environmental pragmatism, and its primary scholar Bryan G. Norton, has promoted a new outlook in that debate by proposing an ideal methodology based upon classic American pragmatism. In this methodology, a community can determine what is morally righteous by conducting open-ended inquiry and considering all relevant stakeholders in a rational (...) discourse. Environmental pragmatism must therefore accommodate reasonable value pluralism. Moreover, Norton claims that these criteria should be complemented with what I call the ‘sustainability criterion’. However, this principle of righteous decision- making appears inconsistent with the two aforementioned commitments. This article considers why this is the case. (shrink)

The present paper deals thus with some fundamental agreements and disagreements between Peirce and James, on crucial issues such as perception and consciousness. When Peirce first read the Principles, he was sketching his theory of the categories, testing its applications in many fields of knowledge, and many investigations were launched, concerning indexicals, diagrams, growth and development. James's utterances led Peirce to make his own views clearer on a wide range of topics that go to the heart of the foundations of (...) psychology and that involve the relationship between perception and logic, between consciousness and the categories, between abstraction and the 'stream of thought'. The idea is to show that Peirce detected important discoveries and insights in the Principles, but felt that James could not make proper use of them because of logical confusions, and also because of his "clandestine" metaphysics. The point in this essay is thus not to look for remains of psychologism in Peirce's writings,13 but to look at Peirce's comments about James's psychology in an attempt to identify where and why Peirce amended James's views. Since the project to provide some insight on Peirce's extensive reading ofJames's Principles of Psycho/.ogy would deserve a full volume, I shall focus here on three occasions where Peirce explicidy commented on Jarnes's Principles. In the first section, I shall consider bis assessment of James's chapter on space, which was published as a series of articles in 1887, in Mind. I shall then turn to the 1891 review of the Principles in The Nation for important complements on perception as inference. In the third section, I shall deal with Peirce's manuscript "Questions on James's Principles"(Rl099). These "Questions" reveal a deep interest in psychological problems and suggest different ways along which Peirce's new advances in the field of the categories, of continuity, and abstraction could provide a proper basis for the philosophy of mind. (shrink)

This book is aimed at analyzing the foundations of medical ethics by considering different moral theories and their implications for judgments in clinical practice and policy-making. It provides a review of the major types of ethical theory that can be applied to medical and bioethical issues concerning reproductive genetics. In response to the debate on the most adequate ethical doctrine to guide biomedical decisions, this book formulates views that capture the best elements in each, bearing in mind their differences and (...) taking into account the specific character of medicine. No historically influential position in ethics is by itself adequate to be applied to reproductive decisions. Thus, this book attempts to offer a pluralistic approach to biomedical research and medical practice. One usually claims that there are some basic principles which constitute the foundations of bioethics and medical ethics. Yet these principles conflict with each other and one needs some criteria to solve these conflicts and to specify the scope of application of these principles. Exploring miscellaneous ethical approaches as introduced to biomedicine, particularly to reproductive genetics, the book shall elucidate their different assumptions concerning human nature and the relations between healthcare providers, recipients, and other affected parties. The book attempts to answer the question of whether the tension between these ethical doctrines generates conflict in the field of biomedicine or if these competing approaches could in some way complement each other. In this respect, lecturers and researchers in bioethics would be interested in this reading this book. (shrink)

This book is aimed at analyzing the foundations of medical ethics by considering different moral theories and their implications for judgments in clinical practice and policy-making. It provides a review of the major types of ethical theory that can be applied to medical and bioethical issues concerning reproductive genetics. In response to the debate on the most adequate ethical doctrine to guide biomedical decisions, this book formulates views that capture the best elements in each, bearing in mind their differences and (...) taking into account the specific character of medicine. No historically influential position in ethics is by itself adequate to be applied to reproductive decisions. Thus, this book attempts to offer a pluralistic approach to biomedical research and medical practice. One usually claims that there are some basic principles which constitute the foundations of bioethics and medical ethics. Yet these principles conflict with each other and one needs some criteria to solve these conflicts and to specify the scope of application of these principles. Exploring miscellaneous ethical approaches as introduced to biomedicine, particularly to reproductive genetics, the book shall elucidate their different assumptions concerning human nature and the relations between healthcare providers, recipients, and other affected parties. The book attempts to answer the question of whether the tension between these ethical doctrines generates conflict in the field of biomedicine or if these competing approaches could in some way complement each other. In this respect, lecturers and researchers in bioethics would be interested in this reading this book. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is briefly to present a case for the principle of reparation as a new jus in bello principle for just humanitarian intervention. The article is divided into three sections. In “Restorative Justice and Civilian Protection”, I investigate the idea of restorative justice in order to consider whether or not it can complement the shortcomings of the just war tradition in civilian protection. In “The Legal Framework on Reparation: Its Scope and Limitations”, I examine (...) the scope of the law of armed conflict on reparatory measures in order to consider whether and how ideas of and measures for restorative justice might be incorporated in the jus in bello framework for military humanitarian intervention. In “The Issue of Civilian Victims: A Case for Reparation”, I explore the implications of reparatory measures for victims in order to suggest that these measures are not only beneficial to civilian victims but also imperative to be taken by the interveners if they undertake military intervention within the jus in bello framework and claim its moral justifiability. (shrink)

