This work brings in both the original German and English translation of over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind of historical importance to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of Friedrich Waismann and dating from 1932-35, the majority are highly important dictations by Wittgenstein to Waismann, but also includes texts of redrafted material by Waismann closely based on the dictations. Many of these (...) texts become the ultimate sources of material on philosophy of language that constitutes the bulk of Waismann's book Logic, Sprache, Philosophy. The transcriptions throw light on the development of Wittgenstein's thought in this period and some of the topics are not covered in any of the existing publications of his writings, in particular his detailed attention to causal theories of meaning. They also contain texts covering psychological concepts such as expecting, intending and experience; these have no counterparts in Waismann's publications. (shrink)

The Voices of Wittgenstein brings for the first time, in both the original German and in English translation, over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. This text is of key historical importance to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of Friedrich Waismann and dating from 1932 to 1935, the majority are highly important dictations by Wittgenstein to Waismann. It also includes texts of (...) redrafted material by Waismann, closely based on these dictations. (shrink)

In this study Friedrich Waismann gives a systematic presentation of insights into philosophical problems which can be achieved by clarifying the language in which the problems are posed. Much of the material and the method itself derive from Wittgenstein's work in the early 30s. The book was originally envisaged as a lucid and well organized account of Wittgenstein's distinctive form of linguistic philosophy to enable the Vienna Circle to incorporate these valuable methods into their own programme of (...) analysis. The project evolved over many years into a wide-ranging survey of the dissolution of many philosophical problems and the construction of a systematic philosophical grammar. Waismann shows in detail how puzzlement can be removed by careful description of the uses of the terms employed in framing problems. At the same time, he sketches a general framework for analysis of language, including chapters on names, general terms, logical operators, propositions, questions, etc. This book is an authoritative presentation of Wittgenstein's influential philosophy of language in a format much easier to follow than his own intricate and elusive texts. Waismann exhibits clearly the merits of this method of philosophizing. This book should serve as an important and useful text for those who wish to understand the method and power of linguistic philosophy. It has no equal as an introduction to Wittgenstein's philosophy. (shrink)

Friedrich Waismann (1896–1959) was one of the most gifted students and collaborators of Moritz Schlick. Accepted as a discussion partner by Wittgenstein from 1927 on, he functioned as spokesman for the latter’s ideas in the Schlick Circle, until Wittgenstein’s contact with this most faithful interpreter was broken off in 1935 and not renewed when exile took Waismann to Cambridge. Nonetheless, at Oxford, where he went in 1939, and eventually became Reader in Philosophy of Mathematics (changing later (...) to Philosophy of Science), Waismann made important and independent contributions to analytic philosophy and philosophy of science (for example in relation to probability, causality and linguistic analysis). The full extent of these only became evident later when the larger (unpublished) part of his writings could be studied. His first posthumous work The Principles of Linguistic Philosophy (1965, 2nd edn.1997; German 1976) and his earlier Einführung in das mathematische Denken (1936) have recently proved of fresh interest to the scientific community. This late flowering and new understanding of Waismann’s position is connected with the fact that he somewhat unfairly fell under the shadow of Wittgenstein, his mentor and predecessor. Central to this book about a life and work familiar to few is unpublished and unknown works on causality and probability. These are commented on in this volume, which will also include a publication of new or previously scattered material and an overview of Waismann’s life. (shrink)

INTRODUCTION The present volume unites contributions by the leading figure of the Vienna Circle and by two of his closest assoCiates, contributions that deal with an area of thought represented, indeed, in this Collection but certainly not the central one in the common picture ofthe Circle's activities. It is no accident that an interest in ethics and the philosophy of action was particularly marked in what Neurath was apt to call the right wing of the Circle. For them, as for (...) Wittgenstein (the respected mentorofSchlickandWaismanninparticular),theadvancetobehoped for in philosophy consisted not solely in freeing natural science from a confused sense of dependence on speculative metaphysics but also in seeingthatotherareasoflanguageandaction hadto bethoughtaboutin theirownterms, whichwereneitherthoseofnaturalsciencenorthoseof philosophy as traditionally conceived. The scepticismofSchlick about theprogrammeofUnifiedSciencewaswellknown: EinheizwissenschaJt he called it, as it might be 'boozified science'. And in sober truth the programme sometimes masked a left-wing set of values taken (surely illogically) for granted, though the membersofthe Circle entertained a wide range ofpolitical views. Schlick's own contribution to the present volume is a section from thenotesforoneofhisfinal lectureseries,forsightofwhich wewarmly thanktheonlysurvivingcontributortoourvolume,DrJosephSchachter: Schlick'sgrandsonDra. M. H. vandeVeldehaskindlyconsentedtotheir publication. This section poses the problem we have outlined: there are questionsandaneedforclarificationinethics,butthesenomoredemand a metaphysical solution than does a similar situation in epistemology. Here, as in his earlier Problems of Ethics,l Schlick sets his face against thewholeprocess,mostobviousin Kant,ofmakingtheconceptofvalue absolute. One might say that for Schlick there is no unhypothetical imperative. (shrink)

