The beginning of university life can be a stressful event for students. The close social relationships that they can experience can have positive effects on their well-being. The objective of this paper is to estimate the effect of perceived social support on the changes of the hedonic and eudaimonic well-being of Chilean university students during the transition from the first to the second academic year. Overall, 205 students participated with an average age of 19.14 years, evaluated during their first academic (...) year and the succeeding one. For the evaluation of perceived social support, the Spanish version of the Perceived Social Support Questionnaire “MSPSS” was used, and PERMA-profiler was used to measure hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. Changes through the time of hedonic well-being and social support and the correlations between the variables were analyzed. Changes in the perception of social support were analyzed according to four categories of hedonic well-being. The prediction of social support for eudaimonic well-being was evaluated. Results indicated that the perception of students’ social support did not change over time. Statistically significant differences were found in hedonic well-being scores in the two measurements, being significantly higher in the first measurement than in the second one. More than 50% of the participants presented a positive balance of affections. The perception of social support is associated with the two types of well-being. Students who had a high balance of affections had a greater perception of general social support than the groups of positive evolution of affections and a low balance of affections. In the case of the friends and family support dimensions, the perception in the high-balance group of affections concerning the low-scale group is greater. Improving the perception of social support increases the eudaimonic well-being of university students. The perception of support that students had during the beginning of their university life benefits their general well-being, which contributes to their mental health. (shrink)

El artículo se constituye en una exploración del pensamiento de un escritor, pensador y activista afrocostarricense Dolores Joseph Montout, específicamente en relación con el Caribe. La reconstrucción de sus ideas se basó principalmente en su obra periodística en los años treinta, en The Searchlight y The Atlantic Voice, en los cuales escribió asiduamente sobre sus principales preocupaciones referentes a la población afrocostarricense. Se recuperan tres aspectos fundamentales en su obra: a) sus inquietudes nacionalistas y su lucha por la integración y (...) ciudadanía de los afrodescendientes, b) su relación y controversias con las ideas de Marcus Garvey y la Universal Negro Improvement Association (UNIA) y los ataques producto de su posición y c) la importancia que le brinda a la educación y a la formación intelectual de los jóvenes para el crecimiento de su cultura, por ejemplo, a través delClub Literario Alpha. En las conclusiones, se evidencia lo contradictorio y lo complejo de su pensamiento y de la diversidad y diferencias de la población afrocostarricense entre 1930-1938, sus ideas nacionalistas y patrióticas, así como la importancia de proseguir con este tipo de estudios, tanto del autor como de otros pensadores y pensadoras invisibilizados enla historia del Caribe costarricense. (shrink)

In Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute, Daniel Andrés López reassembles Lukács’s philosophy of praxis on a Hegelian basis, as a conceptual-historical totality, both defending him and proposing an unprecedented, immanent critique that raises problems for Marxian philosophy as a whole.

This article offers a philological commentary on the ‘Calpurnia Cycle’ present within the letters composed by Pliny the Younger, concentrating particularly on the analysis of Ep. 7.5. The author behaves like a true elegiac lover and a loving husband, since the letters that he writes to his wife Calpurnia can be set in the context of the elegiac genre, given the lexicon and motifs present in them. Calpurnia is transformed into a scripta puella not in the sense of a metaphorical (...) figure, but in the sense of ‘literary material’. The aim is to adapt the elegiac motifs to his declared intention of creating a positive image of his persona in the world and for posterity (immortalitas) through the Epistulae. Although Pliny presents himself as similis excluso amatori, albeit while innovatively setting the scene at midday, his interest is not in the typical elegiac conduct of militia or servitium amoris, which would run counter to his self-presentation as an active and politically engaged citizen; rather, his theme is the praise of the beloved and reflections upon his own importance as a poet. (shrink)

In most domains of human life, we are willing to accept that there are experts with greater knowledge and competencies that distinguish them from non-experts or laypeople. Despite this fact, the very recognition of expertise curiously becomes more controversial in the case of “moral experts”. Do moral experts exist? And, if they indeed do, are there ethical reasons for us to follow their advice? Likewise, can emerging technological developments broaden our very concept of moral expertise? In this article, we begin (...) by arguing that the objections that have tried to deny the existence (and convenience) of moral expertise are unsatisfactory. After that, we show that people have ethical reasons to ask for a piece of moral advice in daily life situations. Then, we argue that some Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems can play an increasing role in human morality by becoming moral experts. Some AI-based moral assistants can qualify as artificial moral experts and we would have good ethical reasons to use them. (shrink)

Filosofía latinoamericana es para mí una expresión que describe un estilo de reflexión, esto es, la manera como el filósofo responde a las exigencias de su situación con los elementos que tiene 'a la mano' comprendiendo, es decir, creando proyectos. Permítanme aclarar lo que entiendo por estilo.

Most philosophers would agree that loving one’s romantic partner (i.e., being in love) is, in principle, a good thing. That is, romantic love can be valuable. It seems plausible that most would then think that the process leading to being in love—i.e. falling in love—can be valuable too. Surprisingly, that is not the case: among philosophers, falling in love has a bad reputation. Whereas philosophy of love has started to depart from traditional (and often unwarranted or false) tropes surrounding romantic (...) life, this tendency has not yet reached the analysis of falling in love. The phenomenon continues to be looked at mostly through a compendium of generalisations taken as metaphysical truths—the view of falling in love being akin to “losing one’s mind” or “not being able to think about anything else”. Here, I analyse some of these generalisations to show that although they may reflect some experiences of what falling in love feels like, they wrongly reduce falling in love to two related, but distinct, phenomena: limerence and infatuation. My aim is to refine the current terminology to lay the foundations for a neutral view of falling in love. (shrink)

El presente ensayo resume la crítica del filósofo Gilbert Simondon al antropocentrismo moderno y a las concepciones sobre la técnica desarrolladas en el siglo XX por ciertas corrientes filosóficas que provienen, según él, de lo que denomina un humanismo fácil, que circunscriben el desarrollo técnico a la racionalidad instrumental y a la distinción entre medios y fines. La propuesta de Simondon para salir del marco de estas visiones que considera reduccionistas, es ampliar nuestra mirada sobre la técnica, no centrarnos en (...) la relación entre medios y fines y adentrarnos en el conocimiento sobre los modos de existencia de los objetos técnicos. La mirada de Simondon nos invita a repensar nuestra relación con la técnica y, más allá incluso, a revisar nuestras concepciones ontológicas inclinándose por las que hoy conocemos como ontologías relacionales. La técnica para el filósofo francés es un puente entre nuestro pasado ritual y nuestra actualidad que persiste en la co-existencia de todos los seres, vivos y no vivos que conforman el tecno ecosistema. (shrink)

This book tells the story of the Scientific Buddha, "born" in Europe in the 1800s but commonly confused with the Buddha born in India 2,500 years ago. The Scientific Buddha was sent into battle against Christian missionaries, who were proclaiming across Asia that Buddhism was a form of superstition. He proved the missionaries wrong, teaching a dharma that was in harmony with modern science. And so his influence continues. Today his teaching of "mindfulness" is heralded as the cure for all (...) manner of maladies, from depression to high blood pressure.In this potent critique, a well-known chronicler of the West's encounter with Buddhism demonstrates how the Scientific Buddha's teachings deviate in crucial ways from those of the far older Buddha of ancient India. Donald Lopez shows that the Western focus on the Scientific Buddha threatens to bleach Buddhism of its vibrancy, complexity, and power, even as the superficial focus on "mindfulness" turns Buddhism into merely the latest self-help movement. The Scientific Buddha has served his purpose, Lopez argues. It is now time for him to pass into nirvana. This is not to say, however, that the teachings of the ancient Buddha must be dismissed as mere cultural artifacts. They continue to present a meaningful challenge, even to our modern world. (shrink)

