This article investigates conceptions of morality within the framework of ressentimentful victimhood in the manosphere, while also exploring avenues for resistance among young individuals encountering the “hatred pipeline”. In Study 1, we use the emotional mechanism of ressentiment to examine how incels construct narratives of victimhood rooted in the notion of sexual entitlement that remains owed and unfulfilled, alongside its “black pill” variant emphasising moral and epistemic superiority. Through a linguistic corpus analysis and content examination of 4chan and Incel.is (...) blog posts, we find evidence of ressentiment morality permeating the language and communication within the incel community, characterised by blame directed at women, and the pervasive themes of victimhood, powerlessness, and injustice. In Study 2, we delve into young individuals’ reflections on incel morality and victimhood narratives as they engage with online networks of toxic masculinity in the manosphere. Drawing from semi-structured interviews with young participants who have accessed the manosphere, we explore their perceptions of risks, attribution of blame, and experiences of empathy towards individuals navigating the “hatred pipeline”. Our analysis underscores the significance of ressentiment in elucidating alternative conceptions of morality and victimhood, while shedding light on the potential for acceptance or resistance within online environments characterised by hatred. (shrink)

The purpose of this thesis is to examine two moral emotions(‘ressentiment' and 'cheerfulness’) in Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality. In “the first essay”, Nietzsche analyzes 'ressentiment' as the moral emotion of the weak and explains how the weak have succeeded in the inversion of values. However, Nietzsche considers that 'ressentiment' have played a negative role in harming human health from the perspective of the value of life. The feeling of the incompetence inherent in 'ressentiment', at first, turned the (...) discontent toward the powerful men. But in the end it resulted to oneself, and ascetic ethics appeared. The ascetic ethics have played a role in their own way. It not only interpreted the meaning of human suffering, but also kept it from disturbance of impulses and emotions. But Nietzsche says that the ascetic ethics is far from "great health", because it excessively restrains the exertion of our nature and power. The feelings of 'ressentiment' still remain in the ascetic ethics and make a life heavy. A sinful Life itself can never be a cheerful life. It is Nietzsche's idea that you can not really feel the cheerful emotion without departing from the moral duties and self-condemnation. Nietzsche suggests that "emotions of power" should be exercised to the maximum, unlike the ascetic who want to suppress emotions as much as possible. He believes that man must be completely free from moral obligations and guilt in order to experience these emotions. For Nietzsche, 'cheerfulness' is an emotion that comes to free humans completely free from moral duty. Man must unleash the yoke of life that forces only truth and good. Nietzsche says that "great health" comes when man seeks strength and beauty. 'Cheerfulness' is the signal that "great health" is coming. The restoration of 'cheerfulness' from the feelings of 'ressentiment' is a new challenge of Nietzsche's philosophy. (shrink)

In psychological research, ressentiment is alluded to as a negative emotional response directed at social groups that are mostly marked as ‘inferior others’. However, conceptual work on this notion is sorely missing. In our conceptual proposal, we use the notion of ‘moral emotions’ as a starting point: typically referred to as “other-condemning” moral emotions (Haidt), psychologists have loosely conceptualised anger, contempt and disgust as a set of negative emotions that have distinct elicitors and involve affective responses to sanction moral misconduct (...) of ‘others’. Though this conglomerate of different other-condemning emotions might describe emotions of ressentiment, we argue that the phenomenon itself is a more complex sentiment. Therefore, we apply Withy’s concept of ‘disclosive posture’ to account for the different psychological processes underlying ressentiment. Disclosing refers to a specific openness to the world, which in the case of ressentiment implies a specific awareness of and sensibility for instances of inequality, grudge, or disfavour. Ressentiment thus becomes a perceptual tool in morally relevant everyday situations. The term ‘posture’ refers to a habitualised, embodied comportment or action tendency that leads to the adoption of a negative attitude and stance towards others. Drawing on Withy, we discuss ressentiment’s similarities (and differences) to the closely related concept of hatred (Szanto, Vendrell Ferran) to embed the analysis of ressentiment in a broader social framework. (shrink)

_Ressentiment_—the hateful desire for revenge—plays a pivotal role in Nietzsche’s _On the Genealogy of Morals_. _Ressentiment _explains the formation of bad conscience, guilt, asceticism, and, most importantly, it motivates the "slave revolt" that gives rise to Western morality’s values. _Ressentiment_, however, has not enjoyed a thorough treatment in the secondary literature. This book brings it sharply into focus and provides the first detailed examination of Nietzsche’s psychology of _ressentiment_. Unlike other books on the _Genealogy_, it uses (...) _ressentiment_ as a key to the _Genealogy_ and focuses on the intriguing relationship between _ressentiment_ and justice. It shows how _ressentiment_, despite its blindness to justice, gives rise to moral justice—the central target of Nietzsche’s critique. This critique notwithstanding, the _Genealogy_ shows Nietzsche’s enduring commitment to the virtue of _non-moral_ justice: a commitment that grounds his provocative view that moral justice spells the ‘end of justice’. The result provides a novel view of Nietzsche's moral psychology in the _Genealogy_, his critique of morality, and his views on justice. (shrink)

Nietzsche famously discusses a psychological condition he calls ressentiment, a condition involving toxic, vengeful anger. I offer a free-standing theory in philosophical psychology of the familiar...

