This paper investigates two puzzles in practical reason and proposes a solution to them. First, sometimes, when we are practically certain that neither of two alternatives is better than or as good as the other with respect to what matters in the choice between them, it nevertheless seems perfectly rational to continue to deliberate, and sometimes the result of that deliberation is a conclusion that one alternative is better, where there is no error in one’s previous judgment. Second, there are (...) striking differences between rational agents – some rational agents have most reason to pursue careers on Wall Street while others have most reason to take up a career in teaching, or scuba diving, or working for political causes. These differences aren’t plausibly explained by ‘passive’ facts about our psychology or their causal interaction with our environment; instead, these facts seem in some sense to ‘express who we are’. But what is this sense? These puzzles disappear if we adopt a novel view about the source of the normativity of reasons – some reasons are given to us and others are reasons in virtue of an act of will. We make certain considerations reasons through an act of will and thus sometimes make it true through an act of agency that we have most reason to do one thing rather than another. (shrink)

According to agency theory, agents base their economic decisions on self-interests when adverse selection conditions exist. However, cognitive moral development theory predicts that ethics/morals may influence decision-makers not to behave egoistically. Rutledge and Karim, 173-184) find both the moral reasoning level of the managers and an adverse selection condition affect a manager's project evaluation decisions significantly. Since prior studies have shown that national culture might influence the application of agency theory in project evaluation, this current study uses a (...) different moral development measurement to reexamine Rutledge and Karim's hypotheses in another culture. A total of 73 Taiwanese executive MBA students with an average of 12.17 years work experience participated in this study. We found that both moral development level and adverse selection conditions significantly affect managers' project continuance decisions. The interaction effect of these two factors indicates that, when adverse selection conditions exist, participants with a high level of moral development exhibit less of a tendency to continue an unprofitable project than those with a low level of moral development. With subjects from a different culture, our results confirm the findings of Rutldege and Karim. That is, the effects of moral development and adverse selection conditions on managers' project continuance decisions are robust and can be generalized to different cultures. Implications of the findings of this study to multinational firms are also discussed. (shrink)

What makes a choice hard? I discuss and criticize three common answers and then make a proposal of my own. Paradigmatic hard choices are not hard because of our ignorance, the incommensurability of values, or the incomparability of the alternatives. They are hard because the alternatives are on a par; they are comparable, but one is not better than the other, and yet nor are they equally good. So understood, hard choices open up a new way of thinking about what (...) it is to be a rational agent. (shrink)

‘Normative powers’ are capacities to create normative reasons by our willing or say-so. They are significant, because if we have them and exercise them, then sometimes the reasons we have are ‘up to us’. But such powers seem mysterious. How can we, by willing, create reasons? In this paper, I examine whether normative powers can be adequately explained normatively, by appeal to norms of a practice, normative principles, human interests, or values. Can normative explanations of normative powers explain how an (...) exercise of the will can afford us special freedom in determining our reasons? I argue that normative approaches to answering this question prove to be inadequate. To vindicate the thought that normative powers can make our reasons ‘up to us’, we need an altogether different approach to understanding them, one that is located not in the normative but in the metaphysical. I end the paper by sketching a metaphysical explanation of normative powers. This metaphysical defence of normative powers provides a window into a different, more agent-centered way of thinking about rational agency. (shrink)

This paper proposes a way to understand transformative choices, choices that change ‘who you are.’ First, it distinguishes two broad models of transformative choice: 1) ‘event-based’ transformative choices in which some event—perhaps an experience—downstream from a choice transforms you, and 2) ‘choice-based’ transformative choices in which the choice itself—and not something downstream from the choice—transforms you. Transformative choices are of interest primarily because they purport to pose a challenge to standard approaches to rational choice. An examination of the event-based (...) transformative choices of L. A. Paul and Edna Ullman-Margalit, however, suggests that event-based transformative choices don’t raise any difficulties for standard approaches to rational choice. An account of choice-based transformative choices—and what it is to be transformed—is then proposed. Transformative choices so understood not only capture paradigmatic cases of transformative choice but also point the way to a different way of thinking about rational choice and agency. (shrink)

This paper presents an argument against the widespread view that ‘hard choices’ are hard because of the incomparability of the alternatives. The argument has two parts. First, I argue that any plausible theory of practical reason must be ‘comparativist’ in form, that is, it must hold that a comparative relation between the alternatives with respect to what matters in the choice determines a justified choice in that situation. If comparativist views of practical reason are correct, however, the incomparabilist view of (...) hard choices should be rejected. Incomparabilism about hard choices leads us to an implausible error theory about the phenomenology of hard choices, threatens an unattractive view of human agency, and leaves us in perplexity about what we are doing when we choose in hard choices. The second part of the argument explores the main competitor to comparativist views of practical reason, noncomparativist view, according tow which a choice is justified so long as it is not worse than any of the alternatives. This view is often assumed by rational choice theorists but has its best philosophical defense in work by Joseph Raz. On Raz’s view, incomparabilism about hard choices avoids the problems faced if comparativism is correct, but it faces different difficulties. I argue that Raz’s noncomparativist view mistakenly assimilates practical reason to more restricted normative domains such as the law. (shrink)

In this article, I identify and critically examine 3 dogmas of normativity that support a commonly accepted ‘Passivist View' of rational agency. I raise some questions about these dogmas, suggest what we should believe in their place, and moot an alternative ‘Activist View' of what it is to be a rational agent that grows out of rejection of the 3 dogmas. Underwriting the dogmas and the Passivist View, I suggest, is a deeply held but mistaken assumption that the normative (...) domain is fundamentally akin to the nonnormative domain. Once we allow that the normative may be fundamentally unlike the nonnormative in certain key ways, a shift in our thinking about what it is to be rational becomes possible. I end by considering some implications of this paradigm shift in rationality from the passive to the active for various applied matters. (shrink)

In this article, we propose that giving in cash and non-cash differ in their relation with the giving firm’s future corporate financial performance and only cash giving is associated with future CFP. Using a novel dataset from ASSET4 that differentiates corporate giving over a sample period of 2002–2012, we examine three competing hypotheses: agency cost hypothesis that cash giving reflects agency cost and destroys value for shareholders, investment hypothesis that cash giving is an investment by management that aims (...) for better future return, and information hypothesis that cash giving has informational value to shareholders as cash is a critical resource at a firm and giving is a decision by managers who are insiders. We find that indeed, only cash giving is positively associated with future CFP and firm value, measured by Fama–French five-factor abnormal risk-adjusted stock returns, future return on assets, and Tobin’s Q. In addition, we find that the positive association exists only between excess, i.e., unexpected, but not expected cash giving and future CFP. Our empirical findings support the information hypothesis, but neither the agency hypothesis nor the investment hypothesis, and are robust to a number of endogeneity tests, including orthogonalized cash giving, instrumental variable regression using geography-based instruments, and propensity score matching. Furthermore, we show that the positive association between future CFP and unexpected cash giving is only pronounced at firms with good governance and relatively higher sales growth where agency problems are less likely, and at firms with no alternative mechanisms to demonstrate the strength of cash flow. Additionally, we do not find evidence that suggests in-kind giving to possess any informational value. (shrink)

The aim of the inquiry is to interpret the Yijing consistently in terms of time and creativity. In the course of analysis of cosmology, changes and constancy, the self and community in the Yijing, this inquiry suggests that time and creativity play a significant role to understand the whole text. ;In the Yijing, change and time are the ultimate facts of the world. As there is no external agency, every being is in the middle of self-realizing process. It (...) is an one-world view in the sense that myriad things generate and produce in the same field. They are unique and self-determining in that they have freedom to make a decision to construct themselves in their own way. ;There are various kinds of term for change and constancy in the Yijing. While bian tends to be employed as discontinuous breakthrough from one to another, tong refers to continuity. The compound biantong, a dynamic concept of concord of the opposites, seems to signify effective change under the changing environment and "to hit the mark timely." ;Constancy in the Yijing is full blossom of realization and unbounded movement of dao. ;In the Yijing, instead of defining general quality of human being, human being is characterized as temporally self-creative. Image and word play a reinforcing role in the creative process of person-making. Images and words point out the experience of perceiver to orient oneself to the goal of maximizing one's potency. This process suggests a magnifying process of the person. ;Time and creativity play a primary role in making many kinds of interpersonal relationships. Interweaving interpersonal relationship is serial and continuous. At the same time, relationships are discontinuous in that they do not repeat and duplicate what the initiators achieved. The process formulates seamless network of persons. (shrink)