In contrast to individualistic explanations of social injustice that appeal to implicit attitudes, structural explanations are unintuitive: they appeal to entities that lack clear ontological status, and the explanatory mechanism is similarly unclear. This makes structural explanations unappealing. The present work proposes a structural explanation of one type of injustice that happens in conversations, discursive injustice. This proposal meets two goals. First, it satisfactorily accounts for the specific features of this particular kind of injustice; and second, it articulates a structural (...) explanation that overcomes their unattractiveness. The main idea is that discursive injustice is not the result of biased interlocutors, but of problematic discursive norms. (shrink)

According to Michael Thompson’s defence of neo-Aristotelian naturalism in meta-ethics, (i) ‘[t]he concept LIFE-FORM is a pure or a priori, perhaps a logical, concept’, and (ii) ‘[t]he concept HUMAN, as we human beings have it, is an a priori concept’ (p. 57). Here I show Thompson’s argument for (ii) to be unsound, hoping thereby to shed light on the neglected subject of the a prioricity of concepts more generally.

Seeing total darkness is a peculiar perceptual state: in it, the subject is visually aware of something while seeming to fail to be aware of anything. Recent treatments of the topic (Sorensen 2008, Soteriou 2000) leave this particular puzzle unsolved. Here, I attempt a solution. Following Dretske, I begin by suggesting that the perceptual report ‘S sees (total) darkness’ is ambiguous between two distinct kinds of perceptual states: epistemic and non-epistemic. This will lead to an examination of the metaphysics of (...) what is supposed to be seen. I show, on the one hand, the difficulty of reducing the perception of total darkness to the perception of a particular instantiation of a property, and on the other, that it has important similarities with the perception of (non-particular) ‘stuff’. I propose, finally, that the solution to the puzzle might involve postulating a novel ontological status for total darkness: that of a ‘concrete universal’. Potential implications of interest for particularism and for naïve realism are suggested. (shrink)

Technological development is accompanied by a paradox: while it often promises enormous benefits for humanity, it can also lead to inconceivable tragedy, including the instrumentalization of the individual, growing social inequality, environmental impact, etc. What causes this paradox? a) Could it be that the nature of technology generates this contradiction? b) Is it the agent that uses it? c) Or is it the circumstances in which technology is used that determine its suitability or disservice? My aim in this paper is (...) to revise nature, causes and political explanations of the paradox. To do so, the first section will give a historical overview of this phenomenon, the second will assess three proposals that attempt to explain its origin, and, finally, the paper will weigh such approaches from the view of the Frankfurt School. Evaluating the paradoxical conditions that surround technology allows us to better understand its role in our societies. (shrink)

El presente ensayo resume la crítica del filósofo Gilbert Simondon al antropocentrismo moderno y a las concepciones sobre la técnica desarrolladas en el siglo XX por ciertas corrientes filosóficas que provienen, según él, de lo que denomina un humanismo fácil, que circunscriben el desarrollo técnico a la racionalidad instrumental y a la distinción entre medios y fines. La propuesta de Simondon para salir del marco de estas visiones que considera reduccionistas, es ampliar nuestra mirada sobre la técnica, no centrarnos en (...) la relación entre medios y fines y adentrarnos en el conocimiento sobre los modos de existencia de los objetos técnicos. La mirada de Simondon nos invita a repensar nuestra relación con la técnica y, más allá incluso, a revisar nuestras concepciones ontológicas inclinándose por las que hoy conocemos como ontologías relacionales. La técnica para el filósofo francés es un puente entre nuestro pasado ritual y nuestra actualidad que persiste en la co-existencia de todos los seres, vivos y no vivos que conforman el tecno ecosistema. (shrink)

Hinge epistemology is a family of views that offers a novel approach to avoiding skeptical conclusions about the possibility of a posteriori justification of our empirical beliefs. They claim that at the basis of our empirical beliefs lie certain commitments whose rational status is not determined by our evidence. These are called hinge commitments. Prominent hinge epistemologists have claimed that hinge commitments are either rational or arational but yet not beliefs. I argue that such views are subject to decisive objections. (...) I then offer what I consider to be the best version of hinge epistemology. On this view, hinge commitments are best understood as arational beliefs that contingently inform our worldview. I call this view the Arational Beliefs View. (shrink)