In Nietzsche's Psychology of Ressentiment, Guy Elgat develops an interpretation of some of the central themes of Nietzsche's GM, which is one of his most systematic works and a pivotal part of his critique of the modern moral outlook that grew out of Christianity. Elgat's original approach is framed by two fundamental ideas: first, Nietzsche takes the concept of "moral justice" to be central to the morality he sets out to criticize; second, Nietzsche's suspicion toward moral justice is rooted (...) in its association with the affect of ressentiment. Thus, Elgat notes that ressentiment is frequently supposed either to express a sense of justice, or to... (shrink)

This monograph constitutes a response to the criticisms of Christianity outlined in Nietzsche's GENEOLOGY OF MORALS, in which Nietzsche argues that Christianity is a "slave revolt" of the weak--an attempt by the impotent to bring down the vitality of the capable nobility. Scheler's response is multi-faceted but centers on Nietzsche's failure to understand the nature of Christian love. Christianity is not a destructive enterprise trying to bring everyone down to the same low level of its impotent faithful, who must put (...) their trust in the next world because they can get nowhere in this one. Rather, it attempts constructively to bring everyone up to a new level of human flourishing. Christianity's preoccupation with the poor, weak, and marginalized stems from a recognition, through divine love, of the miracle of God's creation and infinite possibilities present even in them. (shrink)

In this paper I track the deployment of Friedrich Nietzsche’s concept of ressentiment by three major thinkers in postcolonial theory, namely Frantz Fanon, Edward Said and Achille Mbembe. My argument is that while postcolonial theory has used ressentiment in a captivating way, which may have the potential for accounting for how contemporary moral culture conditions racism, nativism and xenophobia, the deployment remains incoherent. The postcolonial deployment of ressentiment begins with an incoherent reading of Nietzsche by Fanon, a mistake which is (...) creatively appropriated by Said and Mbembe. As ressentiment travels into the postcolony Nietzsche’s insights are discarded and the term is transformed through Hegelian and psychoanalytic schematics that take morality to be a universal and prescriptive code, the very problem that Nietzsche was attempting to overcome. For Fanon, ressentiment explains how colonial projection or the racial gaze is internalized by the colonized subject to produce a relation... (shrink)

This project attempts a joint reading of the work of Friedrich Nietzsche and Frantz Fanon. This task, however, is problematic because this body of work is in tension or contradictory. These problems are so acute that a careful reading method is necessary to successfully carry out this reading. In order to facilitate this reading I elaborate and apply a particular philosophical methodology, Mestizaje. The methodology is intended to address works that are contradictory by attempting to read the texts as they (...) are presented while at the same time balancing their positions. The goal is to honestly reflect the thought of each thinker and to illuminate a perspective that incorporates but transcends their respective positions. What the application of Methodological Mestizaje finds is that while Nietzsche and Fanon stand in tension to one another, their respective works share several interesting and important convergences. In particular, they share thoughts on ressentiment, morality and violence. With ressentiment, Nietzsche creates the concept and two manifestations of it, while Fanon works with the concept to develop a third manifestation of this form of moral valuation. Furthermore, their works share the view that morality and violence are fundamental to understanding the origin, development and possible overcoming of a morality. This work contributes to the area of Africana Studies by offering a picture of Nietzsche that addresses concerns of these areas of study. Additionally, Methodological Mestizaje intends to follow in the tradition of non-ideal theory. Finally, while each thinker contributes to the discussion of ressentiment, morality and violence, their positions taken together reveal a broad and thorough perspective on colonialism and its concomitant morality, including their inception, and consequent progression and persistence in the current world. (shrink)

A critical discussion of Bernard Reginster's book The Will to Nothingness. The contribution engages with Reginster's interpretation of Nietzschean ressentiment, arguing that it is an essentially interpersonal attitude in two different senses. It is a response to a social situation of structural deprivation, and it involves an element of antagonism toward those who are better off within this social structure. The contribution then discusses Reginster's claim that modern morality restores the sense of power of the masses by adjusting the (...) goals that they aim to pursue. I argue that this interesting interpretation does not do full justice to the themes of hostility or hatred that permeate the Genealogy of Morals, extending from Nietzsche's discussion of the slave revolt to his treatments of the bad conscience and of ascetic ideals. (shrink)

Nietzsche's thinking on justice and punishment explores the motives and forces which lie behind moral concepts and social institutions. His dialogue with several writers of his time is discussed here. Eugen Dühring had argued that a natural feeling of ressentiment against those who have harmed us is the source of the concept of injustice, so that punishment, even in its most impersonal form, is always a form of revenge. In attacking this theory, Nietzsche developed his own powerful critique of moral (...) concepts such as responsibility and guilt. He borrowed his ‘historical’ approach to moral concepts from Paul Ree, who suggested that the utilitarian function of punishment had been obscured by its practice, which appears to be directly linked with moral guilt. Nietzsche responds that punishment has quite different purposes and meanings at different times, so that any single explanation or justification is inadequate. In this way, he rejects the pre-suppositions common to the retributivists and utilitarians of his time. (shrink)

A free and lucid translation of Scheler's first mature work on social and ethical theory. It represents an imaginative reinterpretation of Nietzsche's concept of "ressentiment," the structural key to the phenomenon of "slave morality." Generously sprinkled with apt illustrations, Ressentiment is a sustained attack on the notions of "work" and the "universal love of mankind" as ultimate sources of value. Such ressentiment-laden social tendencies are seen to form the faulty cornerstone of modern morality, both bourgeois and socialist.--K. R. (...) D. (shrink)

