This study derives an improved model of managers' decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim (Accounting, Organization and Society 24, 173-184, 1999) this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are (...) present or absent. Also, this study suggests that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers' commitment. (shrink)

This study derives an improved model of managers’ decision-making behavior regarding possibly failing projects. Instead of adopting cognitive moral development used by Rutledge and Karim this investigation uses the agency theory framework to consider individual moral philosophy for the improvement of decisions regarding possibly failing projects. This research hypothesizes that a manager with low relativism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with high relativism when agency problem are present or absent. Also, this study suggests (...) that a manager with high idealism has a stronger tendency to discontinue a possibly failing project than one with low idealism. Through experiments this work finds that agency problem is a significant factor on decisions regarding possibly failing projects in all circumstances. This result is consistent with prior literature and shows agency problem universality. Next, the empirical evidence supports the hypothesis that a project manager with low relativism tends to discontinue a possibly failing project more than one with high relativism, showing that individual moral philosophy can partially mitigate the phenomenon of escalating managers’ commitment. (shrink)

While previous authors have broadly examined the motivations and outcomes of the philanthropic activities of organizations, the present study extends Miska et al.’s rationalistic approach to examine the degree to which managerial philanthropic decision-making behaviour is dominated by morality. This study also tackles the question of whether this relationship is moderated by the strength of the geographical proximity and amount of the donation within an agency framework. To probe the radical agency problem and the effect of intervention, an alternative heuristic (...) scenario is also developed to provide evidence that managers under the same moral level show significant differences in donation intention under a variety of agency conditions. The results indicate a significant difference between the existence and non-existence of agency problems in charitable decision-making by managers high in idealism and relativism; however, at the same time, philanthropic behaviour is intertwined with various dilemma-related contexts. These findings bridge the gap in the literature on ethics and corporate social responsibility, and challenge current thinking on corporate governance mechanisms in this area by offering researchers and practitioners an integrated model that responds to a strong sceptical bias or a high premium placed on morality. (shrink)

This article investigates stakeholder expectations associated with corporate environmental disclosure. Several articles have studied the effect that stakeholder pressure has on environmental disclosing strategies. In this article, we extend previous research to an examination of the influence of external, internal, and intermediary stakeholder groups or constituencies in turn to clarify the demands of multiple stakeholders as to firms' disclosure of sufficient and adequate environmental information. The sample comprised Taiwanese firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange. Our results show that the (...) level of environmental disclosure is significantly affected by stakeholder groups' demands. External stake-holder groups, such as the government, debtors, and consumers, exert a strong influence over management intentions regarding the extent of environmental disclosure. Internal stakeholder groups, such as shareholders and employees, impose additional pressures on firms to disclose environmental information. As for intermediate stakeholder groups, environmental protection organizations, and accounting firms, these can greatly influence managerial choices regarding their environmental disclosure strategies. (shrink)