[1] Tractatus logico-philosophicus. Tagebücher 1914-1916. Philosophische Untersuchungen. --3. Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis von Friedrich Waismann.--4. Philosophische Grammatik.--5. Das blaue Buch. Eine philosophische Betrachtung. Zettel.--6. Bemerkungen über die Grundlagen der Mathematik. --8. Bemerkungen über die Philosophie der Psychologie.

Abreviaturas das obras de Wittgenstein -- A Lecture on Ethics/Uma confer encia sobre Etica -- Excertos das Conversas com Friedrich Waismann e Moritz Schlick relativas a LE.

The physiologist and neo-Kantian philosopher Johannes von Kries (1853-1928) wrote one of the most philosophically important works on the foundation of probability after P.S. Laplace and before the First World War, his Principien der Wohrscheinlich-keitsrechnung (1886, repr. 1927). In this book, von Kries developed a highly original interpretation of probability, which maintains it to be both logical and objectively physical. After presenting his approach I shall pursue the influence it had on Ludwig Wittgenstein and Friedrich Waismann. It seems (...) that von Kries's approach had more potential than recognized in his time and that putting Waismann's and Wittgenstein's early work in a von Kries perspective is able to shed light on the notion of an elementary proposition. (shrink)

Friedrich Waismann, a little-known mathematician and onetime student of Wittgenstein's, provides answers to problems that vexed Wittgenstein in his attempt to explicate the foundations of mathematics through an analysis of its practice. Waismann argues in favor of mathematical intuition and the reality of infinity with a Wittgensteinian twist. Waismann's arguments lead toward an approach to the foundation of mathematics that takes into consideration the language and practice of experts.

En 1931, Schlick propose de considérer les lois de la nature non comme des propositions au sens strict mais comme des instructions ou des règles pour la formation d’assertions et de prédictions. « Je dois, ajoute-t-il, cette idée et cette terminologie à Wittgenstein. » Cette conception a été couramment considérée comme typiquement instrumentaliste . À partir d’une lecture minutieuse des textes contemporains de Wittgenstein et de Waismann, on montre que ces auteurs proposent non pas une théorie mais (...) une analyse de la grammaire des lois de la nature, laquelle est tout à fait compatible avec une attitude réaliste correctement comprise.In 1931, Schlick suggests that we should consider the laws of nature not as propositions in a narrow sense, but as prescriptions or rules for the making of assertions and predictions. He adds : « I owe this idea and terminology to Wittgenstein. » This view has been frequently considered as typically instrumentalist . Through a minutely detailed reading of contemporary texts by Wittgenstein and Wittgenstein, it is shown here that these authors suggest not a theory but an analysis of the grammar of the laws of nature, which is absolutely compatible with a realistic attitude, if correctly understood. (shrink)

Gregory Lavers gives us a timeline of Waismann’s career, an overview of Waismann’s most significant publications in this later period and a detailed walkthrough from the first to the last paper of Waismann’s series on analyticity, “Analytic - Synthetic”. Lavers closes his paper with comparisons of Waismann and Quine as well as Waismann and Carnap. Both Waismann and Quine argue that the concept of analyticity is vague and both reject reductionism. However, behind these superficial (...) similarities we find fundamentally different epistemologies. According to Lavers, the web of inferential relations, spanning from every experience to any item of scientific knowledge, that supports the outlook suggested by Quine, is rejected as manifestly wrong by Waismann. Conversely, Lavers shows that despite superficial contrasts between Waismann and Carnap—Waismann being interested in the subtleties of natural language, Carnap in replacing these through explication—the two do not really oppose each other’s’ views on analyticity and necessary truth. (shrink)