This study derives an improved model of managers' decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim (Accounting, Organization and Society 24, 173-184, 1999) this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency (...) problem are present or absent. Also, this study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers' commitment. (shrink)

This study derives an improved model of managers’ decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are present or absent. Also, this (...) study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers’ commitment. (shrink)

According to agency theory, agents base their economic decisions on self-interests when adverse selection conditions exist. However, cognitive moral development theory predicts that ethics/morals may influence decision-makers not to behave egoistically. Rutledge and Karim (1999; Accounting, Organizations and Society 24(2), 173–184) find both the moral reasoning level of the managers and an adverse selection condition affect a manager’s project evaluation decisions significantly. Since prior studies have shown that national␣culture might influence the application of agency theory in project evaluation, (...) this current study uses a different moral development measurement to reexamine Rutledge and Karim’s hypotheses in another culture. A total of 73 Taiwanese executive MBA students with an average of 12.17 years work experience participated in this study. We found that both moral development level and adverse selection conditions significantly affect managers’ project continuance decisions. The interaction effect of these two factors indicates that, when adverse selection conditions exist, participants with a high level of moral development exhibit less of a tendency to continue an unprofitable project than those with a low level of moral development. With subjects from a different culture, our results confirm the findings of Rutldege and Karim. That is, the effects of moral development and adverse selection conditions on managers’ project continuance decisions are robust and can be generalized to different cultures. Implications of the findings of this study to multinational firms are also discussed. (shrink)

The concept of work engagement has aroused the interest of many scholars. However, there has been limited academic research in examining how authentic leadership can influence WE, which consequently influences organizational citizenship behavior and task performance. In particular, this study divides WE into cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement to fully reflect the engagement theory. This study introduces three dimensions of WE and tests the theoretical model to validate cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement. Empirical testing using a (...) survey of 151 employees of retail travel agencies in Taiwan revealed that the AL can influence cognitive engagement, emotional engagement, and physical engagement, and also OCB and TP. These analysis results can assist vendors to implement OCB and TP through WE and AL. (shrink)

This paper examines the institutional mechanisms supporting the ethical oversight of human participant research conducted by the United Nations (UN). The UN has served an instrumental role in shaping international standards on research ethics, which invariably require ethical oversight of all research studies with human participants. The authors’ experiences of conducting research collaboratively with UN agencies, in contrast, have led to concern that the UN frequently sponsors, or participates in, studies with human participants that have not received appropriate ethical oversight. (...) It is argued that the institutional mechanisms in place to prevent research with human participants from being undertaken by the UN without ethical oversight do not, at present, extend substantively beyond the provision of guidelines and online training offered by a minority of UN bodies. The WHO and UNICEF are identified as notable exceptions, having implemented various measures to prevent health research with human participants from being undertaken without ethical oversight. Yet, it is highlighted that the WHO and UNICEF are not the only UN bodies that undertake health research with human participants and there are countless actors under the umbrella of the UN system that are regularly involved in non-health research with human participants. Arguments for the pursuit of the highest standard of ethical oversight by UN bodies are presented. Moving forward, the paper asks the question: is it time for the UN to set the standards for the oversight of ethical oversight? (shrink)

This article applies change agency to the institutions of higher education in South Africa – referring here to all the post-school institutions and educators in general and more specifically focused on the unique opportunities and responsibilities towards change agency in theological training. The focus is on the characteristics of a change agent, which could be an individual or a group. Seemingly, change is not going to be initiated in a ‘top-down’ approach; therefore, this article (...) suggests a ‘bottom-up’ approach, starting with a change agent (an individual or a group) to become enthusiastic and active to bring about change. The method of constructivism is used, complemented by a general literature review of the past 70 years, filled with definitions of change agents and change agency. After the discussion of a few models, the researcher ventures to propose a way in which change agency can find a foothold among theological educators in higher education institutions in South Africa. (shrink)

Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 170-183, April 2024.