In den ersten Kapiteln werde ich ein ethologisches Modell von Körperlichkeit vorstellen, in dem Körper, ganz im Sinne Spinozas, als lokale Bestandteile eines weltweiten Gefüges gedacht werden. Körper sind demnach keine von ihrer Umgebung isolierbaren Substanzen, in ihnen treten vielmehr Sach-Verhalte in Erscheinung, denen ein systemisches Selbsterhaltungsstreben (conatus) innewohnt. Der den Körpern immanente Appetit, sich in ihrem Sein zu erhalten, bezieht sich daher nicht nur auf die Selbsterhaltung des eigenen Organismus, sondern auf die systemische Erhaltung des eigenen In-der-Welt-Seins, das ein (...) Organismus mit seiner Umwelt teilt. In den darauffolgenden Kapiteln analysiere ich die dunkle Alchemie, die Körper erleiden, wenn ihr Appetit, sich in ihrem Sein zu erhalten, durch äußere Ursachen gehemmt und schließlich vergiftet wird. Eine Dynamik, die Nietzsche in seiner Streitschrift Zur Genealogie der Moral treffend als Wille zum Nichts charakterisiert hatte. In ihr verkehrt sich der Lebenswille in einen Hass auf das Leben, der sich am Leben zu rächen beginnt, indem er es verdammt. Diesem destruktiven, selbstwidersprüchlichen Willen zum Nichts setzt Spinoza im fünften Buch seiner Ethik eine Glückseligkeitslehre entgegen, die den Geist der Rache immunisiert, indem sie an der Hervorbringung freudvoller Lebensverhältnisse arbeitet. Nicht der dialektische Kampf gegen das Ressentiment und seine destruktive Dynamik steht daher im Zentrum seiner Ethik. Es ist vielmehr die Kultivierung aktiver Affekte – Affekte der Freude, Liebe und Selbstzufriedenheit –, die für Spinoza das Ende der Hass- und Gewaltspirale versprechen. Damit zieht er die Konsequenzen aus der Einsicht, dass ein Affekt nur durch einen anderen, stärkeren Affekt gehemmt und schließlich außer Kraft gesetzt werden kann: Hass durch tiefgründige Liebeserfahrungen, Ressentiment durch freudvolle Erfahrungen. (shrink)

In this paper I apply Friedrich Nietzsche’s critique of European morality to the Western colonial context. I specifically focus attention on his notions of ressentiment and slave morality, and how his critique implicates these as being exported and imposed upon the people Western powers colonized. However, the process of colonization reveals that the imposed morality is transformed into a distinct type of ressentiment that Nietzsche does not to consider. I call this type of ressentiment “colonial ressentiment” in (...) distinction to Nietzsche’s slave morality. To provide the content to clearly distinguish colonial ressentiment from that of slave morality, I utilize Frantz Fanon’s description of the colonial drama to help illuminate their differences. To conclude the paper, I discuss some of the upshots of colonial ressentiment and their relation to present day struggles. (shrink)

The rise of populism, cynicism, fanaticism and fundamentalism challenges us to reconsider the problem of ressentiment, characterized by Friedrich Nietzsche in 'On the Genealogy of Morals' (1887) as the self-poisoning of the will by interiorization of trauma in the form of a postponed and imaginary revenge. The concept of ressentiment is now making a comeback in political discourse"-- Back cover.

Ressentiment—the affectively charged desire for revenge that arises in response to a perceived injury1—is for Nietzsche a concept of central psychological explanatory significance, and thus makes up one of Nietzsche’s most important analytic tools in his attempt to delve into the human psyche and fathom its depth. As Walter Kaufmann says, it “constitutes one of [Nietzsche’s] major contributions to psychology.”2 As such, it has been justly awarded ample attention by scholars in the secondary literature. However, while Nietzsche’s employment of ressentiment (...) in the first essay of the On the Genealogy of Morals has been widely addressed and analyzed,3 Nietzsche’s discussion of this psychic force in the... (shrink)

The concept of ressentiment is increasingly being drawn upon to analyse current political developments, but in doing so it is important to have a clear understanding of its original meaning in the work of Nietzsche and Scheler, who applied it to the inner logic of democracy, rather than political movements opposed to liberal democracy. This article introduces an important essay written in 1937, ‘National Socialism as a doctrine of rancour’, by the Dutch modernist writer, Menno ter Braak. Despite having been (...) highly influential in Dutch literature and scholarship, he is virtually unknown in the Anglophone world, since none of his work has been translated. This article is an important contribution both as a rare examination of how ressentiment can be used to analyse 1930s National Socialism, and as an analysis of the role of ressentiment as a moral sentiment in democratic politics, especially its populist variants. (shrink)

La 4e de couv. indique : "Prenant le contrepied de l'interprétation nietzschéenne plutôt dépréciative du ressentiment, qui cadrait avec un certain souci de défendre les privilèges de l'aristocratie, cet essai suggère une interprétation juridique du ressentiment permettant d'en faire ressortir les aspects positifs. La démarche convie à un parcours en trois étapes. La première conduit de la définition que Spinoza donna de la haine en général au sentiment d'injustice, qui est un motif de haine particulier. La définition de l'injustice, correspondant (...) chez Aristote à des cas de haine donnant lieu à une colère justifiée, permet, à rebours, d'identifier et de déprécier la haine qui ne répond pas à cette définition. Se dévoile ainsi déjà en filigrane le discret génie du ressentiment. La deuxième étape chemine du sentiment d'injustice au ressentiment et permet de distinguer, à partir du critère du droit, le ressentiment de l'indignation. Si l'interprétation de Nietzsche approfondissait la distinction entre le ressentiment et l'acquiescement, l'interprétation juridique conduit à souligner la distinction entre le ressentiment et l'indignation. Redéfini comme sentiment du droit et sentiment juridique d'injustice, le ressentiment fait l'objet d'une réhabilitation dans le dernier temps de cet essai qui est aussi l'occasion d'aborder les relations entre droit et politique, droit et science, justice et amour et de réfléchir aux liens entre ressentiment, indignation et droits de l'homme à l'âge démocratique. En intégrant la vision de Jhering, qui faisait de la paix le but du droit et de la lutte le moyen de l'atteindre, en cherchant à corriger « l'erreur » de Nietzsche par Nietzsche, le droit, sous le rapport de ses liaisons avec les affects, pourrait peut-être se définir comme une arme morale, sociale et politique, plongée dans les complexions de la haine, qui sépare le ressentiment de l'indignation, la domination du premier ayant pour effet de modérer ou de subjuguer la seconde..". (shrink)