In 1929 Wittgenstein left Vienna for Cambridge, and Waismann grew into the role of spokesman for his absent hero. The story of his relation with the man so greatly esteemed by his much-admired mentor Schlick contains dramatic elements: there were moments of friction and of coldness, announcements of withdrawal from a shared project, accusations of plagiarism or, at least, insuffi cient acknowledgement. What we know of this story has been told by Brian McGuinness and Gordon Baker. If one (...) wishes to gauge the extent to which Waismann succeeded in fulfi lling his task as spokesman for Wittgenstein, one must start from the basic fact that between 1929 and 1936 the two men collaborated, trying to realize the common plan of producing a systematic exposition of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. (shrink)

It is commonly assumed that while Nietzsche’s intellectual influence significantly marked 20th century ‘continental’ philosophy, his sway over analytic philosophy was conspicuously minimal. To challenge this received view, this essay demonstrates that the reception of Nietzsche’s philosophy formed a space of dialogue among three founding figures of analytic philosophy: Schlick, Wittgenstein, and Waismann. A significant Nietzschean influence guided Schlick’s project of naturalising ethics. Schlick nonetheless maintained a critical attitude towards various aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy, such as his assertion (...) of the will to power. Despite their proximity, Wittgenstein’s understanding of several of Nietzsche’s views (under the influence of Spengler) deviated from Schlick’s more elaborate interpretation. Wittgenstein concurred with Schlick’s criticism of an absolute ‘ought’, despite his overall rejection of Schlick’s naturalisation of ethics. In Waismann’s articulation of his own view of the relation between ethics and science, we find an emphasis on an element that is common in Schlick and Wittgenstein, namely their rejection of the possibility of scientifically justifying moral claims. Waismann’s criticisms of Nietzsche’s ethics can thus be brought into dialogue with Schlick’s and Wittgenstein’s responses, especially in the case of the notion of eternal recurrence. (shrink)

In the Vienna Circle archives in Haarlem, NL, there are a great number of protocols connected with Moritz Schlick’s philosophical chair – manuscripts, typescripts and shorthand manuscripts. They contain extensive and detailed information about Schlick’s seminars and also about the elementary seminars, so-called proseminars, which were held, as the documents explain: “bei Prof. Schlick”, but actually after 1929 not by him. Since his arrival in Vienna, Schlick was responsible for these both types of seminars and they were under his supervision. (...) They are documented mainly by students. The different participants had the task of producing a handwritten report of the meeting, later also typescripts. It is not mentioned in the protocols who was responsible for the elementary seminars. The professor was the person who mattered. It is interesting to observe that while Schlick’s seminars mainly contained descriptions of chapters in philosophical books, the proseminars were more ambitious. (shrink)

This edited collection covers Friedrich Waismann's most influential contributions to twentieth-century philosophy of language: his concepts of open texture and language strata, his early criticism of verificationism and the analytic-synthetic distinction, as well as their significance for experimental and legal philosophy. -/- In addition, Waismann's original papers in ethics, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of mathematics are here evaluated. They introduce Waismann's theory of action along with his groundbreaking work on fiction, proper names and Kafka's Trial. -/- (...) Waismann is known as the voice of Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Vienna Circle. At the same time we find in his works a determined critic of logical positivism and ordinary language philosophy, who anticipated much later developments in the analytic tradition and devised his very own vision for its future. (shrink)

Waismann's Wittgenstein-influenced ‘How I see Philosophy’ presents a radical vision of philosophy. But its two most general themes—its stress on freedom and vision, and its emphasis on describing the grammar of our language—seem hard to reconcile. This paper elaborates four interrelated themes: 1) Waismann offers his conception of philosophy, not a delineation of the nature of philosophy. 2) His method is radically therapeutic. 3) He offers a diagnosis of the source of philosophical problems: unconscious analogies or conceptions. (...) 4) He advocates a particular form of therapy: offering alternative analogies or conceptions to individuals. Against this background the apparent paradox can be dissolved. (shrink)