In many ways, entropy and probability are two concepts that complement each other. But it has been argued that there is no ‘straightforward connection’ between them with a no-go thesis from Kevin D...

This volume presents a collection of refereed papers reflecting the state of the art in the area of over-constrained systems. Besides 11 revised full papers, selected from the 24 submissions to the OCS workshop held in conjunction with the First International Conference on Principles and Practice of Constraint Programming, CP '95, held in Marseilles in September 1995, the book includes three comprehensive background papers of central importance for the workshop papers and the whole field. Also included is an introduction by (...) one of the volume editors together with a bibliography listing 243 entries. All in all this is a very useful reference book relevant for all researchers and practitioners interested in hierarchical, partial, and over-constrained systems. (shrink)

The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle (...) for conjunction applies to the central core of any forensic proof in the Anglo-American legal system. There are four parts included in this book. Accordingly, these parts have been written in such a way that they may be read in different orders by different kinds of reader. (shrink)

Cognitive Grammar postulates two modes of cognitive processing for the structuring of complex scenes, summary scanning and sequential scanning. Generally speaking, the theory is committed to basing grammatical concepts upon more general cognitive principles. In the case of summary and sequential scanning, independent evidence is lacking, but Langacker argues that the distinction should nonetheless be accepted as it buys us considerable theory-internal explanatory power. For example, dynamic prepositions, to-infinitives and participles (e.g., into, to enter, entered ) are distinguished from finite (...) and bare verbs in terms of summary vs. sequential scanning. In this paper, we try to show that various theory-internal and theory-external arguments do not seem to support the two scanning modes. In particular, we offer a detailed examination of causatives (e.g., get, make ) and argue that their complementation patterns are difficult to reconcile with differences in scanning. We conclude that the status of, and need for, summary and sequential scanning in (Cognitive) grammar is doubtful, especially if grammar is approached from the viewpoint of the language learner/user. It follows also that the parcelling of some form-function mappings may prove less clear-cut than previously assumed. (shrink)

_The purpose _of this article is to find out whether philosophical and anthropological studies of human nature affect the legitimization of decisions about human life and death, using the example of a philosophical analysis of the problem of euthanasia. _Theoretical__ basis._ Philosophically and anthropologically based situational analysis in bioethics is chosen as the research methodology, which reveals the legitimation of euthanasia as a complex and highly responsible moral decision, which should be based on both the consideration of all the patient’s (...) special circumstances and the competent and adequate application of fundamental knowledge about the human being. _Originality._ From a philosophical point of view, it would be correct to legalize euthanasia, but under the condition of significantly limiting the cases of its application, clearly defining the conditions for its provision and strict control over its implementation. It is morally unacceptable to justify either murder or torture, so euthanasia appears as an attempt to avoid both at the same time. _Conclusions._ Specific solutions to practical problems often indicate the necessary direction for solving theoretical difficulties. Thus, making proper moral decisions about euthanasia requires reliance on fundamental knowledge about human beings, but at the same time it provides arguments "for" and "against" artificial termination of life. The basic principles of bioethics – autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence and respect for the dignity of human life – serve as criteria for making balanced ethical decisions both in theory and in practice. These principles should be complemented by a coherent ethical, legal and philosophical position on euthanasia, which is achieved through legitimation procedures. Decisive for making a decision on euthanasia should be the strong desire of the patient himself. (shrink)

The principles Vico offers for his science indicate that his conception of his science is flawed and inconsistent. But this does not mean his conception of explanation is inadequate and inconsistent. Vico's method of science contains three different perspectives which can be called the providential, institutional, and ideational perspectives. Vico does distinguish between description and explanation and the providential perspective involves the former. Explanations of the world of nations are made by looking at institutions and ideas. The institutional perspective aims (...) at knowledge of what is true of things while the ideational perspective studies human thoughts. They are associated with the disciplines of philosophy and philology. These disciplines do complement each other; they are both concerned with ideas and institutions. The complementary workings of these perspectives in producing explanations can be understood in terms of a Vichian explanatory circle. (shrink)

Since Leibniz first put forward the sufficient reason law in his philosophical work "The Monadology" (1914), the issue of the law of sufficient reason has aroused heated discussions in the field of logic in our country. The question of whether the law of sufficient reason is the basic law of formal logic was particularly heated in the domestic logic circle in 1978-1980. Since then, there has been little discussion, but from the newly compiled formal logic textbooks published one after another, (...) no consensus has been reached. Although they didn't agree on the question of "whether or not", the two sides elaborated their arguments in detail and put forward some new opinions, thus creating new conditions for solving this problem scientifically. Firstly, this paper analyzes the different viewpoints of both sides of the argument. Secondly, it analyzes whether the law of sufficient reason is the basic law of formal logic from whether Leibniz put forward the law of sufficient reason. Finally, on this basis, a new transformation method is put forward. After this transformation, the law of sufficient reason is an important basic law of deductive logic, which can be juxtaposed with the other three logical laws, such as identity, and coordinated with the "three laws" and complement each other. (shrink)

In Australian end-of-life care, practicing euthanasia or physician-assisted suicide is illegal. Despite this, death hastening practices are common across medical settings. Practices can be clandestine or overt but in many instances physicians are forced to seek protection behind ambiguous medico-legal imperatives such as the Principle of Double Effect. Moreover, the way they conceptualise and experience such practices is inconsistent. To complement the available statistical data, the purpose of this study was to understand the reasoning behind how and why physicians (...) in Australia will hasten death. (shrink)

While Kants political thought, which downplay or dismiss the role of teleology, I restore Zweckms politics as a theoretically and practically useful material principle, and show that a teleological perspective complements the perspective stipulated by the formal principle of Recht. By means of a systematic reconstruction of what I call ssigkeits political thought.

This is the third edition of Chomsky's outstanding collection of essays on language and mind, first published in 2006. The first six chapters, originally published in the 1960s, made a groundbreaking contribution to linguistic theory. This edition complements them with an additional chapter and a new preface, bringing Chomsky's influential approach into the twenty-first century. Chapters 1-6 present Chomsky's early work on the nature and acquisition of language as a genetically endowed, biological system, through the rules and principles of which (...) we acquire an internalized knowledge. Over the past fifty years, this framework has sparked an explosion of inquiry into a wide range of languages, and has yielded some major theoretical questions. The final chapter revisits the key issues, reviewing the 'biolinguistic' approach that has guided Chomsky's work from its origins to the present day, and raising some novel and exciting challenges for the study of language and mind. (shrink)

The article asks about the function of clinical ethics. It does so by confronting the assumption that ethics is supposed to help in the solution of concrete problems, relying upon a defined set of principles and rules. The scientific character of such an approach to clinical ethics complements the very understanding of modern medicine as being increasingly scientific and technical; that is, as oriented toward the production of effects. The paper claims that, rather tan sharing in the “suspension of meaning” (...) pursued by medicine for the sake of scientific objectivity, the main task of clinical ethics consists of a retrieval, or “anamnesis,” of the very questions medicine seems to suspend: the significance of illness and disease, of birth, suffering and death, and of the service to the ethos of generosity that sustains the healing professions. Also, the paper offers a cultural “etiology” of “the suspension of meaning” in ethics, and pleads for a moral reflection that begins with a free and open confrontation with clinical experience. Attending to the moral meaning of concrete situations, the paper argues that formal modes of logical argumentation are only derivative functions of the moral language and, thus, cannot exhaust the broad spectrum of ethical discourse in medicine. DOI: 10.5294/pebi.2016.20.1.9. (shrink)

I defend the acceptance principle for testimony (APT), that hearers are justified in accepting testimony unless they have positive evidence against its reliability, against Elizabeth Fricker's local reductionist view. Local reductionism, the doctrine that hearers need evidence that a particular piece of testimony is reliable if they are to be justified in believing it, must on pain of scepticism be complemented by a principle that grants default justification to some testimony; I argue that (APT) is the principle (...) required. I consider two alternative weaker principles as complements to local reductionism; one yields counter-intuitive results unless we accept (APT) as well, while the other is too weak to enable local reductionism to avoid scepticism. (shrink)