Change, Agency and the Incomplete in Aristotle

Phronesis 62 (2):170-209 (2017)
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Abstract

Aristotle’s most fundamental distinction between changes and other activities is not that ofMetaphysicsΘ.6, between end-exclusive and end-inclusive activities, but one implicit inPhysics3.1’s definition of change, between the activity of something incomplete and the activity of something complete. Notably, only the latter distinction can account for Aristotle’s view, inPhysics3.3, that ‘agency’—effecting change in something, e.g. teaching—does not qualify strictly as a change. This distinction informsDe Anima2.5 and imparts unity to Aristotle’s extended treatment of change inPhysics3.1-3.

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Andreas Anagnostopoulos
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Aristotle’s Philosophy of Action.David Owain Maurice Charles - 1984 - Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
De Anima II 5.Myles F. Burnyeat - 2002 - Phronesis 47 (1):28 - 90.
The Greek Particles.W. F. J. Knight & J. D. Denniston - 1938 - American Journal of Philology 59 (4):490.
Aristotle's definition of motion.L. A. Kosman - 1969 - Phronesis 14 (1):40-62.

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