Waismann’s writings can be divided into three periods. The fi rst corresponds to his early work in Vienna under the aegis of Schlick, thus mainly to his collaboration with Wittgenstein on the fi rst drafts of Logik, Sprache, Philosophie, out of which came not only the book itself many years later but also transcriptions of conversations with Schlick and Wittgenstein and numerous dictations reworked by Waismann, now published under the title The Voice of Wittgenstein. The (...) Vienna Circle. Waismann also did at that stage independent work, albeit largely infl uenced by Wittgenstein, on probability and identity. The second period runs roughly from the moment relations with Wittgenstein were severed – towards the end of 1934 – to his arrival in Oxford, where he started lecturing in Michaelmas Term 1939. (shrink)

The appearance in 1945 of the idea of the open texture of empirical concepts, which anticipated Friedrich Waismann’s thesis of a many-level-structure of language, led to a re-evaluation of “context”. It widens the sense of context that we are accustomed to mentioning as being Wittgenstein’s conception of meaning in his later philosophy. The new idea Waismann brought into the landscape is how to “clarify the context”, which is in a way a very non-Wittgensteinian question as well as (...) an “explanation of context”, where open texture plays a key role. But despite the amount of literature about open texture, this idea of Waismann is still not properly understood. Open texture must be situated as an obstacle to exhaustiveness of definition for internal reasons not only because of unforeseen conditions that could always arise in the future, but also by virtue of an a priori aspect of the texture of concepts. Thus, the main goal of this paper is to propose an interpretation of open texture as an immanent property of a concept, that is, as something that is underlying its nature. (shrink)

This paper presents a neglected philosophical approach, redevelops it on fresh empirical foundations, and seeks to bring out that it is of not merely historical interest. Building on ideas Ludwig Wittgenstein mooted in the early 1930s, Friedrich Waismann developed a distinctive metaphilosophy: Through case studies on particular philosophical problems, he identified a characteristic structure and genesis displayed by several philosophical problems and presented a distinctive dialogical method for dissolving problems of this kind. This method turns on exposing the (...) need to endow philosophical questions or claims with more determinate meaning and meeting this need by proposing linguistic rules and explanations which the problems’ proponents are free to accept or reject. The approach is embedded in the view that unconscious thought decisively shapes the formulation of philosophical problems. This paper first presents the approach on the basis of Waismann’s texts and then redevelops it through a case study on the ‘problem of perception’ and within a post-Freudian conception of unconscious thought: We will draw on psycholinguistic findings about automatic inferences in language comprehension and production, to examine how unconscious cognition shapes the problem formulation. Findings provide fresh, empirical foundations for the approach which has advantages over more familiar critical projects in ordinary language philosophy, to which it is kindred in spirit. (shrink)

A mysterious remark to Friedrich Waismann on 30 December 1929 marks the only occasion where Wittgenstein refers to both Heidegger and Kierkegaard. Yet although this has generated much controversy, little attention has been paid to the charge of nonsense that Wittgenstein here appears to bring against Heidegger; thus, the supporting argument that may be latent has not been unearthed. Through analysis of this remark, Wittgenstein's arguments in the Tractatus and 'A Lecture on Ethics', and Heidegger's account (...) of anxiety (Angst) in Being and Time, I argue that we can extract an argument against the central question of Heidegger's philosophy: the question of being. To understand this, I examine the Kierkegaardian ideas employed by Wittgenstein and Heidegger and attempt to show that this argument can be partly understood in Kierkegaardian terms. I further argue that examining what Heidegger means by 'being' (Sein) shows that Wittgenstein's argument does not meet its target. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é estruturar, em torno de uma única ideia fundamental, a saber, a de que não há atalhos pela lógica, os diversos comentários de Wittgenstein à época das conversas com Waismann e o círculo de Viena sobre o problema da consistência da aritmética. Observações notórias sobre as noções de consistência, trivialidade e negação na matemática são consideradas do ponto de vista dessa sistematização. Analisa-se também em que medida esses comentários correspondem a um desenvolvimento crítico (...) do pensamento do autor.ABSTRACT: This work aims at structuring, around a single fundamental idea, namely, that there are no shortcuts through logic, the various comments by Wittgenstein at the time of the conversations with Waismann and the Vienna circle on the problem of the consistency of arithmetic. Notable remarks on the notions of consistency, triviality and negation in mathematics are considered from the point of view of this systematization. It is also analyzed to what extent these comments correspond to a critical development of the author's thinking. (shrink)