Intermediaries are social agents who can be found in all types of different environments, cultures, and organizations. More often than enough, intermediaries are middlepersons between two power centers, yet their agency is precarious due to their position as brokers who gain from bridging otherwise unconnected parties, or marginalized vulnerable individuals who suffer from the invasion of the neighboring power holders. How can these two different perspectives of the intermediaries be reconciled? Under what conditions do they shift from one type (...) of agency to another? Previous scholarship attributes the agency of intermediaries to static positionality. This paper treats the position of the intermediary as an opportunity structure, which is shaped by multi-level relational dynamics. We show the changing agency of three intermediary tribal groups (i.e. the Tibetans in northwestern China, Uriyangqad Mongols, and Jurchens) who were situated between the sedentary Chinese and nomadic Mongols during the Ming dynasty (1368–1644) through a systematic study with horse trade data. The group-based and officially-regulated horse trade constituted the most important linkage between the intermediaries and these two power centers. We study the changes in the dynamics of their contact during trade, and explain why these intermediaries became client, client to two patrons, and broker in their trade with the Chinese and Mongols in different eras. We argue that the position of the intermediaries did not provide definite advantages for their exploitation, nor did it paralyze them with any concrete disadvantages. Rather, their position offered them unpredictable opportunities that arose from their relational dynamics with the power centers. Moreover, the self-serving and local interests of the intermediaries, and the strategies and tactics that they used, determined their capacity to respond to emerging and unpredictable opportunities and capitalize on them. (shrink)

Critics of social injustice argue that the agent of transformative social change will (or should) be a mass agent; namely, an agent that is large, complex, and geographically dispersed. Traditional theories of collective agency emphasize the presence of shared intentions and common knowledge, but mass agents are too large for such cohesion. To make sense of mass agency, I suggest a new approach. On the solidarity theory of mass agency, a mass agent is composed of (a) (...) organizers who intend to fight for social change and (b) supporters who are in solidarity with organizers. (shrink)

In South Africa, the majority of the population suffers from the inadequacy of learning opportunities and poor access to the higher education system. This causes the widening of the knowledge gap and increased socio-economic marginalisation, which threatens community agency. Critical knowledge created by academics at South African higher education institutions often culminates in access-controlled, costly scientific publications, thus limiting public access. On the other hand, because of the distance between universities and communities, community knowledge and intelligences are never fed (...) back into the university to enrich scholarship and enhance relevance. This paper explores the need for higher education to be freed from its elitist captivity in order to widen access to knowledge that would enhance community agency and revitalise academic agency for social change. The paper starts with a discussion on the need for change in the elitist nature of higher education. I will recount how essential shifts in thinking and action created the Chance 2 Advance programme hosted by the largest provider of higher education on the continent, the University of South Africa. This programme was designed in an attempt to re-vision academic scholarship for the benefit of the poor. Chance 2 Advance is an engaged scholarship and community-learning programme designed to bring communities and academics closer, in a mutual and reciprocal process of knowledge creation and knowledge mobilisation for social change. The programme has been replicated in urban and rural areas with success. At the end of 2018, the programme is poised to reach 100 000 participants, since its inception in 2010. (shrink)

This article aims to apply the model of change agent to the interpretation of Colossians. Presuming a continuity between Jesus and Paul, the article introduces the concept of ‘by faith alone’ from the Pauline letters. By this expression is meant an undivided fidelity to an inclusive approach to understanding God’s work, with concrete historical roots in Jesus’ crossing of gender, ethnic and cultural boundaries. Living in this manner requires reformation, transformation and change. The study spells out in fuller (...) detail what is understood ‘by faith alone’ by discussing the meaning of ‘faith’ within its semantic domain embedded in the codes of 1st-century Mediterranean culture. Living in faith is both a change of one’s inner convictions and about a life in faith. (shrink)