In On the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche exposes christianity as the product of the slave morality and its resentment. Nietzsche’s exposure provoked different reactions. In Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen from 1913 Max Scheler shows, in contrast to Nietzsche, that the quintessence of christian ethics does not arise from resentment. More interesting than Scheler’s rebuttal of Nietzsche is the reaction from the French-American thinker René Girard. Girard does not only criticize Nietzsche’s analysis, but goes as well into (...) the both paradoxal and crucial point that resentment is, on the one hand, intertwined with christian culture and, on the other, is at odds with christian inspiration. I would like to present Girard’s rebuttal of Nietzsche in two steps. First, I outline the background of Girard’s view on the relation between myth and christianity, taking his interpretation of the function of the scapegoat mechanism in premodern mythical religions as a starting-point. According to Girard, christianity functions as the exposure of premodern mythical religions, rejecting as it does the foundational role of the scapegoat mechanism as a means of canalising violence, inherent to mimetic desire. It is not christianity’s intent to canalize violence by means of limited violence, but precisely to expose violence. By making obvious that christianity did not succeed in doing this – by giving a philosophical analysis of the role of christianity in Western culture Girard shows that christianity has succeeded only in wounding violence, not in eliminating it and, as a consequence, has cleared the way for resentment – he is able to demonstrate that resentment is the child of christianity, not its father. Subsequently I outline Girard’s view on the role of mimetic desire in modern culture. Instead of canalizing mimetic desire by means of the scapegoat mechanism, modern Western culture unchains mimetic desire by means of the free market principle of competition. External mediation, which is typical of premodern mythical-religious cultures, is now being replaced by internal mediation, which is guided by economic principles. As such, resentment is going to determine modern culture from within. Hence, christianity will, as an integral part of modern culture, be likely to fall a prey to this resentment. Finally, I conclude by going into the challenge christianity, squeezed as it were between religious claims on the one hand and modern presuppositions on the other, has to cope with: how can it overcome resentment, of which it undoubtedly bears the fruits and which it simultaneously radically rejects? (shrink)

In recent work, Bernard Reginster argues for an interpretation of the relationship between morality and the affects in Nietzsche which he calls ‘sentimental pragmatism’. According to this view, the values, value judgments, and moral practices agents develop and adopt function to serve specific affective needs. Reginster deploys this interpretation to argue for a functional interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, according to which all three essays of the Genealogy comprise psychological studies designed to uncover Christian (...) class='Hi'>morality’s function to serve the affect of ressentiment. In this paper, I first develop Reginster’s sentimental pragmatism by specifying a need to feel powerful as the one affective need which all moral developments aim to serve on Nietzsche’s view. Then, I argue that while Reginster’s functional interpretation of the Genealogy makes sense of key moral phenomena discussed in the first and third essays, it works less well to explain key developments in the second essay. I then suggest that my power-based sentimental pragmatism does better in this regard, allowing us to identify one basic function of morality that Nietzsche intends to uncover in all three essays of the Genealogy, one basic affective need it aims to serve: the need to feel powerful. (shrink)

La Généalogie de la Morale appartient aux oeuvres de la maturité de Friedrich Nietzsche, puisqu'elle a été publiée en 1887, après Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra. Dans cet essai, le penseur allemand traite de philosophie morale, cherchant à retracer l'origine de nos conceptions morales: selon lui, les valeurs prennent leur source dans la morale chrétienne, qu'il tient pour une morale du ressentiment, une morale d'esclave, dont il faut se libérer: la morale du surhomme sera ainsi une morale de la libération. Le livre (...) est structuré en trois essais, ce qui le rend un peu plus accessible que certains oeuvres écrites en aphorismes et déliées, comme le Gai Savoir. (shrink)

William Remley traces the ascent of the alt-right movement to its prominent place in American politics. Social Dominance Theory and the philosophical work of Sartre and Nietzsche are used to look at how group formation and hierarchies have given rise to the authoritarian leadership and the anti-foreign sentiment that rules American politics today.

Written at the height of the philosopher's intellectual powers, Friedrich Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_ has become one of the key texts of recent Western philosophy. Its essayistic style affords a unique opportunity to observe many of Nietzsche's persisting concerns coming together in an illuminating constellation. A profound influence on psychoanalysis, antihistoricism, and poststructuralism and an abiding challenge to ethical theory, Nietzsche's book addresses many of the major philosophical problems and possibilities of modernity. In this unique collection focusing on (...) the _Genealogy_, twenty-five notable philosophers offer diverse discussions of the book's central themes and concepts. They explore such notions as _ressentiment_, asceticism, "slave" and "master" moralities, and what Nietzsche calls "genealogy" and its relation to other forms of inquiry in his work. The book presents a cross section of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship and philosophical investigation that is certain to interest philosophers, intellectual and cultural historians, and anyone concerned with one of the master thinkers of the modern age. (shrink)

Written at the height of the philosopher's intellectual powers, Friedrich Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_ has become one of the key texts of recent Western philosophy. Its essayistic style affords a unique opportunity to observe many of Nietzsche's persisting concerns coming together in an illuminating constellation. A profound influence on psychoanalysis, antihistoricism, and poststructuralism and an abiding challenge to ethical theory, Nietzsche's book addresses many of the major philosophical problems and possibilities of modernity. In this unique collection focusing on (...) the _Genealogy_, twenty-five notable philosophers offer diverse discussions of the book's central themes and concepts. They explore such notions as _ressentiment_, asceticism, "slave" and "master" moralities, and what Nietzsche calls "genealogy" and its relation to other forms of inquiry in his work. The book presents a cross section of contemporary Nietzsche scholarship and philosophical investigation that is certain to interest philosophers, intellectual and cultural historians, and anyone concerned with one of the master thinkers of the modern age. (shrink)