Why does social injustice exist? What role, if any, do implicit biases play in the perpetuation of social inequalities? Individualistic approaches to these questions explain social injustice as the result of individuals’ preferences, beliefs, and choices. For example, they explain racial injustice as the result of individuals acting on racial stereotypes and prejudices. In contrast, structural approaches explain social injustice in terms of beyond-the-individual features, including laws, institutions, city layouts, and social norms. Often these two approaches are seen as competitors. (...) Framing them as competitors suggests that only one approach can win and that the loser offers worse explanations of injustice. In this essay, we explore each approach and compare them. Using implicit bias as an example, we argue that the relationship between individualistic and structural approaches is more complicated than it may first seem. Moreover, we contend that each approach has its place in analyses of injustice and raise the possibility that they can work together—synergistically—to produce deeper explanations of social injustice. If so, the approaches may be complementary, rather than competing. (shrink)

A long‐standing aim of cinema – in particular of ‘extreme’, ‘unwatchable’ or ‘feel‐ bad’ cinema – has been to acquaint viewers with extreme suffering. In this article I first offer an explication of that aim in terms of recent work in philosophy of mind, then exploit the resulting framework to examine claims to the effect that a new technological development, Virtual Reality, provides cinema's best shot at achieving that aim.

This paper’s main contention is that some basically methodological developments in science which are apparently distant and unrelated can be seen as part of a sequential story. Focusing on general inferential and epistemological matters, the paper links occurrences separated by both in time and space, by formal and representational issues rather than social or disciplinary links. It focuses on a few limited aspects of several cognitive practices in medical and biological contexts separated by geography, disciplines and decades, but connected by (...) long term transdisciplinary representational and inferential structures and constraints. The paper intends to show a given set of knowledge claims based on organizing statistically empirical data can be seen to have been underpinned by a previous, more familiar, and probably more natural, narrative handling of similar evidence. To achieve that this paper moves from medicine in France in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century to the second half of the nineteenth century in England among gentleman naturalists, following its subject: the shift from narrative depiction of hereditary transmission of physical peculiarities to posterior statistical articulations of the same phenomena. Some early defenders of heredity as an important causal presence in the understanding of life adopted singular narratives, in the form of case stories from medical and natural history traditions, to flesh out a special kind of causality peculiar to heredity. This work tries to reconstruct historically the rationale that drove the use of such narratives. It then shows that when this rationale was methodologically challenged, its basic narrative and probabilistic underpinings were transferred to the statistical quantificational tools that took their place. (shrink)

In Leibniz’s New Essays stands out, within many important topics, his doctrine of innate ideas, which supposes the division between sense knowledge and innate knowledge and implies the distinction between truths of reason and truths of fact. That doctrine is particularly relevant for Leibniz’s philosophy, but implicitly entails the epistemological difference between belief, on one hand, and certainty, on the other. In this paper I outline, according to my interpretation, how Leibniz explains that humans can have certainty about innate ideas. (...) This topic is important because if Leibniz demonstrates the possibility of having certainty of those ideas, then, it is feasible to believe in its existence. However, if his explanation is unsatisfactory his metaphysical doctrine would be seriously weakened and, at the same time, both skepticism and Locke’s empiricist doctrine would be reinforced. (shrink)

This article discusses the category of foreigner in the context of academia. In the first part I explore this category and its philosophical significance. A quick look at the literature reveals that this category needs more attention in analyses of dimensions of privilege and disadvantage. Foreignness has peculiarities that demarcate it from other categories of identity, and it intersects with them in complicated ways. Devoting more attention to it would enable addressing issues affecting foreigners in academia that go commonly unnoticed. (...) In the second part of the article I argue that current efforts to make academia a more inclusive environment should address the disadvantages that many foreign academics face. I focus on two senses of foreigner: working and living in a country that is not your country of origin, and being a nonnative speaker of the language in which you work. (shrink)