An investigation into Aristotle's metaphysics of nature as expounded in the Physics. It focuses in particular his conception of change, a concept which is shown to possess a unique metaphysical structure, with implications that should engage the attention of contemporary analysis. First published in hardback in 1982, the book is now available for the first time in paperback. 'A powerful and appealing explanatory scheme which succeeds on the whole in drawing together a great many seemingly disparate elements in the (...) Physics into a neat unitary stucture.' Canadian Philosophical Review. (shrink)

If climate change represents a severe threat to humankind, why then is response to it characterized by inaction at all levels? The authors argue there are two complementary explanations for the lack of motivation. First, our moral judgment system appears to be unable to identify climate change as an important moral problem and there are pervasive doubts about the agency of individuals. This explanation, however, is incomplete: Individual emitters can effectively be held morally responsible for their luxury (...) emissions. Second, doubts about individual agency have become overly emphasized and fail to convincingly exonerate individuals from responsibility. This book extends the second explanation for the motivational gap, namely that the arguments for the lack of individual agency do in fact correspond to mechanisms of moral disengagement. The use of these mechanisms enables consumption elites to maintain their consumptive lifestyles without having to accept moral responsibility for their luxury emissions. (shrink)

This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes (...) will combine with those of others. In some cases they are morally responsible for this failure, in others they are not. Moreover, the argument for collective epistemic agency is incoherent because reasons-for-groups are ipso facto reasons-for-individual. Instead of talking about reasons-for-groups, we should therefore distinguish between self-regarding reasons and group-regarding reasons. Both kinds of reasons are reasons-for-individuals. These conceptual considerations in favour of moderate individualism are strengthened by an analysis of our moral practice of responding to collective shortfalls of rationality and by the unpalatable moral implications of collectivism about epistemic agency. There is no need to change the subject. Groups can be rational or irrational, but they do not reason. (shrink)

A landmark study in the field of political science, The Changing Architecture of Politics charts the profound structural changes taking place in the late twentieth-century state. Looking at both theory and practice, Cerny argues that political structures--states in the broadest sense--are the key to understanding both the history and the future of modern politics. Included for discussion are such salient topics as the problem of locating institutional and structural theory within political and social science, how to describe and classify the (...) main elements of political structures, and a penetrating analysis of the structured action field that lies at the crossroads of political structuration. In addition, he explores several core areas in practice, including how states will operate in the next century and how states will interact with the manifold changes in social and economic processes--at both the domestic and international levels. Through his masterly portrayal of the architecture of contemporary politics, Cerny lays the foundations for an understanding of new political structures that are needed if the pursuit of human values is to continue into the next century. As such, this fascinating volume will appeal to all those interested in the paradigms of political and social science, whether from a purely theoretical or from a more empirical standpoint. "This is the best introduction available in English to contemporary academic discussions about the purpose and prospects of applying the comparative method to political science. Cerny's book is comprehensive in scope and accomplishes three, quite rare tasks: it brings together material on North America, Western Europe, and Japan; it combines theories of comparative politics and international relations; it pays equal attention to systems of party competition and of interest intermediation, although its primary focus is upon the state. Philip Cerny has produced a tour de force, an intelligent, erudite, and comprehensive text that cuts decisively through artificial barriers within the discipline." --Political Science Quarterly. (shrink)