On the Genealogy of Morality is Nietzsche's most influential book but it continues to puzzle, not least in its central claim: the invention of Christian morality is an act of revenge, and it is as such that it should arouse critical suspicion. In The Will to Nothingness, Bernard Reginster makes a fresh attempt at understanding this claim and its significance, inspired by Nietzsche's claim that moralities are 'signs' or 'symptoms' of the affective states of moral agents. The relation (...) between morality and affects is envisioned as functional, rather than expressive: the genealogy of Christian morality aims to reveal how it is well suited to serve certain emotional needs. One particular emotional need, manifested in the affect of ressentiment, plays a prominent role in the analysis of Christian morality. This is the need to have the world reflect one's will, which is rooted in a special drive toward power, or toward bending the world to one's will. Revenge is plausibly understood as aiming to bolster or restore power, and the invention of new values is a particular way to do so: by altering the agent's will, it alters what counts as power for her. By revealing how it is well suited to play such a functional role in the emotional economy of moral agents, the genealogical inquiries arouse critical suspicion toward Christian morality. The use of this moral outlook as an instrument of revenge is problematic not because it is immoral, but because it is functionally self-undermining. (shrink)

While it is uncontroversial that the slave revolt in morality consists in a denial of the nobles as objects of value, Nietzsche’s account in the Genealogy’s first essay invites ambiguities concerning its origin, ressentiment’s relationship to value creation, and its meaning. In this paper, I address these ambiguities by analyzing the morality of good and evil as an historical artifact of Judeo-Christian tradition, and I argue for a two-stage, non-strategic interpretation of the slave revolt, according to which Judaism (...) and Christianity each made essential and different contributions. The inversion of values began with the Jewish prophets, who claimed the poor were holy and ‘good’ and the rich ‘evil’, and it was sustained throughout the Second Temple period by the Jewish priests in relation to a ‘priestly-noble’ conception of the virtuous person as holy and pure. Christ, through his espousal of egalitarianism, negated the pathos of distance essential to noble values, thus beginning the second phase of the slave revolt where goodness became associated with a distinctly slavish conception of virtue. (shrink)

Normativity and the Will collects fourteen important papers on moral psychology and practical reason by R. Jay Wallace, one of the leading philosophers currently working in these areas.The papers explore the interpenetration of normative and psychological issues in a series of debates that lie at the heart of moral philosophy. Part I, Reason, Desire, and the Will, discusses the nexus linking normativity to motivation, including the relations between desire and reasons, the role of normative considerations in explanations of action, and (...) the normative commitments involved in willing an end. Part II, Responsibility, Identification, and Emotion, looks at questions about the rational capacities presupposed by accountable agency and the psychic factors that both inhibit and enable identification with what we do. It includes an interpretation of the Nietzschean claim that ressentiment is among the sources of modern moral consciousness. Part III, Morality and Other Normative Domains, addresses the structure of moral reasons and moral motivation, and the relations between moral demands and other normative domains. Wallace's treatments of these topics are at once sophisticated and engaging. Taken together, they constitute an advertisement for a distinctive way of pursuing issues in moral psychology and the theory of practical reason. The book articulates and defends a unified framework for thinking about those issues, while offering sustained critical discussions of other influential approaches. It should be of interest to every serious student of moral philosophy. (shrink)

Nietzsche’s injunction to examine “the value of values” can be heard in a pragmatic key, as inviting us to consider not whether certain values are true, but what they do for us. This oddly neglected pragmatic approach to Nietzsche now receives authoritative support from Bernard Reginster’s new book, which offers a compelling and notably cohesive interpretation of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality. In this essay, I reconstruct Reginster's account of Nietzsche’s critique of morality as a “self-undermining functionality (...) critique” and raise three problems for it: (i) Is there room within an etiological conception of function for the notion of self-undermining functionality? (ii) If Nietzsche’s critique is internal and based solely on the function it ascribes to morality, where does that critique derive its normative significance from? (iii) Does Reginster’s account not make out ascetic morality to be more universally dysfunctional than it in fact is, given that some priestly types have done remarkably well out of morality? (shrink)