This article addresses the need to interpret Latin American philosophy from its narrative experience. To do this, we must grasp the reflective style of Latin America as a way of cultural configuration and as a symbol work of its own. In addition, to identify Latin American philosophy as a tactic to respond and resist the strategy of the European hegemonic power is essential. Finally, it is argued it is not possible to think of Latin American identity without practicing a political (...) ethic which transposes the figures of narratives with the figures of history to the justice demand situation in which we find ourselves. (shrink)

The authors present some remarks on Al- Farabi's reception and understanding of Platonic Dialogues, especially according to "The Philosophy of Plato". In this treatise, Al- Farabi intends to show how politics were meant to be the leitmotiv of Plato's writings. He also discusses the argumentative and cognitive relations that exist between Political Science, Philosophy and Religion. As the statesman is engaged in pedagogical functions, he is urged to have some discursive abilities —besides the speculative knowledge of the first principles— for (...) him to incite the multitude to act. (shrink)

In this note, my aim is to point out a phenomenon that has not received much attention; a phenomenon that, in my opinion, should not be overlooked in the professional practice of philosophy, especially within feminist efforts for social justice. I am referring to the way in which being a non-native speaker of English interacts with the practice of philosophy.1 There is evidence that non-native speakers are often perceived in prejudiced ways. Such prejudiced perception causes harm and, more importantly, constitutes (...) wrongdoing. As in other cases of prejudiced perception and biased behavior, it would be pretentious and misguided to expect philosophers and the philosophy profession to be free from this vice. There are good reasons to think that this prejudiced perception is bad not only for the persons who are perceived in such a way, but also for the profession, for it might make us miss important things that could improve philosophy in general. I claim we should be more sensitive to this phenomenon, both out of concern for justice, and for the sake of doing better philosophy. (shrink)

The activism we don’t appreciate: Your Honor Kent, my mother is a feminist and votes even if she doesn’t know she’s oppressed Resumen: Broncano mantiene que ocupar una situación de opresión no garantiza la lucidez necesaria para identificar la propia situación como injusta. Esta posición nos advierte que nos vamos a encontrar con casos de personas oprimidas que no tienen conocimiento sobre su situación de injusticia ni una actitud crítica hacia la misma. Lo que me interesa analizar en este comentario (...) es cómo afecta esto a la agencia política de esas personas. La conclusión que quiero evitar es la siguiente: Cuando no escuchamos a alguien que está oprimida pero que no conoce su situación de opresión, no la estamos traicionando como agente política, no la estamos silenciando como posible activista. En este comentario propongo un análisis de las quejas que nos permite escapar de esa conclusión. Las quejas de muchas mujeres han de entenderse como acción política, una acción política que no está necesariamente acompañada de conocimiento sobre la injusticia que sufren. Una vez entendemos sus quejas como activismo, ya no podemos excluir a estas mujeres como sujetos políticos en la lucha contra el sexismo. Este análisis de las quejas nos lleva a concluir que estas mujeres sí que pueden ser traicionadas como agentes políticas, aunque no tengan conocimiento de su situación de injusticia. Las traicionamos cuando no entendemos sus quejas como resistencia. Abstract: Broncano thinks that being oppressed does not guarantee knowing that you are oppressed. This view warns us that we are going to find people who are oppressed and who don’t have knowledge about their oppression nor a critical attitude towards their situation. What concerns me here is how this view affects the political agency of those people. The conclusion I want to avoid is as follows: When we don’t listen to someone who is oppressed but who doesn’t know their position as oppressed, we are not betraying them qua a political agent, we are not silencing them as a potential activist. I propose an analysis of complains that allows us to escape that conclusion. I propose that the complains expressed by many women should be understood as a political action, one that is not necessarily accompanied by knowledge of the injustice they are suffering. Once we see their complains as activism, we cannot exclude these women from the fight against sexism and deny their political agency. Under this analysis, women can be betrayed qua political agents even when they don’t have knowledge of their unjust situation. We betray them when we don’t understand their complains as resistance. Palabras clave: Conocimiento, agencia política, activismo, resistencia, quejas. Keywords: Knowledge, political agency, activism, resistance, complains. (shrink)