The concept of "nature as inner principle of change" is fundamental to Aristotle's theory of the physical world; it is the object of the present thesis to substantiate this claim by tracing the effects of this idea in Aristotle's rejection of materialism, in his doctrine of "natural places", in his definition of change and process in general, and in his notion of agency in general and the supreme Unmoved Mover in particular ). Aristotle elucidates "natural" by. contrast (...) with "artificial" - ), holding that natural substances not merely collectively - ) but as individuals each possess an 'innate impulse of change'. But this must be explained so as to allow for the fact that no change is entirely independent of external conditions - ). If, however, change were totally dependent on external conditions, its occurrence would be inexplicable - ), and the very concept of "change" would be incoherent. This latter conclusion emerges from an examination of the ancient paradox of becoming and Aristotle's treatment of it - ). The paradox is expounded -). Aristotle answers it by showing that language assumes a continuing subject of change - ). But this assumption meets the problem only if the metaphysical category of substance is also assumed, and along with it some distinction between substance-constitutive and non-substance-constitutive characteristics - ). The former mark off their subject as a thing of a certain causal type; thus change, in presupposing a substantial subject, presupposes one that makes some causal contribution to its own changes - ). But Aristotle means more than this by 'nature as inner principle'. He holds a natural substance to be the autonomous determinant of certain changes; these therefore are "natural", as manifesting the substantial nature - ). This problematic notion is taken for granted by Aristotle in the Vhys-ics - ), but can be seen to rest on his metaphysic of substance. It is a consequence of this that the natural change of a given substance be of one kind and display a unitary pattern reflecting the unity of the substance ). This view cripples scientific method as we understand it ), but Aristotle's idea of substance anyway cuts him off from the approaches successfully operated in later mechanics and chemistry - ). A summary of the ground so far covered ) introduces a further sense in which Aristotle's natures are "inner" principles of change: the subject of change is not external to the being which is the source of change - ). (shrink)

Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000) describes the striving mechanism as a mode of routine change driven by successful organizational routines. Striving describes a process by which organization members gain a better understanding of the ideals undergirding their actions. In turn, this insight drives changes within routines. In this paper, I argue that the rational actor model, especially as articulated in Donald Davidson’s (1963) theory of action, is unable to account for the striving mechanism of endogenous routine change (...) identified by Feldman (Organization Science 11(6): 611–629, 2000). Drawing upon Brewer’s (2011) criticisms of propositional theories of desire, the account of meta-language intentional attitudes developed by List and Pettit (2011), and MacIntyre’s (2007) theory of social practices, I introduce an expanded framework for conceptualizing agency at the individual level, and aggregation at the organization level, that better accounts for the striving mechanism as a process of endogenous routine change. (shrink)

Institutionalism gives priority to structure over agency. Yet institutions have never developed and operated without the intervention of interested groups. This paper develops a conceptual framework for the role of agency in historical institutionalism. Based on recent contributions following the coalitional turn and drawing on insights from sociological institutionalism, it argues that agency plays a key role in the creation and maintenance of social coalitions that stabilize but also challenge institutions. Without such agency, no coalition can (...) be created, maintained, or changed. Similarly, without a supporting coalition, no contested institution can survive. Yet, due to collective action problems, such coalitional work is challenging. This coalitional perspective offers a robust role for agency in historical institutionalism, but it also explains why institutions remain stable despite agency. In addition, this paper forwards several portable propositions that allow for the identification of who is likely to develop agency and what these actors do. (shrink)

A powerful and appealing explanatory scheme which succeeds on the whole in drawing together a great many seemingly disparate elements in the Physics' into a neat unitary structure.' Canadian Philosophical Reviews.

Inspired by Weber’s charismatic carrier groups, Eisenstadt coined the term institutional entrepreneur to capture the rare but epochal collective capable of reorienting a group’s value-orientations and transferring charisma, while making them an evolutionary force of structural and cultural change. As a corrective to Parsons’ abstract, ‘top-down’ theory of change, Eisenstadt’s theory provided historical context and agency to moments in which societies experienced qualitative transformation. The concept has become central to new institutionalism, neo-functionalism, and evolutionary-institutionalism. Drawing from the (...) former two, a more robust theory of institutional entrepreneurship from an evolutionary-institutionalist’s perspective is posited. In essence, entrepreneurs formulate institutional projects with dual logic: a collective side focused on innovation where efforts are directed towards organizational symbolic mechanisms of integration and a self-interested side directed towards resource independence, monopolization, mobility, and power-dependence. While outcomes vary based on numerous environmental factors, success leads to greater structural/symbolic independence and ability to reconfigure physical-temporal-social-symbolic space. (shrink)

For a long time, international relations scholars have adopted a narrow view of what is global order, who are its makers and managers, and what means they employ to realize their goals. Amitav Acharya argues that the nature and scope of agency in the global order - who creates it and how - needs to be redefined and broadened. Order is built not by material power alone, but also by ideas and norms. While the West designed the post-war order, (...) the non-Western countries were not passive. They contested and redefined Western ideas and norms, and contributed new ones of their own making. This book examines such acts of agency, especially the redefinitions of sovereignty and security, shaping contemporary world politics. With the decline of Western dominance, ideas and agency from the Rest may make it possible to imagine and build a truly global order. (shrink)

Teacher emotion, an important aspect of language teacher psychology, has recently drawn growing attention in language teacher development studies. Previous research has shown that language teachers, typically pressured by heavy workloads, may face emotional challenges from multiplied sources, especially in the context of educational changes such as curriculum reform and the COVID-19 emergency. Current literature on teachers’ emotions largely centers around ordinary language teachers, with teacher leaders whose agentic actions often exert greater influence on the effectiveness of educational changes rarely (...) examined. Situated in a top-tier research university that has been promoting an English for Academic Purposes reform to enhance its science students’ multilingual competence in academic contexts, this longitudinal case study tracked the emotional trajectory of an English teacher, Lea, for 5 years. Adopting an ecological perspective, our study confirms that language teachers’ emotions vary across the reform ecosystems and extends the current inquiry by conceptualizing the intricately interrelated teacher emotion, agency, power, and identity as dynamic constructs. This study also reveals how the reform-inflected emotional changes were associated with Lea’s EAP teacher and teacher leader identity construction, with both identities reinforcing each other, which to some extent reconciled Lea’s emotional tensions. Our study bears significant implications for language teachers involved in educational reform, teacher leaders, and school administrators. (shrink)

Power differentials are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions and power has been conceptualised as an interpersonal construct. Here we show that priming power changes the sense of agency, indexed by intentional binding. Specifically, participants wrote about episodes in which they had power over others, or in which others had power over them. After priming, participants completed an interval estimation task in which they judged the interval between a voluntary action and a visual effect. After low-power priming, participants judged (...) intervals to be significantly longer than judgments after high-power or no priming. Thus, intentional binding was significantly changed by low-power, suggesting that power reduces the sense of agency for action outcomes. Our results demonstrate a clear intrapersonal effect of power. We suggest that intentional binding could be employed to assess agency in individuals suffering from anxiety and depression, both of which are characterised by reduced feelings of personal control. (shrink)

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Everyday identity change is common after conflict, as people attempt to move away from oppositional group relations and closed group boundaries. This article asks how it scales up and out to impact these group relations and boundaries, and what stops this? Theoretically, the article focusses on complex oppositional configurations of groupness, where relationality and feedback mechanisms (rather than more easily measured variables) are crucial to change and continuity, and in which moral authority is a key node of reproduction. (...) It uses the normatively weighted concept of transformation to augment existing research on boundary and identity change, while elaborating it to recognise the role of everyday agency in furthering change and moral inertia in impeding it. Substantively, the article compares the processes of everyday transformation of groupness in three cases that are very similar in historical depth, social embeddedness, symbolic opposition and everyday change, but very different in time-scale and with contrasting outcomes: successful transformation of reformation religious groupness; partial transformation of national groupness; and failed transformation of complexly-configured ethnic groupness in Northern Ireland. This allows tracing of the patterns and mechanisms at work. To anticipate, the article argues that everyday identity change can erode the moral authority of groupness. Its impact is generational and dependent on institutional linkages. The article highlights the importance of moral mechanisms as drivers of and obstacles to change; and it suggests ways that the obstacles could be overcome by radical policy interventions. (shrink)

The goal of this study is to characterize observers’ abilities to discriminate between endogenous and exogenous changes. To do so, we developed a new experimental paradigm. On each trial, participants were shown a dot pattern on the screen. Next, the pattern disappeared and participants were to reproduce it. Changes were surreptuously introduced in the stimulus, either by presenting participants anew with the dot pattern they had themselves produced on the previous trial or by presenting participants with a slightly different dot (...) pattern . We analyzed awareness of the changes and behavioral adaptation to them in a dynamical manner. We observe signal attenuation in the presence of endogenous change, dissociation between self-attribution reports and behavioral effect of agency. We discuss the source of this sensitive attenuation as well as the relation between a minimal or core self and an extended, narrative or autobiographical self. (shrink)