Journal of Business Ethics 94 (4):595-611 (2010)

This study derives an improved model of managers’ decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are present or absent. Also, this study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers’ commitment.
Keywords Philosophy   Quality of Life Research   Management/Business for Professionals   Economic Growth   Ethics
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s10551-009-0340-5
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,290
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles


Added to PP index

Total views
14 ( #735,088 of 2,518,781 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #408,070 of 2,518,781 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes