In the literature on the recovery of societies from natural disasters, a dominant theme is the importance of pursuing and achieving sustainable recovery. Sustainability implies that recovery efforts should aim to (re-) build, maintain, and, if possible, enhance the quality of life of members of the disaster-stricken community in the short and long term. In this paper, we propose a capabilities-based approach to recovery and argue that it provides important theoretical resources for better realizing this ideal of sustainability in practice. (...) From a capabilities-based approach, the societal impact of a disaster is measured in terms of its impact on selected capabilities of individuals within society. Capabilities are constitutive elements of well-being and capture the valuable doings and beings individuals can achieve or become (e.g., being adequately nourished, and being sheltered). A proposed Disaster Impact Index (DII), we argue, can capture the societal impact of a disaster by measuring its impact on the well-being of individuals, as gauged by the changes in individuals’ capabilities. We discuss how to measure this impact in practice. Also, a proposed Disaster Recovery Index (DRI) measures the current level of individuals’ capabilities. It can provide important information on the degree to which capabilities have been restored and enhanced by comparing the DRI against a benchmark, or level of capabilities attainment, toward which recovery processes should strive. We argue that the DII and DRI provide critical information for policy- and decision-makers to use in order to practically implement the principles of sustainable recovery. Both can be used in the process of predisaster planning for recovery and in the period of recovery itself. (shrink)

In this article, I investigate how phenomenologists have analysed the relation between man and animal with respect to death. The common tendency of most phenomenologists is to grant man a specific mode of being and to attribute a parallel but deficient mode to the animal. In this way, phenomenology fails to accomplish a positive phenomenological description of the animal’s mode of being or of animality as such. I turn to Heidegger’s decisive analysis of human/animal death since Heidegger would constantly hold (...) on to the idea that the animal, in contrast to man, has no explicit relation to death and is therefore not capable of death as death. This leads to his very provocative claim that only man “dies” whereas the animal just “perishes.” Hence, the problem of the man/animal-relation becomes a very distinct problem in relation to death since death concerns the very way in which a certain form of being relates to the world. I aim to shed light on the genesis of the problem in order to put the question of the animal’s death in a proper perspective. I argue that it is precisely death where phenomenology loses its firm grip on the differentiation between man and animal and hence it is this distinction that has to be put back into question. (shrink)

In this paper we compare the strategies applied by two successful biological components of the ecosystem, the viruses and the human beings, to interact with the environment. Viruses have had and still exert deep and vast actions on the ecosystem especially at the genome level of most of its biotic components. We discuss on the importance of the human being as contraptions maker in particular of robots, hence of machines capable of automatically carrying out complex series of actions. Beside (...) the relevance of designing and assembling these contraptions, it is of basic importance the goal for which they are assembled and future scenarios of their possible impact on the ecosystem. We can’t procrastinate the development and implementation of a highly inspired and stringent “ethical code” for human beings and humanoid robots because it will be a crucial aspect for the wellbeing of the mankind and of the entire ecosystem. (shrink)

The conception of man as an economic animal is implied by the view that economic production is the determining “factor” or “sphere” of man or society. Against this conception can be put another, that of man as praxis. This takes account of man as a creative being, capable of realizing his freedom through his own activity. In this article the theory of the determining role of the “economic factor”, and the theory of factors in general have been examined. The (...) economic interpretation of history, a variant of the theory of factors, has been acknowledged as partly true for the self-alienated man and society, but the theory of factors in any variant has been found inadequate as a general theory of man, or society. The possibility of freedom cannot be reduced to the fact that the determining roles played by “factors”, vary, or to the hope that the economic “factor” can be subordinated to a “better” one. Man's freedom consists in his resolving the conflict of “factors”, and in realizing himself as an integral creative being, no longer split into independent and mutually opposed spheres. (shrink)

Man's Approach to God was the 5th lecture in the Wimmer Memorial Lecture Series (1947-1970) at Saint Vincent and was given in 1951 by Jacques Maritain. Maritain was one of the most influential figures in the Thomistic revival of the 20th century. Both in his personal life and in his prolific academic corpus, Maritain modeled the Church's commitment to the interrelationship between faith and reason. So seriously did he take his intellectual commitments in his student years that, along with soon-to-be (...) wife, Ra•ssa Oumansoff, he made a suicide pact that he would only break if he could find some meaning to life. This search ultimately led him to Catholicism. Maritain's works reveal an active mind capable of applying his speculative thought to virtually any subject. Every one of his works was an exploration of reason and its limits, and of how faith completes the natural desire to know. His Wimmer lecture is a model specimen of this approach. Maritain's Man's Approach to God is a three-part lecture. In it, he seeks to explain how man comes to know God existentially, as well as how faith responds to and completes this search for meaning. This lecture grew out of his desire to show that every human being, and not just philosophers, can penetrate into the depths of reality, for all bear within themselves the indelible image of God and are equally called to the communion of love for God and love for our brothers [as] a single love of charity. (shrink)

Résumé Le but de cet article est de mettre en dialogue Ricœur avec la théorie sociale d’Anthony Giddens, plus spécifiquement l’herméneutique de l’homme capable avec la théorie de la structuration. Nous commencerons par explorer quelques termes clefs permettant de comparer les deux auteurs au sujet du rapport entre acteurs et systèmes. Chez Ricœur, nous commenterons les notions d’institution et de pratique; chez Giddens, des notions importantes pour présenter la “dualité de structure.” Au cours de cette exploration, quatre tâches seront (...) identifiées en vue de préciser la “théorie sociale” de Soi-même comme un autre : dépasser le schéma foncièrement téléologique de l’action; explorer la stabilisation de l’action malgré l’incertitude inscrite dans le schéma téléologique; réinvestir la notion de contrainte; et clarifier l’ambiguïté de la notion d’institution. En conclusion, nous montrerons quels apports la mise en dialogue de Ricœur avec Giddens pourrait offrir pour accomplir ces quatre tâches. Mots-clés : Homme capable, sructuration, acteur, dualité de structure, institution, contrainte.The aim of this article is to reconstruct a dialogue between Ricœur and Anthony Giddens, in particular between the hermeneutics of the capable human and the theory of structuration. The article starts with an exploration of key concepts on the basis of which to compare the two authors on the relation between actors and systems. On Ricœur’s side the concepts of institution and practice will be commented on; on Giddens’ side notions selected to present the “duality of structure” will be considered. In the course of this exploration, four tasks will be identified by which to refine the “social theory” of Oneself as Another : surpass its ultimately teleological schema of action; explore the stabilisation of action despite the uncertainty attributed to the teleological schema; reinvest the notion of constraint; and clarify the ambiguity in the notion of institution. In conclusion the contribution of a Ricœur-Giddens dialogue to the accomplishment of these four tasks will be demonstrated. Keywords: Capable Man, Structuration, Actor, Duality of structure, Institution, Constraint. (shrink)

In diesem Aufsatz werden die Interpretationen des Begriffs Menschenwürde vorgestellt, die in den aktuellen ethischen Debatten die am häufigsten diskutierten sind. Dabei handelt es sich um die traditionelle und die Kantische Theorie sowie um die Demütigungs- und die Achtungstheorie. Zudem werden zwei Ansätze präsentiert, die Menschenwürde über Relationen zu Menschenrechten erklären. Es soll ermittelt werden, ob einer der Kandidaten das Potenzial hat, einen begründbaren, gehaltvollen, präzisen und gegenüber dem Common-Sense Gebrauch nicht völlig revisionären Begriff der Menschenwürde zu liefern. Die hier (...) verteidigte These wird lauten, dass Menschenwürde als Bezeichnung dafür verwendet werden kann, dass die fundamentalen Menschenrechte einer menschlichen Person in substantieller Weise erfüllt sind.This essay discusses the most debated theories of the concept of human dignity in contemporary ethical discourses. The essay will explore if one of these theories is capable of delivering a justifiable, substantial and precise concept of human dignity that does not demand an entire revision of the concept in respect of its ordinary usage. The according thesis that will be defended is that human dignity is given if the fundamental human rights of a human person are realised. (shrink)

Often, the behavior of animals can be better explained and predicted, it seems, if we ascribe the capacity to have beliefs, intentions, and concepts to them. Whether we really can do so, however, is a debated issue. Particularly, Donald Davidson maintains that there is no basis in fact for ascribing propositional attitudes or concepts to animals. I will consider his and rival views, such as Colin Allen's three-part approach, for determining whether animals possess concepts. To avoid pure theoretical debate, however, (...) I will test these criteria using characteristic examples from ethology that depict a broad range of animal behavior. This will allow us to detect a series of gradations in animals' capacities, in the course of which we can think over what would count for or against an attribution of concepts and propositional attitudes to them in each single case. Self-conceit is our natural hereditary disease. Of all creatures man is the most wretched and fragile, and at once the most supercilious. ... It is by this conceit that man arrogates to himself ... divine properties, that he segregates himself from the mass of other creatures and raises himself above them .. (shrink)

Essentialism is, on the one hand, anchored with considerable firmness in a common sense picture of the world. On the other hand, it was dismissed for logico-philosophical reasons by a scientifically minded theorist like Quine. ``New essentialists'' like Kripke did engage in very profitable theorizing on an essentialist basis, but made no significant effort to investigate the prospects of imparting to an essentialist metaphysics a solid foundation within a scientific world view. These foundational prospects are the concern of the article. (...) – The investigation is guided by two ideas which are elaborated within a proof theoretical framework in the course of the article. First, being an essential F (where ``F'' represents a predicate) is linked with a lifelong possession of the property signified by ``F'' (but there is something more in it). Second, a special kind of necessity is involved in (true) predications of essential F-ness; it should be capable, like possibly all kinds of necessity, of being spelt out, in the final analysis, in terms of the provability of appropriate propositions in appropriate theoretical systems. In outlining the relevant axiomatic bases, the article draws on an early paper by E. Hirsch on individuation and essence. (shrink)

In the article the problem of transformation of the information received by the user on the Internet into his knowledge is investigated. The paper uses the main special scientific and logical research methods used in the social and humanitarian sciences. At the same time, the methods of systematic and value-worldview analysis of the phenomena of the spiritual world of a person are distinguished by the degree of significance, which allow us to study the problem of the dialectic of knowledge and (...) information on the Internet not in isolation, but in connection with the main phenomena of the spiritual life of people, taking into account the priority of value-worldview structures. The goal of the work is to find a priority factor that provides a higher degree of accuracy in the transformation of information from the Internet into human knowledge. It is shown that the nature of the world wide web to a certain extent complicates the process of translating information coming to a person into his knowledge. It is concluded that the condition for the transformation of information received by the user on the Internet is the cognitive activity of a person, due primarily to the development of its value and ideological sphere. If the cognizing person has sufficiently developed and stable value – ideological foundations of personality, he successfully realizes himself as a developing subject, an active participant in knowledge. On the contrary, insufficiently stable value-worldview sphere can lead to passive perception of information by the individual, adaptation to reality, simplification of personality. Information from the Internet in the most adequate form is transformed into a person’s knowledge on the basis of his own cognitive activity, in the presence of intellectual and volitional capabilities for verifying the information available on the Network. (shrink)

Throughout the twentieth century, social anthropology has given the impression of being a science that is eternally in the throes of birth, all the while wondering whether it has the right to exist. As it has taken root, developed, and subdivided, it has become increasingly doubt-ridden. Today this self-doubt seems to have reached critical proportions: it is difficult to see how this discipline can continue to emphasize its schizophrenia without completely falling apart. Researchers who wish to sustain a belief in (...) the potential scientific vocation of anthropology feel obliged to seek assistance from the outside; for this help they look to the thermodynamics of heat, the selfish gene, or the newly-formed coalition of “cognitive sciences” (which combines the traditionally attractive capabilities of formal logic, psychophysiology, neurology, and so forth). Such researchers prefer second-hand knowledge to ephemeral knowledge. As for anthropologists who seek to preserve the professional autonomy of their practice at any cost, most of them believe that the only way to do that is to abdicate: to hell with the mirage of objectivity, down with laws, and long live the “text”! (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and (...) social resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilities -based Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to acceptable risk. The proposed approach focuses the attention of risk analysts directly on what should be our primary concern when judging the acceptability and the tolerability of risks, namely, how risks impact the well-being of individuals in a society. Also, our Capabilities -based Approach offers a transparent, easily communicable way for determining the acceptability and the tolerability of risks. (shrink)

Cro-Magnon Man was smarter and generally more capable than we are. So why did he go extinct? Precisely because he was so capable. Whereas members of our species are weaklings who rely on others, members of his species had it in them to be rugged individualists; and that is what they did. But then, when circumstances became too severe, they had no social support and thus went extinct.

This paper aims to explore the relationship between Karl Marx’s concept of justice and Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. Nusbaum follows the Aristotelian idea of man as a political animal, which is intrinsically consistent with Marx’s view of human nature, but she provides us with a new normative perspective to reconsider Marxism. When she initially began to design the list of core capabilities, Nussbaum stated that her capabilities approach originated from Marx’s idea of ‘genuinely human functions’, which requires society to provide (...) a reasonable political arrangement so that humans have the ability to obtain real freedom. Her approach relies on Marx’s early understanding of ‘human flourishing’, and it is also influenced by Marx’s ideas about ‘the theory of need’ and ‘the theory of alienation’. From this point of view, Nussbaum’s capability theory of justice reveals different aspects of Marx’s understanding of justice. (shrink)

The very rapid developments in the field of computers in the last few years have made it possible to solve, with their aid, problems utterly new in character. The first "generation" of electronic computers, in the 1950's, was one of capricious and cumbersome vacuum-tube devices, but even it brought a fundamental change in our notions of the kind of tasks machines were capable of solving. The second "generation" - transistorized computers - is a substantial improvement. More compact and dependable, (...) these machines have come into wide use in the control of various processes. Today the third "generation" is in birth, consisting of microminiaturized computers employing solid-state circuits. Such computers are no larger than a small suitcase and it is supposed, not without reason, that in the future they will become pocket-size. It is clear that these possibilities create an utterly new situation. Whereas formerly there was still some validity in posing the question of a clear-cut division of functions between man and a large stationary computer that carried out certain calculations on his instructions, today the question of man-computer interaction takes the center of the stage. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:382 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the spiritual effort of all mankind. Many so-called historic events, he was convinced, will in the end be "as written in water," but the work of the human "spirit," however limited at any given time, is accumulative and helps prepare a better future. It seems fitting to close this review with the concluding words of high commendation addressed to him by the Argentinian Society of (...) Writers on the occasion of the appearance of the Theory of Man: "Se premia a un hombre, a una obra, a una conducta." (We are paying homage to a man, a work, a noble conduct.) COR~ELI~:S KRUS~ Wesleyan University The Knowledge o] Man. Selected Essays. By Martin Buber. Edited with an Introduction by Maurice Friedman. Translated by Maurice Friedman and Ronald Gregor Smith. (New York: Harper Torchbooks, The Cloister Library, TB 135H. Pp. 186. $1.45.) The present volume contains the English translations, previously published, of six anthropological essays of Martin Buber, which had appeared originally in German. They are: Distance and Relation (1950), Elements of the Interhuman (1954), What is Common to All (1956), The Word that is Spoken (1960), Guilt and Guilt Feelings (1957), Man and his Image-Work (1955). As an Appendix has been added the unpublished text of a discussion between the late Martin Buber and the psychologist Carl R. Rogers, in April 1957. An introductory Essay by Maurice S. Friedman intends to set these essays in the context of Buber's philosophy of dialogue and "to show their interrelations and their significance for other fields of thought" (p. 7). Both the Introductory Essay and the translated texts had been seen by Buber before going to the press. Broadly speaking, these essays concern the distinctive features of man, and the reality of the dazwischen (p. 12), translated as "there in-between," "the between" or "betweenness" (p. 107): between man and reality (art), and between man and man (the interhuman in dialogue, word and language, guilt and psychotherapy). No specific texts on religion and knowledge have been included in this collection, its purpose being to present Buber's "philosophical anthropology" (p. 7). One may speak of a synthesis of Buber's view of man, as it comes out in this volume. Man is constituting "a special category of being" (60), by being capable of entering into living relations; this happens in the sphere of "the between," in particular the interhuman, the unfolding of which is "the dialogicaI" (p. 75). Here the "spokenness" of the word has its place (p. 112), here are found the different forms of encounter from which the human "selves" emerge after "a bold swinging...into the life of the other" (p. 81) and making each other "present" through "imagining" the real in each other (p. 70). There is the permanent "temptation to... take refuge in the pseudo security of the world of It, the world of ordered objectivity and private subjectivity" (Friedman, p. 23). But there is also the "common world" (cosmos) as built by "common speech-with-meaning" (logos) (Friedman, p. 40); this is the world of the We (pp. 107-108). Buber dismisses the annihilation of the human person in the dream and sleep of the East (pp. 91-96), the "situationless" and "uncommunal" chemical holidays of Aldous Huxley (p. 100), the solipsism and panpsychism of C. G. Jung (p. 124-125) : by all of these "the pure duty and responsibility of waking togetherness" (p. 91) has been forsaken. Of particular interest are Friedman's pages concerning Buber's view of the unconscious (pp. 32-38): they replace an essay which Buber had intended to write on the subject. In this connection the essay on existential guilt to oneself and to others is illuminating ; this guilt is "as something of an ontic character" (p. 123), and only a--"for the man of our age" (p. 138)--difficult self-illumination can hereby give insight and open the door into "the identity of the human person as such with himself" (p. 147). Also, the discussion on psychotherapy should be mentioned, where Buber puts his finger on "this dialogue bounded by tragedy" (p. 174) in which "You are not equals and cannot... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Royce, Racism, and the Colonial IdealWhite Supremacy and the Illusion of Civilization in Josiah Royce's Account of the White Man's Burden1Tommy J. CurryNo colony can be made by a theory of Imperialism, it can only be made by people who want to colonize and are capable of maintaining themselves as colonists.—Sir Sydney OlivierIntroductionAs with most historic white figures in philosophy, their repopularization and reintroduction into contemporary circles commits (...) their work, regardless of its initial silence, to speak to the problem of anti-Black racism in America. Josiah Royce is no different in this regard. In recent years, white scholars like Jacquelyn Kegley and Shannon Sullivan have introduced revisions to Royce's thought that make it appear multicultural and antiracist, despite the anachronism of such a contention. According to Kegley, "Royce believes, as others in the contemporary scene, that 'race' as a concept cannot be eliminated, [because] it plays too crucial a role, both positive and negative, in self- and social identification" (216). While Kegley is correct that contemporary scholars like Lucius Outlaw and Cornel West have adamantly defended the importance of race as a social and cultural entity, her claim is in stark contradiction to the racial eliminativism of other scholars like Anthony Appiah and Alain Locke, whom she also contends that Royce agrees with simultaneously.2 While it makes perfect sense for Kegley to try to put Royce in conversation with contemporary Black thinkers in race theory, her work is indicative of a trend aiming to gain currency for historic white thinkers in current race debates at the expense of historical accuracy. Black scholars who studied under Royce and applied his theories to the race problem from the mid-1900s onward, like William H. Ferris3 and William T. Fontaine,4 are ignored by white scholars because the first application of Roycean philosophy supported assimilationism. It is only today with the political and ideological [End Page 10] ethicizations of racial diversity and multiculturalism that Royce's work is interpreted as critically conserving race.5In contrast to contemporary works on Royce and race, this article seeks to evaluate the current claims for the relevance of Royce's views in contemporary debates on race. I maintain that only by taking Royce out of his historical context (late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century thought) do his ideas on race acquire a level of importance that cannot be supported by the actual evidence he himself advances. Conversely, by actually placing Royce in his historical context, this article will demonstrate that Royce's 1905 article entitled "Race Questions" (later published as "Race Questions and Prejudices" in 1906) is an unapologetic extension of his 1900 article entitled "Characteristic Tendencies of American Civilization," where Royce adamantly champions British colonialism and assimilation as the remedy to the burgeoning race problem both at home and abroad. I begin with a critical analysis that places Josiah Royce's attitudes firmly within the boundaries of his times. In what follows, I will attempt to contextualize Royce's seemingly progressive stance on Japan as part of a more general reaction whites had during the early 1900s to Russia's defeat by the Japanese. Instead of reading Royce's stance on Japan as a moment of exceptionalism, I contend that Royce's attitude was in fact a popular disposition that signaled the inevitable shift of race science away from biological determinism toward more environmentalist explanations. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, I will show that Royce's disposition toward Blacks was firmly rooted in a colonial and assimilationist logic that ultimately sought the cultural destruction of African-descended people. A closer look at Royce's prefatory remarks on British colonialism from 1900 and his valorization of English colonial administration in Jamaica actually reveals an insidious racial dynamic in Royce's thought that is anything but antiracist. Finally, having established Royce's philosophical stake in American assimilation and Western domination, I argue that the "provincial revision" currently in vogue amongst American philosophers working with Royce is simply not enough to overturn Royce's clearly racist investments in dealing with the race question.If I Can Think It... Then I Can Do It—Reading Royce... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Menkiti's Moral Man by Oritsegbubemi Anthony OyowePolycarp IkuenobeOYOWE, Oritsegbubemi Anthony. Menkiti's Moral Man. Lanham, Md.: Lexington Books, 2022. xii + 221 pp. Cloth, $100.00Oyowe critically examines the various threads in, issues raised by, and implications of Menkiti's maximal conception of personhood, against the backdrop of various criticisms, including his own. He indicates that, as "a repentant critic," he does "not deny the merits of these criticisms," but he (...) is "convinced that there are resources in Menkiti's general account for tackling them."In chapter 1, Oyowe examines how Menkiti uses the idea of community to foreground his normative view of personhood, in order to illuminate the African idea that one is a person because of, and through relationships with, other persons in a community. This indicates that one's existence or [End Page 356] identity has necessary external elements of cultural belonging, in addition to internal intrinsic elements. These cultural elements require ontological progression that involves a process of social-moral incorporation into communal practices and norms. Oyowe argues that while this conception is plausible, it raises questions regarding oppressive cultures and their effects on individuals. He indicates that the kind of person that emerges from this conception is a "soft" social entity.Chapter 2 examines the issue of the nature of the relationship between persons (as soft social entities) and community, and the implications for individual autonomy, practical reasoning, and moral agency. Oyowe argues that the pertinent issue is not whether the individual should have moral or ontological priority over the community or vice versa, but the aspect of individuality that is conducive to what we cherish about the community. This is because Menkiti presupposes that in order to be a maximal person, one must have intrinsic capacities for moral agency to take on communal functions and duties. But the community creates the conditions for individuals to express individuality and autonomy, engage in practical reasoning, and make the choice to conform with communal norms in order to be recognized as persons.So, the maximal conception of personhood raises issues about the nature of entities that deserve a moral status. Chapter 3 examines the moral status of infants, people with cognitive impairment, the senile, nonhuman animals, and the moral duties that people have toward these entities. If we understand personhood as failing to extend moral status to these entities, such a view might be charged with speciesism and anthropocentrism. Oyowe argues that a plausible interpretation of personhood, in the context of the communal priority of duties, suggests that people have certain responsibilities toward human and nonhuman nonpersons. This interpretation is grounded in Menkiti's distinction between "deserving justice"—which is not based on having certain intrinsic properties, moral capacities, or cognitive abilities—and "being a person." Because Menkiti insists that persons ought to be able to use their capacities to perform requisite communal duties, personhood must involve an obligation to consider the interests of nonpersons and a community of respect for those who deserve justice.Chapter 4 examines the dilemma created by the social architecture of a community's cultural traditions, institutions, expectations, norms, and practices that are necessary for personhood and social identity. While such architecture is capable of supporting the achievement of personhood, it could also be restrictive. He uses Chinua Achebe's novel, Things Fall Apart, to illuminate how the structures for recognizing persons that are oppressive of and biased against women could be disguised. Although Menkiti does not address this issue, his conception of personhood highlights the problem of social justice for women because relevant social architecture may exclude women from equal and full communal recognition and participation. An appreciation of this problem [End Page 357] introduces an alternative way of understanding social justice in terms of communal recognition or lack thereof.In chapter 5, Oyowe uses the intuitions underlying Locke's distinction between "person" and "human being" to illuminate Menkiti's account of personhood. Person and human being are not identical because they have different persistent conditions. Persons persist by virtue of mental capacities and practical relevance that are developed after one is identified as a human organism. This raises the issues of (a) whether being a... (shrink)

In this paper I suggest that the Humean male and Humean female of Hume’s Treatise would have different mental lives due to a great extent to what Hume takes to be the socio-culture in place. Specifically, I show that the Humean male would be incapable but the Humean female would be capable of forming a Humean sex-neutral general idea of man. The Humean male’s inability is not innate but the result of the trauma he experiences when discovering sexuality, reproduction (...) and realizing how insecure a claim of paternity is. The Humean female not having such a traumatic experience is not impaired in the same way. Insofar as she is impaired, it is because in the very same socio-culture she cannot exercise her ability because it would endanger the socio-culture she is expected to partake in. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to examine the topic of older people in the world from the perspective of the Social Teaching of the Church. As explained in Christifideles Laici , the Catholic Church believes that the laity is summoned to pave the way for the arrival of God’s Kingdom, and people who are at an advanced age should still respond to God’s calling through their own unique way of contribution. In Familiaris Consortio it is emphasized that the Church (...) should help older people manifest their roles both in families and religious groups. Although it is mentioned in these two apostolic exhortations that older people are blessed with wisdom, it is not explained as they actually acquire such a blessing. In order to address this issue and elaborate on the meaning of older people’s wisdom, Grün’s theory on the nature of older people’s wisdom and where such a blessing comes from is made reference to in this study. Moreover, it is emphasized in the apostolic exhortation of Familiaris Consortio that older people are often marginalized in today’s industrialized and urbanized society and neglected in their families, while also enduring psychological and/or physical pain. Addressing this issue, the value of older people’s work and their unshirkable missions and duties are explained in the present study by examining the nature and value of man’s work as mentioned in Laborem Exercens . Sen’s “capability approach” is also utilized in the present study as a way to examine older people’s values and the deprivation of their capability, allowing an in-depth analysis of this topic. The findings of this study reveal that Grün’s theory of older people’s wisdom being shaped by their life-experiences is significantly complementary to the messages on older people in Christifideles Laici and Familiaris Consortio . While Sen’s capability approach does not offer a complete set of values or cultural system that solves this problem, the approach of “civilization of love” proposed in the Social Teaching of the Church is very useful in helping one contemplate on the problems faced by older people around the world. (shrink)

The new edition of Manning Marable’sBeyond Black and Whiteseeks to explain the course of black politics in the United States over the last thirty years. Marable argues that this history shows the failure of liberal and nationalist politics to address the problems facing black Americans. Though Marable attempts to chart a course beyond these ideologies, his alternative of ‘transformative politics’, shorn of the revolutionary Marxism that defined his earlier writings, is no more capable of confronting racial inequality than the (...) strategies it seeks to replace. (shrink)

John Locke's educational program has long been considered to have two primary aims: to habituate children to reason and to raise children capable of meeting the demands of citizenship that he details in his Two Treatises of Government. Yet Locke's educational prescriptions undermine citizens’ capacity for honesty, a critical political virtue for Locke. To explain how Locke's educational prescriptions are self-undermining, we turn to Rousseau's extended critique of Locke's Some Thoughts on Education in his Émile. We argue that Rousseau (...) explains why such an education allows a natural desire to dominate to flourish, rendering children who receive it dishonest and incapable of self-government. Rousseau's critique exposes how a liberal education focused solely on autonomy cannot produce the kinds of citizens a Lockean politics requires. (shrink)

In this paper, we present a Capabilities-based Approach to the acceptability and the tolerability of risks posed by natural and man-made hazards. We argue that judgments about the acceptability and/or tolerability of such risks should be based on an evaluation of the likely societal impact of potential hazards, defined in terms of the expected changes in the capabilities of individuals. Capabilities refer to the functionings, or valuable doings and beings, individuals are able to achieve given available personal, material, and social (...) resources. The likely impact of a hazard on individuals’ capabilities should, we argue, be compared against two separate thresholds. The first threshold specifies the minimum level of capabilities attainment that is acceptable in principle for individuals to have in the aftermath of a hazard over any period of time. This threshold captures the level that individuals’ capabilities ideally should not fall below. A risk is acceptable if the probability that the attained capabilities will be less than the acceptable level is sufficiently small. In practice, it can be tolerable for some individuals to temporarily fall below the acceptable threshold, provided this situation of lower capabilities attainment is temporary, reversible, and the probability that capabilities will fall below a tolerability threshold is sufficiently small. This second, tolerable threshold delimits an absolute minimum level of capabilities attainment below which no individual in a society should ever fall, regardless of whether that level of capabilities attainment is temporary or reversible. In this paper, we describe and justify this Capabilitiesbased Approach to the acceptability and tolerability of risks. We argue that the proposed theoretical framework avoids the limitations in current approaches to.. (shrink)

This paper argues that Darwin's theory of evolution offers two modes of understanding the relation between life and human knowledge. On the one hand, Darwin can be included within a general turn to “life,” in which human self-knowledge is part of a general unfolding of increasing awareness and anthropological reflexivity; life creates an organism, man, capable of discerning the logic of organic existence. On the other hand, Darwin offers the possibility of understanding life beyond the self-maintenance of organism and, (...) therefore, beyond the rational of life's putative striving. (shrink)

This issue was discussed with regard to chosen commentaries to Aristotle’s treatise De anima, formed in the so-called via moderna mainstream, in particular those of John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and Laurentius of Lindores. In such a context, the Cracovian commentaries referring to Parisian nominalists were presented by those of Benedict Hesse and Anonymus. The analyses carried out above allow one to ascertain that although William of Ockham’s opinion questioning the possibility of knowledge of the soul in the field of philosophy, (...) nominalists of the late Middle Ages did not resign from speculation on the beginning and the separation from the body of the soul, also the fate of the soul after death. They focused on the nature of the matter – human body and his relation with the soul – in the moment of birth. In the aspect of death 14th century scholars undertook the struggle, which was one with the justification of the psycho-physical unity of the human being existing after death solely as an immortal soul. In both thems, they tried to find their solutions, while if they could not solve these aporeticals questions – they had the courage to admit, that is not possible by solely relying on the natural forces of reason. They had to refer to the teaching of christianity, without however falling prey to fideism. This was a methodical endeavour based on the experience that natural reason in searching for the truth is not capable of its own efforts to attain to certain concepts and might on occasion err, it is then that faith becomes its guide and supplies it with more acceptable solutions. This is the courage of one of the greatest philosophers – Plato, who said that you have to have this “great courage” to undertake only probable knowledge, when another is not possible. (shrink)

Italian priest, essayist, and intellectual of the twentieth century, Ernesto Balducci identified the crucial turning points of the new millennium by advancing original perspectives capable of opening unusual future scenarios. Sensitive to emergences of society (pollution, wars, ecological collapse), he retraces the causes in the more general ?crisis of modernity,? proposing a new paideia and a new model of thought. He theorizes the construction of a novel planetary horizon that presupposes not only the building of new organizational structures, but (...) also the achieving of an authentic ?anthropological mutation? capable of inverting the course of history. While the old ethics were anthropocentric, founded on the supremacy of humankind over the world and nature, the new ethics is planetary, meaning that humankind must no longer be used as the parameter, but instead, the global horizon over which the effects of his or her actions extend. (shrink)

We employ the Social Signaling Model and life history of a Western Dani big-man, Tibenuk, to analyze a neglected curiosity in the career of the big-man type. The big-man is renowned as an economic entrepreneur, the master of material displays. In New Guinea, however, big-men had invariably first gained fame and some influence as eminent warriors. The SSM accounts for this two-part career path by proposing that small-scale social organization rests on honest, competitive signaling of individual and collective fighting strength, (...) with leaders being those who excel in these contests. The performances for which big-men are already known, conspicuous ceremonial displays, broadcast this strength indirectly. Explicitly conceptualized as symbolic fighting, they constituted indexical proxies for their sponsors’ individual and collective willingness and ability to fight. Success on the battlefield, though, signaled fighting strength more directly. Men therefore had to demonstrate strength on both the battlefield and the ceremonial ground if they were to become big-men. This was Tibenuk’s achievement. When he was young and at his physical peak, he demonstrated outstanding capability in war. War is a young man’s game, however, and as his physical capacities waned, he shifted to politics, an older man’s game, honing his political talents and developing extensive political networks that allowed him to sponsor massive pig feasts, the principal form of conspicuous ceremonial display. Tibenuk’s career also reveals synergies between warrior and political talents that hitherto have been overlooked in big-man analysis. (shrink)

The new edition of Manning Marable’sBeyond Black and Whiteseeks to explain the course of black politics in the United States over the last thirty years. Marable argues that this history shows the failure of liberal and nationalist politics to address the problems facing black Americans. Though Marable attempts to chart a course beyond these ideologies, his alternative of ‘transformative politics’, shorn of the revolutionary Marxism that defined his earlier writings, is no more capable of confronting racial inequality than the (...) strategies it seeks to replace. (shrink)

This paper explores the role that Mary Shepherd's (1777–1847) acceptance of the so-called imago-dei thesis plays for her account of the human mind. That is, it analyses Shepherd's commitment to the doctrine that humans are created in the image of God, (see Gen. 1, 26–7) parts of which Shepherd quotes in Essays on the Perception of an External Universe (EPEU), 157, and the ways it informs her understanding of the human mind. In particular, it demonstrates how this thesis informs her (...) understanding of the cognitive and moral capacities of the human mind. In other words, I argue that her commitment to this thesis explains why she believes that human beings are capable of reaching the “higher acquirement of intelligence” and the “completion of virtuous habits” (EPEU 381). Thus, this paper highlights the relevance of Shepherd's theological assumptions to (the ever-growing number of) scholars interested in her understanding of the mind. (shrink)

Indeed, death, even the ones that some people are prepared for, comes with painful blows in the hearts of loved ones left behind. One, then, can only imagine the great pangs of pain that pierce the hearts of the bereaved upon hearing a young life that has been ended abruptly by series of uncontrollable occurrences—alas! Tragedy! This particular human experience pushes man’s brokenness to fore, illuminating the gap in human constitution, casting on humanity’s fault a blinding radiance which forces one (...) to think and rethink his life and its possibilities. (shrink)

今、なぜトマス・アクィナスか。人間知性が到達を目指して努力すべき、遠大にして究極の理想像として「神」を捉え直す。.

The transhumanist project of reshaping human beings by promoting their improvement through technological innovations has a broad agenda. This study focuses on the enhancement of the human organism through genetic modification techniques. Transhumanism values and a discussion of their philosophical background provide a framework to understand its ideals. Genetics and ethics are employed to assess the claims of the transhumanist program of human enhancement. A succinct description of central concepts in genetics and an explanation of current techniques to edit the (...) human genome serve to assess the capabilities and limitations of editing techniques. Potential benefits and liabilities of human enhancement through genome editing are discussed to appraise its feasibility. Ethical considerations of genome editing inform a reflection on the implications of introducing heritable changes in the genome of individuals. It is concluded that the transhumanist program is underpinned by a large number of hypotheses rather than by sufficient evidence. (shrink)

Behavioural welfare economics has lately been challenged on account of its use of the satisfaction of true preferences as a normative criterion. The critique contests what is taken to be an implicit assumption in the literature, namely that true preferences are context-independent. This assumption is considered not only unjustified in the behavioural welfare economics literature but unjustifiable – true preferences are argued to be, at least sometimes, context-dependent. This article explores the implications of this ‘critique of the inner rational agent’. (...) I argue that the critique does not support a wholesale shift away from the use of true preferences as an evaluative standard in normative economics; instead, the critique implies that behavioural welfare economists need to inquire into and establish the ‘source’ of particular context-dependent choices in individuals’ decision-making. The source determines the permissibility of correcting individuals’ context-dependent choices and can, in some situations, support decisive welfare judgements. (shrink)

A severe critique of contemporary society as one in which there remains no significant class or group capable of radically opposing things as they are. Marcuse works on the assumption that advanced industrial society is indeed sick, much as some recent sociologists have depicted it to be. He sees evidence of alienation in political and cultural life, in the technical jargon of the bureaucracy, in the technological cult of "operationalism," and especially in contemporary analytic philosophy, which he sees as (...) the triumph of "one-dimensional thought." His conclusion is not optimistic: at this juncture in history, he believes, the only possible task for "critical philosophy" is to be negative.--W. L. M. (shrink)

In his remarks on L’Homme, La Forge aims at a rigid separation of the functions of the body from the activity of the soul. This project looks authentically Cartesian, but some critical issues reveal how difficult it is taking away any activity of the soul in sensitive experience. In the Traité de l’esprit de l’homme, La Forge explicitly limits the cognitive capability of the memory without the active presence of the mind.

The fourth volume in the Spinoza by 2000 series presents the reader with issues central to Part IV of Spinoza's Ethics. Readers of this text face one of the most difficult questions in Spinoza scholarship - Is Spinoza presenting a rational ethics, capable of making human beings free, or is he merely drawing an ethical ideal, never to be reached within the confines of reason alone? Indeed, 'freedom' is meant here mainly in the context of human bondage to the (...) affects, but it is also addressed in connection with human sociability. Whether rational self-understanding is, in itself, sufficient for human emancipation is an open question. The participants of this volume help to clarify the various aspects of the problem, providing an indispensable guide both for Spinoza scholars and the general reader. This collection also links the previous volume in this series, on Spinoza's psychological theory, to the forthcoming volume, which concentrates on the culminating last part of the Ethics. (shrink)

In a recent article Merritt has claimed that current observational data provide “severe tests” falsifying the standard cosmological model. Based on Popper’s idea of conventionalism, he concludes that the introduction of some essential components of the standard cosmological model—including dark matter and dark energy—are a consequence of conventionalist stratagems. In this article, I provide more recent discoveries and discussions showing that the standard cosmological model is not built on any conventionalist stratagem.

To build a true conscious robot requires that a robot’s “brain” be capable of supporting the phenomenal consciousness as human’s brain enjoys. Operational Architectonics framework through exploration of the temporal structure of information flow and inter-area interactions within the network of functional neuronal populations [by examining topographic sharp transition processes in the scalp electroencephalogram (EEG) on the millisecond scale] reveals and describes the EEG architecture which is analogous to the architecture of the phenomenal world. This suggests that the task (...) of creating the “machine” consciousness would require a machine implementation that can support the kind of hierarchical architecture found in EEG. (shrink)

This article aims to uncover the processes of developing sustainable business models in innovation ecosystems. Innovation ecosystems with sustainability goals often consist of cross-sector partners and need to manage three tensions: the tension of value creation versus value capture, the tension of mutual value versus individual value, and the tension of gaining value versus losing value. The fact that these tensions affect all actors differently makes the process of developing a sustainable business model challenging. Based on a study of four (...) sustainably innovative cross-sector collaborations, we propose that innovation ecosystems that develop a sustainable business model engage in a process of valuing value in which they search for a result that satisfies all actors. We find two different patterns of valuing value: collective orchestration and continuous search. We describe these patterns and the conditions that give rise to them. The identification of the two patterns opens up a research agenda that can shed further light on the conditions that need to be in place in order for an innovation ecosystem to develop effective sustainable business models. For practice, our findings show how cross-sector actors in innovation ecosystems may collaborate when developing a business model around emerging sustainability-oriented innovations. (shrink)

One of the fundamental struggles in corporate social responsibility (CSR) is the uncertainty and inherent contradictions that stem from a company being an individual legal entity and a community of persons. The authors contend that CSR has departed from the essence of “social responsibility.” The paper is a commentary on CSR, presented as two frameworks rooted in individualism—The Merchant Trade (the strategic view of CSR) and The White Man’s Burden (self-righteous CSR heroism that assumes the shackles of responsibility normally offered (...) by others). Both, however, contradict the essence of “social responsibility” pitting individual against community, business against society, and economic needs and realities versus ethical reflection. The authors present a model that advocates a more moderate and realistic approach to CSR that goes back to the essence of social responsibility. (shrink)

In setting forth a new theory of the growth of scientific knowledge, Larry Laudan shows that any account of scientific change has consequences for the relationship between the history, philosophy and sociology of science. It is a laudable feature of his work that he does not treat any of these disciplines as undifferentiated monoliths. In fact, one of his main goals is to show that his account of progress requires specific ways of doing and relating these three disciplines. As an (...) historian invited to speak at the Philosophy of Science Association, it seemed appropriate for me to appraise the function of history of science in Laudan’s program. Without going into unnecessary detail, let me begin by examining some of his main claims.The focus of Laudan’s argument is on science construed as a form of problem-solving activity and on progress and rationality as appraisals of problem-solving capabilities. (shrink)

First published in 1983. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

Studies of mythology and the philosophy of religions ascribe violence an important role in understanding traditional societies. Whether perceived as sacred and capable of renewing the world, or as oppressive and destructive, violence acquires a twofold valence, whose constituents are interpreted in a complementary relation of interdependence and entail a world outlook with profound implications. Retrieving this ambiguous dimension of religious violence, Kenzaburō Ōe’s novel imagines, against the historical background of post-war Japanese society, a game that enacts the eternal (...) rivalry between two brothers. Lest the history of this seemingly lost present should fall prey to political abuse, the Japanese writer proposes a return to myth, without, however, idealising it; instead, myth is revalorised and tradition is re-conceived from the vantage point of rationalism, with full and alert awareness of the dangers inherent in an ideology that is imposed by force and aggression. Kenzaburō Ōe’s novel is a lucid meditation on Japan’s modern and contemporary history. (shrink)