The first essay of Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals seeks to uncover the roots of Judeo-Christian morality, and to expose it as born from a resentful and feeble peasant class intent on taking revenge upon their aristocratic oppressors. There is a broad consensus in the secondary literature that the ‘slave revolt’ which gives birth to this morality occurs in the 1st century AD, and is propogated by the inhabitants of Roman occupied Judea. Nietzsche himself strongly suggests such (...) a view. However, in a telling later passage from Ecce Homo, Nietzsche claims that the hsitorical Zarathustra—a Bronze age iranian religious thinker—was the first to consider the opposite of Good vs. Evil; that “Zarathustra created this most fateful of errors, morality” (EH, 'Destiny', §3). However, Nietzsche does not discuss Zarathustra or Zoroastrianism in his critique of moral values and their origin. This creates a prima facie tension. If at least part of what essentially characterises 'morality' preceded Judeo-Christianity, are moral values only contingently related to the feelings of ressentiment essential to Nietzsche’s story of the slave revolt? If the answer is 'yes', then the scope of Nietzsche's critique of morality may be somewhat limited. If the answer is 'no', then we require an answer as to why Nietzsche's genealogy—if it is an exercise in ascertaining the “real history of morality” (GM, Pref: §7)—does not extend further back in history. In this paper, I explore how the extent of Nietzsche's knowledge of Zoroastrianism informs his critique of slave morality in On the Genealogy of Morals. I argue that Nietzsche views the historical Zarathustra—like Socrates and Plato—as a forerunner of ‘morality’ in his creative conception of good and evil in metaphysical terms. From here, it is argued that the proposed tension can be dissolved by viewing Judeo-Christian morality merely as the latest and paradigmatic expression of slave morality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's by Bernard ReginsterRobert GuayBernard Reginster, The Will to Nothingness: An Essay on Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morality New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. viii + 202 pp. isbn: 978-0-19-886890-3. Cloth, $80.00.One might imagine making a rough division between two different modes of modern European philosophy. In one, the way that the world seems to proceed belies the actual (...) ground of things; the task of philosophy is to uncover the sources of our misunderstanding and identify the categories that account for genuinely real processes. The other mode of philosophy questions the determinacy and stability of the categories through which we make sense of the world. Here the task of philosophy is not to settle on the right categories or the actual ground, but to gain some purchase on our confusions and self-deceptions when we try to make sense of things. There may be some philosophers (Hegel and Wittgenstein, perhaps) who try to straddle the divide here. But in general the divide is great enough that if an interpreter mistakes one mode for the other it would be costly: no matter how circumspect the particular claims are, all the interpretive results will be misguided. Something like this, I want to claim, is the case with Bernard Reginster's The Will to Nothingness.There are many detailed discussions in Reginster's book. For the purpose of this review, however, I want to focus on the general critical argument, [End Page 104] in part because there is already at least one excellent review of the book (Mark Migotti's in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, June 1, 2022), and in part because I think it goes wrong at the level of its entire approach. On Reginster's account GM is composed of a series of "psychological studies" (3) of a version of Christian morality and its central aspects. These psychological studies treat moral judgments as symptoms of affective states, and in this way uncover the functional role that moralities play in the affective lives of agents. Moralities are "designed" (12), as it were, for emotional regulation. Christian morality, in particular, expresses the ressentiment of those beset by feelings of impotence and serves their will to power. Genealogical critique proceeds by uncovering the actual function of morality and then showing how well (or rather poorly) morality fulfills its proper function. Moral beliefs are supposed to enhance the agents' feeling of power, but instead work to sicken and enervate them, and indeed morality "incites" (46) such a pernicious functioning.While I am sympathetic to the idea that genealogy offers a functional assessment of morality, I think that Reginster has taken the wrong approach here. So now I want to draw a broad contrast between Reginster's approach and an alternative one, and then offer six sets of reasons for favoring the alternative approach.On Reginster's account, Nietzsche is interested in specifying and analyzing a precise conception of morality, with all of its attendant normative judgments, metaethical commitments, characteristic beliefs about moral psychology, and so on. These features were all, as constitutive of the morality in question, familiar to the believers in that morality. The purpose, then, of a historical account of origins is to give a unitary explanation for the adoption of the morality in terms of a single underlying affective condition and drive. Agents adopt moralities because, whether they realize it or not, holding moral beliefs facilitates a form of emotional self-regulation. To criticize these beliefs Nietzsche makes a sort of inverted teleological argument. He identifies the essential function of the beliefs and shows that they work against the fulfillment of their own function.Here, by contrast, is a different way of thinking about what Nietzsche is doing. He is not interested in explaining the moral beliefs of reflective, fully developed agents. Instead, he wants to explain how the semantic resources that contribute to morality could have become available at all. The puzzle, for Nietzsche, is how the basic terms of morality could ever even seem to make sense. So the historical account of genealogy is meant to suggest [End Page 105] social... (shrink)

In this edition of two of Nietzsche's late works, Kaufmann has written a short introduction to each work and included indices for each work. There is an appendix to the Genealogy consisting of Kaufmann's translations of the aphorisms from earlier works which Nietzsche alludes to in the Genealogy. Also included is an appendix of discarded drafts of parts of Ecce Homo. In addition to a readable translation, Kaufmann has written a running commentary in the form of short footnotes which become (...) more expansive in one section of the Genealogy which deals with intellectual conscience and with truth. The Genealogy is intended by Nietzsche to be a sequel to and clarification of Beyond Good and Evil. It deals with such themes as master morality as opposed to slave morality, bad conscience, ressentiment, and ascetic ideals. Ecce Homo is Nietzsche's commentary on himself, his books, and his intellectual development. In the introductions, Kaufmann pleas for responsible scholarship when dealing with Nietzsche and rails against what he considers to be a conspiracy of malicious misinterpretations that have sought to discredit Nietzsche. He criticizes views that would disregard Ecce Homo as an insanely disfigured self-portrait. He also rejects interpretations of the Genealogy which suppose that Nietzsche would lump together as evils slave morality, bad conscience, and ascetic ideals. Kaufmann's admiration for Nietzsche is undisguised, and he admits a special fondness for Ecce Homo.—S. O. H. (shrink)

In this essay I evaluate a new and influential interpretation of Nietzsche’s idea of the slave revolt in morality. This interpretation was first proposed by Bernard Reginster and has since been extended by R. Lanier Anderson and Avery Snelson. Citing textual evidence from Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morality, these scholars have argued for the counterintuitive view that nobles, not slaves, instigated the slave revolt in morality. This is because Nietzsche says that nobles (...) create new values, introduces priests as nobles, and claims that priests began the slave revolt. However, against this new approach I argue that these scholars neglect important evidence from these same texts in which Nietzsche claims that the psychologically slavish can also create values, assumes that politically subordinated nobles can lose their psychological nobility, and asserts that the slave revolt was instigated by psychologically slavish priests. I also argue that these scholars ignore Nietzsche’s related claims that the priestly peasant Luther renewed the Jewish slave revolt against re-ascendant Roman nobles and that the plebeian philosopher Socrates led a slave revolt in morality against the Athenian nobles. Thus, it turns out that none of the leaders of the slave revolt were noble and that one of them was not even priestly. I conclude with a defense of the traditional and straightforward view that Nietzsche always conceived of the slave revolt in morality as an act of revenge by oppressed people who are politically and psychologically ignoble. (shrink)

Work on representing women's voices in ethics has produced a vision of moral understanding profoundly subversive of the traditional philosophical conception of moral knowledge. 1 explicate this alternative moral “epistemology,” identify how it challenges the prevailing view, and indicate some of its resources for a liberatory feminist critique of philosophical ethics.

Despite the attention paid to the artistic and literary dimensions of Nietzsche’s writings, the literary structure of On the Genealogy of Morality has received little attention. In this article I examine the literary structure of GM’s first treatise. This study shows that Nietzsche structured the treatise simultaneously as a descent to the depths of ressentiment-fueled hatred, and as an ascent bringing its readers from self-ignorance to the beginnings of self-knowledge. The treatise’s structure responds to the preface’s twofold genealogical question (...) on the historical origins of modern moral values, and on their real worth. In GM I:1–8 Nietzsche addresses the first part of the question, while in GM I:10–17 he addresses its second part. The free spirit’s objection in GM I:9, I argue, is the hinge upon which GM I turns, and which brings the treatise to the question of the real worth of moral values. (shrink)

La publicación de Filosofía de la aritmética (1891) trajo consigo un notable avance en las investigaciones fenomenológicas de E. Husserl, a la vez que se abrió paso entre las indagaciones ya existentes sobre la fundamentación de las matemáticas. Fue precisamente dentro de esta constelación de publicaciones donde se originó una de las polémicas filosóficas más interesantes de las postrimerías del siglo XIX: la recensión de Filosofía de la aritmética hecha por Frege en 1894. Lo que ofreceré en este texto son (...) algunas claves de interpretación que permitirán hacer una revisión juiciosa de aquellos aspectos filosóficos no vistos por Frege en su crítica. Todo ello a través del intercambio epistolar entre ambos, de la exposición de la reseña de 1894 y de las recensiones de Filosofía de la aritmética que han permanecido desconocidas hasta ahora. PALABRAS CLAVE: Filosofía de la aritmética, Fenomenología, Filosofía analítica, Husserl, Frege. (shrink)

El presente artículo intentará mostrar el punto de transición que se da en el pensamiento merleau-pontyano entre un primado de la percepción y una rehabilitación ontológica de lo sensible. Dicho punto se refiere a una prioridad ontológica del mundo percibido, el cual pone de manifiesto el paso hacia una ontología de lo percibido, hacia la descripción del ser de lo percibido. Con ello podremos dar cuenta de la exposición del propio autor del modo en cómo la percepción puede ser entendida (...) como un verdadero acceso al ser: el primado de la percepción abarcaría una prioridad propiamente ontológica. El objetivo principal de esta investigación se situará en la exposición de una red conceptual que nos permita dar cuenta del fenómeno perceptivo que no sólo nos proporciona el mundo, tal y como se le aparece al sujeto, sino que intenta ir más allá del aspecto visible, intentará dar cuenta del ser de lo percibido. Expresar, en definitiva, este circuito de incorporación donde se hallan inseridos tanto el ser como el sujeto, donde hay una co-pertenencia entre ambos. (shrink)

Current frameworks on ethical decision-making process have some limitations. This paper argues that the consideration of moral competencies, understood as moral virtues in the workplace, can enhance our understanding of why moral character contributes to ethical decision-making. After discussing the universal nature of four moral competencies (prudence, justice, fortitude and temperance), we analyse their influence on the various stages of the ethical decision-making process. We conclude by considering the managerial implications of our findings and proposing further research.

When a circular coin is rotated in depth, is there any sense in which it comes to resemble an ellipse? While this question is at the center of a rich and divided philosophical tradition (with some scholars answering affirmatively and some negatively), Morales et al. (2020, 2021) took an empirical approach, reporting 10 experiments whose results favor such perspectival similarity. Recently, Burge and Burge (2022) offered a vigorous critique of this work, objecting to its approach and conclusions on both philosophical (...) and empirical grounds. Here, we answer these objections on both fronts. We show that Burge and Burge’s critique rests on misunderstandings of Morales et al.’s claims; of the relation between the data and conclusions; and of the philosophical context in which the work appears. Specifically, Burge and Burge attribute to us a much stronger (and stranger) view than we hold, involving the introduction of “a new entity” located “in some intermediate position(s) between the distal shape and the retinal image.” We do not hold this view. Indeed, once properly understood, most of Burge and Burge’s objections favor Morales et al.’s claims rather than oppose them. Finally, we discuss several questions that remain unanswered, and reflect on a productive path forward on these issues of foundational scientific and philosophical interest. (shrink)

Our pains can be more or less intense, our mental imagery can be more or less vivid, our perceptual experiences can be more or less striking. These degrees of intensity of conscious experiences are all manifestations of a phenomenal property I call mental strength. In this article, I argue that mental strength is a domain-general phenomenal magnitude; in other words, it is a phenomenal quantity shared by all conscious experiences that explains their degree of felt intensity. Mental strength has been (...) largely overlooked in favor of mental states’ type, representational contents, domain-specific phenomenology, or processes such as attention. Considering mental strength in our reflections about the mind illuminates debates about the relation of representational contents and phenomenal character, and it also helps address questions about the structure and functions of consciousness. Mental strength provides a unifying construct to model what is shared in the phenomenology of different types of conscious experiences. (shrink)