Der Beitrag untersucht Wittensteins Stellungnahmen zu Nietzshe, die Thesen und Positionen, die er zu Recht oder zu Untrecht ihm zuschreibt, seine Auseinandersetzung mit ihnen und seine Einschätzung von Nietzsche historischer Bedeutung. An Zeugnissen einer direkten Lektüre fehlt es nicht, aber Wittgensteins Bild des Philosophen ist mindestens ebenso stark durch Autoren wie Spengler geprägt. Man hat "a troubling lack of reference to Nietzsche in Wittgenstein's texts and lectures" festellen wollen. Die eingehendere Prüfung des Materials führt zu einem ganz anderen Ergebris. (...) Es werden eine Reihe von Szenarien skizziert, deren Synopse über Nietzsches Bedeutung für Wittgenstein Aufschluss gibt. Die erste belegt Begegnung datiert von 1914: And der Front denkt er über Nietzsches "Feindschaft gegen das Christentum" nach: Dass er sich dabei auf den Antichrist bezieht, wie in der Wittgenstein-Forschung gegnerell angenommen, erweist sich als keineswegs sicher. In den dreißsiger Jahren wird ihm die 'Umwertung aller Werte" zu einer Formel zuerst für die geschichtlich Epoch und dann für seine eigene neue 'Gedankenbewegung'. Nietzsches Präsenz im Wiener Kreis, Wittgensteins zwiespältige Beziehung zu diesem und eine damalige Sicht auf den Zusammenhang zwischen den zwei Philosophien werden ausgehend von Waismanns Buch Logik, Sprach und Philosophie dargestellt. Zu Zarathustras Diktum "Seele ist nur ein Wort für ein Etwas am Leibe" hat Wittgenstein seit Eine philosophische Betrachtung wiederholt Stellung genommen. Der Begriff der Familienähnlichkeit und die Auseinandesetzung mit dem Wiederkunftsgedanken sind Gegenstand der letzen Abschnitte. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

Wittgenstein was not only an inspirational figure for Schlick but also contributed to scientific philosophy as Neurath demanded. His verificationism is one instance of this, but it is also shown in his treatment of probability (where his ideas were developed further by Waismann). Wittgenstein revived Bolzano's logical interpretation of probability, anticipating Carnap and many moderns. He construed laws of nature as hypotheses that we had to assume. It is the general form of these hypotheses (what he later (...) called a worldview) and not (pace von Wright) relative frequency that provides the basis for judgements of probability. (shrink)

_The Voices of Wittgenstein_ brings for the first time, in both the original German and in English translation, over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. This text is of key historical importance to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of Friedrich Waismann and dating from 1932 to 1935, the majority are highly important dictations by Wittgenstein to Waismann. It also includes texts of redrafted (...) material by Waismann, closely based on these dictations. (shrink)

_The Voices of Wittgenstein_ brings for the first time, in both the original German and in English translation, over one hundred short essays in philosophical logic and the philosophy of mind. This text is of key historical importance to understanding Wittgenstein's philosophical thought and development in the 1930's. Transcribed from the papers of Friedrich Waismann and dating from 1932 to 1935, the majority are highly important dictations by Wittgenstein to Waismann. It also includes texts of redrafted (...) material by Waismann, closely based on these dictations. (shrink)

In conversations with Schlick and Waismann from June and December 1930, Wittgenstein began to turn his attention to the topic of games. This topic also centrally concerned Schlick. In his earliest philosophical output, Schlick had relied on the results of evolutionary biology in setting out an account of the emergence of the human species’ ability to play [Spiel] as a prerequisite for the genesis of scientific knowledge. Throughout his subsequent works one finds fragmentary appeals to this early view, (...) e.g. in his oft misunderstood claim that play constitutes the meaning of life. Wittgenstein’s turn to the topic of games in 1930 not only happened while Professor Schlick was in the room, but was also coupled with an explicit response to Schlick’s 1930 book Fragen der Ethik. Schlick here employs the example of chess to distinguish between rules and their application – a distinction which underlies his whole attempt to naturalise ethics as a descriptive psycho-sociological discipline. This paper investigates the relation between Wittgenstein’s and Schlick’s accounts of games in light of Wittgenstein’s criticisms of Schlick’s ethics. Wittgenstein’s objections can be answered by taking Schlick’s theory of play into consideration. (shrink)