In this chapter, we discuss a selection of current views of the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). We focus on the different predictions they make, in particular with respect to the role of prefrontal cortex (PFC) during visual experiences, which is an area of critical interest and some source of contention. Our discussion of these views focuses on the level of functional anatomy, rather than at the neuronal circuitry level. We take this approach because we currently understand more about experimental (...) evidence at this coarse level and because these results are appropriate for arbitrating between current theoretical frameworks. We discuss the Two-Visual-Systems Hypothesis (Milner & Goodale 1995; 2006), Local Recurrency (Lamme 2010; Lamme 2006), Higher Order (Lau 2008; Lau & Rosenthal 2011) and Global Workspace theories (Baars 1997; Baars 2005; Dehaene & Naccache 2001; Dehaene 2014). Despite the apparent stark differences between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing, available evidence suggests that their neural substrates must be largely shared. This indicates that the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious perceptual processing is likely to be subtle and highly specialized. We argue that current experimental evidence about the involvement of specific activity in prefrontal cortex supports the higher order neural theory of consciousness. In consequence, imaging techniques that focus only on marked differences between conscious and unconscious level of activity are likely to be insensitive to the relevant neural activity patterns that underlie conscious experiences. Finally, it follows from the evidence we discuss that the functional advantages of conscious over unconscious perceptual processing may be more limited than commonly thought. (shrink)

Arguably the most foundational principle in perception research is that our experience of the world goes beyond the retinal image; we perceive the distal environment itself, not the proximal stimulation it causes. Shape may be the paradigm case of such “unconscious inference”: When a coin is rotated in depth, we infer the circular object it truly is, discarding the perspectival ellipse projected on our eyes. But is this really the fate of such perspectival shapes? Or does a tilted coin retain (...) an elliptical appearance even when we know it’s circular? This question has generated heated debate from Locke and Hume to the present; but whereas extant arguments rely primarily on introspection, this problem is also open to empirical test. If tilted coins bear a representational similarity to elliptical objects, then a circular coin should, when rotated, impair search for a distal ellipse. Here, nine experiments demonstrate that this is so, suggesting that perspectival shapes persist in the mind far longer than traditionally assumed. Subjects saw search arrays of three-dimensional “coins,” and simply had to locate a distally elliptical coin. Surprisingly, rotated circular coins slowed search for elliptical targets, even when subjects clearly knew the rotated coins were circular. This pattern arose with static and dynamic cues, couldn’t be explained by strategic responding or unfamiliarity, generalized across shape classes, and occurred even with sustained viewing. Finally, these effects extended beyond artificial displays to real-world objects viewed in naturalistic, full-cue conditions. We conclude that objects have a remarkably persistent dual character: their objective shape “out there,” and their perspectival shape “from here.”. (shrink)

Introspection is a fundamental part of our mental lives. Nevertheless, its reliability and its underlying cognitive architecture have been widely disputed. Here, I propose a principled way to model introspection. By using time-tested principles from signal detection theory (SDT) and extrapolating them from perception to introspection, I offer a new framework for an introspective signal detection theory (iSDT). In SDT, the reliability of perceptual judgments is a function of the strength of an internal perceptual response (signal- to-noise ratio) which is, (...) to a large extent, driven by the intensity of the stimulus. In parallel to perception, iSDT models the reliability of introspective judgments as a function of the strength of an internal introspective response (signal-to-noise ratio) which is, to a large extent, driven by the intensity of conscious experiences. Thus, by modelling introspection after perception, iSDT can calibrate introspection’s reliability across a whole range of contexts. iSDT offers a novel, illuminating way of thinking about introspection and the cognitive processes that support it. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that many scholars involved in the contemporary free will debates have underappreciated the philosophical appeal of agent causation because the resources of contemporary emergentism have not been adequately introduced into the discussion. Whereas I agree that agent causation’s main problem has to do with its intelligibility, particularly with respect to the issue of how substances can be causally relevant, I argue that the notion of substance causation can be clearly articulated from an emergentist framework. According (...) to my proposal, a free agent is _a causally powerful substance that emerges in an anomic way from her constitutive mental events_, downwardly constraining, selecting and, in this way, having control on them. As we shall see, this particular concept of agent causation not only makes sense of the deep insight behind agent libertarianism, but it also provides us with the resources to solve some of the main objections that have been raised against it. It is true that here I cannot develop a complete defense of the evidential credentials of emergentism. Still, even if the considerations that follow do not serve to convince detractors of agent causal libertarian accounts of free will, they do suggest that libertarian agent causation is more promising than is typically acknowledged. (shrink)

In recent years, character traits in general and virtue-related concepts in particular have been of considerable interest to philosophers, psychological researchers, and practitioners in the business ethics field. Three approaches to character traits can be used to incorporate ethics into organizations: virtues, character strengths, and competencies. The aim of this article is to clarify the concept of character traits, or virtues, and provide a unified operational version of it for incorporation into management. To this end, we first discuss the analogy (...) among virtues, character strengths, and competencies. Then, we propose a list of moral competencies that can be implemented in competency-based human resource management. (shrink)

Metacognition is the capacity to evaluate the success of one's own cognitive processes in various domains; for example, memory and perception. It remains controversial whether metacognition relies on a domain-general resource that is applied to different tasks or if self-evaluative processes are domain specific. Here, we investigated this issue directly by examining the neural substrates engaged when metacognitive judgments were made by human participants of both sexes during perceptual and memory tasks matched for stimulus and performance characteristics. By comparing patterns (...) of fMRI activity while subjects evaluated their performance, we revealed both domain-specific and domain-general metacognitive representations. Multivoxel activity patterns in anterior prefrontal cortex predicted levels of confidence in a domain-specific fashion, whereas domain-general signals predicting confidence and accuracy were found in a widespread network in the frontal and posterior midline. The demonstration of domain-specific metacognitive representations suggests the presence of a content-rich mechanism available to introspection and cognitive control. (shrink)